



NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE CODE: INR 351

COURSE TITLE: EUROPE IN WORLD POLITICS



**COURSE
GUIDE**

INR 351
EUROPE IN WORLD POLITICS

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INTRODUCTION

INR 351 Europe in World Politics is a one semester course in the third year of B.A (Hons) degree in International Studies. It is a two unit credit course designed to introduce you to, on the one hand, the history of Europe and on the other hand, the place of Europe in the shaping of global politics. The course begins with a brief introductory module on the history and social geography of Europe which, among other things, discusses the different notions of Europe.

‘Europe in ‘World Politics’ provides an interesting background to the context within which international politics has been framed and thus to the more detailed study of international relations. It is designed to facilitate your understanding of the centrality of Europe, not so much in geography or even politics as it once was, but in the development of many of the ideas, concepts and perspectives that now drive international relations. The study units are structured into modules. Each module is structured into average of 4 units. A unit guide comprises of instructional material. It gives you a brief of the course content, course guidelines and suggestions and steps to take while studying. You can also find self-assessment exercises for your study.

COURSE AIMS

The aim of this course is to give the students of international relations a comprehensive knowledge of the role of Europe in the evolution and development of contemporary world politics.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of this course is to enable you understand the role and place of Europe in international politics. The specific objectives of each study unit can be found at the beginning and you can make references to it while studying. It is necessary and helpful for you to check at the end of the unit, if your progress is consistent with the stated objectives and if you can conveniently answer the self- assessment exercises. The overall objectives of the course will be achieved if you diligently study and complete all the units in this course.

WORKING THROUGH THE COURSE

To complete the course, you are required to read the study units and other related materials. You will also need to undertake practical exercises for which you need a pen, a note-book, and other materials that will be listed in this guide. The exercises are to aid you in

understanding the concepts being presented. At the end of each unit, you will be required to submit written assignment for assessment purposes. At the end of the course, you will be expected to write a final examination.

THE COURSE MATERIAL

In this course, as in all other courses, the major components you will find are as follows:

1. Course Guide
2. Study Units
3. Textbooks
4. Assignments

STUDY UNITS

There are 20 study units in this course. They are:

Module 1 History and Social Geography of Europe

- Unit 1 What or where is Europe?
- Unit 2 Europe: 1789-1945
- Unit 3 World War Two and the Immediate Postwar Years
- Unit 4 The Cold War Years

Module 2 Key Players in Europe

- Unit 1 Britain in European International Politics
- Unit 2 France in European International Politics
- Unit 3 Germany in European International Politics
- Unit 4 Russia/Former Soviet Union in European International Politics

Module 3 Regionalism in Europe

- Unit 1 The Vision of a United Europe
- Unit 2 The Treaty of Rome
- Unit 3 Incremental Regional Integration in Europe: The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty
- Unit 4 The European Union: Structure, Membership and Roles

Module 4 The Transatlantic Relationship

- Unit 1 An Overview of EU-US Relations
- Unit 2 The United States and European Security

Unit 3 EU-US Relations in Afghanistan, Iran, Russia etc.

Module 5 Contemporary Issues in Twenty First Century Europe

Unit 1 Terrorism and Global Security

Unit 2 Immigration and the Challenge of Multiculturalism

Unit 3 EU Expansion

Unit 4 Europe and the Rise of Global Environmentalism

As you can observe, the course begins with the basics and expands into a more elaborate, complex and detailed form. All you need to do is to follow the instructions as provided in each unit. In addition, some self-assessment exercises have been provided with which you can test your progress with the text and determine if your study is fulfilling the stated objectives. Tutor-marked assignments have also been provided to aid your study. All these will assist you to be able to fully grasp the spirit and letters of Europe's role and place in international politics.

TEXTBOOKS AND REFERENCES

At the end of each unit, you will find a list of relevant reference materials which you may yourself wish to consult as the need arises, even though I have made efforts to provide you with the most important information you need to pass this course. However, I would encourage you, as a third year student to cultivate the habit of consulting as many relevant materials as you are able to within the time available to you. In particular, be sure to consult whatever material you are advised to consult before attempting any exercise.

ASSESSMENT

Two types of assessment are involved in the course: the Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs), and the Tutor-Marked Assessment (TMA) questions. Your answers to the SAEs are not meant to be submitted, but they are also important since they give you an opportunity to assess your own understanding of the course content. Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMAs) on the other hand are to be carefully answered and kept in your assignment file for submission and marking. This will count for 30% of your total score in the course.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

At the end of each unit, you will find tutor-marked assignments. There is an average of two tutor-marked assignments per unit. This will allow you to engage the course as robustly as possible. You need to submit at least four assignments of which the three with the highest marks will be

recorded as part of your total course grade. This will account for 10 percent each, making a total of 30 percent. When you complete your assignments, send them including your form to your tutor for formal assessment on or before the deadline.

Self-assessment exercises are also provided in each unit. The exercises should help you to evaluate your understanding of the material so far. These are not to be submitted. You will find all answers to these within the units they are intended for.

FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING

There will be a final examination at the end of the course. The examination carries a total of 70 percent of the total course grade. The examination will reflect the contents of what you have learnt and the self-assessments and tutor-marked assignments. You therefore need to revise your course materials beforehand.

COURSE MARKING SCHEME

The following table sets out how the actual course marking is broken down.

ASSESSMENT	MARKS
Four assignments (the best four of all the assignments submitted for marking)	Four assignments, each marked out of 10%, but highest scoring three selected, thus totalling 30%
Final Examination	70% of overall course score
Total	100% of course score

COURSE OVERVIEW PRESENTATION SCHEME

Units	Title of Work	Week Activity	Assignment (End-of-Unit)
Course Guide			
Module 1	History and Social Geography of Europe		
Unit 1	What or Where is Europe?	Week 1	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Europe: 1648-1945	Week 1	Assignment 1
Unit 3	World War Two and the Immediate Post War Years	Week 2	Assignment 1
Unit 4	The Cold War Years	Week 3	Assignment 1
Module 2	Key Players in Europe		
Unit 1	Britain in European International Politics	Week 4	Assignment 1
Unit 2	France in European International Politics	Week 5	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Germany in European International Politics	Week 6	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Russia/Formal Soviet Union in European International Politics	Week 7	Assignment 1
Module 3	Regionalism in Europe		
Unit 1	The Vision of a United Europe	Week 8	Assignment 1
Unit 2	The Treaty of Rome	Week 9	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Incremental Regional Integration in Europe: The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty	Week 10	Assignment 1
Unit 4	The European Union: Structure, Membership and Roles	Week 11	Assignment 1
Module 4	The Transatlantic Relationship		
Unit 1	An Overview of EU/US Relations	Week 12	Assignment 1
Unit 2	The United States and European Security	Week 13	Assignment 1
Unit 3	EU-US Relations in Afghanistan, Iran, Russia etc	Week 14	Assignment 1
Module 5	Contemporary Issues in Twenty First Century Europe		
Unit 1	Terrorism and Global Security	Week 15	
Unit 2	Immigration and the Challenge of Multiculturalism	Week 15	
Unit 3	EU Expansion	Week 16	

Units	Title of Work	Week Activity	Assignment (End-of-Unit)
Unit 4	Europe and the Rise of Global Environmentalism	Week 16	
	Revision	Week 17	
	Examination	Week 17	
	TOTAL	17 Weeks	

WHAT YOU WILL NEED FOR THE COURSE

This course builds on what you have learnt in the 100 and 200 Levels. It will be helpful if you try to review what you studied earlier. Second, you may need to purchase one or two texts recommended as important for your mastery of the course content. You need quality time in a study-friendly environment every week. If you are computer-literate (which ideally you should be), you should be prepared to visit recommended websites. You should also cultivate the habit of visiting reputable physical libraries accessible to you.

TUTORS AND TUTORIALS

There are 15 hours of tutorials provided in support of the course. You will be notified of the dates and location of these tutorials, together with the name and phone number of your tutor as soon as you are allocated a tutorial group. Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, and keep a close watch on your progress. Be sure to send in your tutor-marked assignments promptly, and feel free to contact your tutor in case of any difficulty with your self-assessment exercise, tutor-marked assignment or the grading of an assignment. In any case, you are advised to attend the tutorials regularly and punctually. Always take a list of such prepared questions to the tutorials and participate actively in the discussions.

ASSESSMENT EXERCISES

There are two aspects to the assessment of this course. First is the Tutor-Marked Assignments; second is a written examination. In handling these assignments, you are expected to apply the information, knowledge and experience acquired during the course. The tutor-marked assignments are now being done online. Ensure that you register all your courses so that you can have easy access to the online assignments. Your score in the online assignments will account for 30 per cent of your total

coursework. At the end of the course, you will need to sit for a final examination. This examination will account for the other 70 per cent of your total course mark.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAs)

Usually, there are four online tutor-marked assignments in this course. Each assignment will be marked over ten percent. The best three (that is the highest three of the 10 marks) will be counted. This implies that the total mark for the best three assignments will constitute 30% of your total course work. You will be able to complete your online assignments successfully from the information and materials contained in your references, reading and study units.

FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING

The final examination for INR 351: Europe in world politics will be of two hours duration and have a value of 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of multiple choice and fill-in-the-gaps questions which will reflect the practice exercises and tutor-marked assignments you have previously encountered. All areas of the course will be assessed. It is important that you use adequate time to revise the entire course. You may find it useful to review your tutor-marked assignments before the examination. The final examination covers information from all aspects of the course.

HOW TO GET THE MOST FROM THIS COURSE

1. There are 20 units in this course. You are to spend one week in each unit. In distance learning, the study units replace the university lecture. This is one of the great advantages of distance learning; you can read and work through specially designed study materials at your own pace, and at a time and place that suites you best. Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to the lecturer. In the same way a lecturer might give you some reading to do. The study units tell you when to read and which are your text materials or recommended books. You are provided exercises to do at appropriate points, just as a lecturer might give you in a class exercise.
2. Each of the study units follows a common format. The first item is an introduction to the subject matter of the unit, and how a particular unit is integrated with other units and the course as a whole. Next to this is a set of learning objectives. These objectives let you know what you should be able to do, by the time you have completed the unit. These learning objectives are meant to guide your study. The moment a unit is finished, you

must go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives. If this is made a habit, then you will significantly improve your chance of passing the course.

3. The main body of the unit guides you through the required reading from other sources. This will usually be either from your reference or from a reading section.
4. The following is a practical strategy for working through the course. If you run into any trouble, telephone your tutor or visit the study centre nearest to you. Remember that your tutor's job is to help you. When you need assistance, do not hesitate to call and ask your tutor to provide it.
5. Read this course guide thoroughly. It is your first assignment.
6. Organise a study schedule – Design a 'Course Overview' to guide you through the course. Note the time you are expected to spend on each unit and how the assignments relate to the units. Important information; e.g. details of your tutorials and the date of the first day of the semester is available at the study centre. You need to gather all the information into one place, such as your diary or a wall calendar. Whatever method you choose to use, you should decide on and write in your own dates and schedule of work for each unit.
7. Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything to stay faithful to it.
8. The major reason that students fail is that they get behind in their coursework. If you get into difficulties with your schedule, please let your tutor or course coordinator know before it is too late for help.
9. Turn to Unit 1, and read the introduction and the objectives for the unit.
10. Assemble the study materials. You will need your references for the unit you are studying at any point in time.
11. As you work through the unit, you will know what sources to consult for further information.
12. Visit your study centre whenever you need up-to-date information.
13. Well before the relevant online TMA due dates, visit your study centre for relevant information and updates. Keep in mind that you will learn a lot by doing the assignment carefully. They have been designed to help you meet the objectives of the course and, therefore, will help you pass the examination.
14. Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that you have achieved them. If you feel unsure about any of the objectives, review the study materials or consult your tutor. When you are confident that you have achieved a unit's objectives, you can start on the next unit. Proceed unit by unit through the course

and try to space your study so that you can keep yourself on schedule.

15. After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the course objectives (listed in the course guide).

CONCLUSION

This is a theory course but you will get the best out of it if you cultivate the habit of relating it to political issues in domestic and international arenas.

SUMMARY

'Europe in 'World Politics' introduces you to the history and social geography of Europe. It also explains the role and place of Europe in contemporary international politics. All the basic course materials that you need to successfully complete the course are provided. At the end, you will be able to:

- recount the history and social geography of Europe; its social and political evolution since at least the 17th century and how it has contributed to the shaping of world history
- explain the underlying social, economic and political issues that have driven that evolution
- determine the place and role of Europe in contemporary international politics
- describe the role of specific European countries in the development of Europe
- explain the role being played by Europe, its institutions and its countries in the development of ideas like environmentalism and multiculturalism.

List of Acronyms

CAP Common Agricultural Policy

COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

EDC European Defence Community

EMU European Monetary Union

EU European Union

NAFTA North Atlantic Free Trade Area

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland

USA United States of America

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



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MODULE 1 HISTORY AND SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE

Unit 1	What or Where is Europe?
Unit 2	Europe: 1648-1945
Unit 3	World War Two and the Immediate Postwar Years
Unit 4	The Cold War Years

UNIT 1 WHAT OR WHERE IS EUROPE?

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3.0	Main Content
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3.2	Europe as a Territorial Unit
3.3	Europe as an Idea
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Europe has been one of the most important influences on the contemporary international system. Indeed, it is often said that the universalisation of the international system is in fact a mere globalisation of an essentially European system. The perception of the foundations of the contemporary international system as Eurocentric is not unfounded. As the literature has shown, the evolution of the contemporary international system can be traced to the treaty of Westphalia which established the state-based contours of international relations. This generally accepted beginning of the present international system in itself provides compelling evidence of the immense influence of European culture, history and civilisation on the way global politics is being conducted at the moment.

In this unit, we will address the definition of that much talked about entity: Europe. We will examine the various issues that matter when a definition of Europe is attempted and why there are different ways to conceptualise Europe. For instance, we will look at Europe as a civilisation, geographical entity and as an idea. We will also take note of the variations that characterise even these broad areas of distinction and

briefly touch on the implications of this divergent notions of Europe on its role in world politics.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the fluid character of Europe
- carve out the relevance of the various definitions of Europe to global politics
- explain the conception of the main players in Europe, the shifting nature of its boundaries and its widespread influence in many other parts of the world.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Europe as a Civilisation

Europe has been described by Palmer and Perkins (2003: 396) as a civilisation, a territorial unit and an idea. This description encompasses three common notions of Europe that have driven the understanding of its role in modern international history and of its potentials as a force in contemporary politics. Europe is considered the heartland of the civilisation that evolved from the Judaic-Greco-Roman and Christian tradition. It is generally referred to as western civilisation. As a civilisation therefore, Europe has its roots in the traditions that evolved from 'world' empires like Greece and Rome and in the normative values of Christianity.

Interestingly however, the geographical boundaries of this distinctly European civilisation have spread far beyond its heartland in continental Europe. There was indeed a time when this civilisation controlled almost the entire world. For instance, it spread its values to the New World (America), New Zealand and Australia. It also effectively colonised peoples as far flung as Africa and India. In fact, throughout the modern historical period, European civilisation has been largely dominant. This civilisation however has its divisive strands. For instance, it has been noted that efforts should be made to distinguish between Western Christian and Western Orthodox civilisations. Western Christian civilisation is centred on West and Central Europe (states like Germany, France, Britain and Spain) while Orthodox civilisation finds its homeland in Russia. While there may be slight variations in these 'two' civilisations however, their origins and essential values are similar. The

divisions are less a civilisational one as they are products of politics and economics. Non western civilisations like the Chinese are for instance very clearly distinct in origin and character.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

To what extent can Europe be described as a civilisation?

3.2 Europe as a Territorial Unit

While the notion of Europe as a civilisation is rather fluid and faced with challenges and divisions, its geography is perhaps less difficult to gauge. According to Charles De Gaulle, Europe 'extends from the Atlantic to the Urals'. This implies that it covers an area of approximately four million square miles, and is divided into as many as 40 states. These states are vastly different in size and national power. From European Russia, with almost half of the entire land mass to the Vatican which covers only 108 acres, European states are the epitome of diversity. States like Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Italy wield immense influence within the continent and indeed, to varying extents, in global politics. The continent can be divided into seven main geographic regions, namely:

1. Eastern Europe (Russia and Poland).
2. South East Europe (Romania, Hungary, the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and European Turkey)
3. Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal and minuscule states like the Vatican, San Marino and Andorra)
4. Central Europe (Germany, former Czechoslovakia, Austria, Switzerland and Liechtenstein)
5. Western Europe (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Monaco)
6. The British Isles (the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland)
7. Islands like Cyprus, Iceland and Malta.

In general, Europe is situated on the western tip of the Eurasian land mass. Its coastal location and the belt of prevailing westerly winds give much of the continent a temperate climate and sufficient rain. Eastern Europe however suffers from extremes of heat and cold typical of continental climates while the Mediterranean basin has a dry summer climate.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Briefly discuss the seven main geographic regions of Europe.

3.3 Europe as an Idea

The third key notion of Europe is its perception as an idea. In this regard, it is a culture as well as a civilisation. Shaped by its social, political, cultural and material history, Europe is in many ways a mosaic of values bound together by common notions of unity and history. This means that it is a combination or collection of values that are connected by a shared sense of history. This notion of a united Europe is framed by the implications of its cultural and religious heritage, its topography, political history and deepening multiculturalism. Driven by both its most honoured history and its darkest past, the idea of a united, peaceful and prosperous Europe, providing normative as well as substantive leadership for the world, has endured significantly since the time of the Romans. It is not unusual to encounter talk of European, or western values, having universal validity even in contemporary European Union discourses. This is very much like the notion of civilised 'Romans' or 'Greeks' as against the 'Barbarian others' that were common in European history. As an idea therefore, Europe represents, or at least is seen to do so by its protagonists, the quintessential essence of human civilisation.

This notion understandably has its antagonists. In fact, the very definition of Europe in a physical sense is highly contentious. For instance, many people consider it rather naive to regard Russia and Turkey as parts of Europe. Some others find it difficult to exclude European colonists in America and the South West Pacific (New Zealand and Australia) from Europe. In fact, the extensive influence of European culture on former colonies in Asia and Africa make some regard Europe as extending far beyond its continental borders to include these very different peoples. The perception of Europe may also in a sense include only states that have joined the European Union. With a definition like this, 'Europe' becomes smaller than the continent of Europe.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How does the imperative of unity drive the notion of Europe?

4.0 CONCLUSION

What the above three descriptions of Europe indicate is that it is difficult, if not outrightly impossible; to set the frontiers of a continent that has never really had precise boundaries. In fact, in a globalised twenty first century, where technological advances and new media have greatly increased global interconnectivity, and with it, the ability of Europe to influence, and indeed be influenced by the rest of the world, it

is a considerably difficult enterprise to determine with precision the frontiers of European culture, civilisation or even territory. This is not to suggest that Europe means the world or that the world is European, rather, it is an acknowledgement of the immense contributions of Europe to modern history and its having stamped, more than any other civilisation, its distinct nature on the contemporary international system.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the different ways in which Europe can be defined. We drew attention to the cultural, geographical and social dimensions of Europe and provided some introduction into how much Europe has both influenced and been influenced by the rest of the world.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. How would you describe Europe?
- ii. Why is it difficult to precisely determine the boundaries of Europe?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Palmer, N. & Howard, P. (2004). *International Relations: The World Community in Transition*. Delhi: AITBS.

Toynbee, A. (1953). *The World and the West*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Willis, F. R. (1968). *Europe in the Global Age: 1939 to the Present*. New York: Harper and Row.

UNIT 2 EUROPE: 1648-1945

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- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 The French Revolution
 - 3.2 The Rise of Science, Imperialism and Militarism in Europe
 - 3.3 The First World War
 - 3.4 Postwar Settlement: The Treaty of Versailles
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The industrial revolution had remarkably changed the social, political and economic conditions of Europe from the 16th century onwards. While it has strengthened to varying degrees, the capacity of the various kingdoms, municipalities and empires that dotted the European landscape to solve many basic human problems on a larger scale than had been possible, it also introduced new tensions and challenges that would further remodel Europe. Some of these new challenges included the urbanisation of Europe and the attendant problems of catering for the urban poor. Of course, new political philosophies emphasising human rights and challenging the 'divine' rights of monarchs and the power of feudal lords also emerged and gained increasing popularity with the emerging class of the urban poor. The French revolution; without prejudice to internal conditions in France; was in many ways, a response to some of the new social issues raised by the industrial revolution. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia also set the context for interstate relations in Europe and decisively put the state at the center of international politics.

This unit traces European history from the 1648 treaty of Westphalia to the beginning of the Second World War. It looks at the contributions of the French revolution of 1789 to the alliances that held together, and later tore Europe apart. It also addresses the technological advances of the period and how it encouraged imperial ambitions, militarism and eventually World War.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the events of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia
- explain the 1789 French revolution and its implications for future political developments in Europe
- describe the complex sequence of events and intricate alliances that made the First World War virtually inevitable
- establish a link between the Postwar Treaty of Versailles that marked the end of the First World War and the discontent that led to the Second World War.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The French Revolution

The Treaty of Westphalia had created a world where potentates could rule through generally established rules of interstate conduct. One of these rules; that of sovereignty; was however severely tested by the events that followed the French Revolution. The French Revolution was not only a crucial event considered in the context of Western history, but was also, perhaps the single most crucial influence on European intellectual, philosophical, and political life in the nineteenth century. In its early stages, it portrayed itself as a triumph of the forces of reason over those of superstition and privilege, and as such it was welcomed not only by English radicals like Thomas Paine and William Godwin and William Blake, who characteristically, saw it as a symbolic act which presaged the return of humanity to the state of perfection from which it had fallen away, but by many other liberals all over Europe as well and by some who saw it, with its declared emphasis on "liberty, equality, and fraternity," as being analogous to the so called Glorious Revolution of 1688. However, as it descended into the madness of the Reign of Terror, many who had initially greeted it with enthusiasm came to regard their early support as, in Coleridge's words, a "squeaking baby trumpet of sedition" had second thoughts.

Members of the old regime in Europe, on the other hand, had from the first, allied itself closely with philosophers like Locke and Newton, those great advocates of reason and order, and Edmund Burke could denounce the revolution in 1790 in his great *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, elegantly bound copies of which George III, who was not renowned for his intellect, gave to all his friends, saying that it was a book "which every gentleman ought to read." Burke maintained

that the radicals who had begun the revolution by releasing the enormous pent-up quasi-religious energies of the common people of France were interested first in the conquest of their own country and then in the conquest of Europe and of the rest of the world, which would be "liberated" whether it wished to be or not. Tom Paine's great response to Burke's work, *The Rights of Man*, appeared in 1791, and the debate between conservatives and radicals raged on for many years and certainly influenced, directly or indirectly, the thought and the work of every major European author for the remainder of the century and beyond.

