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SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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COURSE TITLE: INTERNATIONAL RELATION IN EAST AND CENTRAL
AFRICA

**COURSE
GUIDE**

**INR 352
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EAST AND CENTRAL
AFRICA**

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INTRODUCTION

INR 352, International Relations in East and Central Africa is a two-credit unit course available for 300 level students in the International Relations programme. The course provides an opportunity for students to acquire a detailed knowledge and understanding of the Pattern of external relations in East and Central Africa. Such relations cover several areas. These involve the handling of ethnic crises at both internal and trans-border levels, which often surface in form of military mutinies and rebel movements. Also, the problem of refugees and declining economy is critical in the relations of states in this region with neighbouring and developed nations. In looking at the pattern of relations among states in these regions, specialists in international relations have engaged in analysis of ethnic crises, crisis management, refugee problem, the role of international organisations and the level of involvement of external forces.

COURSE AIMS

The aims of this course are to:

- i. explicate the concept of International relations especially in East and Central Africa
- ii. present an overview of the pattern of relations in the above regions
- iii. identify the parties involved in the relationship
- iv. understand why crises continue to persist in East and Central Africa culminating to various instances of genocide.
- v. apply our discussions to the situation in other regions in Africa and other continents in the world.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this course are to:

- explain the pattern of relations among the nations in east and central Africa in particular and other regions in the world in general
- differentiate between ethnic identities and individual interest in power consolidation
- identify the various forces behind the crises and their role in exacerbating the crises
- describe various approaches at mitigating the effect of the crises
- apply these approaches to other crises situations in international affairs

- identify and discuss types of international relief agencies
- elucidate the major roles played by these agencies in rendering humanitarian services and controlling the crises.

WORKING THROUGH THE COURSE

I would advise you to carefully study each unit, beginning with this *Course Guide*, especially since this course provides an opportunity for you to understand the pattern of relations among nations in East and Central African regions. Also make a habit of noting down any question you have for tutorials. In addition, try your hand at formulating or identifying theories relevant to, and that can be applied to international affairs.

COURSE MATERIALS

1. Course Guide
2. Study units
3. Textbooks
4. Assignment file
5. Presentation schedule.

STUDY UNITS

There are three modules of five units each in this course. Some units may be longer and/or more in depth than others, depending on the scope of the course that is in focus. The three modules in the course are as follows:

Module 1 Foreign Policy Making

- Unit 1 Foreign Policy Making in Central Africa
- Unit 2 The Logic of Foreign Policy Making in Central Africa
- Unit 3 The Changing Foreign Policy Making Context
- Unit 4 Elements of Foreign Policy Making in the Great Lakes Region
- Unit 5 The 1996 Watershed

Module 2 Cases of External Relations Africa

- Unit 1 Kenya's External Relations
- Unit 2 Tanzania's External Relations
- Unit 3 Uganda's External Relations
- Unit 4 Rwanda's External Relations
- Unit 5 Burundi's External Relations

Module 3 Ethnic Crises in East and Central Africa

Unit 1	Background to Ethnic Relations in East and Central Africa
Unit 2	Ethnic Violence
Unit 3	External Influence
Unit 4	The Role of United Nations
Unit 5	Refugee Problems

Each module is preceded with a listing of the units contained in it, and a table of contents. An introduction, a list of objectives and the main content in turn precedes each unit, including Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs). At the end of each unit, you will find one or more Tutor-Marked Assignment (TMA) which you are expected to work on and submit for marking.

TEXTBOOKS AND REFERENCES

At the end of each unit, you will find a list of relevant reference materials which you may yourself wish to consult as the need arises, even though I have made efforts to provide you with the most important information you need to pass this course. However, I would encourage you, as a third year student to cultivate the habit of consulting as many relevant materials as you are able to within the time available to you. In particular, make sure you consult whatever material you are advised to consult before attempting any exercise.

ASSESSMENT

Two types of assessment are involved in the course: the Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs), and the Tutor-Marked Assignment (TMA) questions. Your answers to the SAEs are not meant to be submitted, but they are also important since they give you an opportunity to assess your own understanding of course content. TMA on the other hand are to be carefully answered and kept in your assignment file for submission and marking. This will count for 30% of your total score in the course.

FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING

The final examination for INR 352 will take three hours and carry 70% of the total course grade. The examination questions will reflect the SAEs and TMAs that you have already worked on. I advise you to spend the time between your completion of the last unit and the examination revising the entire course. You will certainly find it helpful to also review both your SAEs and TMAs before the examination.

COURSE MARKING SCHEME

The following table sets out how the actual course marking is broken down.

Assessment	Marks
Four assignments (the best four of all the assignments submitted for marking).	Four assignments, each marked out of 10%, but highest three scores will be selected, thus totalling 30%
	70% of overall course score.
Final Examination	100% of course score
Total	

COURSE OVERVIEW PRESENTATION SCHEME

Units	Title of Work	Week Activity	Assignment (End-of-Unit)
Course Guide			
Module 1	Foreign policy Making		
Unit 1	Foreign Policy Making in Central and East Africa	Week 1	Assignment
Unit 2	The Logic of Foreign Policy Making in Central and East Africa	Week 2	Assignment
Unit 3	The Changing Foreign Policy Making Context	Week 3	Assignment
Unit 4	Elements of Foreign Policy Making in the Great Lakes Region	Week 4	Assignments
Unit 5	The 1996 Watershed	Week 5	Assignments
Module 2	Cases of External Relations		
Unit 1	Kenya’s External Relations	Week 6	Assignment
Unit 2	Tanzania’s External Relations	Week 7	1 Assignment
Unit 3	Uganda’s External Relations	Week 8	1 Assignment
Unit 4	Rwanda’s External Relations	Week 9	1 Assignment
Unit 5	Burundi’s External Relations	Week 10	1 TMA 2 to be submitted

Units	Title of Work	Week Activity	Assignment (End-of-Unit)
Module 3	Ethnic Crises		
Unit 1	Background to Ethnic Relations in East and Central Africa	Week 11	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Ethnic Violence	Week 12	Assignment 1
Unit 3	External Influence	Week 13	Assignment 1
Unit 4	The Role of United Nations	Week 14	Assignment 1
Unit 5	Refugee problems	Week 15	TMA 3 to be submitted
	Revision	Week 16	
	Examination	Week 17	
	Total	17 Weeks	

WHAT YOU WILL LEARN IN THIS COURSE

International Relations in East and Central Africa provides you with the opportunity to gain mastery and an in-depth understanding of patterns of external relations of states in East and Central Africa. The first module provides you with an understanding of the foreign policy decision that informs the pattern of such external relations, which differentiate group interest from personal interest of individuals in position of authority. The second module dwells on practical cases of external relations of selected states in East and Central Africa where various aspects of such relations have been discussed. The third module will introduce you to ethnic relations and the crises that have erupted in the course of such relations; it will also discuss other issues like refugee problems and the role of international organisations. Overall, the course posits that unabated ethnic crises in East and Central Africa does not rest on ethnic factors alone as the major causes of these crises are externally induced.

TUTORS AND TUTORIALS

There are 15 hours of tutorials provided in support of the course. You will be notified of the dates and location of these tutorials, together with the name and phone number of your tutor as soon as you are allocated a tutorial group. Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, and keep a close watch on your progress. Be sure to send in your TMAs

promptly, and feel free to contact your tutor in case of any difficulty with your SAE, TMA or the grading of an assignment. In any case, I advise you to attend the tutorials regularly and punctually. Always take a list of such prepared questions to the tutorials and participate actively in the discussions.

CONCLUSION

All the features of this course guide have been designed to facilitate your learning in order that you achieve the aims and objectives of the course. They include the aims and objectives, course summary, course overview, SAEs and TMAs. You should ensure that you make maximum use of them in your study to achieve results.

SUMMARY

INR 352, International Relations in East and Central Africa provides a theoretical foundation upon which you will develop mastery in international relations in East and Central Africa. It is aimed at equipping you with analytical skills for the understanding the pattern of external relations in East and Central Africa. Relations among these nations and with developed nations cover a variety of issues. Some of the areas of concern are measures of averting regime change, ethnic domination, and mutual assistance in managing human miseries accompanying ethnic crisis. Upon completing this course you should be able to explain the various patterns examined in defining international relations in East and Central Africa, including their weaknesses and strengths. You will also be able to apply these approaches to other international phenomena. This course assumes a prior knowledge of International Relations, which you would have taken at the first year.

I wish you success and hope you will find the course both interesting and useful.

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COURSE**

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MODULE 1 FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

- Unit 1 Foreign Policy Making in Central Africa
- Unit 2 The Logic of Foreign Policy Making in Central Africa
- Unit 3 The Changing Foreign Policy Making Context in Central Africa
- Unit 4 Elements of Foreign Policy Making in the Great Lake Region
- Unit 5 1996 Watershed in Foreign Policy Making

UNIT 1 FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN CENTRAL AFRICA

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- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main content
 - 3.1 The Imperative of Regime Security in a New Context
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 - 3.5 Need for State Building
 - 3.6 Ethnic and Regional Favoritism
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor – Marked Assignment
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy outlines the vital areas which a nation intends to explore in its relations with the outside world. These areas are chosen on the basis of a number of factors. This unit will introduce you to some of the determinant factors of foreign policy in East and Central Africa. Among the factors are the imperative of regime security in a new context, the domestic imperative, the external imperative, implication on the political economy, ethnic or ethno-regional identity, need for state building and ethnic and regional favouritism.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h discuss the imperative of regime security in a new context
- h explain the domestic imperative of foreign policy in East and Central Africa
- h discuss the external imperative of foreign policy in East and Central Africa
- h examine the implication of foreign policy on the political economy
- h mention the ethnic or ethno regional identity and its impact on foreign policy.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Imperative of Regime Security in a New Context

Despite all the dramatic changes in African politics since the dawn of the Post – Cold War era, foreign policy making in Central and East Africa is marked more by continuity than change. As in the pre – 1989 period, the domestic needs of personalistic regimes continue to dominate the process of foreign policy decision making. In addition, this process of foreign policy making has been more constant in Central and East Africa than elsewhere because there has been less fundamental political change. What has changed in the new period is the context, both local and international, in which crucial decisions are made. The changes in the context of decision making have generated a new variety of foreign policies that are distinctive even though the processes and substantive goals have changed little (Clark, 2001).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Why does the domestic need of personalistic regimes continue to dominate the processes of foreign policy decision making in East and Central Africa?

3.2 The Domestic Imperative

Foreign policy making in Central and East Africa can most usefully be explained as a direct outgrowth of domestic political needs. The fundamental fact of political life that ensures continuity in the basic patterns of foreign policy making before and after the end of the Cold War is the preeminence of regime security. This imperative is the first priority of any government in the region, and it has driven, and continues to drive, both foreign and domestic policy. Moreover, regime

security has rarely been assured for most Central and East African states since independence. This assertion should not be uncritically accepted, but it can reasonably be argued. In one sense, the much – proclaimed stability of regimes in African states has been overstated; even in volatile Central and East Africa, many regimes of specific leaders lasted for at least a decade, and some for over thirty years. During the 1980s, rulers such as Omar Bongo (Gabon) Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), and Denis Sassou – Nguesso (Congo) seemed to be providing stable authoritarian rule in their countries.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain the domestic imperative of foreign policy decision making in East and Central Africa.

3.3 The External Imperative

In a deeper sense, however, all of these regimes were unstable no matter how long the rulers in question reigned. Angola of course, has since independence been continually wracked by civil war between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government forces and those of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The MPLA once depended for its survival on the presence of Cuban troops and Soviet Weapons and military advisers. Similarly, the regimes of Umar Bongo (Gabon) and André Kolingba (CAR) depended largely, though to a lesser extent, on the presence of French Military forces and bases to ensure their continuation in power (Gardinier, 1997). Although the Congo Republic, known as the People's Republic of Congo from 1970 to 1992, did not allow French bases on its territory, Sassou's government nonetheless availed itself of French paratroopers in putting down an attempted coup d'état in 1987. Sassou also relied on arms and advisers from Cuba and the Eastern bloc. The regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (the DRC) was likewise dependent on foreign support, notably from the United States and, towards the end, France. His regime was nearly overthrown twice by poorly planned and executed invasions from Angola in 1977 and 1978 (Young, 1978). As the reach of the state into society continually eroded beginning in the early 1980s, the social basis for Mobutu's regime, always weak was completely dissolved (Clark, 1997). There were attempted *coups d'état* in all five of these states during the 1980s and 1990s.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the external implication of foreign policy decision making in the East and Central African states.

3.4 Implication on the Political Economy

The politico-economic basis for all these regimes was the distribution of rents derived from natural resources extraction, although the Central African Republic (CAR) was handicapped in this regard compared to the others. Specifically, oil revenues have provided the economic basis for the regimes in Gabon, the Congo Republic, and Angola; copper, cobalt, and uranium revenues were a key basis in Zaire – Democratic Republic of Congo (Yates, 1996). These regimes co-opted potential political opponents by allowing them access to state resources. This neo-patrimonial strategy calmed down the political opposition without rooting the regimes deeply in society (Yong, 1976). Only the succession of regimes in CAR since independence has lacked a mineral basis for neo-partimonialism, which may explain why it was even less stable than the others. In any case, none of the regimes has rested on a meaningful social contract between the citizens and the state. Rather, the division between the elite, depending on economic rents on the one hand, and the urban lumpen proletariat and rural peasants on the other, widened in post-colonial times. In periods when favorable terms of trade for commodities have declined, these regimes have faltered. Thus none of the regimes gained a solid basis for stability even if individual rulers remained at the helm over many years.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine the political economy implication of foreign policy decision making in East and Central Africa.

3.5 Ethnic or Ethno-regional Identity

Another enormous source of regime instability for these five states has been ethnic or ethno regional identities and antagonisms.

For instance:

- h attempted *coup d'état*, as in the Congo Republic in 1987, have often been generated largely by ethnic jealousy of those in power.
- h the two invasions originating from Angola that shook Zaire in 1977 and 1978 and a pro-Shaba) regional identity basis (Young, 1976).

The counterpart of this phenomenon is that all these regimes have relied more or less explicitly on the loyalty of ethnic or regional constituencies to keep them in power. The most typical pattern was for personal rulers to rely heavily on kinsmen or co-ethnics at the centres of power, often in informal positions, while publicly enunciating policies of ethnic and regional equity. By appointing cabinet members with the widest possible ethnic and regional representations, these rulers sought to superficially uphold the principle of regional equity. These cabinet members typically enjoyed considerable access to state resources but virtually no real power, which was exercised by loyalists in the presidential circle and in elite presidential guards or special military forces (Clark, 1995). Sometimes these rulers have consciously sought to create or reinforce regional identities to support them, as has President Bongo with regard to the Haut – Ogooué region in Gabon (Ayoob, 1998).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention two instances of the ethnic or ethno-regional identities of foreign policy decision making in east and central Africa.

3.6 Need for State Building

To the extent that any of their regimes was ever secure, these states have engaged in the more ambitious programmes of state building. This imperative, like that of regime security, is another key to understanding foreign policy making in the region. One of the most compelling recent theories of international relations has stressed the importance of state building as a critical determinant of foreign policy everywhere in the developing world. In central Africa, such a project could be undertaken only when regime security could be taken for granted, which was not often. In times of crisis, moreover, actions destructive to the state were often necessary to keep specific rulers in power. For instance, when the Congo Republic's Sassou faced challenge from opposition forces in late 1990 and early 1991, he quickly recruited some 5,000 new members for Congo; however Congo already had a bloated civil service. This initiative was designed to buy the President support in urban areas, though its longer – term effect was to undermine the country's already fragile state finances. In Zaire, Mobutu attempted to stir up ethnic antagonisms in the Shaba and Kivu regions during 1992 – 1994, and again during 1996, as a tactic to divide political forces opposing him and divert the country's attention from the political stalemate in Kinshasa. These actions weakened the power on the state in society while serving to temporarily divide the forces opposing Mobutu. Indeed, by the early 1990s Mobutu had long abandoned any dreams of

developing the Zairian state or economy and was merely seeking to cling to power.

Despite these examples, state building was just as frequently the long – term result of regime maintenance. To the extent that states prospered and ethno regional antagonism was diverted into other political outlets, threats to regime security diminished. For these reasons, some fraction of the income generated from natural resources was devoted to social development. After all, an environment of declining standards of social welfare has often provided support and justification for coups d'état.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

State why the need for state building is considered one of the determinant factors of foreign policy decision-making in east and central Africa.

3.7 Ethnic and Regional Favoritism

Another common justification has been blatant ethnic or regional favoritism on the parts of regimes in power. This explains why African leaders really have sought to create a national (statewide) political consciousness; an example is Mobutu's programmes of authenticity in the 1970s. Mobutu's policies such as renaming the country and ordering the return to the use of indigenous African names for persons and places were aimed at creating such a consciousness, and they did so with some success as even Mobutu's critics have acknowledged. The Marxist Leninist rhetoric used in the Congo Republic and Angola represented a parallel effort to replace local loyalists with a trans-regional, trans-ethnic ideological consciousness. These needs explain the apparent paradox of personal rulers who rely on their kinsmen to occupy the most important security positions while simultaneously appealing for national unity. Whereas such domestic concerns in Central and East African politics are undeniable, their influence on foreign policy is less apparent. This is because Central and East Africa do not have the consensus that exists in the West, where regime security can be taken for granted and there are long histories of national integration. Most ordinary Congolese, for instance, resent external (Rwandan and Ugandan) interference in their country's affairs. Opposition parties in most of Central and East Africa would readily accept the military assistance of outsiders to gain and retain power. The first priority of leaders of these states, as with those of early modern European states, has to be the taming of internal challengers for power (Callaghy, 1984).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain why ethnic and regional favoritism is a factor in foreign policy decision making in East and Central Africa.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have stated that foreign policy making in East and Central Africa involves a number of issues which bothers on internal, external and ethnic factors. We have identified the role of personalised regimes in foreign policy making in East and Central Africa.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit has dealt with the imperative of regime security in a new context, the domestic imperative, the external imperative, implication on the political economy, ethnic or ethno regional identity, need for state building and ethnic and regional favoritism in East and Central Africa.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Discuss the imperative of regime security in a new context in East and Central Africa.
- ii. What is the implication of foreign policy decision in East and Central Africa on their political economy?
- iii. Mention and examine the factors responsible for regional favoritism in the foreign policy of East and Central Africa.

7.0 REFERENCES /FURTHER READING

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UNIT 2 THE LOGIC OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN CENTRAL AFRICA

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- 2.0 Objectives
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 - 3.1 Failure of Foreign Policy Models to Explain Decision in Africa
 - 3.2 Foreign Policy Processes
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- 5.0 Summary
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The making of Foreign policy is generally characterised by some established logics. In Central Africa, the universal logic believed to be the yardstick for foreign policy decision widely used by developed nations does not appear to work effectively. In this unit, we are going to look at the following: the failure of foreign policy models to explain decision in Africa, foreign policy processes, foreign policy goals and the logic of counter intervention.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h describe how the western model of foreign policy has failed to explain decisions in Africa
- h explain foreign policy processes
- h state foreign policy goals
- h examine the concept of counter intervention.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Failure of Foreign Policy Model to Explain Decision in Africa

This section helps us to understand why most common foreign policy models designed to explain decision making in developed states are inadequate to explain the decisions in African states. Among the models adopted in the study of foreign policy making in developed states, none has been as useful and popular as that of Graham Allison, Originally outlined in 1969 (Allison, 1969). The utility of Allison's two models, those of bureaucratic politics and organisational process, are of minimal value for Central African States because of the limited role of bureaucratic agencies in foreign policy making. The various Marxist, quasi – Marxist, and business conflict approaches are also limited in their explanatory powers because there is not real bourgeoisie in Central and East Africa (Cox, 1996). The elite class that has emerged is the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which does sometimes have distinct interest, including foreign policy interest. Yet there is little evidence that such a class, even if it is influential, has gained control over the typical African state.

How, then, can one try to understand how foreign policy is made in central and East Africa? Among Western – based models, the rational actor model, which served as Allison's new straw man, seems to have the most relevance if the regime interests are substituted for national interests. Most foreign policies have resulted from the decisions of presidentialist rulers, influenced by a few close advisers, who seek to implement foreign polices to preserve their regimes. Those rulers who do not devote their primary efforts to regime maintenance are not likely to remain in power for long. Past leaders in Central and East Africa such as Jean – Bedel Bokassa and Mobutu Sese Seko, sought to preserve their power using every conceivable method. But when they got distracted from the overall goal of regime maintenance, their rule was jeopardised, as Bokassa's example illustrates. Although bureaucratic agencies and other sectors of society try to have an impact on foreign policy making, their role is circumscribed by the personalised nature of power. It is only when public protests by middle classes threaten the survival of these rulers that some of them make foreign policy decisions (such as mortgaging future oil revenues with Western Companies) to keep them quiescent.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Why did foreign policy models fail to explain decision in Africa?

3.2 Foreign Policy Processes

If foreign policy decisions preserve personal regimes, what are the processes that determine these decisions?

First, personal ties among leaders are likely to exercise an unusually high degree of influence over foreign policy decisions. Although personal ties are hardly insignificant among Western leaders, as the Reagan–Thatcher or Clinton – Blair relationships demonstrate, the importance of such ties between leaders of the developed states is limited by well – established institutional linkages and the perception of overlapping national interests. The bases for strong personal ties between the different Central African leaders have been varied. Simply serving in power together over long periods of time has been the source of many personal ties in the region. For instance, although many African leaders disdained Mobutu, he eventually gained acceptance from his neighbours. Angola’s Eduardo dos Santos accepted Mobutu as a mediator in the Angolan Civil War in the late 1980s eve after UNITA had military bases on Zairian Territory. Congo’s Sassou and Angola’s dos Santos have a long – standing personal relationship that was partly cemented in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when their shared reliance on Marxist – Leninist symbols to maintain their dictatorships gave them a natural bond. Other sources of personal amity are much less visible to the political scientist seeking rational explanations for every relationship but are important nonetheless. In this category, the bonds of Masonry Lodges are a perhaps surprising source of both amity, between leaders such as Bongo, Sassou, and conflict: rivalry between lodges pitted former Congolese president Pascal Lissouba against Sassou. Another important tie between Bongo and Sassou is the fact that Bongo married Sassou’s daughter, Edith, in 1990.

The second major process determinant of foreign policy is ethnic considerations. Just as rules have depended on ethnic ties at home, so they have sought support from ethnic groups abroad. Ethnic considerations in fact, are often yet another source of personal fealty and collaborations between leaders. In the early independence period, the good personal relations between the Congo Republic’s president, Fulbert Youlou, and the DRC’s president, Joseph Kasavubu, were sometimes attributed to their shared Bakongo ethnicity and the rough congruence of ideologies. Yet ethnicity is important not only because of the personal relations that it may affect: any Mukongo leader in Brazzaville, Kinshasa, or Luanda would immediately take into account the natural allies that he would have in the neighboring countries among his Congo kinsmen. When rulers come from small ethnic groups, they often try to build larger constituencies on fabricated regional identities.

When the ethno-regional bases of support for different rulers overlap, they have a natural basis for international collaboration.

The collaboration of Gabon's Bongo and the Congo Republic's Lissouba is instructive in this regard. Bongo is a member of Téké, who represent only a tiny percentage of Gabon's population, but a substantial portion of them live in the Congo Republic; Lissouba belongs to the Nzabi people, who, similarly, represent a tiny percentage of Congo's population but constitute a substantial portion of the Gabonese population. During the early 1990s, Bongo sought to build a regional coalition of ethnic forces that lumped the Téké with Gabon's Nzabi, whereas Lissouba tried to build a regional coalition that linked the Nzabi with the larger Téké group in Congo. By expressing political support for each other, these presidents strengthened the fragile ethno-regional blocs of support that they sought to hold together in their own countries: The alliance gave Lissouba support among Congo's Téké and Bongo support among Gabon Nzabi. This collaboration endured until Bongo was forced to abandon his colleagues during the Congo Republic's civil war.

Finally, along the same personal lines, Mobutu supported Junéal Habyarimana in Rwanda during the Civil War and, after the latter's defeat, allowed the rump of Habyarimana's Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR) to organise in the refugee camps on the border with Rwanda between 1994 and 1996. These forces provided military support to Mobutu during the civil war of 1996 – 1997 until they were routed by a combination of Rwandan army soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and local Tutsi (Banyamulenge) militias from within Zaire. Mobutu's support for Habyarimana during the war reflected the deep personal relationship between the two leaders, which had developed over many years. After Habyarimana's death and the emergence of the RPF to power in Rwanda, Mobutu failed to disarm the ex – FAR militia and tried to expel indigenous Zairian Tutsi from their homes.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain foreign policy processes in East and Central Africa.

1.3 Foreign Policy Goals

A major question this section intends to answer is what are the most substantive needs of the foreign policy makers? Substantive needs can be divided into two: those emanating from the extra-regional world and those within the region.

From the larger world, rulers seek to secure arms, military training, and foreign aid. Arms support provides physical protection for presidential leaders, and economic assistance provides patronage to fend off regime opponents. The conservative former French colonies, Gabon and the CAR, sought such support primarily from France, both with good results. Zaire under Mobutu sought security assistance from the United States of America, China, and France, duping each into believing that its interests corresponded with his own regime security needs. In the 1970s and 1980s, Congo and Angola played the Marxist card, acquiring large amounts of arms from the eastern bloc. All these states receive significant amounts of economic aid from the international financial institutions (IFIs) and, in Angola's case, from individual bilateral partners. From the 1960s through the 1980s, there was one major contradiction in receiving foreign arms and economic aid. Since foreign aid undermined the nationalist credentials of regimes in power, it was both a threat to immediate regime security and a subversion of the state – building goals that leaders sometimes pursued. Thus Mobutu, in his most nationalist phase in the 1970s, liked to emphasize his regime's links with China while downplaying those with the United States and France; likewise, Sassou relied on French Military – training assistance while trumpeting the utility of Eastern bloc cooperation. As a result of this contradiction, central African leaders have frequently denied their dependence on Western military aid. For instance, several regimes have been silent on Israeli's assistance in training their praetorian guards. Leaders in the region have sought the goodwill of their immediate neighbours, hoping to dissuade them from directly intervening in their affairs. In the absence of such direct intervention, there are always expectations that neighbours will not allow opponents to mobilise from their territory or provide material aid to political opponents. At the maximum, they also expect neighbours to cooperate in ejecting armed opponents from their territory.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the concerns for cooperation in ejecting armed opponents were prominent in the foreign policy thinking of the leaders of Angola, Congo, and Zaire. For a long time, UNITA, the primary opponent of Angola's MPLA regime, operated from Zairian territory with Mobutu's explicit support. Angola, in turn, sometimes allowed opponents of Mobutu to organise on its territory, including the forces that invaded Zaire in 1977 and again in 1978. Less well known, but falling in the same category, was the mutual hostility between Congo and Zaire from the mid-1960s through the 1980s, and the mutual sponsoring of opposition groups in each country. For instance, in 1970 a coup attempted against Congolese president Marien Ngouabi was mounted from Zairian territory (Decalo, 1996). Finally, both Congolese have also allowed forces seeking the independence of the Angolan region of Cabinda to operate from their territory. Such policies represent

perhaps the most serious and immediate threat to regime security and, in the case of those seeking Cabindan independence, to the territorial integrity of Central Africa states. Thus, the region's rulers have seen containment of these threats as their very highest priority.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

State the foreign policy goals in East and Central Africa.

3.4 Counter Intervention

When negotiations fail to secure the goodwill of neighboring states, counter intervention to bring more cooperative governments to power is the logical next step. The recent behavior of Angola's MPLA government illustrates the point. First, during the 1996 – 1997 Civil War in the DRC, Angola intervened on Kabila's side, along with Rwanda and Uganda, to help him gain power. Then, during the 1997 civil war in the Congo Republic, Angola intervened decisively to end the stalemate in that country between the rival militias of President Lissouba and former president Sassou, essentially putting Sassou back in power. The first instance of intervention stemmed from the fact that UNITA rebels had been operating from Zairian territory for over twenty years and that Mobutu had either turned a blind eye or even encouraged their activities. Hence, dos Santos and his MPLA colleagues must certainly have hoped that Kabila would repay for favor by expelling UNITA from its territory. The Angolan government tried to help Laurent Kabila for the same reasons – to deprive UNITA of bases on contiguous territory.

The intervention of the Angolan army in the civil war in the Congo Republic in October 1997 may be attributed essentially to the same reason: the desire of the Angolan government to relieve UNITA of bases on the soil of neighboring countries (Clark, 1998). President Lissouba, perhaps in a misguided effort to win French favor, allowed UNITA to move its headquarters to the Congolese city of Pointe Noire after its expulsion from the former Zaire. Subsequently, flows of arms from Europe were dispatched to UNITA via Pointe Noire and into Angola. Moreover, Lissouba allowed armed groups fighting for the independence of the Angolan enclave of Cabinda; the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda (ELEC), to use Congolese territory. Previous Congolese governments had collaborated much more fully with Angolan authorities to try to suppress such groups. Finally, there was the long personal friendship that existed between two old comrades in arms, dos Santos and Sassou – Nguesso. During the Cold War period, Marxist Congo had been a constant friend to the MPLA regime in Luanda, allowing Congolese territory to serve as a rear base for the flow

of Cuban troops and Soviet arms into Angola. After they rose to power, dos Santos and Sassou worked together against South Africa and shared an anti – imperialist stand on many world issues. Although the ideological basis for their relationship had long evaporated by 1997, the personal friendship remained.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine the concept of counter intervention in the foreign policy of East and Central Africa.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have mentioned the logic behind foreign policy decision making in East and Central African where the foreign policy processes and goals are considered in line with such logics. This unit is very important for understanding the foreign policy processes of Central Africa. We have argued that most foreign policy models adopted in the study of foreign policy making in the developed world cannot capture the mosaic in Central Africa. We also identified two type of foreign policy goals within the region; extra-regional base and regional base.

5.0 SUMMARY

Earlier, we have mentioned that the main thrust of this unit is to look at the logic of foreign policy making in Central Africa. This unit therefore, offers us an insight into foreign policies models, processes and goals in Central Africa.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. List and explain the foreign policy processes.
- ii. Mention the foreign policy goals of Central Africa.
- iii. State and explain the logic of counter intervention in East and Central African foreign policy.

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UNIT 3 THE CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY MAKING CONTEXT

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main content
 - 3.1 Fading Usage of Old Paradigms
 - 3.2 The Emergence of Democratic Culture
 - 3.3 The Prevalence of Intraregional and Extraregional Rivalries
 - 3.4 The France Factor
 - 3.5 The Constraints of the Non – Intervention Norm and International Politics
 - 3.6 Increasing Ties with Southern Africa
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor – Marked Assignment
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Certain trends in foreign policy making in the East and Central Africa have made the concept of foreign policy to be dynamic. Thus, foreign policy making in this region does not fit into the framework of the prevalence paradigms. In this unit, we will look at the following: the fading usage of old paradigms; the emergence of democratic culture; the prevalence of intraregional and extra-regional rivalries, the France factor, constraints of the non – intervention norm and international politics, and the increasing ties with southern Africa

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h explain the fading usage of old paradigms in foreign policy decisions in East and Central Africa
- h examine the emergence of democratic culture in East and Central Africa
- h discuss the intra-regional and extra - regional rivalries in the region
- h explain the role of France in East and Central Africa
- h state the constraints of the non–intervention norm in international politics

- h examine the impact of the increasing ties with southern Africa on the region.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Fading Usage of Old Paradigms

Some scholars have argued that recent events have rendered the old paradigms of foreign policy making for states, based on the personal predilections of leaders, obsolete. In the central and east Africa, although the context has changed significantly, the basic priorities and means of foreign policy making have not. The changes in the context have led to new variations distinct to the era but based on the underlying characteristics of the Cold War era – a focus on regime survival, the dominance of big men and dependence on foreign actors.

Some of the changes include the recent wave of democratic transitions that swept across Africa between 1990 and 1994 and the end of the Cold War, which largely brought an end to superpower sponsorship of regimes in the region. Another important area of change is in France's support for regimes in the region, even though the nature of this change is complex and contested. At the beginning of the 1990s, France seemed to abandon its long – standing practice of supporting its regional clients, but its subsequent behavior proved that this was far from the case. Another change in France's behavior is that it has become more focused on the economic benefits accruing from its engagement with Francophone Africa. Some have also suggested an overall decline in the influence of France in Africa's affairs, represented most spectacularly by Paul Kagame's ascent to power in Rwanda in 1994. Finally, the erosion of norms that supported non- intervention has contributed to a new pattern of regionalised conflict and greater security links between Central and Eastern Africa. Yet, despite their significance for Central Africa, these changes have not affected the imperative of regime security for its rulers, and none of them has quite the effect on foreign policy that one might expect.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain why the usage of old paradigms of foreign policy has faded in East and Central Africa.

3.2 Emergence of Democratic Culture

Although there is an assumption that democratisation has weakened the prerogatives of the big men in foreign policy, as it has in other national policy contexts, there is no such trend in Central and East Africa, since

political change has not yielded liberal environments. Of the five countries, there was no regime change in Angola, Gabon, and Zaire – DRC as a result of the political openings of the early 1990s. Each of the three rulers stayed in power by a different, but equally effective, method: dos Santos allowed relatively free and fair elections, monitored by the UN, knowing that he stood to win; Bongo orchestrated fraudulent elections with the help of secret French security; and Mobutu divided the opposition and perpetually delayed the elections until he was overthrown. In Gabon, and Zaire, opposition forces did gain representation in the national assembly or (in Zaire's case) transitional parliament, but in neither case did these forces exercise significant influences over foreign policy.

In addition, one should not mistake regime transition, even by an election, for real democratisation. In the CAR and the Congo, there were regime transitions through elections, but neither of the elected regimes proved to be genuinely democratic in its methods and behaviour (Clark and Gardinier, (n.d)). Moreover, opposition forces were generally excluded from participation in cabinets, and opposition forces in parliament did not play any significant role in foreign policymaking. What is significant about the recent era of political reform, however, is that it has created a new internal context for foreign policy making. That is, it has rendered the regimes far more vulnerable than before to coup d'état or civilian overthrow. External powers and the International Financial Institutions (ITFs) have also made their continued assistance dependent on progress towards political reforms. More generally, external forces, public and private, are encouraging internal opposition forces to put pressure on the existing regimes to undertake political reforms. In addition, all five states came under severe economic pressures as their economy deteriorated and as oil and mineral prices on world markets plummeted. As a result, all these regimes became more desperate for external sources of aid and for gaining the goodwill of neighbors that could potentially support internal opposition forces. Overall, Central African states became more externally dependent on the IFIs and great powers than they had been before. More important, democratisation made them all more vulnerable and sensitive to physical attacks emanating from neighboring states.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine the consequences of the emergence of democratic culture on foreign policy in East and Central Africa.

3.3 The Prevalence of Intra-regional and Extra-regional Rivalries

Although the end of the Cold War has had an impact on Central Africa, it hardly ended intraregional rivalries or extra-regional intervention. The present political stalemates in Angola and the DRC reflect the same dynamic as the rivalries of the 1970s and 1980s, which were driven as much by personal and ethnic considerations as by ideological ones. Moreover, even though the Anglophone – Francophone rivalry has to some degree replaced the Soviet – U.S. rivalry in Francophone Africa, local rivalries are still able to find new external sponsors for their causes (Schraeder, 1998). United States and French oil companies are competing for influence in the three oil – producing states (as well as in Chad), and French and U.S. capital continues to compete for influence in the DRC, as it has for decades. In addition, France and the United States now find themselves on opposite sides of civil wars and international confrontations in the region. For instance, France continued to back the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda even beyond the death of Habyarimana in April 1994, whereas the United States was tacitly supportive of the RPF invasion, led by Kagame. France and the United States were similarly on opposite sides of the conflict that engulfed Zaire – DRC in 1996 – 1997.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the effects of the prevalence of intraregional and extra-regional rivalries on foreign policy in east and central Africa.

3.4 The France Factor

There are two important issues regarding changes in French regional influence. First, it is not clear that French political interests evaporated with France's setback in Rwanda in 1994. France remains the steady backer of Bongo in Gabon, and it maintained support for the regime of Ange – Félix Patassé in the Central African Republic during the mutinies in 1996 and 1997. Besides, several networks in French government and business circles supported the return to power of Denis Sassou – Nguesso in 1997, even if others remained loyal to Lissouba. Some analysts' saw Kabila's rise to power as a major reversal of French influence in the DRC because of the support from Rwanda and Uganda. When, however, Kagame and Yoweri Museveni turned against Kabila in August 1998, France saw an opening to reassert its influence in the region. Before he was assassinated in January, 2000, Kabila made overtures to France in an attempt to find external support. His successor, Joseph Kabila, has continued this trend.

There are three other cases of continuing French influence in the region. Although the Congo Republic's three nominally Marxist presidents, who ruled from 1969 to 1991, denounced France's neocolonial economic policies, they quietly cooperated with the French in return for economic and military aid. With the advent of multiparty politics in the Congo, there have been public demands for the new government to reduce this dependence on France, particularly in the oil sector. But when Lissouba attempted such a policy by trying to reduce the role of the local subsidiary of Elf – Aquitaine, France reduced aid and, more important, withdrew political support. As a result, Lissouba made the decision in 1994 to placate France by allowing it to maintain its privileged place in the Congolese oil industry and economy at large. Thereafter Lissouba followed an essentially pro-France course in foreign policy, supporting Mobutu's regime to the bitter end. This position led to an initial relationship of hostility between Lissouba and Kabila when the latter assumed power in May 1997.

The following month war broke out in the Congo Republic when Lissouba attempted to arrest former president Sassou, who was to have been a candidate for president in the elections scheduled for July 1997. France soon made it clear that it would do nothing to aid Lissouba militarily and took an officially neutral stance in the war. Lissouba was greatly puzzled and angered by the French position given that France had repeatedly supported the elected government in the Central African Region (CAR) in the face of army mutinies and that Lissouba had been elected in fair elections. When Lissouba went to France in August 1997, he was snubbed by the French government; Lissouba's supporters claimed that both the French government and private French capital interests were supporting Sassou's bid to retake power by force. In desperation, Lissouba soon abandoned his previous course and sought assistance from Kabila, then known to be anti-French. Specifically, Lissouba slowly distanced himself from the mediation that was taking place in Libreville, Gabon, which was dominated by pro-French leaders including Gabon's President, Bongo. At the time of one critical meeting in Libreville in August 1997, Lissouba instead flew to Kinshasa for talks with Kabila, who was outside the Libreville process. Lissouba's ultimate failure to enlist sustained support for his regime from outside meant that Angola's forces quickly tipped the balance to Sassou's favor when they intervened in October.

Foreign policy decision making in the CAR was similarly conditioned by the country's dependence on France. The new regime of Patassé, elected in September 1993 was rocked by army mutinies on three occasions – in April 1996, May, 1996, and again in January 1997. On each occasion, French troops already within the country were mobilised to engage the mutinous troops and clamp down any attempted *coup*

d'état, making Patassé directly dependent on direct French support. As a result, when Patassé learned that the French intended to close their two bases in the CAR, he retaliated by refusing to allow the French to dispatch planes at night from their bases, accusing them of aiding Sassou in the Congo's civil war. When France announced in July 1997 that it would close its military bases for economic reasons, Patassé vehemently denounced the decision and began to seek other external allies. He immediately aligned himself with Lissouba and Kabila, both of whom were completely hostile to France, and he even made overtures to the United States, offering that country the right to establish bases in the CAR. Fearing that he had lost his external protector, despite French reassurances that their defense treaty with the CAR remained intact, Patassé turned on his former patron and desperately sought new ones.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the France Factor in the East and Central African foreign policy.

3.5 The Constraint of Non – intervention Norm and the International Politics

Two recent trends in central Africa have gained salience in the post – Cold War Context. First, there has been an erosion of the shaky norm of non-intervention in the political affairs of neighbours. Although the practice of hosting and supporting groups hostile to neighboring regimes has existed since independence, the norm of non-intervention in the United Nations and OAU charters exercised significant restraint on the region's decision making before the 1990s. For instance, although Mobutu allowed Savimbi to move some of his operations from Namibia to Zaire in the late 1980s, he did not allow Zairian territory to become a full – scale launching pad for a major invasion of Angola. Much of the hosting of foreign forces intervening in neighboring states was by default because existing regimes had little control over their own territory. In addition, unlike previous arrangements, invasion by a national army was a rare occurrence. Yet in the 1990s, all of these activities became much more common. For instance, the Angolan military forces were actively involved in overthrowing Mobutu in Zaire in 1996 and Lissouba in the Congo Republic in 1997. In the latter case, the Angolan forces were the deciding factor in the civil war. In August 1998, units from the national armies of Angola and Zimbabwe intervened in the second civil war in the DRC, and armies from Uganda and Rwanda fought on the opposite side.

Second, the international politics of Central Africa has now become far more connected to that of the Great Lakes region and to the Southern

African region, whereas the connections to West Africa have grown more fragile. The DRC has long been involved in affairs of the Great Lakes because of its colonial and cultural ties with Rwanda and Burundi. But with the exodus of over 1 million refugees, mostly Hutu, from Rwanda in Zairian territory in 1994, the fate of the two countries' contemporary political trajectories was intertwined more directly for the remainder of the 1990s. Mobutu was linked with Habyarimana through their personal ties, and their mutual reliance on French support came under attack in the early 1990s. Mobutu's willingness to disarm former members of the FAR on Zairian territory put Kagame and Mobutu at odds. Meanwhile, Uganda's Museveni, who had been scornful of Mobutu's corrupt, ineffective rule for years, was ready to join Kagame in sponsoring those who would eventually overthrow Mobutu's weak regime. When Kabila's rule became less satisfactory for Museveni and Kagame, the two rulers again intervened in the DRC with the intention of removing Kabila from power.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What do you consider to be the constraints of non – intervention norm and the international politics on foreign policy in East and Central African?

3.6 Increasing Ties with Southern Africa

Central Africa's increasing ties with Southern Africa pre-date the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, but that event greatly accelerated the trends that were already unfolding. During the Cold War, only Angola, as a member of the Front Line States (FLS) and the Southern African development Coordination Conference (SADCC), was deeply integrated into the politics of Southern Africa. Zaire traded with neighboring states in Southern Africa, and Mobutu maintained ties with the apartheid regime, particularly to facilitate effective diamond marketing. South Africa also quietly cultivated ties with the conservative Francophone African states, such as Gabon and the CAR. Both the conservative and radical states (Angola and Congo Republic) began to establish much closer links to industrialised South Africa after the signing of the Angola–Namibia Peace Accords in December 1988. South Africa's former antagonists, Angola and the Congo Republic, were soon negotiating with their former nemeses, and the Congo Republic finally established diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1993. These warmer relations allowed the conservative regimes in Libreville, Bangui, and Kinshasa to finally make public and formal their ties to South Africa. Investments from South Africa had begun to flow into Angola, Zaire, the Congo Republic, and Gabon even before Nelson Mandela was elected the President of South Africa in 1994.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention implications of increasing ties with southern Africa on foreign policy in East and Central Africa.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Foreign policy making in East and Central Africa has undergone various changes. This has been so because of paradigmatic, structural and ethnic factors. The role of France in foreign policy making in the region, as well as the norm of non-intervention and the interconnection of the region with the Great lake region and Southern Africa had diverse implications on the nature and character of foreign from this region.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, you have been introduced to the changing context of foreign policy-making in the Central African region. Among the pertinent issues we have highlighted include fading usage of old paradigms in foreign policy making; emergence of democratic culture in the region, prevalence of inter-regional and extra-regional rivalries; the constraints on non – intervention norm and international politics and the increasing ties with Southern Africa.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. How does the emergence of democratic culture affect the foreign policy decision in east and central Africa?
- ii. Mention the critical areas where France has had influence on the foreign policy decision in east and central African.
- iii. Explain the changing context of foreign policy making in the Central African Region.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 4 ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN THE GREAT LAKE REGION

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main content
 - 3.1 Background
 - 3.2 Ascendance to Power through Force
 - 3.3 Military and Political Interdependence of States
 - 3.4 Aversion to External Interference
 - 3.5 Unity in Diversity
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor – Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The great lake region comprises mainly of the reconstructive state systems of Rwanda, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Issues that will be treated to highlight foreign policy making in these states include, the general background of the Great Lake Region, ascendancy to power through force, aversion to external interference and unity in diversity.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- state the background events in the great lake region
- mention the use of force as a means of coming to power
- examine the military and political interdependence among states in the region
- describe the aversion of states in the region to external interference
- discuss the impact of unity in diversity in the region.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Background

Nowhere in the continent of Africa has ethnic conflict taken a more savage edge than in East Africa. Nowhere else does ethnic and political

exclusion pose a more daunting challenge. This observation applies especially to the barely reconstructed state system of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire). U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright emphasised the centrality of the region to the U. S. foreign policy agenda in an address to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on December 9, 1997: “Africa matters, and right now no place matters more in Africa than East Africa. The region’s natural and human resources as well as its strategic location make it either a catalyst or a stumbling block to African unity” (Albright, 1997).

Although commentaries about the future of the region have stressed the “catalyst of cooperation with Africa’s new bloc” (Connell and Smyth, 1998:80) (comprising Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea), closer scrutiny of the evidence suggests a more nuanced interpretation. Though sharing certain common characteristics, the leaders in these states do not always see eye to eye on how to deal with their enemies at home and abroad. Their similarities also do not imply, as Secretary Albright claimed, “a common vision of empowerment for all their citizens, for their nations, and for their continent” or a commitment to the consent of the governed” (Albright, 1997). To impute such commendable motives to these leaders invites skepticism, raising questions as to whether official U. S. perceptions have anything to do with the harsh realities facing these rulers.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

State why the U.S. perceptions about East Africa differs from the reality on the ground.

3.2 Ascendance to Power through Force

The most obvious common feature among the leaders in the great lake region of Africa is that they all came to power through the use of force. Paul Kagame, former Congolese president Laurent Kabila, and Yoweri Museveni fought their way to power on the crest of externally supported rural insurgencies and with considerable support from each other. Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia and Isaias Afewerki in Eritrea similarly fought their way to power in a joint campaign against the former regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Pierre Buyoya is the exception, taking power through a bloodless palace coup on July 15, 1996, thirty – two months after being voted out of office by the late Melchior Ndadaye, Burundi’s first Hutu president.

Tutsi refugee support was a critical factor in giving Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) the upper hand in its fight against President Milton Obote, leading to the NRA’s victorious march to

Kampala in January 1986, Four and a half years later, Museveni returned the favour. Uganda's military and logistical assistance proved decisive when the time came for the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to fight its way into Rwanda. That Uganda's role was critical is not too surprising given that the RPF was at the time little more than a clone of the NRA. The late Major General Fred Rwigyema, the RPF's first leader, once served as deputy commander of the NRA and as Uganda's deputy minister of defense. Major Paul Kagame, who took over the command of the invading force after Rwigyema's death on the day of the Rwanda invasion in 1990, was at one time the head of military intelligence in the NRA.

The ties of solidarity between Kagame and Museveni were thus forged in the crucible of battle. Although Kabila did not have the same intimate ties with Kagame and Museveni, he was indebted to both (Wall Street Journal, 1998). His ability to stitch together a credible coalition of insurgents under the umbrella of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) depended on significant assistance from Rwandan. Kabila was able to defeat the Zairian armed forces with the help provided by units of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), ethnic Tutsi from the Kivu region (the so-called Banyamulenge), and the auxiliary support of troops from Angola.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention three instances indicating the use of force among states in East Africa as a means of coming to power.

3.3 Military and Political Interdependence of States

What holds most of the states in East Africa together is not just their shared experience as rebels and allies in their fight against a common enemy but their sense of being heavily dependent on each other, militarily and politically. This mutual dependence is also true of Buyoya in Burundi, whose fortunes are linked to those of his neighbors to the west and the north. Even more important in creating strong solidarity among Kagame, Buyoya, and Museveni is their sense of belonging to the same embattled minority subculture, to the same pastoralist interlacustrine Diaspora. Whether Tutsi (Kagame), Tutsi – Hima (Buyoya), or Hima – Munyankole (Museveni), they share the same cultural self – awareness and therefore see themselves as the spokesmen of threatened minorities. Deeply distrustful of what they see as the tyranny of the majority implicit in Western forms of democracy, they regard as their first obligation to ensure the survival of their respective communities. Fear of annihilation is nowhere more evident than in Rwanda and Burundi. In both states, the perception of an impending

bloodbath continues to shape the attitude of the Tutsi minority. Similar fears are also widely shared by Tutsi communities indigenous to North and South Kivu in the Congo, now collectively referred to as Banyamulenge.