Many historians have described the French Revolution as the encounter of competing classes. In such an appraisal the revolution is seen to begin with aristocratic protest against the absolute monarchy bequeathed by Louis XIV, then to enlarge in scope as a bourgeois movement seeking fundamental political change, and, finally, to take on popular dimensions with working-class participation, particularly in Paris.

In its first and no-activist phase, from 1787 to 1789, the revolution therefore amounted to a legal debate between monarchy and aristocracy over the financing of the state and the political authority which each claimed to enjoy and exercise. It was the near bankruptcy of the state, largely caused by aid to the American revolutionaries, that served as the immediate provocation for aristocratic opposition in 1787, when an assembly of notables (consisting of aristocrats), called by the king and his finance minister, demanded political authority in return for tax reform. This assembly achieved nothing but further aggravation between monarch and aristocracy. However, if the aristocracy now presumed to speak in the name of the "nation," it certainly made no request to extend the political base of the nation.

Such an extension was demanded and obtained by the bourgeoisie, who ushered in the major phase of the French Revolution. To quote again the words of Georges Lefebvre, "The Revolution of 1789 restored the harmony between fact and law." The fact was that the bourgeoisie were the most significant economic element within France. The wealth they generated and the professions they filled were far more important than the political role they were allowed by tradition and law to play. Through revolutionary ideology and institutional change, the bourgeoisie gained a political authority not known before in any European country. In this sense, the French Revolution was a bourgeois revolution. The abolition of aristocratic privileges, the confiscation of church and aristocratic lands and their purchase by the bourgeoisie, and the removal of internal obstacles to trade and commerce allowed the middle class greater economic and social mobility.

Yet it should not be assumed that revolutionary practice directly followed revolutionary principle. The exigencies of the time--war, counterrevolution, factionalism within the various governments combined to tempt the revolutionary leaders to shelve most of the ideals until peace and calm were restored. The most influential factor in this decision was the war which the French began, out of fear of foreign invasion, on April 20, 1792. As the "Declaration of Revolutionary Government" issued on October 10, 1793, succinctly stated: "The provisional government of France is revolutionary until the peace." Put otherwise, revolutionary times required revolutionary, not democratic, government. The now familiar arguments about "national security" were then new, but no less disturbing.

The problem of war against France-England had joined Prussia and Austria in April of 1793 and the problem of provisioning the home population with sufficient staples, again the issue of "bread" complicated government and allowed another social element to play an important role in the revolution. This element was the multitude, variously called the "crowd," "the mob," or the "rabble." Thomas Carlyle, trying to paint a fiery-bright picture of the revolution, described Paris in the second week of July 1789 as already a city in which "the streets are a living foam-sea.... Mad Paris is abandoned altogether to itself." From his mid 19th century perspective, Carlyle viewed the crowd as an uncontrolled mob, blood-thirsty and wild-eyed.

Recent scholarship has disputed and abandoned this view. Today we know the so-called "mob" was composed primarily of lower middle-class artisans, that their initial behaviour was no more disorderly than that of protest movements we witness with great frequency in our own age. Far from wishing to be part of a "spontaneous anarchy," as a French contemporary of Carlyle's saw the situation, the Parisian crowds were set upon relieving the unsatisfactory living conditions they felt had resulted from a government both mismanaged and insensitive. They were interested in having their immediate grievances righted; high-flung ideological considerations were of no concern to them.

In a way, therefore, the revolutionary forces that disturbed France in the summer of 1789 were coincidental: the coming together at a particular time of people protesting their economic plight and people seeking fundamental governmental reform. As many critics have asserted, it was the weight of the urban crowds and the direction of the reform-minded bourgeoisie that gave the French Revolution its force. As the revolution became more popular in support, it also became more intolerant; this dual situation occurring in the years 1793 and 1794, when the Jacobin faction that most closely identified with the people of Paris and with

democracy was supreme. (The Jacobins were named after their meeting place in a monastery in the rue St. Jacob).

In June 1793 the Jacobins effectively removed their political opposition and proclaimed a "republic one and indivisible," in which legislative power would be predominant. The ascendancy of the legislative assembly had begun earlier and had reached an important stage in April 1793, when the Committee of Public Safety was established. This 12 man group was, as its title suggests, responsible for the well-being of the state. But by the summer of 1793, when the Jacobins had reorganised the committee and effectively controlled the government, the revolutionaries were exhibiting a political ruthlessness unlike any seen before. As they set out to eliminate their enemies, they seemed to follow the cynical imperative coined at the time: "Be my friend, or I will kill you."

It was during the Reign of Terror, 1793-1794, that revolutionary tribunals meted out hasty justice. Opponents of the regime, revolutionaries themselves, fell beneath the blade of the guillotine. This was the awful period in which "the revolution devoured its own." Some 11,000 individuals died as enemies of the state, and their deaths added up to a new, horrendous activity of modern western civilisation: institutionalised violence, the harsh elimination of political opposition by the state. Later, Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany would cause the figures of the French revolution to seem small. Unfortunately, the mass age would also mean mass annihilation.

The terror was spent by the summer of 1794, when reaction against it set in. The end was reached at the moment the individual most frequently identified with the harshness of revolutionary retribution, Maximilien Robespierre (1758-1794) was himself beheaded on July 28, 1794. It is important to note that Robespierre came closest to being a revolutionary "hero." A lawyer and one of the first declared republicans, Robespierre was a man of determination, anxious to see the revolution realised according to his writings. Many say that Robespierre was Rousseau's translator, taking the philosopher's ideas on equality and civil government and making them public policy. Yet Robespierre's political behaviour was far from democratic. Elected to the Committee of Public Safety in July 1793, he soon came to dominate that group, hence dominate the revolutionary government. He exhibited himself as a ruthless individual, incorruptible, dictatorial, impersonal, and determined to sweep away all who opposed the revolution. He urged the war on against the monarchical powers of France, and he encouraged the Reign of Terror. He was feared and unloved. He was the image of the modern revolutionary whose profession and passion are political.

Certainly, the French Revolution had a quality of spontaneity, of accident, that later revolutions did not have. There was no clearly defined revolutionary party or conspiratorial group that initially plotted the revolution, and the contending factions that followed after the revolution had occurred never gained a firm grip on the nation's imagination or its institutions. The Jacobins came closest, but their unchallenged period of rule was limited, lasting only a year.

It must be remembered that the French Revolution was the first major social revolution, of far greater dimensions and of deeper purpose than the American revolution that had preceded it. Only the Russian Revolution of November 1917, the one that ushered in modern communism, would rival in world importance what occurred in France between 1789 and 1799. Underlying this extended dramatic development was the new belief that revolution was the most effective means to achieve political and, consequently, social change. Not reform from within, but overthrow from without appeared to be the new law of political physics.

The 10 years of the French Revolution have since been reviewed in terms of the old historical concern with change and continuity. To the revolutionary demand for a "new secular order" came the conservative response that society can never be built anew. According to this interpretation, we are all inescapably part of our own age historically determined, hence socially indebted to previous generations. The usual analogy made to support this argument was that of a house: the present occupant can renovate, alter, add new wings; but if an attempt is made to remove the foundation, the whole structure will collapse.

At the basis of the debate over what the French Revolution could and did accomplish is to be found the 19th century concern with liberalism and conservatism. To sweep away the old and begin the new was the liberal solution; it was predicated upon the assumption that human nature was essentially good, mankind essentially rational, and the purpose of life the "pursuit of earthly happiness." To respect the past, to work within the social structure that now exists so that it is modified, not destroyed, was the conservative solution; it was predicated upon the assumption that human nature was weak, mankind essentially selfish, and the purpose of life the search for social stability and order.

Equally enduring as a historical problem was the position of the French Revolution on the time scale: was the Revolution the end of one era or was it the beginning of another? It seems to have been both: it ended a world based on tradition, on blood-right, on fixed social status. In principle and by legislation, it made the individual citizen the centre of a

new social order. The social order should, therefore, be designed to maximise this freedom, this personal liberty.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What was the impact of the French Revolution on notions of human rights?

3.2 The Rise of Science, Imperialism and Militarism in Europe

The deeper causes of both World Wars have to be sought in the industrialisation of European mode of life, and in the capitalist imperialism of the second half of the 19th century. The upheaval in economy and society caused by new technology, modern means of communication and transport, and the rapid growth of the European population led to the development of the modern capitalist economy. Britain was the birthplace and starting point of the process of industrialisation. It became the world's departmental store. The British imported raw materials from their colonies and delivered the finished products all over the world.

Between 1850 and 1870, the European continent, as well as North America, completed the transition to an industrial mode of living. The United States carried out the process of industrialisation at the same rate as the leading industrial nations of Europe, which were at that time Great Britain and France. The Civil War of 1861-1865, with the defeat of the Confederate States, saved the large American union and secured its way to becoming an industrial world power—a portentous event for the development of Europe and the world. It was at this same time that East Asia was forcibly opened up by the two Anglo-Saxon world powers and France. After the bloody suppression of the Sepoy Revolt from 1857 to 1859, the English made India into a crown colony and made it the heart of the British Empire. By Admiral Perry's 1853 expedition, the Americans forced Japan to abandon its policy of isolation, and by the beginning of the Meiji period in 1868, Japan's adoption of the new industrial economy took hold with ever-increasing speed. In the same way, China, the country with the world's largest population, was forcibly joined to the Anglo-Saxon economic system by the peace treaty of Peking in 1860, which had been preceded by the British Opium Wars (1840-1860). France had been involved in these wars too. The Chinese Empire was thus degraded to a semi-colony.

In the 70s, capitalist imperialism set in, starting from England, as a competition of powers now borne on the wings of technology. World economy, as it was developed radiating from Great Britain, involved, and still involves, the drive to world hegemony through the struggle to dominate resources and markets. In this competition for global rule, the British Empire was to a great extent in the lead. From this largest commonwealth in human history, stretching over five continents, capitalist imperialism ever widened its orbit of power.

Runners-up were the United States and (especially on the European mainland) the German Reich. Germany's industry took off at a breathtaking rate. Between 1870 and 1890, German inventive genius, German organisation, diligence, and competence shaped the newly unified German Reich into the leading industrial power of the European continent, and in English eyes, made it a bothersome competitor. In 1887, the British government enacted the Trade Marks Act, requiring any German product coming onto the British world market to bear the mark "Made in Germany." This measure soon boomeranged, however. For the consumer, "Made in Germany" became the sign of the better, while at the same time the less costly, product.

German competition grew irresistibly. In the fields of iron and steel production and in the chemical industries, Germany outdistanced its British competitor by the turn of the century. To this were added the growth of merchant shipping, and later, the navy. In the 80s, the German Reich acquired protectorates or colonies in Africa. In the 90s, a number of islands in the Pacific were added. On the coast of China, Germany acquired Kiaochow with its capital Tsingtao by a lease treaty in 1897. As Germany's industrial and financial power as well as its trade increased, a growing antagonism between Germany and the British Empire arose. Everywhere the ambitious German industry confronted a British competitor avidly observing the growing danger to his monopolistic trade relations, jealously guarded until then.

Naturally, the rapid growth of Germany's population, economy, and its military potential was a thorn in the sides of its neighbours on the continent. France had never overcome the defeat of 1870 and thirsted for revenge. Russia, the largest land power and main enemy of the British Empire throughout the 19th century (especially in Asia), had lost the Crimean War in 1856, and had to withdraw in the face of British power after a second, victorious war against the Turkish Empire, for fear of another military confrontation with England.

These ethnic, trade and commercial rivalries not only threatened the political stability of Europe but created the economic crisis that aided the emergence of militaristic and aggressive populists in key states.

Hitler's rise to power can be easily mapped along this trajectory. His reading of the German condition in the late 1920s are not unconnected to the rapid social changes that were emerging in Germany as in other parts of Europe as a consequence of reconfigurations of the modes of production. Hitler was however not alone in militarism as he was, of course, helped along by the tense environment in Europe and the rise of militaristic leaders in Japan and Italy.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How did industrial advances lead to militarism in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century?

3.3 The First World War

In the preceding unit, we talked about the scientific advances that Europe witnessed and how they helped promote imperialism and eventually militarism. One of the main consequences of this is the First World War. The First World War was unprecedented in its devastation. It not only destroyed the balance of power system that had kept relative peace in Europe before 1914, it also recreated the structures of European statehood. A war that was described as 'the war to end all wars' also ironically, set the context for the even more destructive Second World War that was to erupt barely 20 years later.

The explosive that was World War I had been long in the stockpiling; the spark was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. Ferdinand's death at the hands of the Black Hand, a Serbian nationalist secret society, set in train a mindlessly mechanical series of events that culminated in the world's first global war.

Austria-Hungary's reaction to the death of their heir (who was in any case not greatly beloved by the Emperor, Franz Josef, or his government) was three weeks in coming. Arguing that the Serbian government was implicated in the machinations of the Black Hand (whether she was or not remains unclear, but it appears unlikely), the Austro-Hungarians opted to take the opportunity to stamp its authority upon the Serbians, crushing the nationalist movement there and cementing Austria-Hungary's influence in the Balkans. It did so by issuing an ultimatum to Serbia which, in the extent of its demand that the assassins be brought to justice effectively nullified Serbia's sovereignty. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, was moved to comment that he had "never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character." Austria-Hungary's expectation was that Serbia would reject the

remarkably severe terms of the ultimatum, thereby giving her a pretext for launching a limited war against Serbia. However, Serbia had long had Slavic ties with Russia whose role would present Austria-Hungary with an altogether different configuration. Whilst not really expecting that Russia would be drawn into the dispute to any great extent other than through words of diplomatic protest, the Austro-Hungarian government sought assurances from her ally, Germany, that she would come to her aid should the unthinkable happen and Russia declared war on Austria-Hungary. Germany readily agreed, even encouraged Austria-Hungary's warlike stance.

Having given this background, it may be much clearer to give the sequence of events that culminated in the First World War in bullet form:

- Austria-Hungary, unsatisfied with Serbia's response to her ultimatum (which in the event was almost entirely placatory: however her jibbing over a couple of minor clauses gave Austria-Hungary her sought-after cue) declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914.
- Russia, bound by treaty to Serbia, announced mobilisation of its vast army in her defence, a slow process that would take around six weeks to complete.
- Germany, allied to Austria-Hungary by treaty, viewed the Russian mobilisation as an act of war against Austria-Hungary, and after scant warning declared war on Russia on 1 August.
- France, bound by treaty to Russia, found itself at war against Germany and, by extension, on Austria-Hungary following a German declaration on 3 August. Germany was swift in invading neutral Belgium so as to reach Paris by the shortest possible route.
- Britain, allied to France by a more loosely worded treaty which placed a "moral obligation" upon her to defend France, declared war against Germany on 4 August. Her reason for entering the conflict lay in another direction: she was obligated to defend neutral Belgium by the terms of a 75-year old treaty. With Germany's invasion of Belgium on 4 August, and the Belgian King's appeal to Britain for assistance, Britain committed herself to Belgium's defence later that day. Like France, she was by extension also at war with Austria-Hungary.
- With Britain's entry into the war, her colonies and dominions abroad variously offered military and financial assistance, and included Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa.

- United States President Woodrow Wilson declared a U.S. policy of absolute neutrality, an official stance that would last until 1917 when Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare - which seriously threatened America's commercial shipping (which was in any event almost entirely directed towards the Allies led by Britain and France) - forced the U.S. to finally enter the war on 6 April 1917.
- Japan, honouring a military agreement with Britain, declared war on Germany on 23 August 1914. Two days later Austria-Hungary responded by declaring war on Japan.
- Italy, although allied to both Germany and Austria-Hungary, was able to avoid entering the fray by citing a clause enabling it to evade its obligations to both. In short, Italy was committed to defend Germany and Austria-Hungary only in the event of a 'defensive' war; arguing that their actions were 'offensive' she declared instead a policy of neutrality. The following year, in May 1915, she finally joined the conflict by siding with the allies against her two former allies.

As the above show, an intricate tangle of alliances made the world wide scale of that war almost inevitable as soon as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had been delivered. It's clear from the summary above that the alliance system was as much at fault as anything in bringing about the scale of the conflict. What was intended as a strictly limited war - a brief war - between accuser and accused, Austria-Hungary and Serbia, rapidly escalated into something that was beyond the expectations of even the most warlike ministers in Berlin (and certainly Vienna, which quickly became alarmed at spiraling events in late July and sought German reassurances).

The above analysis of events has not by any means encompassed all of the suggested contributory factors that led inexorably to world war. It is however a comprehensive if not exhaustive description of the immediate and remote causes of the war. As can be gleaned, the war of 1914 has its roots primarily in the complex alliance systems that had preserved a tenuous peace in Europe in the decades before 1914. What we have done is to pull together the main strands: Austro-Hungarian determination to impose its will upon the Balkans; a German desire for greater power and international influence, which sparked a naval arms race with Britain, who responded by building new and greater warships, the *Dreadnought*; a French desire for revenge against Germany following disastrous defeat in 1871; Russia's anxiety to restore some semblance of national prestige after almost a decade of civil strife and a battering at the hands of the Japanese military in 1905.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

To what extent can the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 be viewed as responsible for the outbreak of World War I?

3.4 Postwar Settlement: The Treaty of Versailles

By early 1918, attention had turned from war to keeping the peace as soon as the guns went silent. The Versailles treaty has been touted as an enterprise that not only ended one World War, but as having provided the justifications for another round of even deadlier conflict. The Treaty of Versailles was in no fundamental sense a success or failure. The accord was merely another chapter in the long history of multilateral peace conferences summoned to terminate multilateral wars, a history which extends from the 1648 treaty of Westphalia to the annual summits of the dominant industrial powers of our day and conveys an impression of extensive efforts succeeded by major failures. The large cast and the large agenda, rather than ill will or outright incompetence, may account for the shortcomings of these grand affairs.

The Paris Peace Conference for instance, fits this scenario. It was convened to resolve the problems accumulated by a war that had lasted far longer and had been more costly than anyone had expected. Some of these problems antedated 1914 by centuries as the earlier unit on the First World War and its complex alliances has shown. Let us, however, not forget that the war which the participants of the Paris Peace Conference had fought differed from its most immediate predecessors. Frederick the Great's armies numbered tens of thousands; Napoleon led an unprecedented 500 men to disaster in Russia; and the wars of the 19th century engaged armies of 100,000 to 200,000 at most. Now millions battled on many fronts in engagements lasting not days, but months.

World War I had been a democratic war, not only because of the incidence of representative institutions among belligerent governments, but because it enlisted soldiers and civilians of both genders. While young males reported for combat, fathers and grandfathers, wives, sisters, girl friends and mothers, took over the farms, operated the machinery of sophisticated manufacture, and ran public utilities. These non-combatants were also involved in the fray as taxpayers and subscribers to war bonds. Economic mobilisation was as essential to the war effort as was the military. Governments as a result of the unprecedented scale of the crisis faced immense pressures and had to take spur of the moment decisions that gradually but inevitably led to war.

Similar handicaps surrounded the efforts to make peace. So long as fighting continues belligerents are preoccupied with the pursuit of military victory. They cannot predict when that goal, or its opposite, defeat, will be reached. True, governments announce war aims, formulate multi-point peace programs, and their propaganda describes the terrestrial paradise that will follow the bloodbath, but when hostilities end, proposals for an actual settlement are as much improvisations as were the battle plans. Before the Paris Peace Conference the newspaper-reading public had heard of Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points, of the expectation of a world safe for popular self-government, and of the pledge to drive the Germans out of Belgium and to turn Alsace-Lorraine over to France. There was also the less public commitment to help Russia gain control of the Straits of the Bosphorus. But how attainable, how realistic, how practical would these goals be at the unpredictable moment and in the unpredictable context of sudden peace?

The war had begun over Serbia. By the time it ended, Austria-Hungary, which had fired the first shot to punish Serbian terrorism, had disintegrated. The decisive battles of a multilateral conflict were not fought in the Balkans, but on the French river Marne. By 1918, furthermore, a revolutionary government in Russia had abandoned the war aims of its predecessors. Examples of such as these remind us that a world accustomed to bi-lateral, one-issue wars of the 19th century was mired in a contest whose participants and purposes had changed repeatedly.

As a result, problems that no one could foresee in 1914 crowded the peace conference's agenda. Claims were presented by new governments, Polish, Czech, and Serbo-Croat, often still in exile. Italy added another set of demands to the common purpose of the original Allies, when she entered the war in 1915. The United States' declaration of war against Germany contributed an entirely new formula--peace without retribution--that challenged the quest for revenge pursued by belligerents who had been victims of attack and invasion. Governments meeting in Paris were therefore limited by a multiplicity of domestic commitments and by war aims that had not been synchronised with those of their allies. The end of World War I was a bad time to make peace.

It must therefore be remembered that heads of the three major allied governments in particular--Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson--faced these multiple handicaps resolutely, and within a reasonable time produced for signature a set of treaties named after the suburbs in which they were signed: St. Germain (with Austria), Trianon

(with Hungary), Neuilly (with Bulgaria), Sevres (with Turkey), and the one which has overshadowed all others to such a degree that even seasoned historians mistakenly refer to it as the Versailles Peace Conference.

The agreement with Germany was signed on June 28, 1919. A formidable document of 438 articles, it became a source of controversy from the day it was first presented to the defeated enemy. Let us take a look at the text that triggered such fury.

The first 26 articles of all five treaties were taken up by the covenant of the League of Nations. Everyone agrees that the resulting international organisation was found wanting in ways too numerous to list here. It could not prevent aggression, nor could it protect its victims. The mission of universal disarmament never got off the ground. And yet...as we contemplate, in 1989, the work of its successor, the UN, we see that international organisations can make a difference, in Afghanistan, for instance, in the Gulf War, to give another example. In a host of non-military sectors international co-operation has become routine, and it cannot be denied that the League has written an important, formulative, chapter in this evolution.

Almost a quarter of the treaty was devoted to drawing Germany's new European borders, and you may take it from a witness first emerging into consciousness in post- Versailles Weimar Germany, that German politicians of all persuasions (with the exception of the Communists), as well as academics and members of the intelligentsia, saw no merit in any part of it. Germany lost 27,000 square miles of territory and 6 ½ million inhabitants, 3 ½ million of whom, by German estimates, spoke German and were, therefore, assumed to prefer life under a German administration. German critics pointed out that these losses exceeded the territory of what we call today the Benelux countries and the entire population of Sweden.

Germany lost territory in the west, the east, and the north, none, of course, in the south where her neighbours were German-speaking Austrian allies and Swiss neutrals. Let us begin our survey with Alsace-Lorraine in the west, whose population of 1.9 million included only three hundred thousand French speakers. But language, alas, provides no clue to the political preferences of the inhabitants. Ever since Alsace-Lorraine was ceded by France to Germany in 1871, its inhabitants had been dissatisfied with the treatment accorded them by their new masters, and in 1918 they cheered the return of French troops to their cities and towns. Never, after 1918, has there been any movement in the area seeking a return to Germany, and even after the fall of France in 1940 Germany did not re-annex these provinces.