This is not to suggest that ethnicity supersedes all other factors, making for automatic unanimity on foreign policy issues. The situational qualities of the phenomena rule out conclusive judgments about its impact on regional policies. To see in the coming to power of the Hamitic trio ominous proof of the reemergence of the Hima Empire, as some Hutu opposition figures are wont to claim, belongs to the realm of fantasy, much like the reference to a pre-colonial Hima empire. To stress their cultural self – awareness, therefore, does not mean that Museveni and Buyoya must necessarily see eye to eye on most regional issues (Lemarchand, 2001).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine the common factors of military and political interdependence among states in East African region.

3.4 Aversion to External Interference

An important major characteristic of leaders in the East African region is their profound aversion to external interference in domestic and regional affairs. That they are conspicuously resistant to outside pressures was made abundantly clear during the crisis leading to Mobutu's demise. Kagame's searing criticisms of the UN for its inability to stop the genocide and of the humanitarian NGOs for playing into the hands of the Hutu extremists organised in the *interahamwe* in the refugee camps in Eastern Congo fell on receptive ears in Uganda and Burundi. Much the same suspicion surrounding the agenda of the international community was seen in Kabila's less than cooperative attitude towards the UN investigation of the massacres of Hutu refugees committed by Kagame's RPA in Eastern Congo. Similar suspicion was equally evident in Buyoya's recalcitrance to yield to external prodding in support of a negotiated solution to the Hutu – Tutsi crisis, not to mention his barely contained anger over the role of regional leaders (including Tanzania) in imposing economic sanctions against Burundi. Each of these leaders saw the international community's interference as little more than a smoke screen for a political agenda designed to prop up their enemies.

The outcome was an undeniable sense of regional solidarity, particularly among the leaders of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. This sense of common purpose was rooted in part in the circumstances of their rise to

power, in part in their shared cultural identities, and, above all, in their shared distrust of the international community's good intentions (Lemarchand, 2001).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the evidences that could justify the aversive tendencies of states in East Africa.

3.5 Unity in Diversity

The common affinities of states in East Africa should not obscure the factors and circumstances that are specific to each state. Just as there are doubts about whether their common vision of empowerment for all their citizens constitute a source of unity among their leaders, focusing exclusively on their common attitude toward the international community can mask the diversity of policy objectives. Only in Rwanda has the capture of power by Tutsi refugee warriors been accompanied by genocide of unprecedented magnitude, resulting in the loss of an estimated 1 million human lives, mostly Tutsi. The sheer scale of the carnage coupled with the extraordinary passivity of the international community explains Kagame's pathological distrust towards the UN and international humanitarian organisations. Why did the UN look the other way while the killings were going on? Why were the warnings issued by UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) Commander Romeo Dallaire concerning the probability of an impending genocide ignored by the Department of Peace – Keeping Operations (DPKO), then headed by Kofi Anan, at UN headquarters? By what moral blindness could the humanitarian NGO's in Eastern Congo lean over backward to provide assistance to the killers – the former Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) and the *interahamwe* militia – in the Hutu refugee camps while so little was being done to help out the tens of thousands of Tutsi returnees?

Kagame believes that French military backing of the Habyarimana regime prolonged the war and increased battlefield casualties. Moreover, France's initiative in getting Operation Turquoise under way, under the fallacious pretext of saving human lives, made it possible for hundreds of *interahamwe* to get away with murder, again. If the latter were so successful in conducting cross – border raids into Rwanda after their exodus into Eastern Congo, part of the credit must go to their French suppliers of arms and ammunition. That some of the gunrunning networks extended to Zaire, China, and South Africa does little to exonerate the French from their sustained military support of the Habyarimana regime.

For Rwanda there is no alternative to ethnic exclusion as long as the Hutu opposition appears to condone or becomes complicit in the crimes of the *interahamwe*. Externally there is no other choice but to exterminate the exterminators operating from foreign bases, even if this approach involves collateral damage among innocent civilians. Anyone seeking to interfere with this objective, be it the UN, NGOs, the World Bank, or the European Union, does a disservice to Rwanda's security interests.

There is no equivalent in Burundi for the way in which the genocide has shaped Rwanda's policies at home and abroad. Nor is there any parallel in Bujumbura to the intense suspicion displayed by Kigali towards Paris. These differences were evident in President Pierre Buyoya's trips to Paris and in French support to Buyoya in getting regional actors to lift economic sanctions on Burundi.

A highly contentious issue among regional actors with regard to Burundi was the question of the embargo. Whereas former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere consistently advocated maintenance of the embargo as a way of forcing Bujumbura to come to terms with Hutu opposition, Uganda's President Museveni had been most reluctant to do so. At the same time Museveni made thinly veiled overtures to Buyoya's rival, former president Jean – Pierre Bagaza, one of the Tutsi leaders least disposed to make concessions to the Hutu. Museveni's position seemed to reflect, in part, his longtime friendship with and heavy indebtedness to Bagaza, dating back to when Bagaza was president of Burundi and Museveni a guerrilla fighter. Kagame, meanwhile, agreed in principle with the decision to impose sanctions, fearing that doing otherwise might antagonise his powerful neighbour to the east, but looked the other way when truckloads of commodities made their way into Burundi in violation of the embargo.

The foreign policies of the new leaders bear the mark of significant power asymmetries among them. The critical elements in the regional power equation are the rise of Rwanda as the central actor in the Great Lakes. That a minute, impoverished, and overcrowded state like Rwanda emerged as something of a regional hegemon almost overnight is a commentary on the relative size and professional competence of its army and the considerable material support it received from Uganda. Rwanda's centrality also draws attention to Kagame's astuteness in drawing maximum advantage from the presence in Eastern Congo of a large pool of potential allies (the Banyamulenge), and to the prominent place occupied – for a time – by Banyamulenge elements in the officer corps of the ADFL military.

Kagame's capacity to project his military power effectively into neighboring states was convincingly demonstrated by the devastating incursions of the RPA into the Congo in 1996 – 1997, first against the refugee camps, then against the 'Mobutist' army, and finally in the cleansing operations against fleeing bands of hapless refugees. In the first incursions, the RPA joined forces with Banyamulenge units trained in Rwanda. The result was the enhancement of Rwanda's regional stature out of all proportions to its size and resources. If there is such a thing as a regional pecking order, Kagame and Museveni must be seen as the dominant figures and Buyoya as the lesser one (Lemarchand, 2001).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the likely attitudes of the international organisations that exacerbated the genocide in Rwanda.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have explained that so many critical issues are involved in foreign policy making in the great lake of Africa. Published texts in foreign relations in the region are our main source for the exercise. In extracting the vital contributions, we have taken into consideration various opinions of the authors and we have shaped them into a concise and logical presentation.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have dealt with elements of foreign policy-making in the great lake region by looking at the background, ascendance to power through force, military and political interdependence of states, and aversion to external interference and unity in diversity.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Mention four examples of forceful ascension to power by leaders of East African region.
- ii. How does political and military interdependence of east African states create some level of harmony within the region?
- iii. How would you describe the common aversion of east African states towards external control?

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UNIT 5 THE 1996 WATERSHED

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
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 - 3.2 Short Term Success
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Kagame's November 1996 decision to launch a 'massive search and destroy' operation in eastern Congo marks watershed in the geopolitics of the region, directed against a Hutu refugee population of well over a million, specific issues that will be discussed here are, objectives, short term success, negative implications and the United States as a regional ally.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h list the objectives of the 1996 watershed by Kagame
- h mention the short term benefits
- h state the negative implications
- h discuss the united states as a regional ally.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Objectives

The immediate objectives of the 1999 watershed by Kagame in foreign policy making involving the launch of a massive search were essentially four. To:

1. destroy the refugee camps of North Kivu and thus bring to a halt the armed incursions into Rwanda mounted by former FAR and *interahamwe*

2. extend the search – and – destroy operations to the campsites in and around Uvira, in South Kivu, where some 150,000 Hutu refugees from Burundi had found shelter since 1995. Such an attack dealt a crippling blow to Leonard Nyagomna's Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie (CNDD), the leading activist faction of the Hutu rebellion in Burundi
3. eradicate Ugandan rebels operating in North Kivu, including the loosed coalition of forces around the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) and the West Nile Bank Liberation Front (WNBLF)
4. pave the way for Kabila's victory and in so doing repay Mobutu in kind for his military assistance to the Habyarimana government and subsequent covert support for the interahamwe militias (Lemarchand, 2001).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

List the immediate objectives of Kagame's decision to launch a search – and - destroy operation in eastern Congo.

3.2 Short -Term Success

On each count the Kagame – Museveni plan succeeded beyond all expectations, at least in the short term.

A brief inventory of the tactical benefits resulting from Kagame's cross – border blitz would include the following:

- h The campsites of North Kivu were thoroughly dismantled and many of the interahamwe killed along with civilians. Whereas no more, and possibly fewer, than 500, 000 Hutu refugees marched back into Rwanda, the remaining 500,000 were left to their own devices as they wandered into the forest in search of food and shelter. Of these it is not unreasonable to assume that at least half, if not more, died of hunger and disease; the RPA units subsequently massacred thousands of others.
- h By grossly inflating the number of Hutu refugees and by claiming, contrary to all the evidence, that all had returned of their own free will after being liberated from the clutches of the interahamwe, the Rwanda government could plausibly argue that there was no longer any need or justification for a multinational force to create safe havens for the refugees. The only refugees left behind were those implicated in the genocide, or so the argued. Only the most disingenuous of analysts could claim otherwise.

- h In South Kivu, the attacks on Uvira and Bukavu deprived the CNDD of its main sanctuary while leaving the survivors no other choice but to walk across northern Burundi into Tanzania. The Burundian army killed thousands before they reached their destination.
- h In the Northern part of North Kivu, units of the National Resistance Army (NRA) joined hands with the RPA to cleanse the area of ADF – WNBLF elements, thereby decisively weakening the Zairian - Sudanese connection behind the two major Ugandan opposition movements.
- h In Zaire, the anointing of Kabila as the leader of the ADFL prepared the ground for a spectacular reversal of regional alliances. None of the regional actors had more reasons for rejoicing than Kagame. After playing a decisive role in transforming Kabila from a nearly forgotten terrorist – cum – trafficker into a major political figure, Kagame could now expect a free hand in policing the border area between North Kivu and Rwanda and could eventually reclaim the areas as part of Rwanda's pre-colonial domain. In the late 1996, shortly after the destruction of the camps, President Pasteur Bizimungu, armed with maps of the region, invoked Rwanda's glorious pre-colonial past – but with utter disregard of historical facts (Newbury, 1997) – to lay claim to a large chunk of North Kivu. Perhaps even more surprising than this sudden display of Rwanda irredenta was that it failed to elicit as much as a whisper of protests from Kinshasha.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention the benefits of Kagame's cross – border blitz.

3.3 Negative Implications

On the negative side of the ledger, however, and with the benefits of hindsight, the following considerations are worth bearing in mind.

- h If the destruction of the refugee camps was meant to eliminate the security threats posed by the former FAR and interahamwe, the results have been less than optimal. Many of the killers were able to infiltrate back into Rwanda by joining the flow of refugees. Others were able to regroup in North Kivu and join hands with Mayi – Mayi elements recruited among non – Banyamulenge elements.
- h The trend among those Hutu activists from Rwanda and Burundi currently operating in the Congo has been to develop tactical alliances, so as to better coordinate their strikes against civilians,

while seeking to enlist maximum support from elements indigenous to North and South Kivu.

- h The mopping – up operations conducted by the RPA in the Congo have done irreparable damage to Kagame’s image by placing him in the company of genocidaires. In addition, a number of unanswered questions remain about the exact role played by members of the U.S. embassy in Kigali in the weeks immediately following Kagame’s incursion, including what kind of assistance, if any, was given to the RPA as it was about the grim task of wiping out thousands of hapless refugees.
- h In terms of his domestic policies it became evidently clear that Kabila was not the saviour that he was thought up to be. Besides having gone further than Mobutu in repressing opposition forces and civil society organisations, his continued reliance on Banyamulenge elements in the government and the army generated enormous resentment across a broad spectrum of the Congolese population, most notably in North and South Kivu.
- h The circumstances of Kabila’s rise to power reduced him to a client of Rwanda, heavily indebted to Kagame’s RPA. It is hard to imagine that without the military backing of the Rwanda army he could have emerged as the spearhead of the local rebellion that quickly snowballed into a massive crusade. By then, however, important diplomatic realignments had taken place that paved the way for the emergence of the United States as the new leader’s major regional ally (Lemarchand, 2001).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What are the negative sides of Kagame’s search – and – destroy operation in eastern Congo?

3.4 The United States as a Regional Ally

In the aftermath of Kagame’s strike into Zaire, the mutuality of interests among the new leaders became evident. Kigali and Bujumbura derived immediate benefits from the shooting up of the camps, since it meant the elimination of the sanctuaries and training grounds from which the Hutu guerrillas operated with impunity. Kampala gained from the dismemberment of the ADF – WNBLF networks. Angola reaped rich dividends from the dismantling of UNITA’s bases in Zaire. The odd man out was Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, longtime Mobutu ally, largely discredited by his failed attempts at mediation and protection of some major interahamwe figures.

Such striking mutuality of interests stood in sharp contrast with the growing disagreements in the international community, most notably

between the United States and the European Union (EU), over the handling of the refugee crises in Eastern Congo. At the root of the discord lay France's plea for a multilateral force into the Congo to create safe havens for refugees to avoid yet another human tragedy. Most EU members, and Canada, endorsed the French proposal. The United States, however, reluctantly expressed interest but then withdrew its support. The critical factor behind the U.S. decision to pull out was the announcement by Kigali that some 700, 000 Hutu refugees had voluntarily returned to their homeland, thus rendering nugatory recourse to an international force.

By distancing itself from the French proposal, Washington won the immediate sympathy of Kigali and its regional allies. Had a multinational force been sent to Eastern Congo, the RPA would have been faced with a major obstacle in the conduct of its ethnic cleansing operations. The genocidaires would have regrouped under the protective wing of the multilateral forces and resumed their deadly raids into Rwanda, and partnership between Kabila and his Rwandese patron would have been exposed, and the overthrow of Mobutu would have taken longer. From Kagame's perspective it was much to the credit for the U.S. reversal on supporting the multinational force that the worst had been avoided.

The U.S. decision had a certain redemptive quality. Until then, the reluctance of the State Department to use the term genocide had done little to ingratiate it with Kigali. The same is true of the efforts of Susan Rice, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of the State for African Affairs and head of the peacekeeping operations in the National Security Council, to push for a withdrawer of UN troops from Rwanda. On May 3rd 1994, at the height of the carnage, the U.S. position on Rwanda was formalised into broader policy guidelines through Presidential Decision Directives 25, which in effect precluded military intervention in areas where the stakes of conflict were unrelated to U.S. national interests. That a cop – out of such colossal proportion could have happened while genocide was going on was neither forgotten nor forgiven by Kagame.

After President Clinton's three – hour pilgrimage to Kigali on March 24, 1998, Kagame seemed willing to forgive if not to forget. Clinton's act of contrition, phrased in a language free of diplomatic double – talk, was well received in Kigali, Kampala, and Bujumbura; "we did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe haven for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide. We cannot change the past. But we can and must do everything in our power to help you build a future (New York Times, 1998). Interestingly,

not a word was said of the ethnic cleansing of thousands of Hutu refugees in eastern Congo.

The regional dimension of U.S. policy was inscribed in rather more nebulous terms in the communiqué issued after President Clinton met in Entebbe (Uganda) with Pasteur Bizimungu of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Kabila, and Museveni. All six were invited to pursue a dialogue on democratisation. While recognising that there is no fixed model for democratic institutions, the communiqué stressed the need to explore alternative approaches to the democratic management of cultural diversity. What emerged through this carefully calibrated rhetoric was a pro forma commitment to democracy in return for more debt relief and financial assistance for the participants in the dialogue on democratisation.

In no other part of the continent were domestic issues so closely intertwined with foreign policy choices. Security concerns informed the domestic and regional options of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. In all three states, security at home depended on their capacity to counter the threats posed by opposition movements with roots in neighboring territories. In order to deal effectively with Hutu terrorists, Rwanda enlisted the cooperation of Kabila in North and South Kivu, used as staging grounds for armed raids into Rwanda. And to put teeth in the alliance, Kagame maintained a substantial Tutsi presence in commanding positions in Kabila's army. Museveni and Buyoya embraced Kabila with much the same motives.

The security imperative dictated choices that were often difficult to reconcile with the expectations of the international community. Nowhere was this dilemma more evident than in the circumstances forced upon former President Kabila: on the one hand, whenever he gave in to Western demands for democratisation and cooperation with the UN he would incur the wrath of his patron, Kagame, and would find himself dangerously isolated. On the other hand, the price exacted by his subservience to Rwanda was a rapid erosion of his domestic legitimacy.

Burundi was caught on the horns of a dilemma with relation to the choice of meeting the demands of the opposition for effective political participation or holding back on liberalisation. On one hand, by surrendering to regional pressures to engage the opposition in a dialogue toward national reconciliation, Buyoya ran the risk of being overthrown by Tutsi hard – liners in the army. On the other, whenever he refused to heed calls for a dialogue with Hutu opponents, he exposed the country to economic strangulation. With very little room to maneuver in the face

of a sharply polarised ethnic arena, Buyoya had no other option but to accept the push for talks with opposition groups in return for lifting the embargo (Lemarchand, 2001).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the role of United States in Kagame's strike to Zaire (Eastern Congo).

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Kagame's 1996 decision to launch operation search - and - destroy the Eastern Congo has been treated in this unit. The United States of America, which became the main regional ally of the region failed to take a decisive step in ending the genocide even when France called for a multilateral force to end the carnage. However, Clinton's administration impresses on the leaders the need for democratisation (even if it was their own way). Such was a prerequisite for debt cancellation and more foreign aid in the region.

5.0 SUMMARY

We have in this unit, dealt with the 1996 watershed in Eastern Africa involving Kagame's decision of launching an operation search – and - destroy in Eastern Congo. The objectives of the operation search and destroy is also discussed. Finally and of importance to this unit, we have analysed the role of the US from its retroactive position to its involvement, perhaps too late.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. List and explain the objectives of the 1996 watershed involving Kagame's decision of operation search – and – destroy in eastern Congo.
- ii. Mention and examine the short term benefits of the above mentioned Kagame's decision.
- iii. State and discuss the negative implications of the decision.

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MODULE 2 CASES OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS INTRODUCTION

Unit 1	Kenya's External Relations
Unit 2	Tanzania's External Relations
Unit 3	Uganda's External Relations
Unit 4	Rwanda's External Relations
Unit 5	Burundi's External Relations

UNIT 1 KENYANS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Kenya's pattern of external relations centers on two major areas; maintenance of her nonaligned stand between Eastern and Western Europe and her commitment to mediating the conflicts in Tanzania, Uganda and Somalia. Specific time frame that will be covered here 1964, 1965, 1967, 1977, 1989, 1991, and 1993 would be Kenya's international relations within these years.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h discuss the pattern of Kenya's external relations during the years under review
- h highlight the challenges Kenya's external relations faced
- h draw attention to the foreign policy achievements of Kenya.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

2.1 Kenya's External Relations in 1964

Kenya's external relations in 1964 could be discussed under the following areas:

1. Military

After the 1964 January disorders, on March 6th, it was announced in Nairobi that the following agreements had been reached between Kenya and Britain:

- (i) Kenya would grant Britain training facilities for the British army, overflying and staging rights for the Royal Air Force, and port maintenance facilities at Mombasa for the Royal Navy;
- (ii) In return, Britain would consider sympathetically a request for help in the creation of a small Kenyan air force and navy and in expanding and re-equipping the Kenyan army.

There was a momentary strain in relations between Britain and Kenya in July, when Prime Minister Kenyatta was assaulted while in London for the Commonwealth Conference; but the incident was passed over lightly. There was also little strain in relations between Kenya and Communist China. This was also in connection with the attempted January army mutiny in Kenya.

2. Economic Developments

Minister of Finance James S. Gichuru gave details on June 10 of a six-year development plan that would cost \$887.6 million. Of this, 59.3 percent would come from the private sector and the balance from the public sector.

A week before Gichuru's statement, the British government announced in London that it would give Kenya aid worth more than \$168 million in money, materials, and services. Britain also helped finance a new, \$4.2 million land settlement scheme, under which some 20,000 Africans move onto land farmed by Europeans. Britain had already promised to provide \$54.6 million for such schemes.

China had offered Kenya an interest-free loan of about \$15.4 for equipment and technicians and an outright gift of \$2.8 million. The Soviet Union undertook to build, as a gift, a new technical college for 1,000 students and a 200-bed hospital and promised to build factories and develop agricultural projects.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss Kenya's foreign relations in military and economic development in 1964.

3.2 Kenya's External Relations in 1965

Two themes dominated Kenya's relations with the outside world in 1965:

1. The country's determination to follow an independent non-aligned course between East and West; and
2. The search for a satisfactory *modus vivendi* with immediate neighbours, particularly Tanzania, Uganda, and Somalia.

President Kenyatta summed up his approach to non-alignment in a speech commemorating the second anniversary of Kenya's attainment of internal self-government. He said that as head of the government he would fight any person, group, or country trying to undermine Kenya's independence and declared that Communism posed as great a threat as Western imperialism. Kenya, he said, wants its own nationalism, not that of any other state. Although it was natural for Kenya to detest Western colonialism and imperialism, he continued, as a truly nonaligned country, Kenya should not avoid making friends with those Western countries extending an honest hand of cooperation.

Two British journalists were declared 'prohibited immigrants' in December 1964, and the following month, the correspondent of the American magazine, *Time*, was expelled from Kenya. These moves against Western newsmen were balanced in July by an order to the representative of the Chinese Hsinhua News Agency to leave the country within 24 hours. Also in July, the Kenya government publicly rebuked Chinese Premier Chou En-lai for saying during a visit to neighboring Tanzania that Africa was ripe for revolution. The official statement issued in Nairobi said that the Kenya government intended to avert all revolutions, irrespective of origin.

Earlier in the year, the government took control of the Lumumba Institute, built with Soviet aid and staffed mainly by Soviet or Soviet-trained teachers. It is now virtually defunct. At about the same time, President Kenyatta refused to accept delivery of a shipment of arms from the Soviet Union because they were 'too old and second-hand.'

Of the three states—Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda— which might eventually form an East African federation, Kenya is economically and

politically the most robust. Since Tanzania and Uganda are concerned that in union Kenya will be dominant, the three countries have in many ways drifted apart. Although they have managed to maintain the East African Common Services Organisation bequeathed them by the British, in June the finance ministers announced in simultaneous budget statements that their governments would introduce separate monetary systems.

There was a momentary but acute crisis concerning the three governments in May, when Kenya authorities intercepted a consignment of Chinese arms on its way from the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam to Uganda. The convoy carrying the arms was in charge of Uganda army personnel, who, without informing the Kenya government, apparently decided on the spur of the moment to take a shortcut through Kenya territory. The ensuing storm was calmed only after Uganda Prime Minister Obote explained and apologised to President Kenyatta in Nairobi.

Kenya's relations with its northern neighbour Somalia were uneasy, because of the restlessness of Somali tribesmen within Kenya's northeastern district. The Kenyan government, however, publicly discouraged the suggestion that the tribesmen's activities, described in Nairobi as cattle-rustling and looting, were instigated by the Somali government with political intent.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the main areas of Kenyans External Relations in 1965.

3.3 Kenya's External Relations in 1977

As relations with its neighbors, Tanzania and Somalia, became increasingly strained, Kenya effected a rapprochement with Sudan and further oriented its foreign policy toward the West. Tanzania closed its border with Kenya in early February, impounding numerous Kenyan vehicles and private aircraft, and in April announced that the closure was permanent. This action followed the collapse of the East African Airways Corporation, a joint venture of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Relations between Kenya and Tanzania deteriorated further in June, when Kenya refused to allow airline passengers arriving from Dar es Salaam, the Tanzanian capital, to disembark at Nairobi, and then established its own airlines. On June 30, Kenya withdrew from the East African Community (which consisted of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania); Kenya then began to seek markets in the Middle East and, increasingly, in Sudan. A 6,275-mile road was constructed between the

two countries, and in July, Kenya and Sudan signed pacts for closer economic and technical cooperation.

Kenya's new overtures to Sudan were also motivated by worsening relations with Somalia, whose troops were alleged to have attacked a Kenya border post in late June, leaving several Kenyans dead. Somalia made claims to a large area of northern Kenya, a region that was populated by ethnic Somalis.

As an initial gesture to attract Arab petrodollars and markets, Kenya agreed to allow the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to establish an office in Nairobi.

Economic developments

Booming coffee and tea revenues ended a two-year recession. Kenya recorded a growth of 5 percent in gross domestic product during 1976 and had expectations for 7 percent in 1977. Foreign exchange reserves by mid-1977 stood at \$348 million. The consumer price index began to accelerate in 1977, with the possibility of a more than 20 percent rate of inflation for the year as a whole.

Government spending in fiscal year 1977 totaled \$1.06 billion. Of this, \$227 million was funded by external and domestic borrowing. Recurrent expenditures rose 22 percent in 1977, with \$55 million allocated for defense at the end of the year. In accordance with a policy to increase rural incomes and encourage food self-sufficiency, the government raised controlled prices for several staples. Wages were increased for civil servants and lower income groups to compensate for inflation.

The finance minister delivered an optimistic state of the economy message, describing the budget as one shaped for expansion. Export taxes on coffee and tea and duties on imported textiles and clothing were levied to protect Kenya's home industry. Tourism remained good, and the airport tax was doubled to 40 shillings.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain the implication of the strained Kenya's relations with neighbouring states on her involvement in international organisations and the economy.

3.4 Kenya's External Relations in 1989

Strains in Kenya's relations with Uganda continued in 1989. The tension was basically ideological but centered on accusations that each country was supporting the other's political dissidents. When Kenya celebrated the 25th anniversary of its independence in December 1988, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was conspicuously absent from the group of invited guests. The relationship further deteriorated after a mysterious bombing raid in March 1989 on the town of Lokichokio, in the northwestern Turkana district of Kenya, by a jet fighter suspected to be of Ugandan origin. In the months after the raid relations improved only slightly, although trade between the two countries continued.

Kenyan-Tanzanian relations, on the other hand, remained good, as the two countries promoted their regional economic cooperation. Another positive development was President Moi's initiative to encourage the Mozambique government to negotiate for peace with the Mozambique National Resistance ('Renamo'). Toward this end, Moi flew to Maputo, Mozambique, in May to meet with Joaquim Chissano, the country's president. In August a four-day meeting in Nairobi between rebel leaders and church officials representing the Mozambique government ended with the two sides far apart on bringing the civil war to an end.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

State the pattern of relationship between Kenya and Uganda on the one hand and Kenya and Tanzania on the other hand.

3.5 Kenya's External Relations in 1991

Kenya and Norway severed diplomatic relations in 1991 after former Kenyan MP Koigi Wa Wamwere, who had sought and received political asylum in Norway after founding the banned opposition Kenya Patriotic Front in 1988, was mysteriously captured (supposedly in Uganda) and forcibly taken to Kenya to face a charge of treason in late 1990. The Norwegian government insisted on Wamwere's release, legal representation by a foreign lawyer demanded that, but, the Kenyan government rejected. Several other western countries either froze or cut back on aid programmes for Kenya because of Kenya's refusal to adopt multiparty democracy and because officials believed that the assistance was not reaching the people for whom it was intended.

Relations with the United States improved slightly in the first part of the year. The United States expressed appreciation for the use of Kenya's naval and air facilities during the Persian Gulf War and for Kenya's help in the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Somalia and Ethiopia following

the collapse of the regimes in those countries. Relations between Kenya and the United States worsened, however, when U.S. Ambassador Smith Hempstone began publicly voicing his criticism of the Moi government's human rights record. Hempstone's outspokenness prompted Foreign Minister Wilson Ndolo Aya to label the ambassador a 'racist'; Hempstone countered that his criticisms were meant to warn the government that unless it undertook reforms it could suffer a severe loss of foreign aid. His remarks seemed to be borne out when, at a November meeting held in Paris under the auspices of the World Bank, Kenya's 12 major aid-donating nations, including the United States, sent a sharp rebuke to Moi's government, warning that unless political and economic reforms were forthcoming, Kenya could face major aid cuts in six months. The United States subsequently announced that it had set aside \$47 million in aid to Kenya for 1992 but that, barring reforms, only \$19 million would be released. Despite the transition to multiparty politics, the government received another setback in late December, when the International Monetary Fund, citing little progress on economic reforms, delayed disbursing a \$63 million loan to Kenya.

The establishment of limited bilateral trade relations with the Republic of South Africa seemed likely after the widely publicised visit of South African President F. W. de Klerk to Kenya in June. However, the African National Congress remained opposed to the normalisation of South Africa's relations with other African nations in the absence of equal voting rights for South Africa's black majority.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What events brought a strained relationship between Kenya and Norway?

3.6 Kenya's External Relations in 1993

The government of Kenya's continuing harassment and detention of opposition members, especially those of FORD Asili and FORD Kenya, and of the members of the press who criticised the regime, provoked international criticism and protest. Foreign assistance was greatly reduced and in many cases made conditional upon efforts toward political reform.

Kenya strengthened its trade relations with South Africa and other continental neighbors. At the same time, domestic conflicts in Somalia and Sudan exacerbated Kenya's refugee situation. Somali refugees sometimes escaped to Kenya with their weapons, which they sold there. Relations with other East African states, especially Uganda, hardly

improved, but Kenyan-Tanzanian relations showed improvement as border restrictions were greatly relaxed.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

List the priorities areas of Kenya's External Relations in 1993.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Kenya's foreign policy has been described from 1964 to 1993. Within this time span, relations with her neighbours and developed nations were considered. Important areas of interest include military, economy, foreign aids etc. The relations between Kenya and Tanzania as well as some developed countries such as Norway, Britain and others constrained a robust foreign policy environment for Kenya.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit has looked at Kenya's external relations. It has instructively noted that:

- h this relations is in two major areas: maintenance of her non aligned stand between Eastern and Western Europe, and mediation in the conflicts in Tanzania and Uganda
- h both the West (Britain) and Communist China had relations with Kenya sometimes
- h Tanzania closed its borders with Kenya
- h the West promised aid cut if Kenya did not embark on a definite plan to democratise
- h the Kenyan government refused to accept a delivery of old and second-hand shipment of arms from the Soviet Union.
- h Kenya and Norway severed diplomatic relations.

6.0 TUTOR- MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Explain the events leading to the severance of relations between Kenya and Norway.
- ii. State and explain the key elements in Kenya's external relations in 1989.
- iii. List and explain the major aspects in Kenya's international relations in 1993.

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UNIT 2 TANZANIA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

External relations in Tanzania covers a variety of issues, some of them are relations with neighbors, the Western and Eastern Europe as well as Asia. Also important is her role in regional and international organisations. The following years will therefore be considered for discussion: 1964, 1967, 1979, 1974, and 1980.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end this unit, you should be able to:

- h discuss Tanzania's External Relations in 1964
- h describe Tanzania's External Relations in 1967
- h mention patterns of Tanzania External Relations in 1979
- h state issues of Tanzania's External Relations in 1974
- h explain patterns of Tanzania's External Relations in 1980.

3.0 MAIN CONTENTS

3.1 Tanzania's External Relations in 1964

Western reaction to the revolution in Zanzibar put a strain on relations with the Western powers. When recognition for the new republican regime was not immediately forthcoming from either Washington or London, United States and British diplomatic representatives were asked to leave the island. After recognition was accorded at the end of February, these representatives were allowed to return. Much capital

was made locally of the fact that the Soviet Union and China were among the first foreign powers to recognise the new regime. One of the early actions of the regime was to request the United States to close its Project Mercury tracking station on the island. The request was complied with.

Premier Chou En-lai of China was to have visited Tanganyika early in the year as part of his African tour, but after the January mutiny, in which much of the world—rightly or wrongly—saw Chinese influence, his itinerary was revised to omit Tanganyika.

So keen was President Nyerere to avoid involvement in Cold War situations that he felt unable to go along with other former British territories in East Africa in accepting British help in reorganising the armed forces after the incidents of January (Kenya and Uganda had similar trouble with their armed services.). And when concern was expressed later in the year in the United States and Britain over the continued trend in Zanzibar, Dr. Nyerere did not hide his irritation with those countries. Relations with Britain and the U.S. were especially strained in mid-November, when Nyerere and his foreign minister, Oscar Kambona, accused Western powers of plotting to overthrow their government.

Nyerere had also criticised sections of American and British public opinion for their censure of him in August, when he arranged for an 11-member Chinese mission to come to Tanzania for six months to help train the armed forces. 'Our position is what it has always been,' he told a British correspondent. 'We are trying to be nonaligned.' He pointed out that he had signed a five-year agreement with West Germany to train Tanganyika's airmen.

With West Germany, Dr. Nyerere had one difficult moment immediately after the announcement of the union with Zanzibar. The republican regime on the island had recognised the East German government, and the latter had established a big embassy there. When Tanzania came into being, the question of the simultaneous presence of two rival German missions within the borders of the union presented a problem. It was temporarily, but not definitively, solved by the official reduction of all embassies on Zanzibar to consular status.

Hope of an early East African federation to include Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda faded during the year. The governments of these states had not abandoned the idea, but Tanzania was increasingly apprehensive about how it would fare within the proposed federation, since it was the least economically developed of the three territories.

Economic Developments

On May 12th President Nyerere announced details of a new five-year development plan for Tanganyika, calling for expenditure of \$688.8 million. It had three main objectives. Namely to: (1) raise the yearly per capita income from \$54 to \$126; (2) make the country self-sufficient in manpower; and (3) raise life expectancy from 35-40 to 50 years. Of the total funds needed, Dr. Nyerere said, \$324.8 million must come from private investors, who would need to be assured of being able to make profits and repatriate them.

The budget presented to Parliament in June called for record expenditures totaling \$96.6 million. It imposed increased taxes on luxury goods to raise extra revenue of about \$9.8 million.

Finance Minister Paul Bomani said Britain would provide a loan of \$21 million for the first two years of the development plan. Later, Second Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa visited the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, where he got promises of help from all three countries totaling \$42 million for the development plan. Communist China had already promised a free grant of \$2.8 million and an interest-free loan of \$28 million to pay for Chinese equipment. In August the U.S. Agency for International Development announced four grants to Tanganyika totaling \$925,000.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What do you consider as the key issues in Tanzania's external relations in 1964?

3.2 Tanzania's External Relations in 1967

Economic Developments

The day after the issuing of the Arusha Declaration, President Nyerere announced the nationalisation of all commercial banks in Tanzania. And a few days later came news that the government would nationalise the country's eight biggest flour-milling companies, the seven leading import-export houses, and the insurance business. The government also announced its intention of securing majority control of the sisal industry. Most of the concerns affected were foreign-owned, among them three British banks. The government promised compensation, and agreement on terms was reached with some of the owners. In most cases non-Tanzanian technical staff continued in their jobs after nationalisation, but the British banks withdrew their British personnel.

The immediate effect of nationalisation was to scare away foreign investment interest. But the interest later revived cautiously, and from February, negotiations were completed with Dutch, Italian, and Japanese investors.

Foreign Relations

In September, Tanzania and Zambia signed an agreement with the Chinese government in Peking under which China would build the long-discussed railroad linking Zambia with the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam. Among other things, this would end Zambia's dependence on the white nations in southern Africa for a rail outlet to the sea. The agreement was valuable, expensive, and a prize for the Chinese. Both Tanzania and Zambia would have preferred to have the job done by a western consortium, perhaps the United States, Britain, and West Germany. But these countries had reacted to feelers by pointing to a World Bank report of 1964 describing the proposed railroad as unviable. Details of the agreement with Peking were not fully disclosed. Reportedly, the Chinese were willing to put up some \$280 million for the project and to limit their team of experts assigned to it to 2,000 or 3,000. Further report demanded that the railroad was expected to be completed by the mid-1970.

U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach visited Dar es Salaam during a tour of Africa in May and conferred with President Nyerere.

Hope had persisted that diplomatic relations with Britain might be restored. They were severed late in 1965, as a protest against Britain's policy on Rhodesia. But in October, President Nyerere said, 'It is now clear that in Rhodesia a change of government can be brought about only by the struggle of Africans alone, by military means.'

In June, Tanzania signed a treaty with Kenya and Uganda for the establishment of an East African common market and an East African development bank.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe Tanzania's Foreign Relations in 1967.

3.3 Tanzania's External Relations in 1979

Opening a preparatory meeting on April 13th in Dar es Salaam for the Third Summit Conference of Nonaligned Countries (held in September in Zambia), President Nyerere said that the threat to the independence of

nonaligned countries came not from the military power but from the economic power of the big states. Such thinking has led him to eschew reliance on economic aid from the industrial giants of the West (notably the United States) and to turn more readily for help than many other African countries to China. China then provided an interest-free, US\$400 million loan to Tanzania and Zambia for one of the most expensive projects undertaken in independent black Africa—the construction of the Tanzam Railroad, which would give landlocked Zambia's copper mines an outlet to the sea at Dar es Salaam, thus bypassing white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa. Work was begun on the first stretch of track for the 1,116-mile railroad in late October. On May 6, President Nyerere laid the foundation stone for a naval base for the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces—also to be built with aid from Peking at Kigamboni in Dar es Salaam.

Visitors to Tanzania during the year included King Frederick and Queen Ingrid of Denmark, President Makarios of Cyprus, President Tito of Yugoslavia, and Premier János Kádár of Hungary. On January 16, Tanzania recognised the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; its mission in Dar es Salaam was raised to embassy status.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention the critical areas of Tanzania's foreign relations in 1979.

3.4 Tanzania's External Relations in 1974

Developments in Tanzania during 1974 were dominated by the interplay between Tanzania's desire to achieve regional stability in East Africa and social and political justice in Southern Africa and the equally strong desire to conquer its own problems of poverty and underdevelopment. The dilemmas associated with these various goals could be seen in Tanzania's foreign policies, in its internal political choices, and in steps the country took on the economic front.

International relations

During recent years Tanzania has had troubled relations with some of its neighbours. In 1974, relations with Burundi seemed to stabilise, but there continued to be tension with Uganda.

In midyear Tanzania and Burundi held 'good neighbor' talks which seemed to mark the end of earlier disagreements. Burundi accepted responsibility for two 1973 border attacks and agreed to pay compensation to the families of the 84 people who were killed. In

addition, the World Food Programme provided Tanzania with 12 million shillings to help resettle 40,000 Burundian refugees in western Tanzania.

Relations with Uganda continued on the mercurial course that had been followed since General Idi Amin came to power in that country. There were border skirmishes in 1973, and considerable ill will centered in general on Amin's belief that Tanzania continued to support Milton Obote, Uganda's former president, in his desire to return to power.

In July, Tanzania's first vice-president, Sheikh Aboud Jumbe of Zanzibar, paid a short visit to Uganda. This was seen as a gesture of reconciliation and followed on Tanzania's earlier expulsion of David Martin—a British Broadcasting Corporation and *Financial Times* correspondent—from Tanzania. Martin had angered Amin by his reporting of Ugandan purges, and the Tanzanian government felt that improving relations with Uganda was a political priority. Despite these moves, however, relations remained tense. Just days after Jumbe's visit, a Ugandan military spokesman publicly accused Tanzania of plotting war against Uganda. This charge was totally rejected by Tanzania, and the situation seemed defused after a mediation visit to East Africa by William Eteki, secretary-general of the Organisation of African Unity.

President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania continued to be a major international spokesman for the cause of poor nations. Early in the year he took a long trip to Mauritius, Australia, New Zealand, and the People's Republic of China. Throughout the entire tour he spoke repeatedly on the issue of redressing the economic imbalance between Third World and industrialised nations. He asked for aid in the spirit of the struggle against poverty and exchange on the basis of equality. Later in the year he underlined Tanzania's commitment to a nonaligned course in foreign affairs by paying a visit to President Marien Ngouabi in the Congo.

Perhaps the event which gave Tanzania the greatest satisfaction during the year was the coup in Portugal that has apparently opened the way for the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) to come to power in Mozambique. For the past decade, support for Frelimo's armed struggle against Portugal has been a priority of the first order for the Tanzanian government.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain the pattern of Tanzania's External Relations in 1974.

3.5 Tanzania's External Relations in 1980

Tanzania had become increasingly involved in the domestic politics of other states in its region. It has approximately 10,000 troops stationed in Uganda and 170 others in the Seychelles; until recently, Tanzania also had troops in Madagascar and in Mozambique. President Nyerere played a leading role in the process whereby Rhodesia became independent as Zimbabwe, and he is believed to share responsibility for internal political changes in Uganda since the ouster of President Idi Amin. Tanzania's alleged heavy-handed political involvement in Uganda contributed to a continuation of poor relations with Kenya, whose leaders also accused him of promoting internal opposition to the regime of Kenya's President Daniel Arap Moi.

In global affairs, Nyerere condemned the U.S. initiative to boycott the Moscow Summer Olympics, and Tanzania was represented at the games. Tanzania did call upon Iran to release the U.S. hostages seized in November 1979, and, in the United Nations, it voted to condemn the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

Economics

A report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, released at midyear, stated that the country's grain production was off by 40 percent and that seven of its regions would be food-deficient. Anticipating a 289,000-ton shortfall in maize production, Tanzania purchased 48,000 tons of U.S. maize in May. Tanzania bought on the open market and reportedly used money which had been borrowed at very high interest rates. Purchase of 171,000 more tons was planned, at an expected cost of \$27 million.

Floods, drought, and the Ugandan war only partially accounted for the food shortage. Production of almost every cash crop has dropped steadily since 1974. Many Tanzanian producers preferred to smuggle cash crops to Kenya where they fetch higher prices, and where farmers were more certain of being paid for their produce. A number of farmers have stopped producing cash crops, opting for subsistence agriculture. The performance in the subsistence sector, including cassava and banana crops, continued to be good throughout 1979 and early 1980.

Tanzania's economic problems have been attributed to the increased cost of oil imports, a scarcity of trained and experienced manpower,

credit problems, poor transport and marketing arrangements, disruptive changes in administrative personnel, over bureaucratisation of all sectors, and the negative impact of the war with Uganda. The war created severe shortages of foodstuffs and commodities and cost Tanzania about \$500 million (of which \$375 million was in hard currency); it set the country back by eight to ten months in payments to foreign creditors.

The near bankrupt position of its balance of payments compelled Tanzania to seek help from the International Monetary Fund. President Nyerere had devalued his currency by 10 percent in 1979, and, in 1980, he objected to IMF wishes that he devalue again. A compromise was being worked out with promise of support from the World Bank as well. Meanwhile, by October, Tanzanian shillings were worth only one-third of the official exchange rate on the black market, and the minimum wage had been raised by 40 percent because of inflation. Tanzania turned to private commercial banks for assistance, but these were unwilling to extend further credits.

The public sector bureaucracy continued to grow at an annual rate of 14 percent. By 1980, of the 330 government organisations established to run nationalised businesses, 155 had collapsed and 24 had an accumulated loss of \$20 million. In July, the entire medical profession was nationalised, and the government was planning to do the same with its legal profession. A scheme to nationalise the retail trade sector and replace privately held shops was being revived.

As a result of nationalisations, Tanzania's economy was unable to attract private investment and depends on the almost \$600 million in grants and loans which the country receives each year from foreign governments and institutions. Tanzania receives the world's highest annual per capita development assistance (\$38).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain Tanzania's external relation in 1980.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Tanzanian external affairs borders on a range of issues within, in the region and at international levels. Such issues include regional conflicts, economic development and relations with other foreign nations. It clearly showed the extent to which President Nyerere was poised to avoid an involvement in Cold War politics.

5.0 SUMMARY

- h The relationship between Tanzania and the Western powers were strained when Nyerere accused the latter of plotting to overthrow his government.
- h nationalisation of all commercial banks and other companies, export houses and the insurance business strained the relationship between Tanzania and Britain.
- h nationalisation initially scared away foreign investors
- h Tanzania and Zambia signed an agreement with the Chinese government to build the long railroad linking Zambia with Tanzania port of Dares Salaam
- h Nyerere continued to be a major international spokesman for the cause of poor nations
- h increased cost of oil imports, low manpower, credit problems, poor transport and marketing arrangements and other personnel and organisation challenges contributed to Tanzania's economic problems.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss Tanzania's foreign policy dynamics under President Julius Nyerere.

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UNIT 3 UGANDA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Uganda is regarded as one of the strongest nations in East Africa. Uganda's foreign policies involve a variety of issues which among many other things bothers on relations with advanced and African nations. In this unit, we are interested in looking at Uganda's external relations within the time span of 1962, 1965, 1971, 1973, 1978, 1992, and 1993.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h discuss the pattern of Uganda's external relations during the years under review
- h highlight the challenges encountered in prosecuting Uganda's external relations
- h draw attention to the foreign policy achievements of Uganda.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Uganda's External Relations in 1962

Upon his return from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in September, President Obote expressed doubts about Uganda's accepting associate membership in the European Common

Market, declaring that he could not envisage such a relationship with Europe as being free from political implications.

Upon Uganda achieving independence he said: 'While we value our relationships with old friends, we most firmly will not be drawn into ideological conflict.' However, with the attack by Communist China upon India, he declared that Uganda would not support Communist China's admission to the United Nations 'until the shooting stops.'

After achieving independence, Uganda refused to recognise South Africa or the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as a result of their racial policies.

Economy

A World Bank mission to Uganda recommended the expenditure of \$145 million by 1966 on various projects. The government accepted the plan, which emphasised agricultural development as offering Uganda its principal opportunity for economic growth.

Upon independence the United States offered Uganda a \$2 million loan for the purchase of U.S. equipment, materials, and services.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine the basic elements of Uganda's external relations in 1962.

3.2 Uganda's External Relations in 1965

East African Relations

Uganda's relations with her partners in the East African Common Market (EACM) and Common Services Organisation (CSO) suffered increasing strains throughout the year. With the failure of plans for an East African federation, each territory began to follow a separate course of action. In June it was announced that Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania would each introduce its own currency. In addition, the Kenyan government's anger and embarrassment over the discovery of a secret shipment of Chinese arms across Kenya territory to Uganda gave pointed testimony to emerging differences of interest between the East African neighbors.

International Relations

Uganda reacted angrily to the bombing in February of two border villages by Congolese planes. Obote placed responsibility on the United

States, reasoning that the United States had furnished the government of Moise Tshombe with the planes in the first instance. Violent demonstrations occurred outside the U.S. embassy in Kampala.

Other international events of significance included the signing of an investment guarantee agreement with the United States, the conclusion of a £4.3 million interest-free loan and £1.07 million gift agreement with Communist China, and a joint declaration with the Soviet Union condemning 'American aggression' in Vietnam.

Economic Developments

Agriculture continued to be the pivotal sector of the economy, with the cotton crop surpassing all previous national records. To cushion dependence on cotton and coffee as well as to increase general opportunity, the government announced plans for a fourfold expansion of tea production by 1976.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss Uganda's foreign relations in 1971.

3.3 Uganda's External Relations in 1971

A military coup on January 25 deposed President Apollo Milton Obote, who was at a conference of Commonwealth leaders in Singapore. The leader of the coup, Major General Idi Amin, proclaimed himself head of state, released political prisoners detained by the Obote government, and promised to hold free elections. He also arranged for the return from England of the body of Edward Frederick Mutesa II, late king of Buganda, who was buried near Kampala on April 4. The coup was a reaction against Obote's move to socialise the country, his breakup of Buganda's power (strongest of Uganda's four kingdoms) by exiling its king, and his recent attempt to eliminate Amin's power in the army. Ghana and Great Britain recognised Amin's government on February 5.

Foreign Affairs

Obote received asylum in Tanzania, whose president, Julius K. Nyerere, was hostile to the Amin government. At the meeting of the Organisation of African Unity in Addis Ababa in late February, Tanzania contested the seating of General Amin's delegation. Further conflict arose in the operation of the East African Community in which Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya cooperate economically. In June, Tanzania's President Nyerere would not accept Amin's Ugandan representative in the regular rotation of community chief executives. Amin in turn barred Tanzanian

community officials from their offices in Kampala, Uganda's capital. Charging that Tanzania aided Obote's guerrilla incursions, Amin closed Uganda's borders with Tanzania and Rwanda on July 7. (The border with Rwanda was opened a month later.) Fighting broke out near the Uganda-Tanzania border in August, but reconciliation was achieved at the end of October.