The adjustment of Germany's border with Denmark represents another set of unique conditions. Since 1866 Denmark had vainly pressed for a plebiscite in North Schleswig to determine the border between herself and Germany--a border which the Peace of Prague (1866) wanted fixed according to the wishes of the local population. Although Denmark had not entered World War I, her government asked the peacemakers to right this long-standing wrong. The request was granted; in fact, some Allied statesmen urged Denmark to annex as much of Schleswig as she wanted, Danish Conservatives were quite willing to exploit Germany's defeat in this way, but the Liberal and Social Democratic majority in parliament successfully kept these aggressive elements from encumbering their country with a troublesome German irredenta. The northern portion at issue was divided into two zones. The referendum in the first region resulted in a Danish majority of 75 percent, while in the second Germany carried the contest by an even greater margin. On June 15, 1920, the supervisory international commission disbanded, and the 1500 square miles of Zone 1, with 125,000 Danes and 40,000 Germans, became part of Denmark.

The territorial settlement did comprehend other features that Germans found understandably difficult and onerous. Despite the revisionist emphasis on the loss of population, the most serious damage wrought by these transfers was economic. Germany gave up 26 percent of its coal and 25 percent of its iron ore mines. To the extent that these resources were located in the Metz-Thionville sector of Lorraine, whose francophone population manifested no German sympathies, they could not be re-claimed. Consequently the Germans concentrated their propaganda guns on Upper Silesia, and the Polish boundary settlement in general. This campaign kept alive a profound sense of grievance, and while subsequent German governments were eventually willing to accept the postwar borders in the west, their cold war against Poland continued unabated.

Under the treaty the German armed forces were reduced to an army of 100,000 men, including 4,000 officers, and a navy of six battleships, 6 cruisers, and two dozen smaller crafts with a complement of 15,000 sailors. The Weimar government was not allowed to maintain an air force. Other prohibitions excluded the manufacture and use of armor and chemical weapons, and fixed the amount of ordinance and ammunition available to equip these forces.

Reparations rested on assumptions stated in Article 231 of the treaty: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies *for causing all the loss and damage* to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their

nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." (Italics mine.) This article often referred to--misleadingly--as the war guilt clause, became to most Germans the war guilt "lie." The assumption of German aggression was furiously denied by all political parties (again, with the exception of the Communists who imputed aggression to all capitalist regimes). A successful propaganda effort was mounted to convince the world that this article was a heinous misrepresentation. Forty-five volumes of German diplomatic documents were published, incidentally forcing other governments to publish similar disclosures from their archives. These documents, in turn, were accompanied during the first postwar decade by the publication of some 50 memoirs by major public figures and then a succession of monographs, attempting to reconstruct the events leading to the firing of the "guns of August."

In the case of the Treaty of Versailles, lack of enforcement turns out to have been a more serious defect than any clause in the text. The United States dared what Germany could not; it never signed. Britain was divided by doubt. Many of the small powers, such as Belgium, received less than what they thought to be their due (not necessarily from Germany), and, let us not forget, in French public opinion Clemenceau turned from Father Victory (*Pere la Victoire*) at the time of the armistice, into a Loser of Victory (*Perd la Victoire*) by the time of the signing. In 1920 Clemenceau lost the contest for France's presidency because he had not obtained what many Frenchmen considered adequate compensation for their suffering.

What would it have taken to please the Germans? Fewer reparations? More negotiations? We have no way of knowing. If we understand that Frenchmen and Belgians hated an invader who had levelled their towns, requisitioned their property, and killed their sons and fathers, if we understand that Germany's neighbours wanted Germany disarmed so that they could sleep peacefully instead of standing guard around the clock, we have come close to explaining Allied goals pursued in Paris in the winter and spring of 1919. But we must also understand the fundamental reason for Germany's reaction. We have already spoken about the surprise of war and the surprise of peace. What hit Germans the hardest was the surprise of defeat. On November 11, 1918, no foreign armies threatened Germany with invasion. For four years the imperial armies, in Europe at least, had rushed from victory to victory overrunning Belgium and then Rumania, standing at the gates of Paris, investing both the Baltic and Ukraine and now, out of nowhere, appeared a balance sheet which showed the agents of this succession of victories to be the defeated. It made no sense, and no treaty confirming such an incomprehensible verdict could expect German acceptance. Nothing shook the German's belief that their armies returned undefeated

from the field of battle. Everything following the armistice was so out of tune with these assumptions that it produced not just disaffection, but collective paranoia and disorientation. As we have seen in the Erzberger case, a stunned nation, incapable of accepting what had happened, became singularly receptive to the idea that only extreme measures could set things right.

When we consider, then, what people thought and saw, when we review the conflicting perceptions of reality separating victor from defeated, only pure, blind luck could have led to a lasting peace in 1919. Albert I of Belgium has been credited with the most sensible verdict on the peace conference of 1919: "What would you have?" He is quoted as having said. "They did the best they could." The Treaty of Versailles, for all its failings and weaknesses, can be credited for creating the League of Nations, or better still, the precedent of popular consultation on issues that had not been attended by democratic ritual before. World War II overshadowed these modest gains, but it did not invalidate them, and in its wake, some of the mistakes of 1919, at any rate, were not repeated.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

The Treaty of Versailles is a major cause of the Second World War. Discuss.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The history of Europe between 1789 and 1939, as the above has shown, is filled with both major advances and significant distress. For one, the period marked the deepening of ideas of democratic and representative governance and also helped define the nature of nationalism. There were also a number of destructive wars that were fought with new and more terrible weapons. This period also saw the effective development of the first, though unsuccessful, experiment of global governance with the creation of the League of Nations after the First World War. Overall, the period 1789-1939 is a very important epoch in not only European history, but also in the dynamics of global history.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined European history since the 1789 French revolution. We drew attention to the connection between the revolution and the changes that had been going on within Europe since the industrial revolution. We also demonstrated how these changes led to militarism and eventually war. We also examined the complex nature of the European alliance system at the time and how it made the descent into war almost inevitable. Finally, we addressed the postwar settlement

at Versailles and how the resentment and discord it generated was eventually used as a pretext for a new round of violence in 1939.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Discuss the nature of European alliances that culminated in the First World War.
- ii. Examine the implications of the Versailles Treaty for the outbreak of World War II.
- iii. Discuss the social changes that provided a framework for the 1789 revolution in France.

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UNIT 3 WORLD WAR TWO AND THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR YEARS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Second World War was even more destructive than the first. The war was driven by grievance left unattended by the rather abrupt and messy end to the First World War. The implications of this conflict were felt far beyond Europe, where it started, and far beyond the years in which it was waged. It effectively changed the nature of the international system, introduced new conceptions of order and peace and framed national interest in ideological clothes.

In this unit, we will look at the origins of the Second World War. Particularly, we will attempt to draw attention to the connection between it and the First World War. We will also look at the axis advance and eventual defeat and finally examine how Europe changed significantly after the war.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- grasp the connection between the two World Wars
- describe the pivotal events of the Second World War
- highlight how much they changed the international conditions of Europe in the immediate postwar years and throughout the cold war.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Origins of World War Two

One can only understand the origins, progress, and results of the Second World War if one considers both World Wars as constituting one homogeneous, inwardly coherent era. The immediate roots of the Second World War lie in the termination of the First World War by the so-called "suburban treaties" of Paris in 1919.

Wilson had induced the German people to capitulate and overthrow the monarchy by the promise, soon to be broken, of a peace without annexations and indemnities. Capitulation and revolution delivered the German Empire to the mercy of the vengeful victors. Germany was not allowed to take part in the peace negotiations; the victors alone decided the conditions of peace, in a procedure without precedent in European history. On May 7, 1919, the peace conditions were handed over to the German peace delegation. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, foreign secretary and leader of the delegation, pointed out in his speech before the delegates of the western allies and their associates:

- ... We know the impact of the hate we are encountering here, and we have heard the passionate demand of the victors, who require us, the defeated, to pay the bill and plan to punish us as the guilty party. We are asked to confess ourselves the sole culprits; in my view, such a confession would be a lie ...

By these words the foreign secretary refused to accept article 231 of the peace treaty, the so-called war-guilt article, and the lie which claimed that Germany was solely responsible for the war and could therefore be made responsible for all the havoc wrought by the war. The victors threatened that if the German government didn't sign the treaty, they would invade Germany proper. Indignation in the Weimar National Assembly was general, and the climate of opinion favoured rejection. The Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann, who had proclaimed the German Republic on 9 November 1918, and was prime minister of the first republican government elected by the National Assembly, declared: "I ask you, who as an honest man-not even as a German, simply as an honest man feeling himself bound by contracts, is able to accept such conditions? Which hand would not wither, should it be bound in such chains? In the government's view, this treaty is unacceptable."

Scheidemann, as well as Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, resigned under protest. Important German-Jewish economic leaders, namely Walther Rathenau and the Hamburg banker Max Warburg, took a firm stand against accepting the dictate of the victors and called for a refusal, even against the odds of an enemy invasion of Germany. The National Assembly, however, did not have the courage to maintain such a position, and under protest, voted acceptance of the Versailles dictate. It was on June 28, 1919, the date fixed by the victorious powers that the National Assembly's plenipotentiaries had to sign that treaty. The date had been chosen as a reminder of the murder at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914.

Connected with the "war guilt article" were the punitive regulations of sections 227-231, referring to the surrender of "war criminals" to the victors, the most prominent "criminal" on the lists being the German emperor, who had fled to the Netherlands. Since the Dutch government declined to extradite the emperor, the planned trial did not take place. The German government refused to hand over other prominent German leaders to the victors, and passed an act concerning prosecution of war crimes.

Adolf Hitler, then an unknown soldier, experienced the famine which lasted throughout the war and in those early post-war years. His political program was born of those experiences, particularly his idea of conquering Ukraine for the German people. Conquering the fertile regions of southern Russia could provide not only living space for the German people; it could ban forever the possibility of another hunger blockade.

Hitler experienced the Revolution of November 1918 lying wounded in a military hospital. He became a passionate enemy of the November revolution and of the "Soviet Republic" in the Bavarian capital of Munich during April 1919, a political coup staged chiefly by Jews and directed by Lenin's radio commands from Moscow. Hitler became a member of the then totally unimportant "Deutsche Arbeiterpartei" (German Worker's Party) founded in January of that same year, and he soon proved to be a brilliant orator. His main topic was the Versailles dictate, which he saw as closely connected with the November revolution and the mischievous revolutionary activities of the Jews. As a German of the late Habsburg Monarchy, he was a fanatic supporter of a union of the Austrian Germans with the German Reich. The main focuses of his political activity were the fight against the peace dictate, the Marxist-Communist threat with the leading role of the Jews in the revolt, and the fight for self-determination and equality of rights for the German people. The miserable end of the Weimar Republic, "the freest democracy of the world," and its result, Hitler's dictatorship, were

consequences of the Versailles dictate. The victors had won the war but lost the peace by their treaty.

The most important stipulations of the dictate of Versailles were as follows: The German Reich had to cede 73,485 square kilometres, inhabited by 7,325,000 persons, to neighboring states. Before the war it had possessed 540,787 square kilometers and 67,892,000 inhabitants; after the war, 467,301 square kilometers and 59,036,000 inhabitants remained. Germany lost 75% of its yearly production of zinc ore, 74.8% of iron ore, 7.7% of lead ore, 28.7% of coal, and 4% of potash. Of its yearly agricultural production, Germany lost 19.7% in potatoes, 18.2% in rye, 17.2% in barley, 12.6% in wheat, and 9.6% in oats.

The Saar territory and other regions to the west of the Rhine were occupied by foreign troops and were to remain so for 15 years, with Cologne, Mainz, and Coblenz as bridgeheads. The costs of the occupation, 3,640,000,000 gold marks, had to be paid by the German Reich. Germany was not allowed to station troops or build fortifications to the west of the Rhine and in a 50-kilometer zone to the east.

Germany was forced to disarm almost completely, the conditions calling for: abolition of the general draft, prohibition of all heavy arms (artillery and tanks), a volunteer army of only 100,000 troops and officers restricted to long-term enlistments; reduction of the navy to six capital ships, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo-boats, 15,000 men and 500 officers. An air force was absolutely prohibited. The process of disarmament was overseen by an international military committee until 1927. Additionally, all German rivers had to be internationalised and overseas cables ceded to the victors.

The economic conditions of the Versailles treaty were as follows: After the delivery of the navy, the merchant ships had to be handed over as well, with only a few exceptions. Germany was deprived of all her foreign accounts-private ones too-and lost her colonies. For a period of ten years, Germany had to supply France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy with 40 million tons of coal per year, and had to deliver machines, factory furnishings, tools and other materials for the restoration of devastated areas in Belgium and the North of France. In regard to the hunger blockade, which continued until January 1920, a special hardship on the German people was the forced delivery of German cattle to the victors for breeding and slaughtering purposes.

George Kennan, the well-known American diplomat and historian, commented as follows:

- ‘In this way, the pattern of the events that led the Western world to new disaster in 1939 was laid down in its entirety by the Allied governments in 1918-19. What we shall have to observe from here on, in the relations between Russia, Germany and the West, follows a logic as inexorable as that of any Greek tragedy.
- The Second World War was thus an inevitable consequence of the First World War’s termination in the peace dictates of Versailles and St. Germain. The immediate origins of the Second World War from a German point of view were the ‘Allied Powers’ breaking of the preliminary agreement based on Wilson’s 14 Points; the refusal of the right of self-determination and of equality of rights for the German people; the creation of the eastern frontier and the “Polish Corridor”; the treaties’ paragraphs on war guilt and war criminals, and impossible financial and economic claims. The outbreak of the war of 1939 was caused directly by the conflict between Poland and Germany over the “Corridor” and Danzig problems and of course by the militarism and hatred being promoted by political leaders like Hitler and Mussolini.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

In what way was the treaty of Versailles responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War?

3.2 The Axis Powers and their Triumphs, 1939-1942

The belligerents during [World War II](#) fought as partners in one of two major alliances: the Axis and the Allies. The three principal partners in the Axis alliance were Germany, Italy, and Japan. These three countries recognised German hegemony over most of continental Europe; Italian hegemony over the Mediterranean Sea; and Japanese hegemony over East Asia and the Pacific.

Although the Axis partners never developed institutions to coordinate foreign or military policy as the Allies did, the Axis partners had two common interests: 1) territorial expansion and foundation of empires based on military conquest and the overthrow of the post-World War I international order; and 2) the destruction or neutralisation of Soviet Communism.

On November 1, 1936, Germany and Italy, reflecting their common interest in destabilising the European order, announced a Rome-Berlin Axis one week after signing a treaty of friendship. Nearly a month later, on November 25, 1936, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan signed the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact directed at the Soviet Union. Italy joined

the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 6, 1937. On May 22, 1939, Germany and Italy signed the so-called Pact of Steel, formalising the Axis alliance with military provisions. Finally, on September 27, 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, which became known as the Axis alliance.

Even before the Tripartite Pact, two of the three Axis powers had initiated conflicts that would become theaters of war in World War II. On July 7, 1937, Japan invaded China to initiate the war in the Pacific; while the German [invasion of Poland](#) on September 1, 1939, unleashed the European war. [Italy](#) entered World War II on the Axis side on June 10, 1940, as the defeat of [France](#) became apparent.

In July 1940, just weeks after the defeat of France, Hitler decided that Nazi Germany would [attack the Soviet Union](#) the following spring. In order to secure raw materials, transit rights for German troops, and troop contributions for the invasion from sympathetic powers, Germany began to cajole and pressure the southeast European states to join the Axis. Nazi Germany offered economic aid to Slovakia and military protection and Soviet territory to Romania, while warning Hungary that recent German support for Hungarian annexations of Czechoslovak and Romanian territory might change to the benefit of Slovakia and Romania.

Italy's failed effort to conquer Greece in the late autumn and winter of 1940-1941 exacerbated German concerns about securing their southeastern flank in the Balkans. Greek entry into the war and victories in northern Greece and Albania allowed the British to open a Balkan front against the Axis in Greece that might threaten Romania's oil fields, which were vital to Nazi Germany's invasion plans. To subdue Greece and move the British off the European mainland, Nazi Germany now required troop transport through Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

After the Italo-Greek front opened on October 28, 1940, German pressure on Hungary and the Balkan States intensified. Hoping for preferential economic treatment, mindful of recent German support for annexation of northern Transylvania, and eager for future Axis support for acquiring the remainder of Transylvania, Hungary joined the Axis on November 20, 1940. Having already requested and received a German military mission in October 1940, the Romanians joined on November 23, 1940. They hoped that loyal support for a German invasion of the Soviet Union and faithful oil deliveries would destroy the Soviet threat, return the provinces annexed by the Soviet Union in June 1940, and win German support for the return of northern Transylvania. Both politically and economically dependent on Germany for its very existence as an "independent" state, Slovakia followed suit on November 24.

Bulgaria, whose leaders were reluctant to get involved in a war with the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, which was nominally an ally of Greece, stalled, resisting German pressure. After the Germans offered Greek territory in Thrace and exempted it from participation in the invasion of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria joined the Axis on March 1, 1941. When the Germans agreed to settle for Yugoslav neutrality in the war against Greece, without demanding transit rights for Axis troops, Yugoslavia reluctantly joined the Axis on March 25, 1941. Two days later, Serbian military officers overthrew the government that had signed the Tripartite Pact. After the subsequent invasion and dismemberment of Yugoslavia by Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria in April, the newly established and so-called Independent State of Croatia joined the Axis on June 15, 1941.

On June 26, 1941, four days after the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, Finland, seeking to regain territory lost during the 1939-1940 Winter War, entered the war against the USSR as a "co-belligerent." Finland never signed the Tripartite Pact.

After Japan's surprise attack on the United States fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and the declaration of war on the United States by Germany and the European Axis powers within a week, the Atlantic and Pacific wars became a truly World War.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What were the interests that connected the key members of the Axis?

3.3 The Defeat of the Axis Powers

In 1944, US and British army's invaded the continent of Europe in the great 'Operation Overlord', landing in Normandy. It was hazardous and risky, especially for the first troops to land, who would necessarily be few in numbers. They would be slaughtered if the Germans had masses of tanks waiting for them.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander had said that success depended on two factors: First is that the Germans had to be taken by surprise. Several tricks and deceptions were used to make them think the landings would be at Calais and not Normandy. For example on 'D-Day' (the first day of the landings) the German radar screens at Calais showed what seemed to be an invasion fleet approaching; this effect was achieved by launches towing barrage balloons and aircraft circling and dropping 'window' (metallised paper).

Second, even supposing the Germans were taken by surprise, there was the danger that they might rush forces more rapidly overland than the Allies could bring in reinforcements over the sea and beaches. If they did, the Germans would drive the invaders into the sea. To win this 'battle of the build-up', as Eisenhower called it, he insisted that the heavy bomber forces should spend weeks before the invasion destroying the French railway system, which is what Germans would use to transport their troops. The French Resistance joined in with sabotage of roads and railways. The Allied air forces had control of the air -5000 of their aircraft flying on D-Day and they had shot up anything seen moving in daylight. The German panzers could only move at night.

The German leaders could not agree on how to resist the invasion. Field Marshal von Rundstedt, C-in-C in France, wanted to keep four panzer divisions well back and rush them in wherever the landings were made. Rommel, who was in charge of the channel defences, said Allied air power would prevent this. He thought the landings would be in Normandy and he wanted four panzer divisions ready 'at the water's edge'. Hitler did not allow this. The disagreements were never sorted out. Rommel strewed the Normandy beaches with obstacles of steel and wood to wreck allied landing crafts.

On 6 June 1944 the Allied invasion force of five divisions; about 4060 vessels from ports all round southern England crossed the Channel without incident and landed on five beaches on the Normandy coast. Three airborne divisions, two American and one British, had been dropped beforehand to secure positions to each side. At dawn German sentries looked out to sea and were shaken by the sight of the vast invasion fleet. They were taken completely by surprise.

The American landings were made on the beaches code-named 'Utah' and 'Omaha'. The transport ships anchored a long way out and the troops went in on assault craft (LCAS) lowered from the lifeboat davits. At 'Utah', the German coastal defences were damaged by heavy bombing and a naval bombardment with big guns. Amphibious or 'swimming' tanks (ones that could be used on land and water) arrived on the beaches with the first wave of infantry, and the landing was a success. In a few hours troops were moving inland to link up with the airborne forces. At 'Omaha', however, the landings came close to disaster. The German defences here were the strongest the Americans ever had to face. Several of the LCAs were swamped in rough seas and sank. Others only kept afloat when soaked and seasick soldiers frantically bailed out water with their helmets. The US bomber planes could not see the German coastal defences through low cloud and dropped their bombs too far inland. Intense German gunfire from the cliffs overlooking the beach broke

most of the first wave of infantry companies. Eventually 'Bloody Omaha' was captured, but many men died in the process.

In 1943 the allies invaded Sicily in an attempt to knock Italy out of the war. The invasion was one of the biggest amphibious attacks (launched from the sea) of the war, with 150000 men, as many as those landed in the great invasion of Normandy of the following year. Most went ashore in small assault craft, which were lowered, from the lifeboat davits of large transport ships. New beaching craft were used: the big LST, which could land about 60 tanks and the LCT (Landing Craft Tank), which could land about six tanks.

The allied conquest of Sicily was a success, though not easy. Patton, the American Commander, did well. He was proving to be the best blitzkrieg commander on the allied side. He was a rough, outspoken character who carried pearl-handled revolvers on his hips, cowboy style. He had to be sacked for doing what an officer should not do - striking a soldier, a mental patient in hospital whom Patton suspected of pretending to be ill.

Most Italians were fed up with the war and Mussolini was overthrown. The allies hoped that they would be able to occupy Italy without a fight. The new Italian government signed a secret peace agreement with the allies; but the Germans quickly seized control of the country. The allies then invaded Italy, making their main landing at Salerno. The Germans struck back hard and nearly drove them into the sea. Under General Kesselring's leadership, the Germans skillfully used the difficult mountainous countryside to slow down the allies, whose tactics were by contrast uninspired.

Fighting near Monte Cassino was particularly frustrating for the allies. In turn Americans, New Zealanders, Indians and Poles attacked Cassino over a period of six months but were driven back. An Allied seaborne landing behind the German lines at Anzio did little good. French troops finally broke through in May 1944. By June the allies were in Rome and by August had reached Florence. Further north the allies suffered heart-breaking resistance right through to the end of the war.

After the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese, in desperation, made the first use of 'Kamikaze' attacks. Japanese pilots ready to die for their country made suicide dives onto Allied ships in planes loaded with bombs. This stemmed from the religious belief that to die in battle won a man a place in heaven. Kamikaze attacks proved to be extremely dangerous. The allied fleet was ringed with destroyer pickets with radar, directing fighters onto the Kamikazes, stopping most but not all. Small ships met the Kamikazes sideways on for maximum firepower, making

full speed to present a moving target. The Kamikazes' speed of descent was so great that their controls became locked by air pressure and they could not manoeuvre. There were no survivors to question about methods. Kamikaze attacks sank 34 US ships and badly damaged 288 others but the Kamikaze did not halt the allied advance on Japan.

In February 1945, the Americans launched an assault on the volcanic island of Iwo Jima and Okinawa from Tokyo. The steep beaches of soft volcanic ash were very difficult for landing and the Marines had to scramble ashore as best they could. The Japanese had dug their defences deeply into the lava of this volcanic island and it took the Americans a month of fighting to capture the island. Over 4000 Americans and 25000 Japanese died in the fighting.

In Okinawa, closer to the Japanese mainland, the Americans met even more fanatical resistance. The Japanese navy made its last effort here with the giant battleship Yamato, a cruiser, and destroyers. The last fuel oil in Japan was just enough to take them to Okinawa, where they were to beach themselves and fight to the end. They were stopped on the way and sunk by US carrier strikes. Over 1200 Americans died in the struggle to capture Okinawa, and countless numbers of Japanese.

Japan suffered an appalling heavy weight of bombing. The centres of five major cities were burnt out. On 6th August 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in Japan, destroying most of the city and killing 70000 to 80000 people. Two days later another was dropped on Nagasaki, killing 40000 and injuring 60000. The Japanese finally surrendered and World War II at last ended amid scenes of unimaginable death, horror and suffering.

The use of the atomic bomb has been questioned on moral grounds. At the time it seemed justified as a means of avoiding the bloodbath of an invasion of Japan against fanatical resistance. Other possible motives were:

- To defeat Japan before the USSR entered the war against her
- To show results for the astronomical expenditure on developing the bomb
- To warn Stalin off attempts to take more of Europe.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What factors made 'Operation Overlord' successful?

3.4 Europe after the War

By the end of 1945, Europe lay in ruins. Infrastructure had been all but destroyed, economies lay in shambles and deprivation was high. Europe emerged out of the Second World War a truly shattered society. The power configurations that had not only kept Europe at the center of global politics but also maintained some semblance of order in its international relations had also been shattered. For the first time in hundreds of years, the most powerful states in international politics were clearly not European. The US, whose mainland had been untouched by the war, and the Soviet Union, who suffered immense devastation, became the two most powerful states and were largely able to frame the immediate postwar years along their views of the world.

There are five major developments that signposted the nature of international politics in Europe in the postwar years. The first is the immense infrastructural damage that left many cities in virtual ruins. The second is the massive flow of refugees fleeing discrimination, reprisals and social unrest all over Europe. The third is the massive infusion of American aid under the Marshall Plan. Fourth is the shift in the center of gravity of international relations to two states (the US and USSR) and finally the impact of widespread atrocities committed by all sides of the conflict on notions of human rights. We will discuss here two of them; the change in power configurations and the flow of refugees.

To start with, the global power structure of the world was drastically shifted after the end of World War II. Before the war, the world power balance was based on the interaction and interplay of multiple power bases that would shift and alter to fit the current political situation. But after the war the world was split between only two competing power bases, The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Before the war the Major Powers of the world were United Kingdom, France Japan and Germany. The Soviet Union was in a period of decline from the paranoid purges of Joseph Stalin. The United States was just recovering from the great depression. The United States was rated as a world military power just behind Romania.

The United States and the Soviet Union produced militaries that rivalled the rest of the world. Before the attack on Pearl Harbour, the United States Army was rated 18th in the world with 120 thousand under arms. By the end of the war 16 million men had served in the Military of all branches. The Soviet Union was under equipped and under manned at the time of the attack by Hitler But afterwards they had a massive army that had faced and defeated 75% of the German army. The German and Japanese armed forces were totally destroyed and the countries civilians

demoralised. France and England forces had been bleed white and were a shadow of their former strength and glory.

The Survivors of World War II were split into two camps of the victors. NATO led by the United States and the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union. The two sides seemed to be staging for the next conventional war. But both sides had developed Nuclear weapons. Neither side would face the other in open conflict due the fact that a massive nuclear arsenal backed up the common infantryman.

Another way the war changed Europe was in the massive unprecedented flow of refugees. Even before the end of the war the greater part of the German population of East Prussia had fled westwards - although thousands drowned en route, in overloaded ships that sank in the Baltic Sea. In the city of Königsberg, annexed by the USSR, the food supply broke down completely in 1945. People were reduced to eating offal, and human flesh was offered for sale as fried meatballs. Seven centuries of German civilisation, in the city that had nurtured philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottfried von Herder, thus ended in cannibalism. By 1949 nearly all the surviving Germans in the region had been driven out.

In Poland, German-owned farms and houses were handed over to Poles. Germans were rounded up by Polish militias and put in camps, before being removed from the country. In Czechoslovakia, more than 2.2 million Germans were expelled, and their property was expropriated. At the peak period, in July 1946, 14,400 people a day were being dumped over the frontier. About three quarters went to the American occupation zone of Germany, and most of the remainder to the Soviet zone.

Cold War considerations, combined with calculation of labour requirements in industries such as mining, led Britain, Australia and other countries to grant Poles and some others permanent settlement. The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 finally provided a secure refuge for Jews who had been hounded from their homes in central and Eastern Europe. But the buoyant United States economy held out the most tantalising hope to refugees.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What was the implication of atrocities committed during the Second World War for the development of human rights?

4.0 CONCLUSION

That the Second World War changed Europe in very many significant ways is undeniable. One of the most remarkable events of the immediate postwar years however is the rapid recovery of war devastated economies in Germany, France and to a lesser extent, Britain. This was due in part to US help through the Marshall Plan. More importantly however, even though industrial infrastructure lay in ruins, technical and scientific expertise had in fact improved tremendously in response to war needs. As a result, Germany and France, in particular, were able to bounce back remarkably in the postwar period. Europe also learnt that the various economies, and thus collective well being, were inextricably linked. This helped spur a rash of integration plans that eventually culminated in the European Union.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have addressed the devastation of the Second World War and the aftermath. We detailed what changes Europe saw at the end of the war and how its affairs began to depend on non Europeans for the first time in centuries. We also looked at the events of the war itself. First we chronicled its origins, and then we looked at the early triumphs of the axis powers and their eventual defeat.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Describe the origins of the Second World War.
- ii. Describe the German Refugee crisis in the aftermath of World War II.
- iii. How did the Second World War change the face of European international politics?

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UNIT 4 THE COLD WAR YEARS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The cold war period was characterised by intense tension. The spectre of nuclear annihilation that would not only end human civilisation as it was known then, but would also kill all life on the planet was a looming possibility in the almost five decades that the cold war raged. The period is described as the cold war because, while it was characterised by knife edge nuclear tension, the main antagonists, the US and the Soviet Union, avoided direct military confrontation. In fact, even though the race to develop arms was stiffest in the period, the armaments were actually developed to prevent, rather than fight a full blown war. Military confrontations were conducted through proxy states as was seen in the Korean conflict. The US and Soviet Union both headed their respective blocs that were largely bound together by ideology. For Europe, the cold war period was a particularly difficult period. In the first place, most European states had been drawn into alliances that made them legitimate targets in the event of military, including nuclear, conflict. These states were however not only generally incapable of defending themselves, particularly if an all out war ensued, they also had little or no control over the outbreak of war. In short, Europe was faced with the unfamiliar situation of having to depend on non Europeans for their safety and even long term survival.

In this unit, we will examine the origins of this European dilemma and how Europe responded to it. We will also examine the Marshall Plan and how it aided not only western European postwar economic recovery but also how it concretised east-west divisions that were only just emerging in the closing years of the Second World War. We will also examine European integration efforts in the context of its goals, challenges and main drivers.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the cold war years, the tensions that characterised them and the key actors therein
- explain how the Second World War contributed to Europe's decline in global politics, and its efforts to recover
- analyse the key elements, goals and inspirations of early European integration, particularly the Schuman Plan etc.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Diminished Status of Europe

Europe's reign as a world power does not mean that European countries united to dominate the world. European kingdoms frequently fought each other and a different state or states would rise to become the most dominant. For example, in the 15th–16th century, Spain and Portugal were the most prominent seafarers. They colonised the whole of what is today [Latin America](#). Then, during the 17th and 18th centuries, the Dutch became very prominent in seafaring and international trade. They had colonies and territories in for example Asia (like Indonesia), Africa (the Cape of Good Hope), and in South America (what is today Suriname). Also, New York (called New York by Britain) used to be called New Amsterdam, after the Dutch capital Amsterdam. Between Napoleon's rise in 1799 and his fall in 1815, France became very important in world affairs. Britain's empire stretched far and wide even in the 18th century, but during the 19th century it became the most dominant world power as its empire grew and included colonies and influence all over the world. In the 20th century, Germany also became a world power, especially under Adolf Hitler. Europe as a world power therefore refers to the collective [imperial](#) and [colonial](#) force wielded by Europe in world affairs.

After the First World War, much of Europe lay in ruins. People were shocked that their technological and philosophical [advancement](#) had contributed to such destruction and merciless killing of other human beings. Many felt that the liberal and democratic values for which they had fought during the 18th and 19th century were worthless and even dangerous. Still, the [inter-war years](#) saw Europe reach its highpoint as a colonial and world power. European nationalism grew after the First World War and the terms of the peace settlement were a bitter pill for some countries to swallow, in particular Germany. Despite the impact of the Great Depression of 1929 - 1933, which left many European economies in ruins, it would still take another World War, more destructive and costly than the first, to end Europe's reign as the [dominant](#) world power.

After the war, and despite American President Woodrow Wilson's role in establishing the League of Nations, America chose to stand aloof from world affairs and did not become a member of the League. When the Great Depression came in 1929, America was hard hit and focused on restoring her own economy. When the Second World War started in 1939, America only became involved in 1941 after Japan bombed the American naval base, Pearl Harbour. During this war, America rose to prominence and took over from a ruined Europe as the dominant world power.

By the time the Second World War ended, Europe lay in even more devastating ruins. Cities had been shattered by bombs, transport networks, farmlands and livestock were destroyed, people were hungry and homeless, and some had been forced to flee their homelands. The money needed to rebuild Europe was monumental.

Before the war, the great world powers had been Britain, France and Germany. As these states now focused on rebuilding efforts, new powers rose to become the mightiest states in the world. America had proven with its nuclear bomb that technologically, industrially and financially, it had surpassed the strength of Europe and everyone else. Although about 25 million Russians had died during the war, the [USSR](#) still had the largest army in the world and was fast expanding its influence over Eastern Europe. Europe's days as imperial powers and colonial rulers were numbered. Nationalism and independence movements were sweeping through Africa and Asia as colonies demand decolonisation. In 1947 India won independence from Britain, and in 1949 Ghana did the same. They were soon followed by other colonies in Africa and Asia. Inevitably, Europe's status as undisputed master of the world effectively ended in 1945.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What was the status of the European Great Powers at the end of the Second World War and how did they seek to cope with the new realities?

3.2 The East -West Division

The division between East and West defined the era often referred to as the Cold War. The Cold War was a 20th century conflict between the United States of America (US), the Soviet Union (USSR) and their respective allies, over political, economic and military issues, often described as a struggle between capitalism and communism. In Europe, this meant the US led West and NATO on one side and Soviet led East and the Warsaw Pact on the other. It lasted from 1945 to the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The war was 'cold' because there was never a direct military engagement between the two leaders, the US and the USSR, although shots were exchanged in the air during the Korean War.

The aftermath of World War II left the United States and Russia as the dominant military powers in the world, but they had very different forms of government and economy, the former a capitalist democracy, the latter a communist dictatorship. The two nations were rivals who feared each other, each ideologically opposed. The war also left Russia in control of large areas of Eastern Europe, and the US led allies in control of the West. While the allies restored democracy in the West, Russia began making Soviet satellites out of its 'liberated' lands; the split between the two was dubbed the Iron Curtain.

The West feared a communist invasion, physical and ideological. The US countered with the Truman Doctrine with its policy of containment to stop communism spreading and the Marshall Plan, massive aid aimed at supporting collapsing economies which were letting communist sympathisers gain power. Military alliances were formed as the West grouped together as NATO and the East as the Warsaw Pact. By 1951 Europe was divided into two power blocs, American led and Soviet led, each with atomic weapons. A 'cold war' followed which spread globally, leading to a nuclear standoff.

The first time the former allies acted as certain enemies was the Berlin Blockade. Post-war Germany was divided into four parts and occupied by the former allies; Berlin, situated in the Soviet zone, was also divided. In 1948 Stalin enforced a blockade of Berlin aimed at bluffing the Allies into renegotiating the division of Germany in his favour rather than invading. The Allies responded with the 'Berlin Airlift': for 11 months supplies were flown into Berlin via Allied aircraft, bluffing that

Stalin wouldn't shoot them down and cause 'hot' war. He didn't. The blockade was ended in May 1949 when Stalin gave up.

Stalin died in 1953 and hopes of a thaw were raised when new leader Khrushchev began a process of De-Stalinisation. In May 1955, as well as forming the Warsaw Pact, he signed an agreement with the allies to leave Austria and make it neutral. The thaw only lasted until the Budapest Rising in 1956: the communist government of Hungary faced with internal calls for reform, collapsed and an uprising forced troops to leave Budapest. The Russian response was to have the Red Army occupy the city and put a new government in charge. The West was highly critical but, partly distracted by the Suez Crises, who did nothing to help.

Fearing a reborn, West Germany allied to the US, Khrushchev offered concessions in return for a united, neutral, Germany in 1958. A Paris summit for talks was derailed when Russia shot down a US U-2 spy plane flying over its territory. Khrushchev pulled out of the summit and disarmament talks. The incident was a useful way out for Khrushchev, who was under pressure from hardliners within Russia for giving away too much. Under pressure from the East German leader to stop refugees fleeing to the West, and with no progress on making Germany neutral, the Berlin Wall was built, a complete barrier between East and West Berlin.

Despite the tensions and fear of nuclear war, the Cold War division between East and West proved surprisingly stable after 1961, despite France anti-Americanism and Russia crushing the Prague Spring. There was instead conflict on the global stage, with the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam. For much of the 60s and 70s a programme of 'détente' was followed, a long series of talks which made some success in stabilising the war and equalising arms numbers. Germany negotiated with the East under a policy of *Ostpolitik*. The fear of Mutually Assured Destruction helped prevent direct conflict.

By the 1980s Russia appeared to be winning, with a more productive economy, better missiles and a growing navy, even though the system was really corrupt and built on propaganda. America, once again fearing Russia domination, moved to re-arm and build up forces, including placing many new missiles in Europe (not without local opposition). US President Reagan increased defence spending vastly, starting the Strategic Defence Initiative to defend against nuclear attacks, an end to Mutually Assured Destruction. At the same time Russian forces entered Afghanistan, a war they would ultimately lose.

Soviet leader Brezhnev died in 1982 and his successor, realising change was needed in a crumbling Russia and its strained satellites which they felt were losing a renewed arms race, promoted several reformers. One, Gorbachev, rose to power in 1985 with policies of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* and decided to end the Cold War and 'give away' the satellite empire to save Russia itself. After agreeing with the US to reduce nuclear weapons, in 1988 he addressed the UN, explaining the end of the Cold War by renouncing the Brezhnev Doctrine, allowing political choice and pulling Russia out of the arms race.

The speed of Gorbachev's actions unsettled the West, and there were fears of violence, especially in East Germany where the leaders talked of their own 'Tiananmen Square'. However, Poland negotiated free elections, Hungary opened its borders and East German leader Honecker resigned when it became apparent the Soviets would not support him. The East German leadership withered away and the Berlin Wall fell 10 days later. Romania overthrew its dictator and the Soviet satellites emerged from behind the Iron Curtain.

The Soviet Union itself was the next to fall. In 1991 communist hard liners attempted a coup against Gorbachev; they were defeated and Boris Yeltsin became leader. He dissolved the USSR, instead creating the Russian Federation. The Socialist era, begun in 1917, was now over and so was The Cold War.

Some books, although stressing the nuclear confrontation which came perilously close to destroying vast areas of the world, point out that this nuclear threat was most closely triggered in areas of outside Europe, and that the continent in fact enjoyed 50 years of peace and stability which were sorely lacking in the first half of the 20th century. This view is probably best balanced by the fact that much of Eastern Europe was, in effect, subjugated for the whole period by Soviet Russia.

The D-Days landings, while often overstated in their importance to the downhill of Nazi Germany, were in many ways the key battle of the Cold War in Europe, enabling allied forces to liberate much of Western Europe before Soviet forces got their instead. The conflict has often been described a substitute for a final post-Second World War peace settlement which never came and the Cold War deeply permeated life in East and West, affecting culture and society as well as politics and the military. The Cold War has also often been described as a contest between democracy and communism, while in reality the situation was more complicated, with the 'democratic' side, led by the US, supporting some distinctly non-democratic, some brutally authoritarian, regimes in order to deny countries to the Soviet sphere of influence.

The key elements of this intricate web of events are presented below:

- 1945 End of the Second World War
- 1947 Enunciation of Truman doctrine
- 1947 George Kennan's 'X' files published
- 1947 Marshall Plan launched
- 1947 Marshall Plan rejected by the USSR
- 1947 Two camps doctrine adopted
- 1949 COMECON established
- 1949 NATO formed
- 1950 European Integration relaunched
- 1955 Warsaw Pact formed.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How did the final battles of the Second World War contribute to the division of Europe between East and West by 1945?

3.2 The Marshall Plan and Europe's Relationship with the US

The Cold War grew out of anxiety over Soviet expansionism and widespread economic problems in Europe following the Second World War. It was institutionalised in minds by 1947 and in reality in 1950 during the Korean War. The Cold War then became a system of carefully managed "irreconcilable antagonism" that evolved out of the plan to rehabilitate Europe. The Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine of Containment together defined the structure of the emerging Cold War between America and the Soviet Union. Europe, the location of Churchill's infamous 'Iron Curtain' dividing line between the rival powers, would see its future geopolitical orientation defined by the creation and consolidation of these spheres of influence.

The Truman doctrine was outwardly a reaction to political problems in Greece. In early 1947, the British decided it was not in their interests to keep providing financial aid to the Greek government, which was under attack by communist guerrillas. This left an important strategically placed state susceptible to political upheaval and communist takeover. In George Kennan's famous 'X' article later that year he articulated publicly his views of the Soviet Union. He warned that the Soviet Union was committed to destroying capitalism, and that it could not coexist with capitalist nations. With a background of Soviet troops moving southwards towards Tehran and Turkey it did appear that there was a Soviet desire and a willingness to control the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Although diplomatic pressure eased this particular

example, there were widespread fears within the Truman administration that if so inclined, the Soviet Union *could* conquer much of Western Europe. At the very least they would have a significant initial advantage in any such move. Kennan noted that the answer to this threat was “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment” He believed that the Soviet Union would be patient, moving slowly forward in a multitude of geopolitical and ideological advances. The answer was for the United States to contain them and inhibit their ability to do so. Providing assistance to Greece, replacing British aid, was to be the first application of this strategy. Although Kennan later emphasised his disagreement with the confrontational language and the military emphasis of the doctrine, Truman declared that like the Greek example, America would “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” Turkey also received help, and the European continent became a front line of the ‘first’ Cold War.

The Marshall Plan is inescapably linked to the policy of containing the Soviet Union and is perhaps more than any other single element was “of pivotal significance in crystallising the East-West conflict in Europe”. Together with the Truman doctrine it consolidated two clear ‘sides’ in an ideological and economic conflict. It is often described as a corollary of the Truman doctrine as both are directed against Soviet expansion. However, both differ in their tactical deployment. The Truman doctrine focuses on military aid, such as that lent to Greece and Turkey in the 1940’s whilst the Marshall Plan was a package of purely economic aid, at least outwardly. In the words of Hadley Arkes, the Marshall Plan dissolved the ambiguity in the postwar European arena and consummated the Cold War. Also known as the European Recovery Plan, it was a package of aid totaling \$13 billion over a duration of four years received by 16 European nations. It was “an important example of the overt use of economic power in foreign policy”. Much has been written of the initial American offer of this aid to all of Europe (excluding Spain), including nations aligned or under the influence of the Soviet Union, and to the Soviet Union itself, which was included in the plan as both an aid recipient and an aid provider – which Stalin rejected. It is unclear whether that offer was sincere or not. After all, perhaps there would have been no division of Europe if the offer had been accepted by all parties it was offered to.

- America perhaps only offered aid to the Eastern European nations and to the Soviet Union to avoid blame for dividing Europe. Revisionist historians see the Marshall Plan as an extension of the Truman doctrine’s design to create political and economic buffers to contain the Soviet Union. Richard Freeland elaborates by noting that the aid package was deliberately designed so that it

would be rejected by Stalin due to its requirement of multilateral economic policies – which the Stalin had frequently and consistently rejected in the past as incompatible with the Soviet economy. However Cromwell notes that this approach, whilst making some interesting points, ignores the domestic factors that contributed to the Marshall Plan in Washington. Congress was hostile to further bilateral aid packages to European nations and there was already an accepted inevitability within American statesmen that the division of Europe was inevitable. The collective continental approach to the aid was one made to ensure its approval in the Congress, and it was therefore as much an exercise of domestic policy in action as just foreign policy. Where Cromwell and the revisionists agree is in the certainty that the Marshall Plan was designed to fit an already divided Europe in perception, and was not intended inwardly or outwardly as a measure to reverse or ease that division. America was simply acting in its best interests by consolidating its allies and rewarding them in a mutually beneficial way. In this sense, both donor and recipients had their cake and ate it.

Of course, the role of Stalin cannot be ignored. His refusal of the American plan was (with the benefit of hindsight) a miscalculation made through overconfidence in communist power in Western Europe and a reliance upon his rigid Marxist economics. According to this doctrine, capitalism was approaching a crisis which would cut off the flow of America aid leaving Europe ultimately in the hands of the Communists. This situation simplified the task of American leadership and led to the alienation of Communist parties in Western Europe as the public were clearly forming a consensus in support of the American economic intervention. Therefore Stalin's actions are equally to blame for the division of Europe as the polarising climate created by the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan. His role underplays perfectly the much commented upon conclusion that both the Soviet Union and America were resigned and accepting of a division of Europe shortly after the Second World War, certainly by mid 1947. With the Marshall Plan being accepted by some and rejected by others, it is also safe to say that this fate was also accepted within Europe. Additionally the belligerence of Stalin gave America a degree of influence it would not have otherwise had in Europe, helping to transform American power into a position of dominance over the 'West'. Of course the mirror opposite can be said as Stalin's position did the same within his own 'bloc' albeit on different terms.