On October 2nd, President Amin announced that he would ask South Africa to receive a ten-man Ugandan delegation to study 'the problems that face black South African people.' This decision was very likely to increase Amin's diplomatic isolation.

Missing Americans

Intertribal fighting continued through the year between followers of Amin and those of the exiled Obote, with at least 1,000 persons reported dead. On July 8 two U.S. citizens disappeared while investigating reports of intertribal warfare among Ugandan Army units at Mbarara. The two men—free-lance journalist Nicholas W. Stroh and Robert L. Siedle, American lecturer at Makerere University in Kampala—were presumed dead.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

State the patterns of Uganda's external relations in 1971.

3.4 Uganda's External Relations in 1973

Relations with the United States greatly deteriorated during the year. In February, the American ambassador in Kampala was recalled after President Amin delivered two 'totally unacceptable' messages to President Nixon criticizing the U.S. participation in Vietnam. In a further message on July 4, President Amin compounded the incident by wishing President Nixon a 'speedy recovery from Watergate.'

An even greater strain on relations, however, was the detention of 112 U.S. Peace Corps volunteers on July 7 because President Amin suspected that they were 'mercenaries.' The airplane carrying the volunteers had stopped en route to Zaïre for refueling in Uganda. After the release of the volunteers two days later, President Amin told the U.S. chargé d'affaires that Americans in Uganda would be closely scrutinised and any involved in subversion or propaganda would be severely punished. On November 8 the U.S. State Department announced that it was closing its embassy in Uganda and recalling the last American stationed there. To prevent a complete break in relations, Uganda was allowed to retain its embassy in Washington, D.C.

Meanwhile, Uganda could not afford a permanent state of hostility with her neighbours. Therefore, General Amin sought to improve his personal relations with General Mobutu Sese Seko, president of Zaïre; Jomo Kenyatta, president of Kenya; Jafaar Muhammad al-Nimery, president of Sudan; and Julius K. Nyerere, president of Tanzania. The reconciliation with Nyerere took place during the tenth anniversary Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, which was held in Addis Ababa.

As part of the 'decolonisation' process, Zaïre's President Mobutu Seseko and General Idi Amin met in July to rename the lakes lying across their common border. Lake Albert was renamed Lake Mobutu Sese Seko, and Lake Edward became Lake Idi Amin Dada.

After General Amin's visit to France early in the year to talk with President Georges Pompidou and French officials, it was announced that France would supply arms to Uganda later in the year. At the end of April, a Soviet military mission visited Uganda, also presumably ready to supply arms.

Africanising the Economy

The expulsion from Uganda in 1972 of approximately 40,000 Asians, mostly traders and businessmen, brought to fore the economic position many of these Asians had held as middlemen and entrepreneurs in Uganda. Under the announced government policy of economic Africanisation, small and medium-sized businesses and residences that were previously owned by Asians would be allocated to Ugandan citizens. The value of the goods in any store previously owned by Asians was treated as a loan by the government, which itself took over the large Asian-owned businesses, sugar estates, hotels, garages, and factories. Asian assets left in the country were estimated at \$400 million. The government also nationalised about 30 British-owned businesses and tea estates valued at approximately \$100 million. General Amin made clear that he regarded compensation to the expelled Asians and British citizens as a question with a very low priority.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain Uganda's policy of Africanising the economy.

3.5 Uganda's External Relations in 1978

Adverse international reaction to Amin's rule was mounted steadily. The December 1977 release of an Amnesty International report exposing Uganda as holding the record for human rights violations in Africa

coincided with an attempt by the Scandinavian countries to introduce a resolution in the United Nations condemning the Amin regime. African objections led to the withdrawal of the resolution, but while some African states feel that South Africa's violations of human rights deserve more attention than the aberrant behaviour of Amin, many of them (notably Tanzania, Zambia, and Liberia) have often expressed their revulsion for Amin's methods. Further occasion for revulsion was provided by the release of an Amnesty International report alleging that up to 300,000 Ugandans has been murdered by security forces since Amin seized power in 1971.

Major non-African powers had also taken a stronger stand against Uganda. The Soviet Union, which has been providing military assistance, began to phase out its aid programmes in 1978. The U.S. Congress passed and President Jimmy Carter signed in October a measure mandating a total trade embargo against Uganda, aimed primarily at halting American companies' imports of Ugandan coffee. Such purchases accounted for 37.5 percent of Uganda's export earnings in 1977. The Carter administration also acted to halt the sale of aircraft to Uganda and the training of Ugandan pilots in the United States as part of the service provided by aircraft manufacturers.

Relations with Tanzania were stormy. In late October, Uganda radio charged that Tanzania had launched an invasion in the south; Tanzania dismissed the reports as 'nonsense.' Subsequently, Ugandan troops crossed the border into northwestern Tanzania, where they occupied a 710-square-mile strip of land between the border and the Kagera River and engaged in heavy fighting with Tanzanian troops. Some Western analysts believed the incursion into Tanzania was originally made in pursuit of mutinous Ugandan troops; others hypothesised that the venture was intended to distract military units grown restive as a result of the purges earlier in the year of military leaders and of cutbacks in the luxury imports that Amin has used to essentially buy armed forces support.

Economic developments

Despite record prices for its coffee exports, Uganda has been experiencing economic problems, partly as a result of mismanagement, corruption, and the squandering of resources and partly because of the hostility of a growing number of African and non-African countries on which Uganda depends for trade or transportation. During the January national forum, the government announced curbs on luxury imports and cuts in defense spending, so as to free funds for economic development.

Shortly before his dismissal, Moses Ali acknowledged that economic growth had experienced a decline in real terms since 1971. He also

admitted that the production of coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, and sugar had dropped in the 1972-1977 period and that the government had been unable to finance all the projects envisaged under its three-year Action Programmes. Coffee production in 1976-1977 was reported to be 156,000 tons (a slight increase over the previous year), but almost the entire output of the high-priced Arabica variety (12,600 tons) was smuggled out of the country, Ali said. Uganda's budgetary deficit for 1977-1978 was expected to reach Sh2, 620 million, which the government proposed to meet by raising taxes and by selling off some of the properties confiscated from expelled Asian residents. Despite such adverse trends, then-soaring coffee prices led to a 65 percent increase in the value of Uganda's exports for the 1976-1977 fiscal year.

Following the deterioration of its relations with Kenya and the collapse of the East African Community, Uganda has been forced to rely increasingly on air transportation to carry its exports and imports. Goods have been airlifted into Uganda from such scattered locations as Gabon, Sudan, Djibouti, and Great Britain, and coffee exports have, for the most part, been routed via Djibouti and Aden by chartered pilots and aircraft. Such expensive methods of shipment could only be justified by the extremely high level of world coffee prices, and their future viability was called into question when coffee prices began declining in the latter part of 1978.

Meanwhile, serious fuel shortages developed in Uganda when American firms cut off oil shipments after the U.S. embargo legislation was signed.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the experiences of Uganda in the mist of resistance to Idi Amin's rule and other related events in 1978.

3.6 Uganda External Relations in 1992

Foreign Relations

During the first half of 1992, Rwandan authorities accused the Ugandan government of continuing its support for the rebels in the second year of their war in Rwanda. In early July the Rwandan government and rebels agreed at a meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, to a cease-fire, an international African military observer group, and further peace negotiations, which Uganda supported. Rwanda and Uganda in mid-September agreed to ban operations from their own country against the other, and to create bilateral border-monitoring teams. In January, 3,000 Ugandan refugees caught in Sudan by that country's civil war were able to return home. By

late March more than 20,000 Zairean refugees, including rebels fighting Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko's government, had crowded into the Bundibugyo district of western Uganda. A mid-February agreement among Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania to promote cooperation and border security brought hope that some version of the former East African Community might eventually be revived.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe Uganda's foreign relations in 1992.

3.7 Uganda External Relations in 1993

An August 1993 agreement halting the civil war in Rwanda improved stability and the economy in southwestern Uganda. Fighting in southern Sudan from March through October and in Zaire from January through August increased the flow of refugees to Uganda; in October, President Museveni stated that the nation was host to some 340,000 of them. The presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda signed a treaty of political and economic cooperation in Arusha, Tanzania, in early December, raising hopes for the revival of the East African Community, which had been defunct since the middle 1970s.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the pattern of foreign relations in Uganda in 1993.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Foreign relations in Uganda involve personalistic efforts towards regime consolidation and relations with other countries in the region for common challenges as well as with international community from developed nations for mutual cooperation. Gen. Idi Amin's rule especially was condemned by many nations, Western and African alike who criticized his human rights records.

5.0 SUMMARY

- h Uganda's relations with her partners in EACM and CSO suffered. Both Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania introduced their own currency
- h The Kenyan government anger and embarrassment over the discovery of a secret shipment of Chinese arms across Kenya territory pointed to the differences of interest in the region
- h Obote was deposed in 1971 while attending a conference of Commonwealth leaders in Singapore.

- h the international community condemned Uganda's deteriorable human rights
- h the coup was a reaction against Milton Obote's move to socialise the country and break up of Buganda's power
- h Obote received asylum in Tanzania, where President Nyerere was hostile to Amin
- h relationship between US and Uganda were low, leading to closure of the former's embassy
- h about 40,000 Asians were expelled in Uganda in 1972
- h government nationalised about 30 British owned businesses
- h mismanagement, corruption and squandering of resources were some of the problems confronting Uganda.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss the pattern of external relations in Uganda.

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UNIT 4 RWANDA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Rwanda's foreign policy has been characterised by relations with Europe and Africa especially East and Central Africa. Rwanda has been engulfed in decades of civil wars. We shall discuss her foreign policy with emphasis on the following years; 1964, 1969, 1970, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1980, 1983 and 1989.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h discuss Rwanda's foreign relations in the years of 1964, 1969 1970, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1980, 1983 and 1989
- h highlight the tensions in Rwanda's external relations
- h outline areas of foreign relations in Rwanda
- h explain the achievements of Rwanda's foreign policies.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Rwanda's External Relations in 1964

The king and the premier of Burundi appealed to United Nations Secretary-General U Thant at the end of January 1964 to intervene 'to put an end to provocations by Rwanda.' U Thant had already sent his

special representative in the Congo, Max Dorsinville of Haiti, to Rwanda and Burundi at the end of December to ascertain the facts. Dorsinville returned to the area in February, and he subsequently reported that 'despite the violent reprisals at the end of December,' there could be no talk of a 'systematic elimination or extermination of the Watutsi.'

Kayibanda had close ties with both Belgium and the Roman Catholic Church. He was a former theology student, and perhaps because of these associations, he had not recognised either the Soviet Union or Communist China. In return, the Communist countries tended to treat him as a Western puppet. It has been suggested that the Watutsi Inyanzi, who are active against the Rwanda government, had Chinese Communist backing, given from Peking's mission in the capital of Burundi, Bujumbura. The latter city is Inyanzi headquarters.

Economic Developments

Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa south of the Sahara and has the continent's lowest per capita income, just under \$40. The troubles between the Bahutu and the Watutsi further weakened the economy. The coffee crop was off, and the local currency had fallen to half its official value in relation to the East African shilling. Only continued financial support from Belgium kept the situation from deteriorating further.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the pattern Rwanda's foreign relations in 1964.

3.2 Rwanda's External Relations in 1969

On February 4th, diplomatic relations were resumed between Rwanda and the Congo (Kinshasa). They had been broken off 13 months earlier because of a dispute with the Congo over the deportation of white mercenaries who had taken refuge in Rwanda after involvement in an attempted revolt in the Congo. The border between the two countries was reopened simultaneously with the resumption of relations. President Kayibanda sent a representative to the May convention of the ruling Popular Revolutionary Movement in the Congo at Kisangani.

The Rwanda foreign minister joined the foreign ministers of Burundi and the Congo (Kinshasa) in a conference at Bujumbura in Burundi 'to consolidate relations between the three countries and to find solutions to their problems of development.' The ministers studied the possibilities of forming a regional grouping in accordance with the wishes of the

Organisation of African Unity. They set up three commissions, one under the responsibility of each country: political and judicial (Congo); social and cultural (Rwanda); and economic, financial, and technical (Burundi).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the relation between Rwanda and Congo (Kinshasa) in 1969.

3.3 Rwanda's External Relations in 1970

Of great importance to Rwanda was the December 1969 tripartite meeting of the heads of state of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda at the Rwandan town of Gisenyi. The meeting laid the groundwork for regional cooperation among the three countries. The Congo, the potentially richest, has the most to offer, and Rwanda, the poorest, has the most to gain from regional cooperation.

Economic affairs

Belgium, Rwanda's main source of outside help, announced a US\$4 million aid agreement for Rwanda in February 1970. Belgium sent 261 technical experts to Rwanda and helped the training of local technicians through the Belgo-Rwandan center at Murambi, which Belgian experts took over. The aid also covered agriculture, public works, education, tourism, and communications. Special arrangements were signed for the expansion of Kigali's airport and hospital center by Belgian experts.

The International Development Association, the soft-loan affiliate of the World Bank, announced in September that it would lend Rwanda US\$9.3 million for the building of a road linking Kigali with Gatuna on the Uganda border. From there the land-locked Rwandans will have road and rail links through Kenya to the Indian Ocean at Mombasa.

Although Rwanda's coffee production had risen steadily over the last few years, the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimate of the crop for the marketing year 1969-1970 was considerably down. Since coffee accounts for 50 to 60 percent of Rwanda's exports, the country's whole economy could be gravely hurt by any substantial drop in production. The forecast was all the more disturbing because of the sharp drop in the output of the country's main mineral, cassiterite, used in the production of tin.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

List the main areas of Rwanda's external relations in 1970.

3.4 Rwanda's External Relations in 1974

The year 1974 was dominated by the efforts of the new Rwandan government of President Juvénal Habyalimana to consolidate its internal and international position. The new government had come to power in July 1973 following a military coup, and the aftershocks of that event continued to be felt well into 1974.

Foreign relations

Early in the year, Habyalimana traveled to Paris for the funeral of President Georges Pompidou. Rwanda's close ties to the French-speaking world were further emphasised in August by Rwanda's attendance and participation in the African, Malagasy, and Mauritian Common Organisation (OCAM) meeting in Banqui, Central African Republic.

Twice during 1974, Habyalimana met with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre and President Michel Micombero of Burundi. These three states have many common problems, despite the traditional enmity between Burundi and Rwanda. At the end of their June summit meeting in Bujumbura, Burundi, the three heads of state agreed to work hard to eliminate border smuggling and to try to improve commerce and tourism between their countries. In addition, they agreed that any refugee that fled from one country to another would be settled at least 90 miles from the border.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss Rwanda's relations with external world in 1974.

3.5 Rwanda's External Relations in 1975

The military government of major General Juvénal Habyalimana, who seized power in 1973, attempted this year to improve Rwanda's relations with its African neighbours while broadening its political base.

Foreign relations

Rwanda's relations with its neighbours, and particularly with Burundi, its traditional rival to the south, became more cordial. Tribal animosities had been exacerbated in 1973 and 1974 by fighting in both Rwanda and

Burundi between the Hutu, Rwanda's ruling tribe, and the Tutsi, Burundi's rulers. But this year animosity seemed to be giving way to recognition of a need for cooperation for the sake of economic development. In May, Rwandan leaders met with officials from Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zaïre to discuss the development potential of the Kivu and Tanganyika lakes. In June representatives of Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaïre met in Rwanda for an organisational meeting of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes. The community was to develop plans for diplomatic and economic cooperation and for mutual security against guerrillas. Later in the year, Habyalimana solidified the new ties with Burundi on a state visit to that nation's capital, Bujumbura.

Rwanda also sought trade relations with the East African Community, which established air routes in Rwanda, and with France. In February, Rwanda was one of the Third World signatories of the Lomé Convention, providing for trade preferences and development assistance from the European Economic Community.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain the areas of external relations in Rwanda in 1975.

3.6 Rwanda's External Relations in 1976

President Habyalimana continued his policy of leading Rwanda out of the international isolation brought on by his predecessor. He pursued reconciliation with neighboring Burundi and discouraged revanchist attitudes on the part of Rwanda's Hutus toward Burundi's ruling Tutsi tribe. In June, Habyalimana received Burundi's President Michel Micombero in Kigali, and there they spent four days working out a basis for better mutual understanding and closer socio-economic cooperation.

Rwanda also attended the third summit meeting of French and African officials in Paris in May and joined in a call for a new French-African 'solidarity fund' for African development.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Outline the events indicating efforts at reconciliation with neighboring states by Rwanda in 1976.

3.7 Rwanda's External Relations in 1980

Rwanda continued to work toward regional cooperation. In December 1979, President Habyarimana attended a summit meeting of the Great

Lakes Economic Community, in Zaïre, and joined his counterparts from Burundi and Zaïre in signing multinational agreements on automobile insurance, sports exchanges, and agricultural research. As outgoing chairman of the seventh annual Franco-African summit, held in Nice, France, in May, Habyarimana warned about catastrophic economic conditions on his continent. He visited Western Europe in May; later in the year, he visited Canada and the United States, attending the UN General Assembly session in New York City.

Economy

A serious drought hurt the economy and brought an emergency infusion of \$1.9 million from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (UNFAO) in 1980. The 1979 war between Uganda and Tanzania also hampered Rwanda's economy, by causing vital supply lines to be severed. Mineral production, which generates nearly one-fourth of Rwanda's hard currency, declined, but the nation received assistance from France in exploring further mineral potential. Rwanda continued to seek financing for development of methane gas deposits in Lake Kivu.

In March, the European Economic Community granted £3 million for an irrigation project, and in June the International Development Association provided an additional \$21 million for forestry and livestock projects.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention the Rwanda's efforts towards regional cooperation.

3.8 Rwanda's External Relations in 1983

President Habyarimana participated in a summit meeting of the African and Mauritanian Common Organisation and in the conference of nonaligned nations held this year in New Delhi. In December 1982, Rwanda joined the East and Southern Africa Preferential Trade Area, which was to conduct negotiations to reduce tariffs on products in intra-African trade.

Economy

Like many other African countries, Rwanda continued to suffer from the impact of recession. Unfavorable weather compounded Rwanda's problems, causing a substantial drop in the production and export of coffee, Rwanda's major foreign exchange earner, in 1982. Slightly higher international coffee prices partly offset the export decline.

Rwanda won higher export quotas from the International Coffee Organisation for 1983 and following years. Tea production and exports increased somewhat in 1982, but sugar production dropped by 24 percent, making it necessary to import sugar to meet local needs.

A greater than expected budget deficit in 1982 required Rwanda to adopt semi-austerity policies in 1983. Although the administrative budget rose by 12 percent, the development budget declined by 1.5 percent, in sharp contrast to a 20 percent increase the previous year.

The country should benefit from a number of regional development projects to expand the road and rail networks to Rwanda from Tanzania and Kenya, through which most of its trade must pass. Rwanda in 1983 obtained loans and grants for roadway and agricultural development from the Arab Bank for Economic Development, the West German government, and the European Economic Community.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss Rwanda's Economic problems and assistance in 1983.

3.9 Rwanda's External Relations in 1989

The 60,000 Hutu refugees who had fled to Rwanda in mid-1988 as a result of ethnic violence in Burundi had been seen as a major threat to Rwanda's security. By early 1989, however, most of the refugees had been repatriated with help from the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international bodies.

In spite of long-standing differences with its southern neighbor, Rwanda took pains in 1989 to demonstrate its goodwill toward Burundi. In February, when torrential rains struck western Burundi, Rwanda sent aid in the form of metal roofing to help flood victims rebuild. On March 22 Presidents Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Pierre Buyoya of Burundi met at Cyangugu, Rwanda, and restated their determination to jointly ensure the security of their borders.

Economic Affairs

In June the World Bank approved a \$20 million loan for a project aimed at increasing agricultural productivity by improving the way services were provided to farmers. Also this year, Japan approved a loan of 3 billion yen (about \$23 million) for construction of a hydroelectric power station on the Mukungwa River. The project was controversial partly because the cost was nearly three times the average amount per kilowatt for construction of African hydroelectric projects and partly because

feasibility studies carried out for the World Bank revealed potential hydrologic and environmental problems.

Despite efforts to diversify its economy, Rwanda remained heavily dependent upon exports of coffee and, to a lesser extent, tea. A major blow was the collapse in July 1989 of an agreement under which the International Coffee Organisation had maintained average minimum prices for coffee; this resulted in a steep drop in world coffee prices.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Why did Rwanda seek to work jointly with Burundi in the area of security? Explain the foreign interest in extending economic assistance to Rwanda.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Rwanda's foreign relations in the years under consideration hinges basically on power struggle among the leading ethnic groups; Hutu and Tutsi. It further covers other critical areas like refugee and arm struggle; we have looked at the groundwork for regional cooperation among the three countries of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Rwanda.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we considered the following years in explaining foreign relations in Rwanda 1964, 1969, 1970, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1980, 1983 and 1989. We have also looked at the role of the economy in projecting the foreign relations of Rwanda during the period under discussion.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. State and discuss areas of external relations in Rwanda 1969.
- ii. List and explain important areas of external relations in Rwanda in 1970.
- iii. Outline and explain areas of foreign relations in Rwanda in 1983.

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UNIT 5 BURUNDI'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Burundi is a nation that has been engrossed in ethnic struggle for political power. Thus, it grapples with issues of refugee and mutinies among the state security agencies. The following years will be considered to introduce you to practical cases of such experiences; 1965, 1967 – 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1980 -81 and 1985.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h describe Burundi's External Relations
- h highlight the role of ethnic conflicts and power capture in defining Burundi's foreign policy
- h describe the tensions in Burundi's external relations.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Burundi's External Relations in 1965

In December 1963, Watutsi refugees from Burundi joined fellow tribesmen who had sought refuge in Uganda and the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville) in incursions into Rwanda, apparently in an attempt to restore Watutsi authority there. A protest from Rwanda to Burundi was rejected on January. 27th, 1964, and in a communication

the government of Burundi described Rwanda's President Kayibanda as 'Africa's Nero, the champion of imperialists and neocolonialists.' For a time, the two countries virtually broke off diplomatic relations. By mid-summer, however, the situation had eased somewhat. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees allocated more than \$750,000 to help settle Watutsi refugees in Burundi, Uganda, and Tanganyika (Tanzania).

As a reflex action consequent upon Rwanda's closer relations with the West, particularly Belgium, Burundi has tended to seek closer ties with both the Soviet Union and China and has accepted technical aid from both Moscow and Peking. The Chinese mission in Bujumbura (formerly Usumbura), capital of Burundi, was throughout the year in close touch with dissident Congolese who refused to accept the authority of Premier Moise Tshombe. Inevitably this led to recriminations between the governments in Léopoldville and Bujumbura.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine Burundi's foreign policy in 1965.

3.2 Burundi's External Relations from 1967 – 1969

1967

In March, the president of Burundi and Rwanda met in the presence of President Mobutu of the Congo in the Congolese town of Goma. They reached agreement in principle about the disarming of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda (where the Hutu are in power) now in Burundi and of Hutu refugees from Burundi now in Rwanda.

Also in March, it was confirmed that Belgium had approved a credit of 60 million Belgian francs to help enlarge the airport in Bujumbura and, also, that Belgium would assume responsibility for payment of the annual installment due on Burundi's loan from the World Bank.

1968

The long-standing animosity between Burundi and neighboring Rwanda was kept under control.

In March, Burundi signed an agreement with another neighbour, the Congo (Kinshasa), whereby the Congolese Army will train parachutists in the Burundi Army. Belgium pledged the equivalent of \$1.4 million for technical and financial assistance to Burundi during 1968. In March the International Monetary Fund approved a standby agreement

permitting Burundi to draw up to \$6 million over the ensuing 12 months.

1969

President Michel Micombero traveled to Uganda at the end of July to meet Pope Paul VI. In May, the president attended the convention of the ruling Popular Movement of the Revolution in the neighboring Congo (Kinshasa) at Kisangani. Burundi was among the countries represented at the conference of nonaligned states at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in July.