Taking into account the role of the internal politics in the Soviet Union beyond Stalin's role is also interesting in relation to the Marshall Plan. Andrei Zhdanov proclaimed a 'two camps doctrine' in September 1947

in which he stated that the world was divided into an imperialist camp headed by America, and a democratic camp headed by the Soviet Union. This was adopted as internal policy after the failed Paris negotiations in June-July 1947 and the rejection of the Marshall Plan. There is no doubt that the Marshall Plan solidified this line of reasoning, and it is worth noting again the sense of inevitability in the division of Europe as both the Soviet and the American thought processes were at least in part converging on this division before the fact of its final existence. Soviet rejection of the American offer led to the Molotov Plan, in which a series of bilateral treaties were made between the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations, beginning the process that led to the establishment of Comecon in 1949. With Comecon and the Marshall Plan operating in parallel, and the Truman doctrine of containment outwardly involving America in a reactionary process against the Soviet Union, it is certainly safe to state that by late 1947 Europe was divided in two.

In conclusion, it is clear the division of Europe had its roots in the way that the Second World War ended. The Truman doctrine was a manifestation of foreign policy resulting from the insecurities and fears of Soviet power filling the vacuum in Europe. Together with the Marshall Plan, it solidified the Western nations of Europe into accepting the reality of a divided Europe, indeed a divided world in which two distinct economic, ideological and political systems were in conflict. In the strict sense of the word the combined effect of the Marshall Plan and the policy of containment created the structure with which the previously uncodified and loosely felt, yet inevitable tensions were spiraling around before mid 1947. Coupled with the Soviet reaction and the establishment of Comecon, the impetus whether intentional or not for the division of Europe was certainly within the realm of American foreign policy. It is not necessary to apportion blame in this analysis, but it is certainly accurate to state that all parties involved in the division of Europe did less to prevent it than to accept its perceived inevitability.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How did the Soviet Union respond to the Marshall Plan?

3.3 European Integration

The year 1950 marked the launching of European integration—the construction of formal, centralised economic cooperation that would coordinate the national policies of individual European countries. In that year, two French statesmen, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, advanced the first proposals for a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), an organisation designed to coordinate the coal and steel

industries of its six member countries (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), In 1957, the same six governments negotiated and ratified the Treaty of Rome, creating the European Economic Community (EEC). The goal of the new organisation was to create a common market by 1970. As a result, all tariffs and most quotas among the members would be eliminated, a common tariff would be created vis-à-vis third-party countries, and a managed system of agricultural trade, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), would be constructed. Three primary concerns motivated the governments that negotiated the Treaty of Rome. The first was to tie Germany firmly to the West and prevent another Franco-German war. Even after the North Atlantic Treaty organisation (NATO) was established in 1949 and the stability of West German democracy came to be taken for granted in the 1950s, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer believed strongly in the need for Franco-German cooperation to defend German cold-war interests—not least in Berlin. The second concern was to provide an alternative to communism, the official Soviet ideology and a potent force among strong opposition groups in France and Italy. The centrist, particularly Christian democratic, political parties were strong advocates of European integration. Support for integration long remained a particularly important force in Italian, German and Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) public opinion. By contrast, important groups in countries like Britain and Denmark remained relatively skeptical even hostile to integration.

The third and probably most important motivation for integration was economic. The West European economies were then, and are still, extremely interdependent. The value of trade per capita was many times higher than in non-European industrial countries like the U.S. or Japan, making Europe sensitive to trade fluctuations. Individual countries had their own reasons for supporting integration. Germany, for example, favoured industrial trade liberalisation that facilitated exports of its competitive manufactured products. France and Italy gained protected markets for their agricultural goods, at the expense of third-country producers, particularly those in the U.S.

By 1970, the broad outlines of common market and common agricultural policy had been completed, and in the decade and a half that followed, the EC continued to expand. Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined in 1973, followed by Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986, and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. Over the same period, the EC continued to broaden its activities. In 1979, after years of experimentation with international monetary coordination, agreement was reached on the European monetary system (EMS). This was an arrangement whereby governments agreed collectively to stabilise and manage currency exchange rates. Environmental rules, antitrust policy,

social policy. In 1967, the EEC (or common market) and two other treaty organisations were consolidated to form the European Community (EC); with the 1993 ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, it became the EU.

In the 1980s, EC members launched the “Europe 1992” initiative to complete the single market by harmonising and mutually recognising regulations that impose nontariff barriers. With the Maastricht Agreement in 1992, they opened a drive to create a single European currency, which was completed with the establishment of an independent European Central Bank in 1998 and the introduction of the euro in 2002.

With the collapse of communism in the 1990s, discussions began about the enlargement of the EU to the East and South. This process reached its culmination in the first decade of the new Millennium. After extensive negotiations, involving the imposition of substantial economic, legal, administrative and political reforms, 12 new countries joined the EU between 2004 and 2007. Its 489 million citizens now inhabit territory that runs from Malta in the southern Mediterranean to near the Arctic Circle in northern Finland.

In addition to enlargement, the last decade of EU politics has concerned the constitutional structure of the EU. Discussion of the EU’s structure was launched by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s speech at Humboldt University in 2000 calling for a “constitutional convention.” This was an effort both to encourage reform of decision making, particularly in foreign policy, and to redress the “democratic deficit” in Europe. The effort was bogged down, however, for seven years—having all but collapsed after unruly French and Dutch voters rejected a draft constitution in referendums held in 2005. Only now does the process seem to be getting back on track.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Briefly discuss the motivations for the formation of the EU.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Even though modern European integration began in 1950 in response to the postwar realities, it should be noted that it is an ancient idea. Since the time of Charlemagne and the Holy Roman Empire, uniting the territory of Europe under a single government had been a dream. The present efforts have gone a long way, but still remain far from uniting Europe under a single government. It is unclear if this will happen or if

it is indeed desirable, but it may be safely assumed that efforts to integrate will continue to deepen.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the diminished status of Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War; the east-west division and its implications for Europe. We also examined the remarkable postwar economic recovery of Europe and the role of the Marshal Plan in driving it. Finally, we took a look at the various efforts at integrating Europe and the challenges that have dogged this process.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Discuss the role of France and Germany in the formation of the EU.
- ii. Is there a link between the Marshal Plan and the Cold War?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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MODULE 2 KEY PLAYERS IN EUROPE

Unit 1	Britain in European International Politics
Unit 2	France in European International Politics
Unit 3	Germany in European International Politics
Unit 4	Russia/Formal Soviet Union in European International Politics

UNIT 1 BRITAIN IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Britain is without doubt one of the major players in contemporary European politics. In fact, it had played a significant role in shaping the social and material history of Europe for centuries. Being a small island nation, British power had often relied on the dominance of the seas by the Royal navy which helped to not only discover new lands, but also kept the routes to those lands open to commercial shipping. Britain had a head start in the industrial revolution and was a major contributor to the evolution of European philosophy, culture and the arts.

This unit addresses the nature of British engagement with the rest of Europe since the industrial revolution. It discusses Britain both as a part of and as a rather aloof stakeholder in European politics. We will also examine the contributions of scientific thought to Britain's rise. In addition, we will have a look at Britain's struggle with its European identity and see the events, both domestic and external, that drove its European policies.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- deduce a clear grasp of the dynamics of British engagement with European integration
- explain how science contributed to Britain's rise to prominence in Europe
- identify and explain the issues surrounding the European balance of power system and the role of Britain in it.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Science and the Rise of Britain

Modern science began when mathematical models replaced abstract ideas of 'sympathies' and 'innate virtues' as ways of explaining how the world works, and how we might harness nature to enhance human power over it. Arab and Indian mathematics and science played an important part in laying the foundations for modern science, and major early figures came from mainland Europe and beyond. In Britain, scientific development reached its zenith in the second half of the 17th century, during the period known as the 'scientific revolution'.

The foundation was laid for modern science in Britain long before the Polish mathematician Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) demonstrated a model of the universe in which the Earth and other planets revolved around the Sun. At Merton College, Oxford, Robert Grosseteste (1168-1253) and his student Roger Bacon (1219-1292) argued that geometry was the basis for comprehending the mysteries of nature, and that mathematical models provided our understanding of the world around us.

By the time Galileo, in Italy, announced that the Copernican system was more than merely a mathematical model, and that the earth 'really' moved around the sun, the 'new philosophy' had emerged from the ivory towers of Oxford and Cambridge, and started to make an impact on people's everyday lives.

We may trace the birth of the so-called 'scientific revolution' in Britain to the activities of three influential figures, all of whom flourished

around the year 1600, and all of whom belonged to an exclusive inner circle of advisers to the royal family of the day, Elizabeth I, James I, and above all James's eldest son Prince Henry (who died in adolescence). Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626), often called the 'Father' of modern science, made no major scientific discoveries himself, but wrote extensively on empirical scientific method - the procedures by which experimentalists could arrive at general laws governing the natural world. He served as Lord Chancellor under James I, but was disgraced in 1621 for accepting bribes from clients, and retired to his estate, where he published his major work, the *Novum Organum* (1623). In this he expressed the classic view that only by following the laws of nature could man triumph over his environment: 'The Empire of man over things depends wholly on the arts and sciences. For we cannot command nature except by obeying her.'

It is to Bacon that we owe the strong strand of pragmatism in 17th-century British science. Western scientific progress, he argued, was built upon a foundation of three key technological discoveries, which had changed man's ability to control the natural world. These three were printing, gunpowder, and the magnet. 'For these three have changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world, insomuch that no empire, no sect, no star seems to have exerted greater power and influence in human affairs than these mechanical discoveries.' (Voltaire, an admirer of Bacon, later added the invention of glass to the three discoveries, as fundamental to the advancement of knowledge.)

William Gilbert (1544-1603) was court physician to Elizabeth I and (briefly) to James I. In his 'De magnete' [On the magnet] (1600), written ten years before Galileo published his 'Starry Messenger' (1610), Gilbert proposed that the earth was a giant magnet or lodestone, with its poles at either geographical pole. He argued that the earth rotated about its axis because of terrestrial magnetism.

William Harvey (1578-1657), was also a court physician, who served both James I and Charles I in this capacity, and was physician to Sir Francis Bacon (whom he described as having 'the eye of a viper' and writing science 'like a Lord Chancellor'). His experiments on the movement of the blood in the body of animals were assisted by his privileged court position and James I's passion for hunting - Harvey was granted access to all game immediately it had been slaughtered, dissecting and observing in situ. In 1616, Harvey announced his discovery of the circulation of the blood in his Lumleian lectures at the Royal College of Physicians; his *De motu cordis et sanguinis* [On the motion of the heart and of the blood] was published in 1628.

Gilbert's and Harvey's classic publications matched Bacon's theoretical expectation that close and repeated observation of nature would yield powerful laws, on the basis of which dramatic alterations could be made to man's environment (though Bacon complained that Gilbert extended his generalisations about magnetism to explain the phenomena with rather too much enthusiasm). It is probably no accident that these three groundbreaking scientific thinkers came from a single intellectual milieu. The combined effect of their influential writings kick-started the scientific revolution in England. The Civil War (1642-9), and the execution of Charles I, led in England to the establishing of first a Commonwealth, and then a protectorate, under Oliver Cromwell. Between 1650 and 1659, both the victorious parliamentarians and the defeated royalists turned enthusiastically to science and technology for its potential economic and social benefits.

Collaborative data-collection, organisation of knowledge, and production of new practical outcomes played a major part in the agenda of the Commonwealth. Royalists in retirement on their country estates, meanwhile, turned to intellectual pastimes in search of money-making initiatives to relieve their financial difficulties. By 1660, when Charles II, who had himself dabbled in chemistry and become fascinated with clock mechanisms during his exile, returned, the 'new natural philosophy' had become a fashionable pursuit for gentlemen and commoners alike.

Science took off in Britain with the Restoration of the monarchy. In late 1660, John Wilkins (1614-72), former Warden of Wadham College, Oxford, with a group of talented young experimental scientists and some gentlemen 'virtuosi' (amateur enthusiasts), founded the Royal Society, and persuaded the new king to be its patron. A driving force behind state encouragement for applied science was a dire cash shortage in the public purse. From its inception, the Royal Society was pledged to research and innovation in all areas of trade and technology.

Among those active in the Society in the early years were some of the major figures in British science: Robert Boyle (1627-91), Robert Hooke (1635-1703), Sir Christopher Wren (1632-1723), and Sir William Petty (1623-87). Boyle's experiments with his vacuum pump were central to the Society's programme of weekly experiments, presided over by Hooke, the Society's first curator of experiments. Wren's and Petty's contributions spanned an extraordinarily wide range of technologically driven discoveries, from detailed observation of the progress of comets, to attempts at blood transfusion from one large dog to another.

In 1675 the Royal Observatory was established at Greenwich, and the talented astronomer John Flamsteed (1646-1719) appointed the first

Astronomer Royal. Paid for with military money, the observatory's explorations of the heavens using state-of-the-art telescopes and instruments were intended to put Britain ahead of France in the race to solve the problem of finding a way of measuring longitude at sea. Among those closely associated with charting the heavens over the next 25 years were Edmond Halley (1656-1742) and Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727).

Newton, who emerged from scholarly near-reclusiveness at Trinity College, Cambridge, in the 1690s, to become Master of the Royal Mint (assuring the reliability of English coinage), and President of the Royal Society in 1703, now stands as a figurehead for British scientific achievement. His mathematical principles of natural philosophy (1687), in whose data-collection and computations fellow Royal Society members - including Wren and Halley - played a significant part, set science on its modern course (although few contemporaries understood it).

By 1700 there were scientific institutions across Britain, and a commitment to science as the firm basis for success in commerce and industry, and for national prosperity, was an established plank in the political agenda. Britain's rapid industrialisation over the next century, and its domination of world trade, confirmed the importance of science in driving the economy.

With the inevitable increasing professionalism of science, the success of the activities of the gentlemen amateurs who had founded the Royal Society, and who had always been regarded with some amusement by the public at large, looked increasingly irrelevant. However, the patterns of group activity, documenting and corroborating experimental results, and public dissemination of outcomes (including publication in science-dedicated journals), which the society established, set lastingly important standards for scientific practice. In the long run, these standard protocols and procedures may turn out to have left a more lasting legacy than 'discoveries' made by individual scientist-members.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the role of the British Monarchy in the advancement of science.

3.2 The Balance of Power System

According to the Routledge Dictionary of politics, the balance-of-power theory rests on the idea that peace is more likely where potential combatants are of equal military, and sometimes political or economic,

power. In the classic period of balance of power, which ran roughly from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the beginning of the First World War, there were always several countries of roughly equal power, none of which could guarantee to defeat a coalition of the others. The key to the balance of power maintaining international stability was that there were no ideological or other constraints on which powers could join others: any coalition was possible because all the members of the system, principally France, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, had essentially similar internal politics and general ideologies. Thus if any one country became ambitious, or seemed to be enhancing its power, others would shift alliances to redress this potential imbalance. It should be noted that advocates of the balance of power never thought it would prevent war altogether, the intention was more that wars, if they broke out, would be fought in a limited way until the balance was restored. It was the preservation of the system, and of the identity and autonomy of the actors, that was the aim. Thus the problem of the First World War was not that it occurred, but that it was fought in such a way, and for so long, that it destroyed, rather than preserved, the system.

Britain was a major component of the balance of power system that had kept relative peace in Europe until it was shattered by the eruption of the First World War. Between 1815 and 1865 particularly, British foreign policy was largely dominated by a desire to keep the peace by maintaining some form of balance between the great powers in Europe. The desire for maintenance of the peace in Europe was not altruism on the part of Britain but the result of important considerations. There was a great 'war-weariness' throughout Britain and also in Europe. The French Wars had lasted for 22 years and throughout that time, only Britain consistently opposed the French. Other European nations had been defeated by the French armies and/or had signed peace treaties with them. The people of Britain remembered the effort that had been made by the country during the French Wars; also the wars had cost Britain £600 million. Other and perhaps more important considerations related to Britain's economic situation. Britain depended on trade for survival. Her colonies provided raw materials and a ready market for Britain's manufacturers, invisible earnings banking and insurance provided vast amounts of incoming cash. These things invariably suffered in wartime so Britain wanted to see that diplomacy was the first weapon used. After 1830, Britain was the 'Workshop of the World', needing raw materials to maintain her growing industries and markets for the finished goods. She also needed safe shipping routes. Palmerston said he wanted peace and prestige; he used 'gun-boat diplomacy' as a last resort to clarify Britain's position and to avert a more serious situation.

In 1815, Britain was seen in Europe as the principal agent in defeating France in three ways:

- militarily, through the successful activities of the Royal Navy and then Wellington's army in the Peninsular campaign and later in Europe
- economically through providing gold to her allies and also providing supplies to the allied armies
- diplomatically through the establishment and maintenance of four coalitions.

Britain was at the fore front of defence of the balance of power system. Britain adopted this principle in an attempt to prevent the domination of Europe by any one Power. In the past and at various times different nations had dominated Europe: Spain, France, and Austria-Hungary in particular. The Treaty of Paris in 1815 and the settlement agreed at the Congress of Vienna ensured that there were no obvious winners or losers from the French Wars. Britain wanted to maintain the *status quo* of 1815. Britain also wanted to balance constitutional regimes against autocracies. In 1815 more territory in Europe was controlled by autocratic rulers than by constitutionalists, therefore wherever possible, Britain encouraged the spread of constitutionalism, especially in littoral countries: Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece. [A 'littoral' country is one that has a coastline].

By 1865 Britain had played a major part in setting up constitutional monarchies in almost every European littoral state from Belgium to Greece. These countries provided a barrier to central and eastern European autocracies. Also, the foreign office considered trade and income for Britain by using the physical support and presence of the fleet and army or by utilising her diplomatic influence to encourage constitutional governments. Britain, as the most democratic state in Europe, was generally tolerant towards Liberal Nationalism and had sympathy for the aims of the Liberal Nationalists. After 1832, Britain was even more democratic, following the passing of the Reform Act; by the 1850s, as the idea of a second Reform Act began to develop, Britain had even more empathy towards Nationalism.

All these actions were largely designed to ensure that Britain was not only strong enough to enforce the balance of power system militarily if necessary, but also to provide a strong basis for peaceful coexistence based on the *status quo*.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Was British defence of the balance of power system an altruistic goal?

3.3 Britain in the European Union

The seeds of European unity were first sown on the battlefields of World Wars I and II. The conflicts devastated continental Europe, killing millions. In 1929, French Prime Minister Aristide Briand proposed a political integration of Europe. After the Second World War, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman put forward his plan to irrevocably link Germany and France together, making war "not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible". Having faced each other across the battlefield three times within 80 years, France and Germany desperately needed to find a way to live side by side in peace. These early plans were not just designed to link Europe together economically. Some of those working on the original blueprints - notably the French civil servant Jean Monnet - had the creation of a federal Europe as an ultimate goal.

The first step taken down the road of economic integration was the downbeat sounding European Coal and Steel Community. France and Germany were joined in the ECSC by Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, making a core group of six nations. Despite being invited to join, the British declined. They were content for the Europeans - among whom they did not necessarily see themselves - to press ahead with integration while they attempted to re-build Britain as a world power after six years of war at the end of World War II. The wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill was happy to see Western Europe begin to bind itself together, but he was equally happy to see the UK keep its distance.

The Labour cabinet that held power in the years immediately following the war rejected joining the ECSC to a man. The UK believed itself to have closer ties to the Commonwealth, as well as the USA, and so sidelined itself, first over the ECSC and then again in 1955 as talks began in Messina to create a more ambitious sounding European Economic Community.

Having rejected the idea of taking part Britain left itself unable to help shape the EEC institutions set out in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. As the Six pressed on and formed a European Economic Community, Britain feared membership would have too severe an impact on the UK's Commonwealth markets which still counted for a large part of the nation's trade. Britain instead satisfied itself with creating, along with the Scandinavian countries, Portugal and Switzerland, the rival European free trade area.

But as the 60s drew on, the situation was turned on its head and the EEC - eventually set up in 1958 - accounted for more and more of the UK's trade. Entry was beginning to make economic sense, and Conservative

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan applied to join the Six in 1961. Only a few years earlier Tory Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd had roundly dismissed the EEC as "much ado about nothing".

Macmillan's decision was a striking measure of just how attitudes had changed, and how economically successful Europe was proving to be. But he was only to find he had missed the European boat. French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed the UK's admission, along with bids from Ireland and Denmark, ending talk of expanding the community. But he was only to find he had missed the European boat. French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed the UK's admission, along with bids from Ireland and Denmark, ending talk of expanding the community.

De Gaulle was backed up in his decision by German leader Konrad Adenauer. Both men feared the UK was still too close to America to cooperate fully with its European partners. In opposition, Labour came out strongly against EEC membership under leader Hugh Gaitskell, who issued a passionate warning as to the effects membership would have on the UK's sovereignty. But Labour's position was soon to change once the party returned to power. Gaitskell's successor Harold Wilson attempted to join the community later in the decade, only to have de Gaulle veto the UK's membership once more. Once de Gaulle fell from power in 1969, Britain was free to apply a third time. With de Gaulle out of power and Tory Europhile Prime Minister Edward Heath in Number 10, Britain went full steam ahead for entry, again holding negotiations to sign up to the EEC. For Heath, who had played a big role in the failed talks under Macmillan, it was the realisation of a personal vision. By the beginning of 1973 the UK had finally been accepted into Europe - well over 20 years since the project of integration had first begun, and 12 years after it had first applied to join. By this time the institutions of Europe were well established - and unsurprisingly, they had not been designed with the UK's economy in mind. Painful concessions had to be made by the British, particularly over agriculture and trade with the Commonwealth.

Despite being members, however, the British people and their politicians were by no means keen to march down what many on the continent saw as a path leading towards a federal Europe. Labour and the Conservatives both found themselves heavily divided on the issue, as some in each party feared power was moving irrevocably from Westminster and finding a new home in Europe. When Labour returned to office in 1974 it did so with the commitment to hold a referendum on whether to continue the UK's membership. Leading figures of the 'No' camp included the Tory Enoch Powell and Labour politicians Tony Benn and Barbara Castle. Meanwhile, Labour's Roy Jenkins and Shirley Williams, joined Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher in the 'Yes'

camp. In the event the British public said: "Yes" to Europe, by about two to one. But Britain never found itself in the vanguard of Europe and as the 70s ended the UK showed no inclination to begin preparations for a currency union, despite gathering momentum on the continent

Even though Britain had signed up as a member of the European Community, its relations with its partners were far from smooth. In opposition, Labour began calling for complete withdrawal, while Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher started to adopt what began as a robust, eventually becoming straightforwardly hostile, and defence of what she saw as Britain's interests in Europe. She demanded and succeeded in clawing back some of Britain's financial contributions to Europe and rejected out of hand plans sketched out by European Commission President Jacques Delors for Europe-wide social rights - what later became known as the social chapter.