Economic affairs

The government announced plans to expand the area of tea plantations to 8,000 hectares (19,768 acres) producing between 6,000 and 8,000 tons of tea by 1978. The government also planned to establish eight tea-processing factories by that year.

The development fund of the European Economic Community allocated \$2,806,000 to Burundi for roadwork and \$307,000 to help the country develop a tea plantation at Rwegura, a tea-processing plant, and a power station.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain the pattern of Burundi's External Relations 1967 – 69.

3.3 Burundi's External Relations in 1970

When the 1969 plot was uncovered, allegations were made that the Belgian embassy had been involved in it. This was a risky charge to make, since Belgium, the European power which had formerly administered Burundi is the country's main source of much-needed outside aid. Belgium reacted with a strong protest note. The charges against the Belgian ambassador were then withdrawn and President Micombero dropped Labare Ntawurishira as his foreign minister.

President Micombero met with the heads of state of the Congo (Kinshasa) and Rwanda at Gisenyi in Rwanda in December 1969. The meeting was generally regarded as a forward step toward renewal of the regional cooperation which existed before the three became independent.

Economic affairs

The allegations of Belgian involvement in the 1969 plot put a strain on relations with that country, although there were signs of improvement when King Baudouin and Queen Fabiola included Bujumbura on their itinerary when visiting Africa in July. Since Belgium has continued to finance Burundi's budget deficits since independence, the Burundi government hardly afforded to be on bad terms with Brussels. When Belgium delayed signing its 1970 aid agreement with Burundi, Burundi was able to reach an agreement with France for military assistance.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the aspects of Burundi's foreign relations in 1970.

3.4 Burundi's External Relations in 1971

A highlight of 1971 was the state visit in April of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. While in Burundi, Selassie urged greater cooperation between the two countries 'within an eastern African regional framework.' During the visit, both countries announced their disapproval of any step taken by other African countries to enter into dialogue with white-dominated South Africa outside of the conditions set down in the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto. The two countries signed bilateral transport, cultural, and scientific agreements during the visit.

In June, at the Organisation of African Unity summit meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Burundi joined with other African countries in rejecting by 28 votes to six any dialogue with South Africa 'unless it has the sole objective of obtaining for South Africa's oppressed people recognition of their legitimate and imprescriptibly rights and the elimination of apartheid.' Burundi was on the OAU committee of eight that drafted this resolution.

Economic developments

Two research projects were announced this year that may in time help Burundi to alleviate its economic distress. Burundi agreed to join with neighboring Tanzania and Rwanda in the two-year Kagera River project. Financed by the three governments and by the United Nations Development Program, the project was designed to do aerial and ground surveys for determining water, power and mineral resources in the region. It was hoped that subsequently an overall development plan for the region would emerge. A second project also funded by the United Nations Development Program and the Burundi government was examining water resource possibilities on Lake Tanganyika.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention the major concerns of Burundi's external relations in 1971.

3.5 Burundi's External Relations in 1973**Relations with Tanzania**

About 40,000 of the Hutu refugees were in Tanzania. The Burundi's government views their refugee camps as a source of opposition to its rule, and in March and June there were border incidents which inflamed relations with Tanzania. In March, Burundi planes, apparently flown by French pilots, bombed three Tanzanian villages in which Burundi refugees lived, killing 74 people. Burundi initially denied that it had violated Tanzanian airspace. A similar incident occurred in June.

In July, Tanzanian dockworkers briefly boycotted Burundi trade, 85 percent of which passes through Tanzania, in protest against the bombings. President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre, who has acted as a mediator in Burundi's disputes with its neighbors, arranged talks between Tanzania's president, Julius K. Nyerere, and President Micombero. As a result, Burundi formally apologised for the border incidents, and Nyerere promised to restore commercial relations between the two countries.

Relations with Rwanda

Burundi's relations with Rwanda have often been strained because Rwanda, with roughly the same ethnic makeup as Burundi, is governed by the majority Hutu population. Throughout the year Rwanda attempted to help the Hutu in Burundi, primarily through publicising the violence, which has passed largely unnoticed in the outside world.

In May, Burundi formally accused Rwanda of supporting the Burundi rebels, and the two countries exchanged charges of genocide at the Organisation of African Unity meetings. However, after the military coup in Rwanda in July, President Micombero met with Rwanda's new president, General Juvénal Habyarimana, and the two leaders agreed to work for better relations between their countries. Burundi withdrew its complaint against Rwanda.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

List four areas that depict the soaring relationship between Burundi and Tanzania in 1973.

3.6 Burundi's External Relations in 1975

The tribal wars, which resulted in the killing of about 100,000 Hutu tribesmen by the Tutsi, the tribe of President Michel Micombero, severely strained relations with Rwanda, a traditional home of the Hutu.

A conference in May, at which Burundi, Rwanda, and nearby Zaïre discussed the development of Lake Tanganyika, gave evidence of improved relations. Tensions were further relaxed over the summer, when Rwandan President Juvénal Habyalimana paid a state visit.

In February, a Burundi delegation seeking further economic assistance visited Peking, a trade partner since 1972. The China visit notwithstanding, Burundi's traditional dependence on Western nations continued this year. Later in February, Burundi signed the Lomé Convention, which qualified it for development aid and trade preferences from the European Economic Community. At the Franco-African summit in March, Burundi pressed France for help in developing sources of energy.

Though an outspoken critic of South Africa, Burundi maintained its moderate stance on black African matters. In June, Micombero pleaded for clemency for British writer Dennis Hills, sentenced to death by Ugandan President Idi Amin for referring to Amin as a 'village tyrant.'

Economy

The depressed world coffee market and the failure, due to bad weather, of an ambitious cotton-planting scheme undercut the economy's two major exports. The resulting balance-of-payments deficit qualified Burundi for UN assistance as a 'hardship' case. At one point, the annual rate of inflation was over 20 percent, while Burundi's per capita gross national product, \$70, remained one of the lowest in the world.

One of the few bright spots on the economic horizon was the discovery of a 300-million-ton nickel deposit at Gitega.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you describe Burundi's external relations in 1975?

3.7 Burundi's External Relations from 1980-1981

Burundi abstained from the United Nations vote in January that denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Earlier, on November 26, 1979, the official newspaper *Renouveau* condemned the seizure of

U.S. embassy hostages by militants in Iran. In April, Newark, N.J., Mayor Kenneth A. Gibson made an eight-day visit to Burundi to promote business, educational, sports, and cultural exchanges.

Economy

Burundi's expansive monetary and budgetary policies produced a trade deficit of well over 2 billion Burundi francs for 1979. The International Monetary Fund extended 9.5 million special drawing rights late in 1979 to help the country overcome an export shortfall caused by a drop in coffee prices. Agricultural yields continued to decline in 1980. There was also a severe shortage of fuel wood. Only about 3 percent of Burundi is forested, and at current consumption rates, timber will be exhausted by the end of the 1980s. With outside help, Burundi is developing a 20-year supply of peat reserves in the hope that this will enable it to undertake a reforestation program.

1981

In its external affairs, Burundi has close ties with Tanzania. Within the Organisation of African Unity, Burundi is aligned with radical rather than conservative regimes. However, development assistance comes from diverse sources, including some European nations. The African Development Bank recently granted a \$13 million loan for airport expansion. Additional grants have been allocated for water, hydroelectric and telecommunications development, and road construction.

Economy

Seriously overpopulated, Burundi remains one of the poorest countries in the world. In November 1980, President Bagaza complained that economic hardship was increasing 'banditry and delinquency.' Coffee production, which generates over 80 percent of export earnings, declined because of prior overproduction. The harvest was satisfactory, and future production prospects are good. However, low world prices have limited export earnings and worsened balance-of-payment problems. Deposits of nickel, cobalt, and copper could be important in the future.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

State and explain the economic fortunes of Burundi's external relations between 1980- 81.

3.8 Burundi's External Relations in 1985

The government of President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza enjoyed a period of calm and moderate optimism in 1985. Bagaza could look back upon some notable events of the previous year. In December 1984 he hosted the prestigious annual Franco-African summit meeting, held in Bujumbura. And in November 1984, Burundi and Tanzania achieved agreement on demarcation of their mutual frontier.

Although Burundi has universal suffrage, all political candidates must be approved by the Union for National Progress, or Uprona, the government political party dominated by the Tutsi minority. Members of the Hutu, the ethnic majority, occupy only 5 of the 19 ministerial positions and 10 of 65 seats in the national assembly. Government suspicion of political involvement by Catholic clergy and particularly Belgian priests led to the expulsion in March of ten missionaries accused of spreading slanderous information in Europe. The government considered foreign missionaries partial to the Hutu and therefore, in governmental eyes, partly responsible for the mass communal violence between the Hutu and Tutsi that occurred in neighboring Rwanda before and after independence in 1962 and in Burundi itself in 1972 and 1973.

Libyan head of state Muammar al-Qaddafi visited Bujumbura in May to dedicate a gold-domed mosque built there by his country for Burundi's Muslim minority. Qaddafi's speech attacking President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire brought a threat of military retaliation upon his Burundi's host by Mobutu, who charged that Burundi was lending support to Zairian rebels. Burundi's official radio station denied the charge.

Economic Developments

Mindful of mounting foreign debt, the government was intent on keeping public spending under control. Burundi's development budget increased by only 9 percent, and the concerted effort made in 1984 to limit imports continued. Loans were obtained from diverse sources, however, for important construction projects to be undertaken by foreign firms, including improvements in roads, telecommunications, and hydroelectric power. Cotton-growing projects also attracted new loans, and output was expected to rise, with a new processing plant providing raw materials for local textile manufacture. An Amoco Oil Company subsidiary contracted for an oil prospecting concession on Lake Tanganyika. Meanwhile, efforts to obtain financing for a sugar mill to satisfy domestic needs were rewarded with \$22.5 million from foreign sources. Substantial nickel deposits remained unexploited, and the export of metals from this landlocked nation remained unprofitable

because of continued sluggish world demand. Reduced dependency on coffee was considered crucial, owing to unpredictable world market prices and the tendency of prices for exported commodities to lag behind those of imported manufactured goods and other items Burundi needs to obtain from abroad.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Outline the reasons for the expulsion of Priests in Burundi by President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza in 1985.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have explained foreign relations in Burundi, with emphasis on its internal and external crises as well as its efforts at restoring peace. The impact of such foreign policy decision on the economy has also been explained. Ethnic struggle and struggle to gain political power between the Tutsi minority and Hutu majority coupled with the precarious economic situation in Burundi shaped its foreign policies. As earlier mentioned, Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world.

5.0 SUMMARY

The main thrust of this unit is to look at the foreign policy orientation of Burundi during the period under review. We have seen that this orientation is a product of ethnic polarisation, power tussle between the minority Tutsis and the majority Hutus.

Burundi is a very poor country. This has conditioned its relations with its neighbours, other African countries and the international system. We have mentioned that although Burundi was an outspoken critic of apartheid South Africa, it maintained moderate stance on black African matters.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Examine the factors that shaped the direction of Burundi's external relations in 1965.
- ii. List the causes of soaring relations between Burundi and Rwanda in 1973.
- iii. Examine Burundi's economic relations between 1980 – 1981.

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MODULE 3 ETHNIC CRISES

Unit 1	Background to Ethnic Relations in East and Central Africa
Unit 2	Ethnic Violence in East and Central Africa
Unit 3	External Influence in East and Central Africa
Unit 4	The Role of United Nations in East and Central Africa
Unit 5	Refugee Problems in East and Central Africa

UNIT 1 BACKGROUND TO ETHNIC RELATIONS IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

CONTENTS

1.0	Introduction
2.0	Objectives
3.0	Main Content
3.1	Formation of Ethnic Identities
3.2	History of Settlement in Central Africa
3.3	Early Settlement in Burundi
3.4	Roots of the Conflict between the Hutu's and Tutsi's
3.5	The Role of European Colonisers
3.6	The Modern Conflict
4.0	Conclusion
5.0	Summary
6.0	Tutor – Marked Assignment
7.0	References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The general background of ethnic groups in the East and Central Africa has been mentioned in the previous units. There are traces of the existence of the ethnic groups with the region for a very long time. The European colonisers have also exerted a lot of influence on them. This unit specifically focuses on the formation of ethnic identities, roots of the conflict, and the role of Europeans colonisers and modern conflict in the East and Central African regions.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h explain the formation of ethnic identities in the East and Central African region
- h examine the history of ethnic settlement in Central Africa
- h describe the early settlement of ethnic groups in Burundi

- h discuss the roots of ethnic conflicts in the East and Central Africa
- h list the role of European colonisers in ethnic conflict in the region.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Formation of Ethnic Identities

If ethnicity is considered synonymous with how people are identified, both by themselves and others, then throughout Africa, language serves as its primary marker. Language links people to a specific place of origin, which, in turn, signals a shared cultural history.

The ethnic identities of many other peoples are more recent and often derive largely from external sources. The Gogo of central Tanzania are a case in point. In the mid-19th century they lived in many small clan-based chiefdom that had no sense of being part of a wider Gogo group, even though they shared the same language. However, the phrase “gogo” was a part of several of the clans’ names, and their Nyamwezi neighbors picked up on this as a way to refer to all of them. When Arab and Swahili traders arrived in the area in the mid-19th century, they adopted this designation and passed it along to the first Europeans to enter the area. Because of repeated use, the name *Gogo* became accepted, eventually by the people themselves.

This process of naming groups on the basis of language similarities gained speed during the colonial era. This was done largely for administrative purposes, allowing colonial rulers to appoint chiefs to recruit labor and collect taxes from so-called tribes occupying specific designated areas. Anthropologists followed suit and classified ethnic groups by language similarities and locale. Without these external effects, it is unlikely that many of the overarching African ethnic identities now taken for granted would have developed.

The Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi demonstrate that factors other than language play roles in the formation of ethnic identities. Prior to the colonisation of these regions, “Hutu” and “Tutsi” designated what might best be called classes, with the former referring to farmers and the latter designating cattle keepers. The two classes shared a common language, and people moved from one to the other by way of marriage or the ownership of cattle. When the Germans and subsequently the Belgians colonised the region, they assumed that the Tutsi were rulers, and thus privileged them with education and positions of authority in the colonial state. By the mid-20th century the boundaries between Hutu and Tutsi identities hardened to where they started to conceive of themselves as separate peoples. Since the independence of Rwanda and

Burundi, this separateness has periodically led to one group treating the other as a hated enemy in efforts to rule the countries. In a real sense, they now conceive of themselves as separate ethnic groups.

Way of life, not language, is what differentiates some ethnic groups from each other. In Tanzania, the Masai and Arusha speak the same language, but those who herd cattle are known as Masai, while those that gave up herding to become farmers are known as Arusha. Similarly, not too long ago, whether or not a person herded sheep distinguished Khoikhoi from San in the Cape region of South Africa. In these cases, people who changed occupations ended up changing their ethnic identities as well.

A person's religion sometimes is the crucial factor defining his or her identity. This is what differentiates Christian Copts from their Muslim neighbours in Egypt. In addition, people sometimes identify themselves as Arabs simply because they adopted the religion of Islam and developed supposed genealogical links to the Prophet Muhammad.

An interesting case of ethnicity involves the pygmy hunter-gatherers of equatorial Africa, among whom the Mbuti of the Ituri region of the DRC are best known. While there are indications that the various pygmy groups had their own unique languages at some point, they all adopted the languages of the nearby Bantu farmers with whom they interacted. In this case, occupation, residence, and physical differences all came together to create a sense of ethnic distinctiveness that both sides recognise.

Upon independence, ethnic politics thus became commonplace in Africa, with Rwanda and Burundi illustrating the extreme end of the scale. Zimbabwe has been wracked by hostility between Shona and Ndebele. In Nigeria, Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa compete, sometimes violently, with each other and with other minority groups. At the other end of the scale, ethnic politics is of little importance in Tanzania, which is so diverse that no group is particularly powerful. Sometimes older ethnic rivalries become submerged beneath other differences. This has happened in Sudan, wracked by a decades-long civil war between the Islamic, Arabic-speaking north and the non-Islamic, non-Arabic-speaking south. This conflict has put on hold long-standing disputes between the Dinka and Nuer of the south.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain the formation of ethnic identities in east and central Africa.

3.2 History of Settlement in Central Africa

According to many scholars, Hutus first settled in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa between five hundred and one thousand BC. Generally speaking, Hutus were an agricultural people who lived in large family groups.

The Tutsis, also known as Watutsis, were a nomadic people who began arriving in the Great Lakes region from Ethiopia some four hundred years ago. Eventually, the Tutsis settled amongst the Hutus - adopting their language, beliefs and customs.

But economic differences between the groups soon began to form. The Tutsis as cattle-herders were often in a position of economic dominance to the soil-tilling Hutus. That is not to say that all Tutsis were wealthy and all Hutus were poor, but in many areas, like Rwanda, the minority Tutsis ruled the Hutus.

According to some historians, like Congolese Professor George Izangola, the only difference between the two groups was economic, rather than ethnic. In a 1996 interview with Charlayne Hunter Gault, Professor Izangola explained:

In Rwanda, the Tutsi and the Hutu are the same people. They are all people (large grouping or communities) which go from seven regions of Cameroon to Uganda, all the way to South Africa in the same culture." Izangola said. "People used to be Tutsi or Hutu, depending on the proximity to the king. If you were close to the king, owned wealth and a lot of cattle, you are a Tutsi. If you are far away from the king, you are a cultivator, you don't own much cattle, then you are a Hutu.

Germans and Belgians colonised the region after World War I. A 1934 Belgian census arbitrarily classified anyone owning more than 10 cows as a Tutsi. Roman Catholic schools educated Tutsis and largely ignored Hutus. But after the Second World War, as decolonisation began to sweep Africa, the Belgians did an abrupt about-face.

Colonial rule, which began in the late 19th Century, did nothing to bring the groups together. The Belgians, who ruled what would later become Rwanda and Burundi, forced Hutus and Tutsis to carry ethnic identity cards. The colonial administrators further exacerbated divisions by only allowing Tutsis to attain higher education and hold positions of power.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine the historical differences between Hutus and Tutsis.

3.3 Early Settlement in Burundi

In the early 14th century, the Hutu arrived, probably from the Congo Basin, and imposed their language and customs on the Twa, who are believed to be Burundi's original inhabitants. The development of an organised kingdom began in the 15th century, when the Tutsi, probably migrating from the north, established themselves as feudal rulers. Tutsi kings, or *mwamis*, became monarchs of distinct kingdoms in Burundi and Rwanda. Their rule was enforced by chiefs and sub - chiefs, who each ruled an *umusizi*, a fiefdom consisting of a single hill. Political and economic relations were based on an unequal feudal relationship, known as the *ubugabire* system, in which most Hutu became serfs subjugated by and economically dependent on the Tutsi. However, Burundi's economic and sociopolitical structures were not as rigid as those of Rwanda. The power of the mwami was not absolute, and various princely leaders, known as *ganwa*, often vied for the throne. Unlike in Rwanda, marriages between Hutu and Tutsi were common in Burundi.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the early settlement of ethnic groups in Burundi.

3.4 Roots of the Conflict between the Hutu's and Tutsi's

The conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi in east and central Africa was neither new nor was it the product of ancient tribal hatreds as was so often reported. The Hutu and Tutsi are not tribes. A tribe is a distinct community with its own language, customs, territory, and religion. Hutu and Tutsi in the nations of Rwanda and Burundi share the same territory, speak the same languages (Kinyarwanda in Rwanda, Kirundi in Burundi), share the same customs, practice the same religion, and frequently intermarry. The real difference between the majority Hutu (who make up between 80 and 85 percent of the population in Rwanda and Burundi) and the minority Tutsi (between 12 and 15 percent in both countries) is sociopolitical.

The aboriginal inhabitants of the area now known as Rwanda were the Twa. Rwanda's Hutu migrated to the region later and were well established by the time the Tutsi arrived in the 1400s. This early pre-colonial society was hierarchical, with Tutsi serving as the ruling aristocracy. Their status was linked to the ownership of cattle, a symbol of social distinction in many East African societies.

Hutus were not allowed to own cattle unless the cattle were given to them by a Tutsi overlord. The granting of cattle, a ceremonial process called *ubuhake* in Kinyarwanda, was an essential link between Tutsi social patrons and their Hutu clients. For example, Hutu soldiers who served their Tutsi masters well in war were often rewarded with cattle.

Wars in the region were frequent, but they did not pit Tutsi against Hutu. Rather, they were civil conflicts between high lineage Tutsis who were supported by their Hutu retainers in a system similar to that of medieval Europe. Or they were wars between the kingdom of Rwanda and the neighboring kingdoms of Iweju, Mpororo, Nkore, or Buha, which today are part of Uganda and Tanzania.

Rwanda was first colonised by Germany (from 1894 to 1916) and then by Belgium (from 1916 to 1962). Belgium occupied the region during World War I (1914-1918) and ruled under a mandate from the League of Nations and later the UN. Both Germany and Belgium chose to exercise their rule through Rwanda's existing social system of Tutsi aristocrats and Hutu clients. However, their reasons for doing so created tensions between these groups and helped lay the groundwork for Rwanda's later conflicts.

Using physical characteristics as a guide—the Tutsi were generally tall, thin, and more “European” in their appearance than the shorter, stockier Hutu. The colonisers decided that the Tutsi and the Hutu were two different races. According to the racial theories of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Tutsi, with their more “European” appearance, were deemed the “master race” and received preferential treatment. By 1930 Belgium's Rwandan auxiliaries were almost entirely Tutsi, a status that earned them the durable hatred of the Hutu.

After World War II (1939-1945), many African colonies began moving toward independence. Favoured in everything, including education, Rwanda's Tutsi were more keenly aware of the trend toward independence and sought independence from Belgium. In a desperate bid to stave off this demand, the Belgians began supporting the Hutu against the Tutsi, touching off a violent struggle. The fighting began in 1959 and eventually led to independence under a Hutu-dominated government in 1962.

Although the number of people killed and exiled between 1959 and 1962 was small compared to 1994, the events of those years caused a great deal of damage to the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi. About 15,000 Tutsis were killed between 1959 and 1962 and about 120,000 fled Rwanda to escape persecution by the new Hutu-led government.

Many fled to Burundi, where Tutsi dominated the new independent government, but also to Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania. Some traveled as far as Europe and the United States.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the roots of conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in East and Central Africa.

3.5 The Role of Europeans Colonisers

The colonial powers had been at pains to emphasise ethnic diversity, as a way to weaken national opposition. They had encouraged a sense of ethnic difference and rivalry far greater than that which had existed in pre-colonial times. In the most extreme version of this policy, for instance, the German and Belgian rulers of Rwanda and Burundi had encouraged Hutu and Tutsi adversity. They co-opted the Tutsi aristocracy as their partners in colonial rule and, in doing so, deprived the Hutu peasantry of educational and economic opportunities. In this policy lay the seeds of Hutu-Tutsi ethnic hatred that was to lead to massacres and genocide in the 1990s. In many democratic nations of independent Africa, political parties developed around ethnic identity. As a result, insecure governments constantly feared ethnic conflict or secession. The fear was well founded, as shown by the 1967 secession of the Igbo homeland, called Biafra, from Nigeria, leading to the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention the various ways through which the European colonisers encourage ethnic conflicts in east and central Africa.

3.6 The modern conflict

Following independence in 1962, Ruanda-Urundi split into two countries: Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda, the Hutu majority lashed out at the minority Tutsis - killing thousands and forcing hundreds of thousands to flee to neighboring Uganda. In Burundi, the minority Tutsis maintained their control of the military and government through a campaign of violence against the Hutus. Although they lost multi-party elections in 1993, two assassinations and a military coup have allowed the Tutsis to remain in power.

When Yoweri Museveni, a rebel leader of Tutsi descent, seized power in Uganda in 1986, it was largely through the assistance of Rwandan Tutsis. With a power base in Uganda, the Rwandan Tutsis formed the

Rwandan Patriotic Front and began attacks against the Hutu-led government. After years of fighting, the Rwandan government launched a genocidal campaign against Tutsis living in Rwanda. According to reports, over 800,000 people were slaughtered over a period of 100 days.

Eventually, the tide turned against the Hutus and the Rwanda Patriotic Front defeated the Rwandan Army, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee, mostly to Tanzania and Zaire.