So it was with much reluctance that she gave her consent for the UK to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which Britain finally did in October 1990. Mrs. Thatcher also heartily rejected federalist moves to create stronger political links which she feared would create "an identikit European personality" and weaken nation states. Thatcher had initially refused to join the ERM, against the advice of her chancellor, Nigel Lawson - a refusal that played a part in his resignation. When ERM membership was undertaken it was at an exchange rate against the Deutschmark which was later to prove ruinously high. The ERM itself was designed to lead to currency stability across the continent and so pave the way for monetary union. But when Mrs Thatcher delivered an uncompromising speech against political integration with Europe, she provoked the resignation of her deputy Geoffrey Howe. Her strident and entrenched attitude on Europe and other issues had alienated a growing number of her own cabinets, leaving a majority concluding that she had to go.

Howe's resignation set off the chain of events that led within weeks to her being toppled from the leadership of her party and from Downing Street. So it turned out that Europe, ultimately, was the rock which sank the Thatcher premiership. But ironically it was Prime Minister Thatcher who in 1987 signed the Single European Act - the landmark treaty from which much of the EU's future integration has flown. In later years she bitterly protested that she was misled as to its meaning.

With Thatcher gone, her successor, John Major, initially sought to mend fences with Europe. But as divided attitudes on the issue caused a vicious civil war at home in his own Tory Party, it was impossible for him to seek to make Britain a leader on the continent, as he had wished. As well as deepening conviction within his own party that power was steadily seeping from Westminster to Brussels, his troubles on Europe were further

compounded when the UK crashed out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism when massive currency speculation saw the pound take a heavy battering. The Maastricht Treaty also proved a long-running headache for the Major government as he struggled to have it ratified by Parliament. The British had been given an opt-out from the provisions of the treaty most detested by anti-federalists - the single currency and the social chapter - but for many Tories this was not enough.

As 12 out of the 15 EU states pressed ahead with monetary union in 1997, one of the biggest questions Tony Blair's Labour government faced was when or even if the UK should take the plunge. Prime minister between 1997 and 2007, Blair had pursued a "prepare and decide" stance, committed in principle to joining the single currency and pledged to hold a referendum on membership when the government believes the time has come to join - a point that will be decided by the chancellor and his "five economic tests". Blair has since stepped down without achieving his dream of bringing the UK into the Eurozone. His successor, Gordon Brown did not stay in office long enough to effectively improve Britain's relationship with the EU. Since the defeat of Gordon Brown and the return of the Conservative party to Downing Street, Britain still shows little sign of joining the Euro Zone. However, it is working far more closely with Europe than in the 1950s and remains a major force within the EU.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What factors influenced Britain's decision not to join the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Even though the British have emerged as one of the major determinants of the direction of European politics, they have in no way become as influential as the key states of Germany and France. In the first place, the British economy is smaller than that of these two countries.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, the unit addressed the nature of British engagement with the rest of Europe since the industrial revolution. It discussed Britain as both a part of and as a rather aloof stakeholder in European politics. We examined the contributions of scientific thought to Britain's rise. We also looked at Britain's struggle with its European identity and saw the events, both domestic and external, that drove its European policies.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Chronicle British engagement with the Europe from 1955 to date.
- ii. What role did science play in the rise of Britain as a major power in Europe?
- iii. What factors made Britain particularly suited to maintaining the balance of Power system in 19th century Europe?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 2 FRANCE IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

CONTENTS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

France is one of the most important stakeholders in European and indeed global affairs. It has a long and distinguished history of dominance of the affairs of Europe and of control of vast swathes of territory in Africa, the New World and Asia. By the late 19th century however, France had begun to decline relative to its chief competitors in Europe; Britain and Germany especially. Because of its fertile land, the bulk of the population was agrarian and thus came relatively late into the industrial revolution. By the late 19th century, France's industry and even population growth could no longer keep pace with its more aggressive neighbour, Germany, and the extensive naval power of Britain. Its consequent decline was masked by effective diplomacy until the overall weakness was exposed by humiliating defeats in the first and second world wars.

This unit will examine some key issues in French history that have informed its roles in European and global history. We will discuss the Napoleonic period and the many wars and reforms he imposed on Europe. We will also discuss another important figure in French history- Charles de Gaulle. This unit will also touch on France's role in the

European Union and of course the lessons it has drawn from its recent history.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the importance of France to European politics
- situate important figures like Napoleon and Charles de Gaulle in the dynamics of French history
- explain the profound lessons the French appear to have drawn from the experiences of these men.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Napoleonic France

Napoleon Bonaparte was born on August 15, 1769 in Ajaccio on the Mediterranean island of Corsica, the son of [Carlo](#) and [Letizia](#) Bonaparte. Through his military exploits and his ruthless efficiency, Napoleon rose from obscurity to become Napoleon I, Empereur des Français (Emperor of the French). He is both a historical figure and a legend and it is sometimes difficult to separate the two. The events of his life fired the imaginations of great writers, film makers, and playwrights whose works have done much to create the Napoleonic legend.

Napoleon decided on a military career when he was a child, winning a scholarship to a French military academy at age 14. His meteoric rise shocked not only France but all of Europe, and his military conquests threatened the stability of the world. Napoleon was one of the greatest military commanders in history. He has also been portrayed as a power hungry conqueror. Napoleon denied those accusations. He argued that he was building a federation of free peoples in a Europe united under a liberal government. But if this was his goal, he intended to achieve it by taking power in his own hands. However, in the states he created, Napoleon granted constitutions, introduced law codes, abolished feudalism, and created efficient governments and fostered education, science, literature and the arts.

As emperor, Napoleon proved to be an excellent civil administrator. One of his greatest achievements was his supervision of the revision and collection of French law into codes. The new law codes, seven in number incorporated some of the freedoms gained by the people of France during the French revolution, including religious toleration and the abolition of serfdom. The most famous of the codes, the code Napoleon or code civil, still forms the basis of French civil law. Napoleon also centralised France's government by appointing prefects to administer regions called departments, into which France was divided.

While Napoleon believed in government "for" the people, he rejected government "by" the people. His France was a police state with a vast network of secret police and spies. The police shut down plays containing any hint of disagreement or criticism of the government. The press was controlled by the state. It was impossible to express an opinion without Napoleon's approval.

The Napoleonic wars were a series of conflicts fought between France under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte and a number of European nations between 1799 and 1815. They followed on from the war of the First Coalition (1793-97) and engaged nearly all European nations in a bloody struggle, a struggle that also spilled over into Egypt, America and South America. During the Wars (for during this period the fighting was not constant) warfare was to change and move towards modern warfare leaving behind forever the idea of war as a sport of kings and moving towards the concept of total war and the nations in arms. Weaponry also evolved though at a much slower rate than the ideas of the nation at arms and conscription. By the end of the period most European armies had riflemen and the British made the first large scale use of Congreve Rockets in a European war. The period starting with bright uniforms but by the end of the period dark blue or green uniforms had become common for skirmishers, the beginnings of military camouflage. The period also saw the British Army under the leadership of the Duke of Wellington become renowned as the best in Europe.

The first campaign of the Napoleonic wars was the war of the second Coalition with Bonaparte absent in Egypt fighting the British, a new coalition formed against the French in 1798. This consisted of Russia, Great Britain, Austria, Portugal, The Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Naples. The fighting took place mainly in Northern Italy and Switzerland, with the Russians under General Aleksandr Suvorov being successful at first undoing the damage done by Napoleon's victories in Italy. The French defeated the Russians who pulled out of the coalition. Bonaparte offered peace but the coalition refused and in 1800 he crossed the Alps and defeated the Austrians at the battle of Marengo 1800. Other French victories followed and soon only Britain remained to stand against the French. After a failed attack in Holland, Britain made peace (1802). This was not to last long.

In 1805 the war of the Third Coalition broke out, with Britain joined by Russia, Austria and Sweden. Napoleon defeated the Austrians at Ulm (1805) and finally at Austerlitz in 1805 (known as the battle of the three Emperors). Once again the coalition reformed this time with Prussia but without Austria in 1806. Napoleon quickly moved against the Prussians and crushed them at the battle of Jena in 1806. By 1808 Napoleon was master of all Europe but he was now to begin a series of mistakes that would lead to his defeat. Dethroning King Charles IV of Spain he made his brother Joseph Bonaparte King, causing a revolt and what was to be known as a Guerrilla war in Spain. During the peninsular war (1808-1813) the Spanish guerrillas aided by British troops under Wellington and Portuguese allies drove the French out and eventually invaded southern France. A fifth Coalition formed but the Austrians were defeated at the battle of Aspern and Wagram in 1809.

With large numbers of his troops tied down in Spain, Napoleon decided to invade Russia in 1812 with an Army of 500,000 men and although he defeated the Russians at the battle of Borodino in 1812 and took Moscow he was forced to retreat due to weather, costing him most of his army and marking the beginning of the end. Surrounded by enemies on all sides with his best troops dead Napoleon was forced to abdicate in 1814. As the members of the Fifth coalition decided the fate of Europe, Napoleon staged a daring return to power and tried to reverse the outcome of the war at the battle of Waterloo (18 June 1815). Waterloo was a bloody battle which saw his remaining elite guard destroyed and Napoleon exiled to St Helena from where he was never to return, marking the end of the Napoleonic wars.

This period was perhaps France's finest hour as a European power. Napoleon's military conquests, as spectacular as they were, were perhaps not as deeply significant as the civil and constitutional reforms he instituted all over Europe. It is perhaps a testament to history's tendency to highlight the flashiest, that Napoleon is remembered more for the bloody wars than for his efforts at advancing many of the fundamental ideas of the French revolution. Napoleon's defeat effectively dissolved the empire he had built and encouraged the reformulation of the basic principles driving European politics. The balance of power system was restored and a period of relative calm ensued.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

The Napoleonic period is often described as France's finest period as a European power. Discuss.

3.2 French Decline and the Humiliation of the Wars

France had been in relative decline since the last decades of the 19th century. This decline was a function of its inability to keep pace with the technological and industrial advancements that sign posted Europe's rise, the political instability that troubled it and its demographic decline. In spite of this decline however, France has occupied a central position in the geographical, cultural and political development of western civilisation.

France surrendered to Nazi Germany quite early in World War II (June 24, 1940). Nazi Germany occupied three fifths of France's territory (Northern France and the entire French Atlantic Coast) and on July 10, 1940 established a new French government based at the town of Vichy. This government was commonly referred to as Vichy France and was headed by Henri Philippe Pétain, a General during World War I. Its senior leaders acquiesced in the plunder of French resources, as well as the sending of French forced labour to Nazi Germany; in doing so, they claimed they hoped to preserve at least some small amount of French sovereignty. In the meantime, civilian anti-semites and Vichy officials aided in the concentration and persecution of Jews, in particular those of foreign citizenship. The Nazi German occupation proved costly, however, as Nazi Germany appropriated a full one-half of France's public sector revenue.

On the other hand, those who refused defeat and collaboration with Nazi Germany, the Free French, organised resistance movements in occupied and Vichy France and the Free French Forces. The Free French Forces started in exile in and with the support of the UK. They were led by Charles de Gaulle, who was then the under-secretary of state for war and national defence and whose role in the resistance was to pave the way for his immense impact on the future of France, as leader of its provisional government and first President of the French Fifth Republic. After the Allied landings in North Africa (Operation Torch) the German Army occupied southern France as well, leading to the scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon. After four years of occupation and strife, allied forces, including Free French Forces, liberated France in 1944.

The events that led to the eventual humiliation and defeat of France by Nazi Germany had started long before 1939. As stated earlier, France had been in steady decline since the late 19th century and the war defeats only served to highlight that reality. The humiliation of occupation and collaboration in World War II had profound influence on the postwar history of France. In the first place, French industry had been all but destroyed by the war and the bulk of what was left had been stripped off and expropriated by Nazi Germany's occupation. As a result, France required massive infusion of capital from the US, through

the Marshall Plan, to fund its postwar economic recovery. Beyond that, France also faced serious political turmoil that can be easily traced to the social distortions and tensions that had been created by the shameful events of World War II.

Governments were created and forced to collapse in quick succession. But perhaps most humiliating was the realisation by French leaders that France had been effectively downgraded to the status of second rate power by the configurations that emerged after the war. The US and Soviet Union had become undisputed masters of the world and France had to contend with a highly diminished status; something it was most unaccustomed to. These issues had important implications for France and French policy all over the world. It faced revolts in its colonies (Algeria and French Indochina particularly) and was generally unable to impose its vision on these colonies let alone on more powerful states like the US and the Soviet Union. In the next unit, we will discuss how France reacted to this changing international climate and, particularly, the role of Charles de Gaulle in driving this.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the experience of France in World War II and its implications for French postwar policies.

3.3 Charles De Gaulle and the Vision of a United Europe led by a Strong France

Charles de Gaulle was born in Lille, France, on 22nd November, 1890. The son of a headmaster of a Jesuit school, he was educated in Paris. He was a good student and at the military academy- St. Cyr, he graduated 13th in the class of 1912. By 1913, he had joined the French army and saw combat during World War 1. He was captured by the Germans and held as a prisoner of war for 32 months during which he made five unsuccessful attempts to escape. During World War II, Charles De Gaulle held various combat positions until he was appointed war minister by Prime Minister Paul Reynaud in 1940. Following the ouster of Reynaud, De Gaulle fled to London from where he made a radio broadcast calling on the French people to continue the resistance against Nazi Germany. De Gaulle made attempts to unify the resistance movements in France. In March 1943, [Jean Moulin](#), [Charles Delestraint](#) and [Andre Dewavrin](#) managed to unite eight major resistance movements under de Gaulle's leadership. However, this good work was undermined when in June, 1943, both Delestraint and Moulin were arrested by the [Gestapo](#).

On 30th May, 1943, De Gaulle moved to Algeria. The following month the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) was established with de Gaulle and [Henri Giraud](#) as co-presidents. De Gaulle had difficulty working with his co-president and by July, 1943, had limited Giraud's power to command of the armed forces. By 1944, De Gaulle announced the formation of what he called the Provisional Government of the French Republic. This government was eventually recognised by the allies and was allowed to represent France at the signing of the final instrument of surrender with Germany in 1945.

He was elected president of France by the constituent assembly in 13th November, 1945 but resigned only after nine weeks, citing frustrations with the slow pace of reforms. During his retirement, he wrote the first three volumes of his memoirs. He returned to office in 1958 at the height of the Algerian crisis and gained dictatorial powers to rule France until he resigned in 1969 in the wake of protests against his regime and negative results in a referendum. Charles De Gaulle died on 9th November, 1970.

Many scholars have written about General Charles de Gaulle and his policies within the context of European integration, postwar Western defense or French foreign policy. Yet in at least one respect, these studies are remarkably uniform. Almost without exception, they treat de Gaulle as the archetype of the visionary or ideological statesman. He was, biographers and commentators agree, an “innovative leader” driven by “high” politics rather than “low” politics, politico-military prestige and security rather than economic welfare, a distinctive geopolitical worldview rather than the mundane concerns of democratic governance. His term as French president from 1958 to 1969 is a study in the possibilities and limits of visionary statecraft in the modern era. Nowhere, it is said, are De Gaulle’s ideational motivations more clearly demonstrated than by the striking series of French actions toward the European Community (EC) taken under his presidency. Upon entering office in 1958, the General surprised observers by swiftly embracing the treaty of Rome and working closely with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to accelerate its implementation. This involved pressing both Adenauer and his successor, Ludwig Erhard, to institute the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In 1960, de Gaulle proposed the Fouchet Plan, an intergovernmental arrangement for European foreign and economic policy coordination. Between 1958 and 1969 De Gaulle consistently opposed closer relations with Britain, first vetoing a free trade area (FTA) in 1959, then calling off two years of negotiations over British entry in January 1963 and rejecting British initiatives to begin them again in 1967. He then turned around as initiating discussions over British cooperation with the EC in 1969, which swiftly became membership discussions under his close associate and Gaullist

successor, Georges Pompidou. In July 1965, in an effort to alter the institutional structure of the EC, De Gaulle launched the “empty chair crisis”—a six-month French boycott of decision-making in Brussels. The crisis, which appeared to threaten the very existence of the EC, was resolved only with the “Luxembourg Compromise,” which granted each member government an extra-legal veto over any EC legislation that threatens a “vital interest.”

De Gaulle’s vision of Europe and France’s role in it was deeply influenced by the events of World War II. France had been an occupied country while the rest of the ‘free’ world fought against the aggression of the axis powers. More humiliating for France was the collaboration of the Vichy regime in the German war effort and its genocidal campaign to exterminate the Jews. This robbed many French politicians of the moral high ground and left France humiliated. De Gaulle in contrast, was the leader of the ‘Free French’ who coordinated the resistance movement against Nazi Germany. This made him a highly respected and celebrated leader in France, Europe and the US. In fact, he was able to extract a prominent role for France in the immediate postwar period that was not commensurate with the reality of French power as at then. The need to recapture the glorious history of France was one of the main driving forces of De Gaulle’s foreign policy. His policy of *La Grandeur* sought to re-establish France as a major player in global affairs.

In Europe, Charles De Gaulle was at once an advocate of unity as he had a disruptive influence of European affairs. He started out with the closing of the doors of Europe to Britain. He vetoed Britain’s application to join the European Economic Community at a time he was encouraging the association of Francophone African states to the EEC. By closing the doors of the EEC to Britain, De Gaulle became a clog in the wheel of European integration. Even though French men had been the key drivers of concepts of European unity through innovative proposals like the Bidault plan for the creation of a European assembly, Schuman’s plan for the European Coal and Steel Community and the Pleven plan for a pan European defence force, De Gaulle’s return to office in 1958 effectively returned France to fierce nationalism reminiscent of the Napoleonic era.

He was in fact much more obstructionist in the Trans-Atlantic alliance. In many ways, he challenged the basic arrangements for military security and economic cooperation in Europe. It has been noted that his approach was more widely approved in other European states than would have been apparent at first glance. What marred the general acceptance of De Gaulle’s opinion on the NATO alliance was his obsession with French pride and his haughty manners. De Gaulle followed a policy of unilateralism and non cooperation which caused

extreme irritation and endless friction within NATO and which eventually threatened the very existence of the alliance. Because his proposals for a tripartite global leadership to be held by France, the US and Britain was rejected, he followed a policy of deliberate obstructionism that shook the Trans-Atlantic alliance to its foundations. Regardless of the opinion of allies, France largely followed independent foreign policy throughout the Gaullist years. He took the decision to build atomic weapons, extended recognition to communist china, and was outspoken in his condemnation of America's policies in Vietnam. De Gaulle also treated the UN with disdain.

In all, De Gaulle's obsession with French pride and nationalism routinely dominated his assessment of the world he lived in and was the defining characteristic of his approach to Europe and the Trans-Atlantic alliance.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the role of Charles de Gaulle in Europe after World War II.

3.4 France and the European Union

The unification of Europe has been an ideal of French statesmen for at least four centuries. From Henry IV's Grand Design to Napoleon's wars and then the European Union, the object has principally been the same: unifying Europe under French leadership. France has, to varying degrees, been able to shape European history. It has faced the highs (the Napoleon period) and the lows (defeat in World War I and II) of European engagement.

France's relationship with Europe is paradoxical. On one hand, France has long been a strong supporter of the idea of a united Europe. Aristide Briand, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman were the founding fathers of European integration. This enthusiasm also stems from the intellectual, idealistic and universal dimensions of French philosophy. But France is also a country with a long history as a nation-state and an early experience with global power. Even when France's position within Europe was weakened during the 19th century as a result of the rising power of Germany, France was able to maintain its importance in the global arena. It found solace in its colonial adventures and by 1914 was the second largest colonial empire in the world. And even when the Cold War forced Europe to rely on the United States, France was quick to demonstrate its independence and weight during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle.

Since the break-up of the Soviet bloc and the reunification of Germany, France's place at the center of Europe has become threatened. France's reaction was to step up its attempts to bring about European integration, especially through promotion of the single currency. France decided also to help to create a political Europe ("Europe puissance") by promoting the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and by re-launching a common European security and defense policy (ESDP), together with the UK, at the 1998 St. Malo Summit.

Three lessons about France's approach to Europe derive from the past and apply to the present. First, the concept of Europe is popular in France and is perceived by many as a way of avoiding both the conflicts of European history and the problems of a balance of power in Europe. Second, the French obsession with Germany has never waned. France partly wants Europe in order to lock in Germany, out of fear of German power. This was evident at the 2000 Nice Summit when France insisted on an equal voting weight with Germany in the council of Ministers. The Franco-German dimension is central to the European project.

Brzezinski put it well: "France seeks reincarnation as Europe: Germany hopes for redemption through Europe." The European Union is the product of this Franco-German interaction. Third, France is trying to create a Europe that helps promote French interests (in, for example, the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP]) and that helps to preserve France's unique identity, while at the same time leaving ample room for manoeuvre. François Mitterrand said it expressively in 1986: "France's independence and European integration are complementary." In this sense, the promotion of European defence policy reflects a change in context. The transatlantic relationship is weakening as a result of the disappearance of the Soviet threat; the challenge is now to define a European capacity to act.

Given this ambivalence toward Europe, France reacted with some hesitation to the European constitutional process that was begun by German foreign minister Joschka Fischer's speech at Humboldt University in May 2000. The then president Jacques Chirac accepted the idea of a Constitution, but not of a European federation in his speech at the German Bundestag in June. Prime minister Lionel Jospin waited a year to give his own vision of Europe and proposed to "make Europe without unmaking France." Both of them advocated creating a "federation of nation states," a concept invented by former European commission president Jacques Delors. The European convention, made up of representatives from European governments and parliaments and from the European institutions, was chaired by former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and met from the beginning of 2002 to the middle of 2003. During the convention, France had three major goals: it

wanted to avoid a federalist Europe or parliamentary supremacy in the European Union; it rejected the separation of competencies between Europe and member states as an excuse for the re-nationalisation of common policies such as the CAP; and it supported greater efficiency in decision making.

The referendum held in France on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992, only barely passed (51.05% voted yes, 48.95% voted no). Since that time, French public opinion seems to have become more Euro-skeptical or at the very least more unsure about Europe. A survey carried out by BVA, a French polling firm, in early October 2003 revealed these uncertainties. Seventy-two percent of the French were in favour of a European constitution and 71% in favour of a European army. But 59% preferred a Europe of states, with priority given to national institutions while only 32% preferred the idea of a federal Europe with priority given to European institutions. Eurobarometer figures in the spring of 2004 paint a similar picture: 43% think France's membership of the European Union is a good thing (with 18% thinking the contrary), a slightly lower level of support than the EU-15 average (where 48% think EU membership is a good thing and 17% do not). French public opinion is also skeptical about enlargement (37% for, 47% against), but curiously support has increased since the end of 2003 (when 34% were for, 55% were against). Germany has now replaced France as the country most hostile to EU enlargement.