From refugee camps in Zaire, Hutus continued the fighting by launching cross-border raids on Tutsis and moderate Hutus living in Rwanda and Uganda. When Zaire's government, led by President Mobuto, was unable or unwilling to assert control over his eastern frontier, the Tutsi governments of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi backed a rebellion that toppled the state. The rebel leader they supported, Laurent Kabila, renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When the Hutu raids continued, the Tutsi-led states encouraged a second rebellion against Kabila. With Tutsi rebels continuing to fight in the former Zaire and Hutus waging guerilla battles in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, the ethnic strife that sparked the slaughters in Rwanda continue to infect the region.

The major challenges of this region have been graphically captured in the following words: *The biggest obstacle at present is that those who are in power (the minority), are like one riding on the back of a tiger. And they really want almost a water-tight assurance before they get off the back of the tiger because they feel if they get off the back of the tiger it will eat them.*

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

List the possible causes of modern conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi and Rwanda.

3.2 CONCLUSION

The co-existence of various ethnic groups in Africa in general and East and Central Africa in particular had been there since recorded history. However, the socio – economic and political factors among them have made this coexistence vulnerable to conflicts. Of salient importance has been the role of the colonial government in creating a wedge in-between ethnic groups who had coexisted as one before they were forcibly colonised. The discrimination between Tutsis and Hutus in the form of education, identity cards, and employment opportunities therefore laid a

shaky ground for post-independence Hutu and Tutsi relationship in Eastern Africa.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit provides background information on ethnic relations in East and Central Africa. Among salient issues discussed were the roles of colonialism in fomenting ethnic particularisation in the region. Although the two ethnic groups were one, they were differentiated by class: Tutsi (cattle herders) and Hutu (farmers). This configuration changed to differences in ethnic groups whereby the colonial masters propagated differences among the groups. The repercussion in post independence era is catastrophic.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Explain the implications of the pattern of ethnic formation on politics in east and central Africa.
- ii. Describe the pattern of settlement among the ethnic groups in east and central Africa.
- iii. How can colonial activities be linked to incessant ethnic crises in east and central Africa?

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UNIT 2 ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Some Ethnic Groups in the East and Central Africa
 - 3.2 Antagonism
 - 3.3 Historical Vendetta
 - 3.4 Military Maneuvers
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor – Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References /Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Over the years, states in East and Central Africa have witnessed increased level of ethnic violence; such violence has swept across the region to the extent that developmental strive has been greatly hampered. The various issues that will be discussed in this unit include identification of some of the ethnic groups in east and central Africa, antagonism among these ethnic groups, historical vendetta and military maneuvers.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h list some the ethnic groups in East and Central Africa
- h discuss the factors responsible for antagonisms among these ethnic groups
- h list the evidences of historical vendetta inherent in this crises
- h describe the military maneuvers behind this crises.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Ethnic Groups in the East and Central Africa

Kenya: Kikuyu

Kikuyu, Bantu-speaking people make up the largest tribal group in Kenya. Traditionally an agricultural people, the Kikuyu long resided in

separate family homesteads raising crops of millet, beans, peas, and sweet potatoes. Some groups also raised animals to supplement their diet, but little or no hunting or fishing took place. In these family homesteads, the basic social unit has consisted of a patrilineal group of males, (who are polygamous) their wives and children.

During the early 1950s the Kikuyu led a movement to violently overthrow the British colonial government. The resulting warfare became known as the Mau Mau rebellion. The leader of that movement, Jomo Kenyatta, was elected prime minister after Kenya gained its independence from Britain in 1963. Since that time, the Kikuyu have been an influential part of Kenyan society. Today, they are some of the most educated and prosperous people in Kenya. Many live and work in Nairobi and other cities, often in government or business.

Tanzania: Masai

Many nomadic herders live in East Africa. The Masai people live mostly in Kenya and Tanzania, and the Dinka people live in the Republic of the Sudan. Traditionally, the Masai, like other Nilotic peoples, have worn minimal dress, such as a simple cloth wrapped around the waist and legs, and elaborate body paint. They also wear beaded ornamentation in the form of necklaces or collars. Traditional dress depends on age and marital status. Young warriors, for example, wear beaded necklaces and earplugs (thick, cylindrical ornaments worn on the earlobe), with special hairstyles and headdresses. Warriors also wear short skirts of fur or hide, while women wear cloth skirts. Unmarried women go bare-chested and wear a beaded belt with their skirt. Married women traditionally wear cotton cloth body wraps, which come in a variety of colours, with red as a favorite.

Hutu in Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Congo (DR)

Hutu people make up most of the population of Rwanda and Burundi, and small neighboring countries in East Central Africa. By the estimates in 1988, the Hutu number between 12 million and 13 million and represent about 90 percent of the population in Rwanda and about 85 percent of the population in Burundi. The region has been torn by a violent struggle for power between the Hutu and the Tutsi, a rival group, and many Hutu have fled and settled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire) and Tanzania.

Most Hutu are farmers. Major crops cultivated by Hutu's include bananas, cassava, sweet potatoes, and plantains. Hutu live almost entirely in rural areas, in round grass huts on family farms dispersed throughout hills. Most Hutu are Roman Catholic, a result of the work of

European missionaries in the region beginning in the late 1800s. About one-fourth of all Hutu follow native tribal religions. The Hutu speak the native languages of Kirundi in Burundi and Kinyarwanda in Rwanda. Swahili is also spoken by those involved in trade. Those with a high school level education also speak French, but this is a relatively small proportion of the Hutu population. Less than half of all Hutu can read or write. Traditional activities include basket making, wood carving, and metal work. Proverbs and songs also play an important part in Hutu culture.

The origins of the Hutu are unclear. They probably inhabited the Congo Basin in central Africa before migrating eastward. They were well established in east central Africa by the 1400s, when the Tutsi are thought to have invaded from the north. Unlike the farming Hutu, the Tutsi were cattle herders. The Hutu became serfs subject to and dependent on the Tutsi. This social order led to centuries of tense relations between the two groups.

Tutsis in Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Congo (DR)

Tutsi, people live primarily in Burundi and Rwanda in east central Africa. For most of the last 500 years, the Tutsi have been the ruling group in this part of Africa. Since the 1950s, however, Tutsi dominance has been shaken by fierce conflicts with the Hutu, a rival group that makes up the majority of the population in Rwanda and Burundi. Hundreds of thousands of Tutsi have been killed and many others have fled Rwanda and Burundi.

There are about 2 million Tutsi. They comprise about 20 percent of the population in Burundi and 9 percent of the population in Rwanda. Almost all Tutsi live in round grass huts scattered throughout the hilly countryside. Towns and villages are rare. Most Tutsi are cattle herders. The cattle are used as currency and for trade, but rarely for food. The Tutsi diet consists mostly of grains, beans, milk, and fruit. Most Tutsi are Roman Catholic, a result of European influence in east central Africa. About one fourth of all Tutsi follow native religions. The Tutsi speak the native languages of Kirundi in Burundi and Kinyarwanda in Rwanda. Many of the better educated Tutsi also speak French. The literacy rate is slightly higher for Tutsi than for other groups in the region. More than half of all Tutsi can read and write.

The Tutsi have a rich cultural heritage. They are known for their myths, epic songs, and poetry. Traditional crafts include painting, wood carving, jewelry, and basket making. In the past, tall, splendidly adorned male Tutsi dancers, known as *intores*, and *tambourinaires* (drummers) were tourist attractions.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

List and describe some distinct features of ethnic groups in East and Central Africa.

3.2 Antagonism

In 1959 antagonism between the Hutu and the Tutsi, who still held power, erupted into violence in the region. At that time, the region was a United Nations trust territory administered by Belgium, which ruled through Tutsi leaders. Both Rwanda and Burundi gained their independence in 1962. The Hutu had gained control of Rwanda in 1961. In 1963, an unsuccessful invasion of Rwanda by Tutsi exiles prompted massacres of the Tutsi by the Hutu. In 1965 the Hutu gained a majority in the legislature of Burundi. However, when the Tutsi monarch appointed a Tutsi prime minister, the Hutu revolted. The attempted coup resulted in the massacre of most of the Hutu political figures. Burundi became a republic in 1966 under Tutsi control. In 1972, 1988, and 1993, uprisings in Burundi led to widespread massacres of hundreds of thousands of Hutu by the Tutsi.

Violence between the Hutu and the Tutsi has continued into the mid 1990s. In 1994 the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi both died in a suspicious airplane crash, which each group blamed on the other. In an effort to maintain control of Rwanda's government, the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Army initiated a campaign of genocide to eliminate the Tutsi. An estimated 500,000 to 1 million Rwandans, mostly Tutsi, were killed. This in turn led to retaliation by the Tutsi and the killing of thousands of Hutu. Up to one-fourth of the population of Rwanda, mostly Hutu fled the country in fear of further massacres.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the factors responsible for antagonism between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi.

3.3 Historical Vendetta

Relations among ethnic groups in East and Central Africa was characterised by crises, considerable amount of crises witnessed in the region has been political crises between the Hutus and Tutsis.

- h On August 14, 1988 ethnic violence erupted in northern Burundi, resulting in the deaths of at least 5,000 people and the flight of some 60,000 refugees into neighbouring Rwanda. The grisly stories of maiming and mutilation thrust Burundi back into the

spotlight as a leading example of the extremes to which ethnic hatred may lead. In 1972 more than 100,000 members of the Hutu group had been killed by minority Tutsi, who constitute about 15 percent of the population. The Tutsi, through such violence, retained their control over the government, the army, and the institutions of higher education. The tragic bloodletting of 1988 flowed from historical vendettas, exacerbated by continuing resentment over their subordinate status by the Hutu, who account for most of the remaining 85 percent of Burundi's population.

- h In the name of social and historical justice, the Hutu-dominated government in Rwanda enacted unabashedly anti-Tutsi policies in an effort to avenge years of Tutsi domination. Using ethnically based quotas, the government's "Hutu Power" ideology, a mix of ethnic and social theories whose common theme was Hutu superiority, limited what jobs and social positions could be held by Tutsis. Those Tutsis who stayed behind became second-class citizens, while those who fled abroad were not allowed to return. The Hutu-led government restricted economic opportunities available to Tutsis. Most Rwandans sought to earn a living by farming, but land was scarce owing to Rwanda's small size, about 26,000 sq km (10,000 sq mi). This scarcity was made worse by a post-independence population growth of about 3 percent annually. Tutsis who attempted to purchase land were often blocked by government restrictions, and those whose land had been confiscated between 1959 and 1962 were unable to win it back. Tutsis also faced discrimination in other fields. Government jobs, for example, were reserved for Hutus. As a result, many Tutsis went into business for themselves or worked for international organisations.
- h On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down by unknown assailants as his plane approached the Rwandan capital of Kigali. Habyarimana's death triggered a chain of events in which neighbour turned on neighbour and friend upon friend. Murders occurred within families as ethnic Hutu killed their ethnic Tutsi relatives. Many Hutu priests refused asylum to Tutsi fugitives, and some Hutu schoolteachers actually murdered their Tutsi students. Although the violence appeared spontaneous, it was in fact planned. Many reports in Western news media inaccurately described what was happening as a tribal conflict. The true causes lay elsewhere.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

List and discuss the evidences of historical vendetta behind ethnic crises in East and Central Africa.

3.4 Military Maneuvers

Unannounced military maneuvers in the north by the Tutsi-dominated army, and a particularly inflammatory speech on June 28 by a Tutsi administrator, apparently helped to ignite the simmering Hutu tensions in the communes of Ntega and Marangara, leading Hutu peasants to attack Tutsi, with ensuing counterattacks by Tutsi. The army was said to have intervened, using modern weapons to halt the clashes.

Some argued that the worsening of relations between the two groups was, in fact, a result of intra-Tutsi political intrigue designed to discredit the government of Pierre Buyoya, which came to power in September 1987. The government succeeded in limiting the violence to Ntega and Marangara, which in September 1988 were joined in a special administrative unit governed by a commissioner responsible for political activities and the rehabilitation of the two communes. Buyoya's government—which had improved relations with the Roman Catholic Church, released numerous political prisoners, and re-established some local democratic institutions—was clearly shaken by the events of August. Vowing to restore national unity, Buyoya reshuffled his cabinet in October, establishing the new post of prime minister to which he appointed a Hutu, Adrien Sibomana, the governor of Muravya province.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the evidences of military maneuver that has ignited conflict between Hutus and Tutsis.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Ethnic violence, which amounts to rising up of one ethnic group against another predominate the relationship among ethnic groups in east and central Africa. The main antagonists have been between the Hutu's and Tutsis over control of political power. This has resulted in the murder of thousands of the population.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we focused on identification of some of the ethnic groups in East and Central Africa, antagonism among these ethnic groups, historical vendetta and military manoeuvres. An important theme identified has been the continued mutual suspicion and conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis which had resulted to callous vendetta.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. List and describe 3 ethnic groups in east and central Africa.
- ii. State and discuss factors responsible for antagonism.
- iii. List and examine the evidence of historical vendetta.

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UNIT 3 EXTERNAL INFLUENCE IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

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- 2.0 Objectives
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The ethnic crisis in east and central Africa is not devoid of external influence. This influence is felt through direct and indirect measure. In this unit will we consider the following for discussion: supports received from foreign nations; the struggle for control of the region by imperialist powers; the ostensible claims by G7 imperialists to protect refugees and, the regional economic organisations.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h mention the various forms of support extended by foreign nations to crises communities
- h describe the measures of struggle for control of the region's resources by imperialist nations
- h examine the ostensible claims by G7 imperialist to protect refugee in the region
- h describe the regional economic organisations in Eastern and Central Africa.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Supports from Foreign Nations

Most of the ethnic crises in East and Central Africa were sponsored or supported by foreign nations. A typical case of crisis involving the Tutsi and Hutu attest clearly to this.

In spite of the abuses of the Tutsis by the Hutu's led government in Rwanda, the Rwandan government's resolutely pro-Western stance during the Cold War ensured that it retained solid foreign support. Many Western governments, especially those of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Switzerland, were involved in economic aid and political support for the Hutu-led government. Tutsi exiles abroad attempted to voice their concerns and complaints, but they were largely ignored.

The situation changed drastically with the outbreak of civil war in Uganda in 1981. Guerrilla leader (now President) Yoweri Museveni belonged to the Nyankole tribe from western Uganda. Museveni's social group within the Nyankole, the Himas, occupied the same social position as had the Tutsis prior to Rwandan independence. The government of former Ugandan President Milton Obote considered the Himas and the Tutsis to be natural allies and, emphasising this association, depicted Museveni as a foreigner in an attempt to discredit him. Caught in the midst of this propaganda and targeted as rebel allies, the Rwandan Tutsi refugees in western Uganda were soon engulfed in an anti-guerrilla repression and joined Museveni's fighters in order to survive. As members of Museveni's army, the Tutsi refugees gained military experience and acquired weapons. When Museveni finally won the war and seized power in 1986, the Rwandan Tutsi refugees became part of the regular Ugandan army. From their new position of power the Tutsi refugees began plotting their return to Rwanda.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention the specific supports extended to the crises ridden Rwanda by foreign nations.

3.2 The Struggle for Control of the Region

The plight of over a million Rwandan refugees was to put a righteous gloss on the call for western military intervention. However, other, less admirable, purposes than the feeding of hungry people were poignant.

A complex drama had developed in this large strategic region of central Africa with several contending forces involving diverse African ethnic groups that spread across state boundaries as well as rival western imperialist powers that never left the scene despite "independence" and who were jostling for control of the region's natural resources.

Although bloody warfare between Tutsis and the Hutus which led to the flight of over a million Hutus to Zaire has drawn the most attention, resolution of the problem in those two small countries was not the central principle in the larger drama. That "principle" lies in Zaire, a vast territory with some of the richest mineral deposits in Africa. Zaire, the former Belgian Congo, as is the case with virtually all African countries, is made up of numerous ethnic groups in provinces that have repeatedly threatened to secede. It has been held together by the ruthless dictatorship of General Mobutu Sese Seko, the willing neo-colonial ally, who had literally looted the country to amass colossal personal wealth, while millions of Zairians exist in extreme poverty.

Over time, Mobutu, who carried through the CIA plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba at the time of independence in 1960, shifted his loyalty from Belgian interests to an alliance with those of the U.S. and France, the only colonial power to keep armed forces in its former colonies. French troops have been used to intervene not only in Zaire to put down anti-Mobutu and secessionist revolts, but also in Rwanda and Burundi, both former Belgian colonies.

In the up and down struggles to govern these states, the French had supported the Hutus who are the majority group. In the recent period Zaire had slid toward chaos with rebel movements growing in the provinces, a situation complicated by the presence of the refugees in Zaire's eastern Kivu province.

In 1994 an extremist Hutu militia called the Interahamwe (those who kill together) rose up against the then-coalition government in Rwanda of Tutsis and moderate Hutus and massacred at least half a million Tutsis. It was the threat of retaliation by the Tutsi-led army that caused the mass flight of Hutus to Zaire. At this point the French army intervened with "Operation Turquoise," enabling the Hutu militia to escape and establish a base in the huge refugee camps in Zaire.

At the camps, the refugees established towns and two years elapsed before their plight became front-page news with appeals for emergency international aid, with France taking the initiative on the question. France accused the U.S. and Britain of dragging their feet over sending in an interventionist force of at least 10,000 that would supervise the delivery of aid to the refugees. It was generally recognised that the chief

problem in the camps was the Hutu militia that controlled aid shipments and killed anyone seeking to return to Rwanda and Burundi, which have been ready to receive them. The removal of the Hutu militia was obviously essential, but at French insistence the international force declared that it would not be used for that purpose.

As the question of a joint intervention was argued, some influential voices were raised in France assailing the role of the United States. The man who had reportedly masterminded French policy in Africa during the past 40 years, Jacques Foccart, called the fighting in Zaire an undeclared battle for influence between Paris and Washington, and insisted that France's real enemies are Africa and the United States.

On the 6th November, the leading French paper *Le Figaro* claimed that the U.S. was responsible for the Tutsi (i.e. ADLF) attacks in Zaire, that there were a number of U.S. military advisers in Kigali (the Rwandan capital). It also claimed that there was a Rwandan-Ugandan plot to destabilise Zaire in which Washington was behind it.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the measure used by imperialist powers to get grip of the Central Africa region's resources using the crises situation.

3.3 The Claims by G7 imperialist to protect Refugees

The recent threat of the main G7 imperialist powers to intervene in Zaire "in order to protect refugees" highlights the growing crisis in Central Africa.

A lot of scholars considered it as a pure hypocrisy. The "protection of refugees" was simply a cover to hide the real intentions: to maintain imperialists grip on the rich natural resources of the region. However, Western military intervention has been dealt a serious blow by the successes of the Zairian opposition forces in defeating the Rwandan Hutu militias and allowing the mass return of refugees to Rwanda. The pretext for sending imperialist troops to the region has been removed - temporarily.

The bulk of the problems facing the peoples of Central Africa, particularly in Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi, originated through the policy of the former colonial power, Belgium imperialism, which deliberately played off the Tutsis against the Hutus, and granted the Tutsi minority the top administrative posts. Previously, various nationalities lived together and intermarried. It was a classic case of divide and rule, leading to the present devastating conflict. However,

Belgian support for the powerful Tutsi minority waned in the 1950s when the Rwandan National Union pressed for independence. The Belgian government set up the Party of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Bahutu, sparking communal strife. In 1959 there was a war in which the Hutus drove out the Tutsis, and Rwanda declared a Hutu republic in 1962. A parallel situation developed in Burundi where the Hutus were suppressed. The Tutsis in Burundi attacked Rwanda in 1963. This resulted in 250,000 refugees, mostly Tutsi, living in Uganda, Zaire and Burundi.

A major part of the refugee problem in eastern Zaire came about when France intervened in Rwanda in 1990 and 1993 to prop up the Hutu government of Juvenal Habyarimana, and finally in 1994 to create so-called "safe havens". Then, the mainly-Tutsi opposition Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda and routed government troops and its allied Inter-ahamwe militias, which had engaged in genocide and the murder of more than 500,000 Tutsis.

The success of the opposition forces forced the Inter-ahamwe to flee. This, in turn resulted to the domination of the army and the militias over the one million refugees, who were forced to flee to Zaire. The Inter-ahamwe dominated the camps and even the food rationing supplied by the international aid agencies. They launched attacks into Rwanda and prevented the return of refugees on pain of death. The Inter-ahamwe's subsequent defeat by the Patriotic Front, freed the refugees to return to Rwanda.

In the 1950s, the Belgian imperialists, through the United Nations, moved against independence leader Patrice Lumumba, who was betrayed and murdered by troops under the command of Mobutu - trained and educated by the Belgian regime. Mobutu came to power, backed by imperialism. His authoritarian regime bled the people dry, and Mobutu turned himself into a billionaire.

Now the chickens were coming home to roost. The opposition Patriotic Front wanted to establish a more democratic regime in Zaire and had seized control of the eastern part of the country, with the support of the Tutsis, who had lived there for 200 years. The Mobutu regime had been trying to discriminate against them as "foreigners."

What motivated the imperialists, especially French imperialism, was the fear that the Mobutu regime, which was on its last legs, may collapse and open the road to possible revolutionary developments in Zaire, or even precipitate the breakup of the country. This is not new. Apart from its intervention in Zaire in the 1960s, using its Moroccan surrogates, France intervened to safeguard Mobutu in 1977 and 1978. They did the

same thing in Rwanda to protect the government during the first half of the 1990s.

The Patriotic Front had out manoeuvred the imperialists by attacking the refugee camps and forcing the Inter-ahamwe to flee to the bush, so opening the way for the hundreds of thousands of refugees to return. However, this did not totally defuse plans by the imperialists to intervene. France and Canada were still pushing hard for a full scale intervention. "Now is not the time to pause and reflect. We still have to have very direct action," stated Canadian Foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy. The United States and Britain, however, were having cold feet. Overseas minister Baroness Chalker, described the French plan as "daft".

Any foreign intervention would now meet with hostility and even military opposition. This was made clear by both Rwanda and Laurent Kabila, leader of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire. The Canadian advance force had difficulty getting out of Rwanda's capital, Kigali due to the opposition of the government.

The United Nations has played the same baneful role as always. It represents the interests of the imperialists in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The strategic, economic and political considerations are prime. The very last considerations would be the needs and interests of the peoples involved. Britain and the US have pulled back from military intervention, putting pressure on France to do the same. However, it is not excluded that they may intervene again if civil war breaks out in Zaire - in order to protect the economic interests of world imperialism, particularly the enormous natural resources of this huge area. They will want to prop up the same interests as Mobutu represented.

The United States and the other imperialists have been converted to "democracy" in the ex-colonial areas of the world because they find such regimes much more reliable than the dictators that they supported previously. That is why they wanted to abandon Mobutu if they could, and why they came out for elections in Zaire (which were rigged in any case). They made a ghastly mess in Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi and elsewhere in Africa. This is not due to the innate qualities of the Blacks (which was the imperialist's old argument), but the class interests involved. The imperialists' interest in the so-called Third World is to bleed these countries economically through adverse terms of trade, where these countries' commodities are sold below their value, while those from the West are sold at high rates thus impoverishing these countries and peoples.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine the claims by G7 imperialist to protect refugees in central Africa and east Africa.

3.4 The Regional Economic Organisations

At a summit meeting in December 1981, the leaders of the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) agreed in principle to form a wider Economic Community of Central African States. ECCAS was established on 18 October 1983 by the UDEAC members and the members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL) (Burundi, Rwanda and the then Zaire) as well as Sao Tomé and Príncipe. Angola remained an observer until 1999, when it became a full member.

ECCAS began functioning in 1985, but was inactive for several years because of financial difficulties (non-payment of membership fees) and the conflict in the Great Lakes area. The war in the DRC was particularly divisive, as Rwanda and Angola fought on opposing sides. ECCAS has been designated a pillar of the African Economic Community (AEC), but formal contact between the AEC and ECCAS was only established in October 1999 due to the inactivity of ECCAS since 1992 (ECCAS signed the Protocol on Relations between the AEC and the Regional Economic Communities in October 1999). The AEC again confirmed the importance of ECCAS as the major economic community in Central Africa at the third preparatory meeting of its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in June 1999.

Presided over by President Pierre Buyoya of Burundi, the 2nd Extra-Ordinary Summit of ECCAS was held in Libreville on 6 February 1998. The Heads of State/Government present at the summit committed themselves to the resurrection of the organisation. The Prime Minister of Angola also indicated that his country would become a fully-fledged member.