Today, enlargement generates fears of dilution of the "European project" and challenges the future financing of common policies (such as the CAP). There is also concern about a reduction of France's influence in a 25 country European Union that will be yet more difficult to control. The belief that a wider Europe has become a vehicle for free-market globalisation and American hegemony is spreading in France. The support of the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe for the war in Iraq has strengthened these feelings and led to then President Chirac's controversial comments about these countries "having lost an opportunity to keep quiet."

In addition, resentment of the EU bureaucracy in Brussels, while not new, increased recently when the European commission demanded that France and Germany make painful efforts to reduce their budget deficits and initially opposed the French government's efforts to rescue the French engineering giant Alstom. The fact that in the new European commission there will be only one French commissioner (Jacques Barrot) who will deal with a minor portfolio (transport), while in the previous commission two major commissioners were French (Michel Barnier for regional policy, Pascal Lamy for trade policy), has created a big debate on the declining influence of France in Europe.

France is experiencing a decline in its commitment to Europe and a drop in public identification with the European project. There is a real risk that a rising tide of discontent will carry the day in a referendum on the European constitutional treaty. President Chirac had taken a real risk in putting the issue before the French public, but if he had not, he would have lent credence to the notion that Europe is a technocratic construction made by and for the elite. The Socialists are in an even more uncomfortable situation: they supported the idea of a referendum on the constitution, but are divided on the appropriate answer. Many leaders in the socialist party favoured the ratification of the treaty and took political risks to convince the French populace to ratify it.

If the referendum had happened to be negative among the socialists, the chance that the European constitution be ratified in France would be very low. In any case, France is not the only country that has reservations and doubts about European integration. The United Kingdom is suspicious of Europe, but has realised it has no other choice but to pursue its place in Europe. Germany is increasingly dissatisfied with the bureaucracy at the European commission and reluctant to continue giving so much money to Brussels. Small countries like Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden are reticent about integration and fear becoming dominated by the larger countries. The new member states of Central and Eastern Europe do not want excessive constraints imposed on their new-found sovereignty, but they need financial help from the Western countries to catch up economically.

To overcome this general crisis a two-pronged approach would be necessary. First, the democratic legitimacy of the European institutional framework should be strengthened, but that will prove difficult because of the absence of a European public sphere (the so-called “democratic deficit” in the European integration process). Second, “leadership” must be strengthened which firstly requires action by the Franco-German engine in the areas of economic policy and foreign policy. This leadership is in the interest of all, but other states tend to reject it when they perceive it as a “directory.” For the future of European integration France has to accept two changes which are not easy given the country’s national identity: the acceptance of supranational rules and the replacement of an assertive approach by a persuasive approach.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What role, if any, did public opinion play in France’s EU policies?

4.0 CONCLUSION

As the above shows, France has been a very visible and significant part of European history. It remains poised to play similar roles in framing the future of Europe even though it is unlikely that it will gain, in the foreseeable future, the kind of dominance that it did in the Napoleonic era.

7.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have addressed primarily the subject of France's role in European international politics. In doing this, we looked at a very important era in France's, and of course Europe's, history: the age of Napoleon. We examined the implications of this period for European institutional development. We also looked at French humiliation in the World Wars and how it has affected their perception of France's role in international politics. The third unit addressed the overbearing influence of Charles De Gaulle in France and how his policy of 'La Grandeur' sought to reposition France as a great power after the humiliating experience of occupation and Vichy collaboration with Nazi Germany. The final unit addressed France's role in European integration. It noted the pioneering role of the French inspired Schuman and Monnet plans and the underlying motivations that drove France's promotion of European integration.

8.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Discuss the role of Charles De Gaulle in French foreign policy.
- ii. Examine the implications of the Napoleonic wars on Europe.
- iii. To what extent did the two World Wars influence French policies in the postwar years?
- iv. Discuss France's role in the European Union.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 3 GERMANY IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Germany has had a long and chequered history in Europe. Its history is now somewhat dominated by the two World Wars and the horrifying atrocities committed, particularly in the Second World War. It is however important that other areas of German history must be remembered. For instance, it is important to take note of its leadership in technology, its remarkable postwar recovery and transition from a militaristic and expansionist society to a pacifist one. This unit tries to bring all these perspectives of Germany into focus.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe Germany's role in the two World Wars.
- describe the nature and reasons for Germany's remarkable postwar recovery
- explain how its reunification changed the balance of power in Europe and its leadership role in the European Union.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 German Militarism and the World Wars

On the surface, unified Germany today - to a large degree - resembles Germany after World War I, as a liberal, democratic republic. Yet this is but a mere reflection atop political waters that have run turbulent, and deep, whose currents often churned in conflicting pools of political intent and impact.

Germany's journey, specifically from the period before World War I to the close of World War II reveals significant transformations that occurred during the voyage to the democratic republic it became. By comparing and contrasting Germany's involvement in World War I and World War II, in terms of the political, economic, and moral/social forces involved, it becomes clearest that the crises of Germany's involvement in these two wars wielded reverberating impacts not only upon people under German rule, but also upon international waters in the manner in which Germany and the rest of the world would define itself, its objectives, and its foes. As this analysis reveals, it is in the watershed years between these two great wars that one can best comprehend how the causes and outcome of the first Great War set the course for the second Great War.

Following WWI, Germany energised a revolution that attempted a Democratic Republic amidst a political, economic, and moral template of conflict and pluralism that failed. That failure fractured into anarchy and totalitarianism that witnessed the rise of Adolph Hitler's third Reich and precipitated Germany's expansionism as not an act of self-defense but as a fascist act of liberation through dictatorship. While Germany was handed democracy once more by allies following World War II, by 1945 not one revolutionary hand rose up to bring the country out of the ashes this time. It is paradoxical that in both cases, German expansionism precipitated war, yet for different reasons and with very different outcomes. In both World Wars, the conflicts began and ended in Berlin, Germany's capital, indicating Germany's pivotal role. There is little doubt that Hitler's rise to power was facilitated by these tumultuous watershed years between World War I and World War II. More than anything, the resentments of the masses that festered during these watershed years needed a target and a means; the motive was already supplied. The masses of Germany, without a true history of democratic experience, blaming the monarchy for their economic and political plight, more than anything, needed a sense of pride to restore their own social and moral bankruptcy, and to provide them with a vision for the future. Nothing supplied is better at the moment; it seemed, than to seek retribution from those the masses believed had

caused their downfall. As historians Prior and Wilson explain, by the elections of 1930, Adolph Hitler's Nazi party provided both the means and the target, for the party was "bent on reversing the military verdict of 1918 which the Nazis attributed to the stab in the back of the army by Jews, democrats and communists."

As this analysis has revealed, it is these watershed years between the two great wars that coalesced into significantly deleterious political, economic, and social/moral forces for Germany. Specifically, these failures reverberated after WWI as the inability of the monarchy or the Weimar Republic to recover both from its rebuff from the West in the form of the Treaty of Versailles, or from its inexperience as a liberal democracy that had overthrown the monarchy. The punitive reparations of the Treaty of Versailles, its own instability and inability to enforce the peace it negotiated to end the first Great War, and the pressures these conditions placed upon Germany to embrace non-Western, non-democratic solutions to its economic and political turmoil reaped a high price for Germany and the world. For these failures paved the road for Hitler's fascist movement to capitalise upon the fears and resentments of the German people and rally them to his doctrine of race/world supremacy. In sum, as this analysis has illustrated, one can best comprehend the causes and impact of World War II by understanding the impacts of WWI during the watershed years between these two great conflicts. The defining features of this period are economic crisis and militarism.

3.2 Postwar Recovery

After World War II the German economy lay in shambles. The war, along with Hitler's scorched-earth policy, had destroyed 20 percent of all housing. Food production per capita in 1947 was only 51 percent of its level in 1938, and the official food ration set by the occupying powers varied between 1,040 and 1,550 calories per day. Industrial output in 1947 was only one-third its 1938 level. Moreover, a large percentage of Germany's working-age men were dead. At the time, observers thought that West Germany would have to be the biggest client of the U.S. welfare state; yet, twenty years later its economy was envied by most of the world. And less than ten years after the war people already were talking about the German economic miracle.

What caused the so-called miracle? The two main factors were currency reform and the elimination of price controls, both of which happened over a period of weeks in 1948. A further factor was the reduction of marginal tax rates later in 1948 and in 1949.

By 1948 the German people had lived under price controls for 12 years and rationing for nine years. Adolf Hitler had imposed price controls on the German people in 1936 so that his government could buy war materials at artificially low prices. Later, in 1939, one of Hitler's top Nazi deputies, Hermann Goering, imposed rationing. (Roosevelt and Churchill also imposed price controls and rationing, as governments tend to do during all-out wars. During the war, the Nazis made flagrant violations of the price controls subject to the death penalty. In November 1945 the Allied Control Authority, formed by the governments of the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, agreed to keep Hitler's and Goering's price controls and rationing in place. They also continued the Nazi conscription of resources, including labour.

Each of the allied governments controlled a "zone" of German territory. In the U.S. zone, a cost-of-living index in May 1948, computed at the controlled prices, was only 31 percent above its level in 1938. Yet in 1947, the amount of money in the German economy currency plus demand deposits was five times its 1936 level. With money a multiple of its previous level but prices only a fraction higher, there were bound to be shortages. And there were.

Eucken was the leader of a school of economic thought, called the *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*, or "social free market," based at Germany's University of Freiburg. Members of this school hated totalitarianism and had propounded their views at some risk during Hitler's regime. "During the Nazi period," wrote Henry Wallich, "the school represented a kind of intellectual resistance movement, requiring great personal courage as well as independence of mind" (p. 114). The school's members believed in free markets, along with some slight degree of progression in the income tax system and government action to limit monopoly. (Cartels in Germany had been explicitly legal before the war.) The *Soziale Marktwirtschaft* was very much like the Chicago school, whose budding members Milton Friedman and George Stigler also believed in a heavy dose of free markets, slight government redistribution through the tax system, and antitrust laws to prevent monopoly.

Among the members of the German school were Wilhelm Röpke and Ludwig Erhard. To clean up the postwar mess, Röpke advocated currency reform, so that the amount of currency could be in line with the amount of goods, and the abolition of price controls. Both were necessary, he thought, to end repressed inflation. The currency reform would end inflation; price decontrol would end repression.

Ludwig Erhard agreed with Röpke. Erhard himself had written a memorandum during the war laying out his vision of a market economy. His memorandum made clear that he wanted the Nazis to be defeated.

The Social Democratic Party (SPD), on the other hand, wanted to keep government control. The SPD's main economic ideologue, Dr. Kreyssig, argued in June 1948 that decontrol of prices and currency reform would be ineffective and instead supported central government direction. Agreeing with the SPD were labour union leaders, the British authorities, most West German manufacturing interests, and some of the American authorities.

Ludwig Erhard won the debate. Because the Allies wanted non-Nazis in the new German government, Erhard, whose anti-Nazi views were clear (he had refused to join the Nazi Association of University Teachers), was appointed Bavarian minister of finance in 1945. In 1947 he became the director of the bi-zonal Office of economic opportunity and, in that capacity, advised U.S. General Lucius D. Clay, military governor of the U.S. zone. After the Soviets withdrew from the allied control authority, Clay, along with his French and British counterparts, undertook a currency reform on Sunday, June 20, 1948. The basic idea was to substitute a much smaller number of deutsche marks (DM), the new legal currency, for reichsmarks. The money supply would thus contract substantially so that even at the controlled prices, now stated in deutsche marks, there would be fewer shortages. The currency reform was highly complex, with many people taking a substantial reduction in their net wealth. The net result was about a 93 percent contraction in the money supply.

On that same Sunday the German Bizonal Economic Council adopted, at the urging of Ludwig Erhard and against the opposition of its Social Democratic members, a price decontrol ordinance that allowed and encouraged Erhard to eliminate price controls.

Erhard spent the summer de-Nazifying the West German economy. From June through August 1948, wrote Fred Klopstock, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "directive followed directive removing price, allocation, and rationing regulations" (p. 283). Vegetables, fruit, eggs, and almost all manufactured goods were freed of controls. Ceiling prices on many other goods were raised substantially, and many remaining controls were no longer enforced. Decontrol of prices allowed buyers to transmit their demands to sellers, without a rationing system getting in the way, and the higher prices gave sellers an incentive to supply more.

Along with currency reform and decontrol of prices, the government also cut tax rates. A young economist named Walter Heller who was then with the U.S. Office of military government in Germany and was later to be the chairman of President John F. Kennedy's council of economic advisers, described the reforms in a 1949 article. To "remove the repressive effect of extremely high rates," wrote Heller, "Military Government Law No. 64 cut a wide swath across the [West] German tax system at the time of the currency reform" (p. 218). The corporate income tax rate, which had ranged from 35 percent to 65 percent, was made a flat 50 percent. Although the top rate on individual income remained at 95 percent, it applied only to income above the level of DM250,000 annually. In 1946, by contrast, the Allies had taxed all income above 60,000 reichsmarks (which translated into about DM6,000) at 95 percent. For the median-income German in 1950, with an annual income of a little less than DM2,400, the marginal tax rate was 18 percent. That same person, had he earned the reichsmark equivalent in 1948, would have been in an 85 percent tax bracket.

The effect on the West German economy was electric. Wallich wrote: "The spirit of the country changed overnight; the gray, hungry, dead-looking figures wandering about the streets in their everlasting search for food came to life" (p. 71).

Shops on Monday, June 21, were filled with goods as people realised that the money they sold them for would be worth much more than the old money. Walter Heller wrote that the reforms "quickly re-established money as the preferred medium of exchange and monetary incentives as the prime mover of economic activity" (p. 215).

Absenteeism also plummeted. In May 1948 workers had stayed away from their jobs for an average of 9.5 hours per week, partly because the money they worked for was not worth much and partly because they were out foraging or bartering for money. By October average absenteeism was down to 4.2 hours per week. In June 1948 the bi-zonal index of industrial production was at only 51 percent of its 1936 level; by December the index had risen to 78 percent. In other words, industrial production had increased by more than 50 percent.

Output continued to grow by leaps and bounds after 1948. By 1958 industrial production was more than four times its annual rate for the six months in 1948 preceding currency reform. Industrial production per capita was more than three times as high. East Germany's communist economy, by contrast, stagnated.

Because Erhard's ideas had worked, the first chancellor of the new Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, appointed him

Germany's first minister of economic affairs. He held that post until 1963 when he became chancellor himself, a post he held until 1966.

This account has not mentioned the Marshall Plan. Can West Germany's revival be attributed mainly to that? The answer is *no*. The reason is simple: Marshall Plan aid to West Germany was not that large. Cumulative aid from the Marshall Plan and other aid programs totaled only \$2 billion through October 1954. Even in 1948 and 1949, when aid was at its peak, Marshall Plan aid was less than five percent of German national income. Other countries that received substantial Marshall Plan aid exhibited lower growth than Germany.

Moreover, while West Germany was receiving aid, it was also making reparations and restitution payments well in excess of \$1 billion. Finally, and most important, the Allies charged the Germans DM7.2 billion annually (\$2.4 billion) for their costs of occupying Germany. (Of course, these occupation costs also meant that Germany did not need to pay for its own defence. Moreover, as economist Tyler Cowen notes, Belgium recovered the fastest from the war and placed a greater reliance on free markets than the other war-torn European countries did, and Belgium's recovery predated the Marshall Plan.

What looked like a miracle to many observers was really no such thing. It was expected by Ludwig Erhard and by others of the Freiburg school who understood the damage that can be done by inflation coupled with price controls and high tax rates, and the large productivity gains that can be unleashed by ending inflation, removing controls, and cutting high marginal tax rates.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Can German post war economic recovery be considered a miracle?

3.3 German Reunification and Changing Balance of Power in Europe

The reunification of Germany in 1990 is one of the most important historical milestones of European history after 1945. However, it is not possible to narrow circumstances preceding this historical event only to the period between November 1989 and October 1990, which will mean to the time period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the act of the German reunification. The entire second half of 1980' was an important political prologue to this process.

Relations between both parts of Germany were very strained during the entire Cold War. However, since the half of 1980' certain changes in

communication between West German and East German politicians began to be apparent. The general secretary of the communist party of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Erich Honecker accepted, as the first Eastern Europe political representative, an invitation to visit the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1984. The meeting was not held eventually because of deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles in the FRG. He met Helmut Kohl as late as 1987 during his visit to the FRG. Both leaders agreed on a "constructive cooperation in spite of different views on crucial issues".

Nevertheless, a decisive factor for the German reunification was the arrival of a new Establishment in the Soviet Union after the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev to the office of the General Secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In contrast to his predecessors, Gorbachev regarded it necessary to change radically not only the internal economic and political conditions but also the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, including its attitude to East European countries.

On 25th October, 1989 during his visit to Finland, Gorbachev officially repudiated the Brezhnev doctrine and admitted that East European countries had the right to make their own policies. The new approach to the existing East European satellites became commonly referred to as the Sinatra Doctrine, which was a reminiscence of the lyrics of the Sinatra's song "I do it my way". However, Gorbachev's attitude to German reunification was radically negative both before 1989 and after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The first meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Kohl was held on 24th October, 1988. At that time Kohl did not believe that he would ever negotiate with Mikhail Gorbachev on the German reunification. When asked about a possibility of Gorbachev offer of reunification of Germany, Kohl replied: "I am not a writer of futuristic novels like Wells. What you ask me about, is rather something of the Empire of Fantasy". The crucial role in the process of the German reunification was played by the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl who, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, clearly declared his intention to reunify both parts of the divided German state. On 28th October, he gave in the Bundestag an important speech in which he emphasised the necessity of a speedy reunification of both German republics. On 28 November 1989 he presented a so-called 10-point plan for German reunification.

The most important was the fifth point of the plan in which Helmut Kohl mentioned a possibility to "develop confederate structures between the two states in Germany with the objective of creating of a federal

order in Germany". However the negotiations with East German political representatives were complicated by the fact that the West German side had not known for a long time whom to regard as the legitimate partner at the negotiating table. Officially it was Egon Krenz, the general secretary of the SED, who was the highest representative of the GDR, but he was holding his post only from 24th October, 1989 to 6th December, 1989 and thus he was not able to guarantee continuity of the negotiating process.

It was apparent that this issue could be solved only by general elections in the GDR. They were held on 18th March, 1990 and the alliance for Germany, which won more than 47 % of votes, became a straight winner of the elections. Also Kohl's CDU took part in the elections as a part of this alliance and won more than 40 % of votes. "Not even I had expected such a result" said Helmut Kohl. The ensuing negotiations on the new cabinet were quite smooth and on 12th April, 1990 a new cabinet was appointed. It was headed by Lothar de Maizir (CDU) who negotiated with Helmut Kohl on the future arrangements.

The integration of the two states was done also at the economic level. The date of declaration of the monetary union between the GDR and the FRG was set and the union came into effect on 1st July, 1990. On 23rd August, 1990 the East German parliament (Volkskammer) adopted at its extraordinary session the reunification of both parts of Germany in the ratio of 294 to 64 and on 31st August, 1990 the Reunification Treaty was signed by the state secretary of the GDR Günther Kraus and by the West German minister of interior Wolfgang Schäubl. The Treaty contained 45 articles and three annexes. In the Treaty there were defined relations between the two German republics and set down the state division of former GDR to five federal republics governed by the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.

On 13th November, 1989 an important negotiation of the most significant American politicians President George Bush, the secretary of state James Baker and the chief expert on foreign policy Henry Kissinger – was held. Henry Kissinger said on the issue of the German reunification: "The German reunification is inevitable and the United States will have to pay for that if Germans feels that we are putting obstacles in their path".

Most of American political representatives connected the support of the German reunification with its membership in NATO. The unity of NATO was more important for the United States than the act of the reunification of both German republics itself. As far as this issue is concerned, Kohl was for the United States a fundamental advocate of

their strategy of incorporation of unified Germany into the NATO structures.

A significant event in the process of negotiations on the German reunification was the setting-up of so-called "4+2 mechanism". This mechanism meant regular meetings of representatives of the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, France and both German states. There were certain critical opinions regarding this arrangement. In particular on the American side there were fears of loss of the influence on the situation in Germany because of broadening of negotiating competences to more states.

In France there were strong fears of unification of the two divided German republics. These fears were based on the idea that the strong Germany would have a different view of the function of the European Union. France was afraid of the weakening of its influence on the foreign policy of the European Union. The demographic factor also played its important role in this respect. While the FRG had a population similar to that of France, the unified Germany would have about 80 million inhabitants. The advisor of the French President Mitterand, Jacques Attali, confidentially told his Soviet counterpart that "France does not wish the reunification of Germany despite its conviction that it is inevitable in the end".

Not even the French President Mitterand concealed his fears of united Germany. As early as in August 1989 began to hold an opinion that in connection with the unification of the two republics the term unification instead of reunification should be used. Mitterand's fears of a possibility of unification of Germany further increased during 1989. In September, during his visit to Kiev, he declared that excessive haste in connection with the German unification could have negative impact on the stability of the European Community.

His fears of German reunification could not be mitigated even by the fact that Mitterand and Helmut Kohl were tied by a firm bond of friendship. He expressed his feelings on 20th January, 1990 when, during a private conversation with the prime minister Margaret Thatcher, stated that "reunification of Germany might lead to the birth of a new Hitler and to the revival of memories of bad Germans who ruled over Europe then". In March 1990 the French ambassador to the United Kingdom during his visit to Margaret Thatcher said that according to the meaning of the French government "France and Great Britain must jointly face to the German threats".

An extremely negative stand to the German reunification was held by the prime minister of Great Britain Margaret Thatcher. Unlike other

statesmen, she did not regard the German reunification as a historical crowning of the disintegration of the Soviet Block and the unification of divided Europe. She was seeing the process of German reunification from the point of view of her fears of the revision of German frontiers. Her fears increased in December 1989 after the release of 10-point plan of Helmut Kohl; in response to this plan she said: "We have defeated Germans twice and now they are here again".

Nevertheless, the British Prime Minister remained isolated with her flat resistance to the German reunification. "Margaret Thatcher went too far with her opposition in this matter", said former west German chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The attitude of the British prime minister changed as late as after the Dublin summit in May 1990; the summit guaranteed existing frontiers on Oder and Neisse. Thus, the ensuing negotiations in the composition 2+4 could be held in a more unemotional spirit. On 12th September, 1990 the treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany was signed in Moscow. This principal document stipulated the German reunification from the point of view of the international law.