The summit approved a budget of 10 million French Francs for 1998 and requested the Secretariat to:

Obtain assistance from UNECA to evaluate the operational activities of the secretariat; to evaluate the contributions due by member states; and the salaries and salary structures of employees of the secretariat;

Convene an extra-ordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers as soon as possible to evaluate the recommendations of UNECA; the Council

should then draw up proposals for a new administrative structure for the secretariat and revised contributions due by each member state.

The summit also requested countries in the region to find lasting and peaceful solutions to their political problems. The chairman also appealed to member countries to support the complete lifting of the embargo placed on his country.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the trend of formation of regional economic organisations

4.0 CONCLUSION

The direct and indirect involvement of external powers in the crises in East and Central Africa has been explored. It is imperative to note that such interests are capable of reengineering new forms of violence if the level of consciousness among leader does not increase. Most of the ethnic conflicts in the region were sponsored by foreign powers who were interested in capturing the region to extract the resources available.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we focused our discussions on supports from Foreign Nations, struggle for control of the region by imperialist powers, and the ostensible claims by G7 imperialists to protect refugees and the regional economic organisations. The argument here is that, the external powers, particularly Belgium, France, Britain, US and Canada intervened actively in this region in order to benefit from the enormous natural resources available here. Their claim that they were protecting refugees was regarded as pure hypocrisy. These powers continue to play a preponderant role in the region even in modern times.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Mention and explain two forms of support enjoyed by crises ridden Rwanda from external power.
- ii. List and describe the measures used by foreign powers to take advantage of crises in east and central Africa and exert their influence on the region.
- iii. Outline and discuss the measures put in place by regional economic organisations to bring stability to east and central Africa.

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UNIT 4 THE ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

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 - 3.3 Consequences of the Nonchalant Attitude of the International Community
 - 3.4 Atrocities witnessed by Children as compiled by UNICEF
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 - 3.6 Problems of Reconciliation in East and Central Africa
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Since the inception of crises in Africa, the United Nations has performed a prominent role in the management of such crises. Specific topics that will be discussed in this unit are the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; genocide; consequences of the nonchalant attitudes of the international community, atrocities witnessed by children; inadequacies of measures in handling the crises and, problems of reconciliation.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h explain the role of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in East and Central Africa
- h describe the extent of Genocide in ethnic crises in East and Central Africa
- h highlight the consequences of the nonchalant attitudes of the international community,
- h discuss the inadequacies of measure in handling the crises
- h discuss the problems of reconciliation.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)

The UNRRA was established on November 9, 1943, as the first service agency of the United Nations. In 1946 it was composed of 48 member governments, each of which participated in UNRRA's policy-making Council. Nine governments — the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, France, Canada, Australia, Brazil and Yugoslavia — composed the Central Committee, which was empowered to make emergency policy decisions between sessions of the Council. Executive responsibility was vested in the Director General, assisted by his staff of over 12,000 persons and some 30 different nationalities. Herbert H. Lehman, Director General of UNRRA from its inception, resigned in March 1946, and was succeeded by Fiorello H. LaGuardia.

Purpose

UNRRA was organised to provide relief and rehabilitation to the people of liberated territories in Europe and the Far East, concentrating primarily on assisting those nations without adequate foreign exchange resources to finance their own relief imports. This assistance consisted of relief supplies like food, clothing, fuel, medicines and relief/welfare services like health, repatriation of displaced persons rehabilitation supplies and services e.g.: seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, basic farm tools, repair parts for the rehabilitation of industry, transportation, and other public utilities, and raw materials.

Finance

To finance these supplies and services, each member country not occupied by the enemy was asked to contribute one per cent of its national income for the year ending June 30, 1943. Later, it was asked to make a second contribution in the same amount. All countries, either invaded or un-invaded, contributed proportionately to UNRRA's administrative budget. As of September 30, 1946, the total operating and administrative contributions authorised by UNRRA's member governments amounted to \$3,693,509,140. The total amounts subscribed by the three largest contributors were the United States, \$2,700,000,000; United Kingdom, \$624,650,000; and Canada \$138,738,739.

Activities

After a period of planning and training, UNRRA took over relief operations from the military in Greece on April 1, 1945, and in Yugoslavia on April 15, 1945. V-J Day made possible relief and rehabilitation operations on a global basis. In 1946, UNRRA provided general relief aid to the following countries: Albania, Austria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Czechoslovakia, the Dodecanese Islands, Greece, Italy, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Yugoslavia. Programs of limited emergency aid were in effect on behalf of Finland, Hungary, and the Philippines, and a special program was being operated to help Ethiopia in the fields of medicine, welfare and transport.

During 1946, UNRRA personnel assisted the military in the care of upwards of a million displaced persons, and administered hundreds of displaced persons assembly centers.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain the mode of operation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).

3.2 Genocide

The killings in Rwanda shattered the post-World War II illusion that the world would no longer stand idly by while genocide was openly occurring. Unlike the genocide of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia that took the lives of nearly two million people in the 1970s while Cambodia was rigidly closed to the outside world, the atrocities in Rwanda were recorded on nightly television reports. The 1948 International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was shamelessly violated. Several countries, including the United States, carefully refrained from referring to what went on as “genocide.” The 1948 convention would have obliged them to take action if they had.

The UN also failed to respond, unable to overcome the conflicting concerns of its members. The UN had a force of about 1500 peacekeepers in Rwanda at the time the massacres began, stationed there as part of the 1993 Arusha agreement. These troops did not attempt to halt the genocide because UN members were concerned about becoming enmeshed in the conflict. In fact on April 21, 1994, just as some of the most violent massacres were taking place, the UN Security Council voted to reduce the number of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda.

France was in the worst position of all. The French government had provided military support to the Hutu-led government throughout its war with the RPF. France believed that the Tutsi exiles—some of whom had learned English during their years in Uganda—were bent on destroying French influence in Rwanda with the support of the United Kingdom and the United States. This bizarre view had very little to do with reality. The majority of the exiles spoke little or no English, and they certainly did not take orders from the United Kingdom or the United States. Nevertheless, this belief led French officials to maintain contacts with the genocidal regime and tolerate the worst acts of violence perpetrated by their former clients.

Because of the chaotic nature of the genocide, the total number of people killed has never been systematically assessed, but most experts believe the total was around 800,000 people. This includes about 750,000 Tutsis and approximately 50,000 politically moderate Hutus who did not support the genocide. Many of these killings were carried out by club- and machete-wielding mobs, and their victims often died horribly. Only about 130,000 Tutsis survived the massacres.

In addition to the organised slaughter, there were also thousands of rapes and beatings, and untold psychological damage was done to those who witnessed but escaped the killings. Over 100,000 houses were torn down. Businesses were looted and other property destroyed. Many of the country's most important citizens were killed or forced to flee, including its most experienced government workers, judges, lawyers, physicians, and many other professionals. These losses continue to haunt Rwanda today in the form of a poor economy, an overwhelmingly backlogged judicial system, and an inexperienced government.

The killings also triggered a new round of fighting between the government and the RPF, which sought to stop the slaughter by ousting the Hutu-led government. As the RPF advanced, its forces killed an estimated 50,000 Hutus considered responsible for the massacres. The Hutu-led government attempted to use these killings to convince the Hutu population that the RPF, which came to power in July 1994, was planning counter-genocide and that all Hutus should flee the country.

The ousted Hutu government was partially successful. By August 1994 more than two million Hutus (about 30 percent of Rwanda's Hutu population) had fled to Tanzania and what was then Zaire (now renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo). Many of those responsible for planning and executing the genocide accompanied the refugees, hiding among the mass of innocents. Under the influence of these extremists,

the UN-supported refugee camps became hotbeds of subversion and terrorism aimed at the new RPF-led government.

Three years after the genocide ended, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), created by the United Nations (UN), had yet to bring a war criminal to justice. In contrast, the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established in 1993 to try war crimes committed during the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, proceeded relatively smoothly. The ICTY reached its first conviction in May 1997. The ICTR's lack of progress has led many Rwandans to believe that the outside world is more concerned about "ethnic cleansing" in Europe than about mass atrocities in east central Africa.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the involvement of external forces in the Rwanda's Genocide episode.

3.3 Consequences of the Non-chalant Attitude of the International Community

The problems that led to Rwanda's 1994 crisis (overpopulation, economic backwardness, ethnic tensions) are far from being resolved. Politically, the Tutsi-led government appears bent upon repeating its predecessors' mistakes by repressing its rivals and jealously guarding its power. In neighboring Burundi a similar repression has led to the formation of Hutu rebel movements and resulted in a long-term civil conflict that killed hundreds of thousands of people.

The perceived indifference of the international community has contributed to a hardening of positions on both sides. However, some efforts have been made to change that perception. On July 18th, 1997, officials from the ICTR, assisted by Kenyan authorities, arrested seven genocide suspects in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. Among those arrested was Jean Kambanda, who briefly served as the prime minister of Rwanda during the 1994 genocide and was accused of helping inflame the violence. The arrests brought the total number of genocide suspects held by the ICTR to 19 out of 21 indicted. By comparison the ICTY has indicted 78 people and has 10 suspected war criminals in custody. Two men charged with war crimes have been convicted.

Nevertheless, many Tutsis are increasingly convinced that the only way to ensure their survival is to repress the Hutus. Many Hutus believe they have been proclaimed guilty by association and that no one cares about their sufferings under the current Tutsi-led government. Extremists on

both sides retain the belief that the only solution is the annihilation of the other. These groups are preparing for a future struggle, one that could include another wave of mass slaughter.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

List the overlaps that led to continued genocide in Rwanda and Burundi.

3.4 Atrocities Witnessed by Children as Compiled by UNICEF

Although United Nations peacekeeping troops began withdrawing from Rwanda on March 8th 1996, the international community continued to assist the country in its recovery from massacres carried out during a civil war in 1994. Also on March 8, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) released a report that cataloged the experiences of Rwandan children during the 1994 massacres. On March 12th, a report sponsored by the government of Denmark criticised the international community's response to those massacres. Finally, a summit was convened in Tunis, the capital of Tunisia, from March 16 to 18 to discuss the ongoing refugee problem.

During the summer of 1994, an estimated 500,000 Rwandans were killed in a wave of terror and violence. Most of those killed were members of the minority Tutsi ethnic group, although some politically moderate members of the majority Hutu ethnic group were also targeted. UNICEF's survey, conducted in 1995, questioned more than 3000 children, both Hutu and Tutsi, between the ages of 8 and 19. The survey found that the events of 1994 will likely haunt Rwandans for many years.

Almost every child surveyed witnessed some form of violence during the civil war. About 80 percent of them lost family members and more than 33 percent witnessed the murder of one or more of their family members. Approximately 33 per cent witnessed other children taking part in the killings, and an equal number witnessed some form of sexual assault. More than 50 per cent saw large numbers of people killed at once, 50 percent witnessed persons hacked to death with machetes, and more than 40 percent witnessed someone being slain with a firearm. 60 percent of the children were threatened with death, 80 percent of them hid in order to survive, and 16 percent hid under corpses. Most of those surveyed thought they would die during the massacres, and more than one-third said they do not expect to reach adulthood.

In an effort to help these children recover from their traumatic experiences, UNICEF trained more than 6000 Rwandans in basic

counseling techniques. Although UNICEF estimated that it had helped nearly 150,000 children, the agency said many thousands more needed trauma counseling.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention the Atrocities witnessed by Children as compiled by UNICEF in the genocide episode.

3.5 Inadequacies of Measures in Handling Crises

The international community was partially to be blamed for the massacres, according to a study financed by organisations and countries that took part in the Rwanda relief effort. The \$1.7-million study concluded that the UN was aware of plans to conduct mass killings in Rwanda but failed to respond to these early warning signs. If adequate political action had been taken in the months before the killing began, said the study, the massacres, as well as the subsequent refugee problem, might have been avoided.

Media organisations were also criticised for treating the massacres as a spasmodic tribal conflict rather than an example of calculated, systematic genocide. However, despite these and other criticisms, the report concluded that the international relief effort was generally effective and saved lives. These lessons should be applied to Burundi, a neighbouring country with an ethnic mix equally prone to tense relations, said the study. In February 1996, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recommended that the UN create a standby force of peacekeeping troops that could quickly intervene if a similar situation developed in Burundi.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

State the inadequacies of Measures in Handling Crises.

3.6 Problems of Reconciliation in East and Central Africa

One of the largest obstacles to reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda was the ongoing refugee crisis. Nearly two million refugees remain in camps in Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. The March summit in Tunis, organised by former United States President Jimmy Carter, was attended by Rwandan leaders and by the leaders of the refugee host countries. The summit, which Carter described as a success, discussed ways to accelerate the repatriation of refugees. Attendees agreed to meet again in the United States in May.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss how the ongoing refugee crises hinder the reconciliation process.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The role of the United Nations in mitigating the effect of the crises in east and central African has been explained here. There is no gainsaying that the United Nations failed to timely respond, and to overcome the conflicting concerns of its members. A total number of about 800,000 people killed would have been averted if the UN had taken an early and proactive stand. The nonchalant attitude of the international community has been condemned.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit has discussed the role of the UN in the crisis in East and Central Africa. We started by highlighting the role of UNRRA. It is evident that like the international community, the UN did little to avert the conflict and timely intervene to avoid the orgy of murder and massacre witnessed in the region.

6.0 TUTOR–MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. State and explain the purpose of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).
- ii. Mention and examine the atrocities witnessed by children in the various genocides that occur in east and central Africa.

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UNIT 5 REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The issue of refugee is very critical in all crises ridden societies; it brings about untold hardships on people. Refugee generates multiple problems such as destitution, hunger, disease among many other unpleasant experiences. The various issues that will be examined in this unit include: the definition of refugees; causes of refugees; the historical résumé and the legal rights and protection of refugees.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- h define refugee
- h list the causes of refugee
- h state the legal rights and protection of refugee
- h discuss the impact of refugees on the socio-political landscape of Central and Eastern Africa.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Definition of Refugees

A refugee is a person who is forced to leave the country in which he or she lives because of a well-founded fear of persecution. Such persecution may stem from race, religion, nationality, political opinions, or membership in a social group. An international agreement, adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 1951, established this definition in international law. The definition of a refugee is sometimes extended to people who flee their countries because of wars, human rights violations, and other disturbances. In popular usage the term *refugee* is applied more generally to any individual who has been forced to flee from his or her home.

The definition of refugees was extended by two regional organisations. The Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) extended the UN definition of refugee in 1969 to include every person compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence and seek refuge in another country owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing the public order. A group of Central American states adopted the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees in 1984. It includes as refugees people who have fled their country because their lives, safety, or freedom were threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order.

People who flee their homes seek *asylum* (safety and protection) in another country. According to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” However, not all countries wish to host refugees. Some countries fear that refugees may compete with inhabitants for scarce resources, or that their presence may worsen racial, ethnic, religious, or economic conflict. In addition, the host country may not want to upset relations with the country of origin by accepting its refugees.

Refugees need assistance, such as food, shelter, and healthcare, when they seek asylum in another country. International and local organisations provide this assistance. These organisations house the refugees in refugee camps until it is safe to return to their home country. If return appears unlikely, they seek to resettle the refugees in the host country or another country. However, some refugees remain in camps for years. For many refugees, the flight to safety is not the end of the ordeal but only its beginning.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What is refugee? State and discuss four attributes of refugee.

3.2 Causes of Refugee

In Africa, civil wars that followed the end of colonial rule have been a frequent source of refugees. In Europe certain national boundaries drawn after World War I (1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1945) disregarded the ethnic composition of the territories, which made nation-building difficult and often violent. Not all the nations stayed together. Yugoslavia, for example, broke apart during the 1990s, leading to ethnic conflict and civil war, which created many refugees. In Asia many refugees were created as a result of the Korean War (1950-1953), the Vietnam War (1959-1975), and wars in Afghanistan from 1979 into the 1990s. In the Middle East the events most responsible for displacing people include, the partition of Palestine in 1948, the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and Iraq from the 1980s on, and the U.S.-Iraq War (2003- Date)

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

List four causes of refugee across various continents.

3.3 The Historical Résumé

The UN definition of a refugee was developed following World War II. During that war, millions of people were displaced by the fighting and the Holocaust. But the concept of a refugee dates back much earlier. Throughout recorded history, oppression and disaster have caused people to flee their homelands. In biblical times, the enslaved Israelites fled Egypt. Millennia later, in the 15th century, the Moors and Jews, hounded by the Inquisition, were expelled from Spain. In the 17th century the Puritans, seeking religious freedom, settled in what became the United States; in the 18th century the nobility fled France during the French Revolution; and political exiles left central and southern Europe during the upheavals of the mid-19th century. After World War I, people were displaced en masse from Asia Minor, the Russian Empire, and the Balkans. During the 1930s, many fled from China because of the Japanese invasion and from Spain because of the Fascist victory in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). During World War II, an estimated 7 million Jews and others threatened by the Nazis fled their homelands.

Following the resettlement of millions of displaced persons after World War II, the United States and other countries established programs to admit refugees from the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. During this same period, refugees fled the Communist takeovers of

Tibet and mainland China; Dutch nationals left Indonesia during the struggles for Indonesian independence; and Arabs in Palestine were displaced as a result of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and 1949. The pattern continued: Cubans fled their country's Communist revolution in 1959, and other peoples fled revolutions in the following decades (Pipher, 2002).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the historical Résumé of refugee.

3.4 Legal Rights and Protection

Until the early 20th century, refugees, who depended for survival on aid from private groups, lacked both legal rights and protection. Since the end of World War I, various international organisations have been created to protect and assist refugees. Most were founded to serve specific groups in certain geographic areas for a specific time. Currently, legal protection and material assistance are provided to refugees by the United Nations Office of High Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR. Established in 1951 to resettle the refugees still remaining in European post-World War II displaced persons' camps, UNHCR succeeded the International Refugee Organisation. This agency, in turn, had succeeded the Office of the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the first such international agency, founded in 1921.

Operating at the request of its 120 member countries is the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration, founded in 1951. Its major function is to oversee the movement of refugees to host countries; it also works to assist the economic and social development of emerging nations. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is responsible for refugees who fled Israel in 1948 and who, with their descendants, have not been absorbed by neighboring Arab states.

The international government refugee agencies work closely with other national and international agencies. Foremost among these agencies are the International Rescue Committee, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, and the U.S. Committee on Refugees.

The legal status of refugees is defined by two United Nations documents: the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. These documents specify the rights and duties of

refugees, including the right to work, to public assistance, to elementary education, to access to courts of law, and to social security (Hein, 1995).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

State the legal rights of refugee.

3.5 Refugee as a Factor in Africa

Africa, with more than 40 nations and 600 ethnic groups, has about one-fourth of the world's refugees, people uprooted by famine or by liberation struggles and escaping racial and ethnic oppression and economic hardship. Caught in the turmoil that characterises developing nations, some African nations have had both an inflow and outflow of refugees, and in time their former exiles are often repatriated. After political and ethnic fighting broke out in Rwanda in 1994, an estimated one-quarter of the country's population died or fled the country, primarily into the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (then called Zaire). Many of the refugees returned to Rwanda after a new government was established later that year. Many Angolan refugees also returned to Angola after a ceasefire was signed in 2002, ending that country's long-running civil war. In Sudan hundreds of thousands fled the Darfur region to escape ethnic violence in the early 2000s.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss refugee situation in Africa.

3.6 African Refugee as Outcome of Wars

The incessant crisis among the ethnic groups in East and Central Africa was responsible for growing number of refugees in the region. This caused a lot of untold hardships on people within the region.

The DRC had a population (2008 estimate) of 68,008,922, with a density of 30 persons per sq km (78 per sq mile). Largely rural, the population was concentrated in the eastern highlands and along rivers. Only about 33 percent of the population lives in cities. In 2004 the DRC also had a refugee population of about 199,323, many of whom were exiles from instability in Rwanda. The remainder was Burundians, Angolans, and Sudanese, all fleeing upheavals in their countries. Meanwhile, about 462,203 DRC citizens had taken refuge in neighboring countries due to violence in the eastern DRC.

In July 1994 refugees from Rwanda began streaming into Zaire because of the ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in that country. More than 1.3 million Rwandans gathered in camps along Zaire's eastern border. The Zairian government and the UN struggled to find a way of safely returning the refugees to Rwanda. In February 1995 the UN sent Zairian troops to maintain order in the camps. In August the Zairian government ordered that refugees be forcibly expelled from the camps. After about 15,000 refugees had been forced back into Rwanda, the government halted the operation in response to international pressure. In November 1995 Mobutu attended a summit in Cairo, Egypt, with the presidents of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, and a representative from Tanzania to discuss the situation. The leaders agreed on a plan to encourage the exiles to return to Rwanda, but most refugees resisted being repatriated. The Hutu, who feared reprisals from Rwanda's Tutsi regime, were particularly resistant. Many camps were controlled by armed Hutu militias made up of former members of the Rwandan army, some of whom had been responsible for genocidal killings in Rwanda. The militias had begun to use these camps as staging areas for raids into their homeland (Cutts, 2000).

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What were the experiences of Rwandan refugees during the war?

3.7 Refugee Camps as Bases for Formation and Training of Militia

Most of the refugee camps in the region were used as bases for forming and training militias either to launch reprisal attacks on governments of home states or to overthrow them.

From bases in the teeming refugee camps of eastern Zaire, the ousted Hutu army was purchasing weapons with money taken from the national treasury and conducting cross-border raids. Despite Rwanda's calls for the camps to be shut down, international attention was focused more on caring for the refugees than sorting out the guilty from among their ranks. The few attempts that were made to shut down the camps met with resistance from the refugees, who had been told by the extremists that they would face retribution in Rwanda.

Meanwhile, as the UN-sponsored war crimes tribunal was struggling to get off the ground, many of the genocide's masterminds were openly living abroad. Exiled government officials denied that the genocide had even taken place, insisting instead that their victims had died in battle.

These circumstances led to a radicalisation of the Rwandan government. The military began to demand an increased role in the political process, and RPF hardliners moved to consolidate their control over the government. Government reshuffles in August 1995 and March 1997 resulted in the removal from power or demotion of many Hutu politicians, especially those with independent political support. These politicians were replaced with Hutus who owed their prominence to the RPF. Even Tutsis tended to be chosen more on the basis of their support for the RPF than any other quality. As a result, the government grew increasingly authoritarian and militarised.

This trend was reinforced by the sudden crisis that developed in late 1996 in what was then Zaire. Most of the Hutu refugee camps in Zaire were located in the two eastern provinces of Sud-Kivu and Nord-Kivu, just across the border from Rwanda. The presence of so many anti-Tutsi elements in eastern Zaire intensified existing tensions between the Zairian government of Mobutu Sese Seko and Zaire's ethnic Tutsi population. In the fall of 1996, the Banyamulenge (a Kinyarwanda-speaking group of Zairian Tutsis) rebelled against Zaire's efforts to force them out of the country. Rwanda began providing military support to the rebels. While assisting the Banyamulenge, the Rwandans also moved to close down the refugee camps. Amid the chaos in Zaire, the Tanzanian government forced Hutu refugees who had fled to Tanzania in 1994 to return home.

By December 1996 several hundreds of thousand refugees had crossed back into Rwanda. The remainder, including many of those responsible for the genocide, fled into the Zairian jungle. They were driven westward by the advancing rebels, who by then were comprised of several movements in addition to the Banyamulenge and were known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL). Many of the refugees died during their trek across Zaire, and the UN has found evidence that some were killed by the AFDL. Under the command of veteran revolutionary Laurent Désiré Kabila, the AFDL overthrew Mobutu in May 1997.

SELF – ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe refugee as the bases for formation and training of militias.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The result of ethnic animosities and conflict in East and Central Africa has been human rights challenges, poverty, absence of good governance and refugees' crisis. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other legal instruments on the status of refugees such as the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the status of refugees have specified the rights and duties of refugees, including the right to work, to public assistance, and to elementary education, to accesses to courts of law and to social security.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have looked at the legal tools, administrative procedures and the impact of refugees in the Central and Eastern region of Africa. Issues covered in this unit include the definition of refugees; causes of refugees; legal rights and protection of refugees and the impact of refugees on the region.

6.0 TUTOR – MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. List and explain the causes of refugees.
- ii. State and examine the legal rights and method of refugee protection.
- iii. How would you describe refugee camps as bases for formation and training of militias?

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