By the adoption of this treaty, the allies lost their right and responsibility related to Berlin and Germany as a whole. In the Article 7 it is stipulated that "the united Germany shall have full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs". The treaty also bound member states to maintain limited number of German armed forces of Germany at the level of 300,000 men. After the signature of this treaty nothing hampered the German reunification. On the night of 2nd October to 3rd October, 1990, more than 100,000 people came to celebrate the reunification of both German states at the Republic Square in Berlin.

As Helmut Kohl highlights in his memoirs, the act of the German reunification at the place in front of the Reichstag building was a historical symbol: "From the window of the western portal, the social democrat Scheidemann declared in November 1918 the First German Republic. Its end was symbolised by flames which flared up out of the cupola of the building in 1933. After the end of the Second World War, Soviets hoisted on its ruins the red flag and started the division of Germany and Europe. What could have been a better place, after those 45 years, for celebration of the end of this division and of the start of a new and let us hope more peaceful era?".

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How did changes in the Soviet Union affect German Reunification in 1990?

3.3 Germany and leadership in Europe

In 2010 Germany celebrated the 20th anniversary of unification. This is therefore an appropriate point at which to review Germany's role in the European Union (EU). However, the developing crisis in the eurozone has given a much more immediate interest to exploring Germany's European diplomacy. During 2010, Germany made significant interventions in addressing the crisis, for instance in making stipulations on assistance to Greece, on the creation of a generalised loan facility for the eurozone and on future reforms to the system. This episode has manifested a number of unusual characteristics in German European policy: unilateral action, for instance in seeking to ban short selling in the financial markets; intense party political controversy over a substantive European policy issue; and the government's adoption of a defensive posture towards a public opinion hitherto characterised by a permissive consensus towards the EU. Given Germany's central role as an advocate of European integration since the early 1950s, any change in this role could be of seismic importance for the EU.

In this unit we will review whether these developments reflect German European policy more generally. Looking more widely, we can see that there is better evidence for evaluating German diplomacy and power within the EU now than when most analysis was undertaken a decade ago. Those studies were influenced by the pro-integration legacy of Helmut Kohl, who remained in office as chancellor until 1998. Furthermore, the 'new' post-Cold War EU, with 27 member states, emerged after many of those analyses were completed. It is this enlarged EU, governed by the Lisbon treaty, with which German European policy now engages. Has Germany's European diplomacy changed over the last two decades? Has there been any change in the way in which it has exerted power within the EU? Does the 'tamed power' argument still hold? Has Germany shifted from being a 'tamed power' to a 'normalised power' in the EU? What would the implications be for the EU if Germany were to be a 'normalised power'?

In addressing these questions we first review Peter Katzenstein's characterisation of Germany as a 'tamed power' in the EU. We also consider other key contributions to the analysis of Germany's role in the EU over the last decade. Second, to provide some analytical criteria we consider the different ways in which an EU member state's power can be exercised. In this discussion we also consider the criteria by which to judge a shift from 'tamed power' to 'normalised power'. Third, we explore and emphasise the domestic 'contingencies' of German European policy—organisational, socio-economic and dispositional—that bear upon its power in the EU. We then offer three policy vignettes to illustrate German power in the EU.

In the first, attention is focused on constitutional politics, since Germany has historically been a major—probably the major—demandeur of EU policy solutions and therefore of integration itself. What can be learned from its role in the recent protracted constitutional episode culminating in the implementation of the Lisbon treaty in December 2009? However, constitutional politics, although headline-grabbing, is untypical of EU business, so additional evidence is needed. Accordingly, German diplomacy is examined in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy, a relatively new, but fast-developing, policy area. Conceived in the Maastricht treaty, it is in some ways the ‘new frontier’ of the EU, and a policy area in which Germany has played a key role.

The third vignette comprises Germany’s role in the eurozone in the period since the euro was introduced in January 2002. Our argument in what follows is that the ‘tamed power’ characterisation of Germany’s position in the EU no longer holds. Its European diplomacy has become more assertive: Germany will if necessary proceed alone (*Alleingang*) rather than engage in exhaustive consultation, and is more prepared to seek out alternative intra-EU policy venues to pursue its policy interests. Domestically, the previously permissive public consensus behind ‘tamed power’, which became much more conditional after unification, is shrinking further; and Germany’s dispositional economic power remains strong even while it feels increasingly vulnerable, as recent events in the eurozone have demonstrated. In short, German power has become ‘normalised’.

Chancellor Merkel has shown no inclination to put forward a ‘vision’ of the EU, often preferring to act as a broker, as for example in 2005 during the EU’s ‘financial perspectives’ negotiations or in her salvage work on the constitutional treaty. This absence of vision left her vulnerable in the eurozone crisis, and her default position has been a much more assertive one. Ahead of the European council in March 2010, for instance, she raised the prospect of excluding states from the common currency if they jeopardized the future of the eurozone. This departed dramatically from Germany’s traditionally solidaristic approaches to EU partners and set a tone that was maintained as the ramifications of the Greek debt problem evolved into a systemic challenge to the design of the monetary union itself.

The German economy, encouraged by the wish held by some partner states to emulate Germany’s low inflation and fiscal rectitude at the time of the negotiations leading up to the Maastricht Treaty’s agreement on EMU. Germany drew upon these resources again in March 2010 in laying down conditions for agreeing to any support to the besieged Greek public finances. One of the key changes in German European policy since the 1990s has been the emergence of compelling demands

that have played a role in EU politics. The need to take into account the views of the Land governments and remain in compliance with the judgments of the FCC enables the federal government to present to EU partners non-negotiable demands of a constitutional quality. Different compelling demands, such as constraints arising from the domestic public finances, adverse public opinion and the fear of a Constitutional Court ruling, played a key role in identifying solutions to the eurozone crisis.

The federal government historically possesses a large measure of credibility and consistency in its European diplomacy. As the most consistent advocate of European integration among the large member states, Germany has built up strong bargaining capital under successive governments in both the constitutional politics of the EU and in day-to-day policy-making. Key contributors have been a longstanding permissive consensus on European integration among public opinion (now much more conditional, however, as we shall show below); cross-party consensus (under pressure during the eurozone crisis); the commitment to integration by successive chancellors and foreign ministers; and a positive commitment by socio-economic interests to lobbying at EU level. The only negative feature in this respect has been the sometimes loosely coordinated and suboptimal articulation of German interests in day-to-day government diplomacy in Brussels. A key component of Germany's credibility and consistency was its practice of presenting its major initiatives bilaterally with the French government. However, another of the recent key changes has been a less frequent use of this approach, in part because of less stable relations between the two states' leaders, but also because the Franco-German 'motor' is no longer as important to the dynamics of an EU of 27 states. The third face of German power is not directly associated with diplomacy at all. This 'unintentional power' is dispositional and relates primarily to the impact of the German economy upon fellow member states. During the later years of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) other member states, such as France and—both outside and, for two years, inside the ERM—the UK, found their domestic interest rates following those set by the Bundesbank in Frankfurt. The sheer importance of the DM to the ERM and the size of the German economy created an asymmetric system with power implications for neighbours. EMU was seen by France as an escape from German monetary leadership. However, the predominance of the German economy in the eurozone has forced major adjustment costs in the aftermath of the financial crisis on more peripheral participants in EMU, notably Ireland and Greece. As David Marsh has noted, while these states plus Spain were able to boost their prosperity through low eurozone interest rates, the consequences of higher public and private sector debt have become very serious problems to contend with.

In the light of French criticisms of the ECB and the sluggish performance of the Italian economy, it is little wonder that Germany has been perceived as the main beneficiary of EMU. Even before the formal creation of the Federal Republic in 1949 the decision had been taken that the German economy would focus on exports—that it would, to use Wolfgang Hager's term, be an 'extraordinary trader', which continually produced huge surpluses.

EMU, which precludes individual devaluation, is the perfect vehicle for such an economy as long as it retains its competitiveness. Through labour market reforms allied to the excellence of its products, Germany became super-competitive while Europe's southern states, lulled by the low interest rates of EMU, failed to take the steps necessary to maintain competitiveness.

The final face of power relates to the bias mobilised in the EU's system of governance. Given the prominent role played by successive German governments in institutional and policy export, it follows that the EU governance structure is not likely to be the source of systemic misfit with German interests. That is not to say that misfit will not occur, as for instance in 2003, when Germany could not meet the criteria of the stability and growth pact which an earlier finance minister, Theo Waigel, had been instrumental in shaping. The Germans had the enviable power, together with the French, to ignore the misfit when it applied to them—as it did in November 2003—but they are powerful enough now to seek to tighten the rules of the stability pact to address the misfit of others.

Twenty years after unification, therefore, Germany has become a normalised member state in the EU. And this is of major consequence for the EU itself; for the postwar 'German problem' and successive German governments have been, in different ways and at different times, absolutely central to the dynamics of the integration process. Germany's new stance thus lends an uncertainty to European integration in a way that no other state with possible exception of France could—and at a point when the EU is facing unprecedented challenges. Germany is likely to be a much more robust negotiating partner in the EU, especially where financial resources are at stake. European integration has very largely been a fair-weather phenomenon, and the current deep-seated recession, where the major contributor is taking a much narrower view of its responsibilities, will do nothing.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What characteristics make Germany a leader in Europe?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In light of the above, it cannot be denied that Germany is indeed a leader in Europe. Its leadership is based on development and demographic indicators that place it in a very vantage position to drive contemporary European politics. Indeed, unlike the late 19th and early 20th centuries when German leadership was based on coercion and violence, Germany appears to have a very strong power of attraction now that is a product of its huge and vibrant economy and its ability to conduct proud, firm but persuasive diplomacy.

7.0 SUMMARY

In this unit we have addressed the issue of Germany's role in Europe. We also looked at its history, particularly the World War years and how this has shaped Europe. We also examined the current leadership of the European integration process and identified the key drivers of German influence in both Europe and the world.

8.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Identify the roles of the Freiburg School in Germany's postwar recovery.
- ii. How has the Re-unification of Germany altered the cold war configuration in Europe?
- iii. Discuss the factors that encourage and constrain Germany's leadership of Europe.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 4 RUSSIA/FORMER SOVIET UNION IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

CONTENTS

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union was one of the two super powers that dominated international politics between 1945 and 1989. This dominance was based primarily on remarkable advances in Russia's military industrial complex but also partly on massive economic growth. Interestingly however, Russia, the core state of the USSR was considered a backward European state as at 1914 and was twice almost conquered. Its losses during the Second World War were by far the greatest as it lost about 20 million people. At the end of that war however, it emerged the largest nation on earth by landmass and had almost unquestioned dominance of about half of Europe.

This unit chronicles the rise of this giant and its eventual fall in 1989. It also addresses the impact of Marxist ideology on the Russian state and its world view, its relationship with satellites states in the Balkans and Eastern Europe and its broader relationship with the west. We will also examine the relationship between Russia and NATO and that between it and the EU (particularly with regard to the two organisation's expansion projects).

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the full implications of Marxist ideology on Soviet policy
- describe the bloody history of Russia continues to frame her perceptions of the world
- explain Russia's relationship with the Baltic states
- explain its opposition to EU and NATO expansion.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Conditioning Factors of Soviet Policies in Europe

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has undergone a significant change in foreign policy. Starting from the second half of the 1990s, Russian foreign policy began to reflect more and more on the concept of geopolitics. In spite of the fact that Russia as a successor of the USSR was facing many economic and political problems, Russian foreign policy was and is based on geopolitical thinking. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost its geopolitical hegemony, but it retained the tendency towards regaining its influence in the world. This tendency is supported by the geopolitical thinking which underlies Russian foreign policy, and which contains elements of all three geopolitical schools of thought.

The general principles of the Russian foreign policy concept also contain visions of other geopolitical thinking schools. The intentions to uphold the rights and interests of Russian speaking minorities can be seen in the pan-Slavinism vision of Zyuganov. Cooperation with UN, development of economy, and further cooperation with other states all underlies the democratic statist's vision of geopolitics. At the same time Russia sees new threats and challenges in the international arena. It contradicts the tendency to establish a "uni-polar structure of the world with economic and power domination of the United States".

Moreover, Russia argues that its foreign policy is a balanced one, and it supports multi-polarity. Being the largest Eurasian power according to its geopolitical position, the Russian Federation is claiming to use geopolitical efforts in all directions. It supports the vision of the Eurasian concept of superpower, which unites Europe and Asia, and links other spaces. If we analyse Russian foreign policy by areas, one may see that geopolitical thinking underlies this policy. Let us start from the near abroad: that is mainly CIS countries. The establishment of CIS,

and now the Eurasian Economic Community and Collective Security Treaty Organisation represents attempts to recreate the Eurasian heartland. Russia has a high influence in these organisations, but the fact that CIS countries have created their own spheres of influence and cooperation (GUAM) makes it difficult for Russia to save its geopolitical influence.

Moreover, “colour revolutions” in some post-Soviet countries have made it harder to re-establish the heartland. However, Russia is not going to give up and lose its geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet area. The recent tensions with the gas supply to Ukraine according to European prices have showed that by economic levers Russia can make Ukraine and even Europe vulnerable. Russia claimed that it was only an economic issue which did not have any political basis, but it is obvious that after the “orange revolution” in Ukraine, Russia demonstrates that it has not lost its geopolitical influence in the region. The Russian Federation challenged the whole Europe and showed to the other CIS states that it would not give up its geopolitical positions.

Relations with European states and European Union are a priority of traditional Russian foreign policy. Russia pays attention on the security issue, by supporting the importance of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and willingness to adapt the Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. This policy shows that Russia wants to cooperate with EU as a potential counterbalance to US hegemony. This fact again shows that Russian geopolitical vision underlies its foreign policy. Moreover, there is a high tendency for geopolitical thinking penetration into Russian leadership. Vladimir Putin’s speech in the German Bundestag in September 2001 depicts it. He states that Europe will “reinforce its reputation of a strong and truly independent center of world politics” if it unites its own potential with Russian one. This is a refined version of Moscow-Berlin axis theory made by Dugin and other New Rightists, which is adapted to contemporary realities, and which discloses the influence of geopolitical vision of New Right school.

Still, in promoting its interests Russia has a barrier embodied in NATO. Russian security and geopolitical vision contradicts NATO which is a lever of US geopolitical influence. In response, still weak Russia warns Europeans with the possibility of Cold War Peace. This growing contradiction with Western geopolitical intentions enforces Russia to play a more assertive role in the relations with US and try to defuse its influence in Asia and the Middle East. Russian foreign policy with Asia is wrapped up with Eurasianist geopolitical thinking. The Russian government understands that necessary cooperation should be established with its Pacific neighbours. In this sense, Japan seems to be

of a great potential for economic and geopolitical interaction. With the beginning of the twenty first century Russo-Japanese relations have improved, which shows the influence of the soft version of the Moscow-Japan axis theory by Dugin and others.

Russia finds crucial the cooperation with China and India, by fostering world stability and security. It considers China and India as key economic and political partners, which shows the reestablishment of the relations with its former Soviet Union allies from a geopolitical point of view. Moreover, the arms trade with these countries supports the idea of the attraction of countries which are unfriendly towards US hegemony. Russia also continues to have close relations and cooperation with the Middle East and mainly Iran, as a one of the main players there, as reflected by economic and political cooperation, arms trade, and technology support. Russia, by support of Iran, in its geopolitical view tends to counterbalance US, which claims that Iran is a threat to global security. Iran's assertive policy and attempts to pursue nuclear research are not criticised by Russia. Russia even supports Iran's nuclear research, which once again reflects its geopolitical thinking vision, and attempts to uphold its influence in the Middle East.

Russia, led by Eurasianism, considers itself as a pivot area, heartland, global power, which unites a unique civilisation with its own identity, culture, history. Geopolitical thinking was and remains a key stone in Russian foreign policy. Realities suppress emotions, but at the same time give a push towards fast development, economic growth, and regaining of power. Hence, with Russia's growth, geopolitical thinking will be playing an even higher role in the foreign policy of Russia, the country which has faced many declines and wars, and which has always managed to regain and even explore its geopolitical influence on the global arena.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the main geopolitical considerations that condition Russia's foreign policy.

3.2 The Influence of Marxism-Leninism

Karl Marx's theories of international relations assumes inevitable conflict between the communist and non-communist worlds; it regards imperialism as the last stage, the dying gasp, of capitalism; it emphasises the finality of ends and the flexibility of means, astute timing of strategy and tactics and the duality of morality and of standards between communists and non-communists.

Soviet foreign policy was driven in very many ways by this Marxist-Leninist logic of world revolution. While some of its postulations were quite relevant and adequately described the nature of the world, the fixation of soviet leaders on this theory sometimes blinded them to the hard reality of the immediate post cold war period. For instance, the Nikita Krushchev, the Soviet Premier after Stalin's death, argued in 1956 that the balance of power had shifted, that the emergence of a world system of socialism was inevitable and had already radically altered the distribution of power in the global system. His assessment, and thus that of the Soviet Union itself, was however erroneous and based on images rather than reality. In 1956, the United States still held a decisive military advantage, especially in nuclear armaments, and even though the Soviet Union had made some economic and technological advances by then, it was still far behind the west.

The point being made here is therefore that Soviet foreign policy was not only driven by immediate realities, but also had to be framed around theoretical models and images that sometimes contradicted reality.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Does the Marxist-Leninist leaning of the Soviet Union contradict the reality of the international system then? If so how?

3.3 Russia and the Baltic States

Russia's relationship with the Baltic States has been complicated not only nowadays but in the past as well. The geographical location of the Baltic States makes them strategically important for Russia's national security as today as in the past. Probably all problems of these countries are laid down in the 20th century's history.

The period was extremely difficult for Europe as well as for Russia, and the consequences are being felt in today's realities. To solve economic and political disputes between these countries, the historical perspective should be taken into account.

As it is mentioned above the Baltic States and Russia confront with each other in diverse sort of issues. Mainly and most probably it is related to the harsh and tricky situation during the World War II. It is possible to say that the source of disputes is the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact signed in 1939 by Soviet Union and Germany's foreign ministers, which was a treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union. Both states pledged neutrality in case of a war and not to support any third part. As it is known now, there were secret protocols dividing northern and Eastern Europe between German and Soviet Union spheres

of influence. According to the pact, Poland would have been divided into two halves shared by Hitler and Stalin and the Baltic States would have become under Soviet Union's dominance. This piece of history has not left the political life of the Baltic States since last 60 years and has become a permanent object in their relations with Russia.

Official political line of the Baltic States claims that after World War II, Soviet Union and now Russia as legitimate successor of Soviet Union was/is responsible for what happened and have to apologise and reimburse the damage done during that era. As history has shown Soviet Union delegates and even modern Russia's officials have already done so at least four times. First, Stalin's cult and crimes were publicly denounced and condemned during the 20th Congress of Communist Party of Soviet Union by speech made by Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of Communist party and the Soviet Union. That is to say that this is the first time after Stalin's epoch when officials of Soviet Union revealed and criticised the dictatorship of Stalin and faulty policy led by him towards some human and economic activities.

Secondly, special Soviet commission under Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev, in December 1989, the commission concluded that the protocol had existed and revealed its findings to the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies. As a result, the first democratically elected congress passed a declaration in December 1989 admitting the existence of the secret protocols, condemning and denouncing them. In 1992, the document itself was declassified only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Third, the sovereignty and independence of the Baltic States was recognised by the first democratically elected president of Federation of Russia.

Boris Yeltsin recognised the independence of the Baltic States and invited the rest of the world to do the same. That is to say that by recognising sovereignty of the Baltic States, Russia automatically rejected the idea of its bid to pretend to restore the influence in this region. Russia recognised all freedoms and respects towards these countries, establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Fourth, during the EU-Russia summit in 2008 then president V. Putin was asked by an Estonian journalist "why is it that it is so hard to recognise the fact of the occupation of the Baltic states?". The answer of the president was as following:

- ".....The conspiracy happened in 1939 between Russia and Germany. I believe it was a conspiracy. What can we do now? It was the reality at the time when small countries were involved in the reality of those days. ... in 1989 the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies declared that Molotov and Ribbentrop pact did

not reflect the real will of Soviet people and recognised the illegitimate action taken by them. It was condemned. What more accurate is possible to say about this? What else? How many times can we repeat that? Every year? We think that everything possible is said about that and this question is already closed".

As it is seen both the Soviet government and the government of modern Russia recognised *de facto* and *de jure* the independence and territorial sovereignty of the Baltic states which actually means that all claims to get this territories back is faulty and there is no foundation for such claims. Moreover, it is recognised that conspiracy between two states (Nazi German and Soviet Union) had no legal foundation, it was in conflict with international law and it is absolutely illegitimate. Consequently the destruction of the sovereignty of the Baltic States was condemned and sovereign power of the national states was recognised.

Despite all these facts Baltic States' governments are prone to get into open conflicts with the Kremlin, criticising the Russian government and even block EU-Russia negotiations. This took place in 2008 when Lithuanian delegation made the list of demands which must be involved in the negotiations with Russia. Of course, it was not very welcome news for Russia.

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) at its XVII annual session approved the Vilnius Declaration including 28 resolutions, one of them entitled "Reunification of the Divided Europe", in which Joseph Stalin's regime in the USSR and the Nazi regime in Germany are recognised as equally evil. The resolution aroused a squall of protests in Russia, in the state Duma, as well as among ordinary citizens. In the Russian blogosphere, the OSCE resolution was among the top subjects of discussion. Konstantin Kosachov, chair of the State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, claimed that the Federal Assembly would issue an official statement, possibly even in a form of a joint declaration of two houses which is a rare occasion, adding that the reaction is going to be "harsh and operative". Oleg Morozov, First Vice Speaker of the State Duma, claimed that the comparison of communism and Nazism is disgusting; Gennady Zyuganov, chair of the communist party of Russia, characterised the document as "a disgrace of Europe", indicating that equalisation of the USSR with the Nazi Germany is loathsome and destructive for Europe itself.

It is important to note that the Baltic States geographically and historically are very connected to Russia. As a result economic ties developed at great extent. However, as tendencies show the Baltic States try to reduce and minimise dependence upon economic sector as well. Immediately after Soviet Union collapse, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

aimed for integration in Western structure such as European Union and NATO. Anyway, Russia remained the most important trade partner for the Baltic States in the last decade of 20th century. During the whole independence period Estonia has imported more goods from Russia than exported there. The difference between exports and imports started to increase significantly since 1998. Later the difference decreased, but grew again in 2004. Contrary to Estonia, Russia remained the main export market for Latvia also during 1990s. In 1996 exports to Russia comprised nearly 25% of Latvia's total exports. The share of goods imported from Russia remained slightly smaller, staying near 20%. In 2004, the trade deficit between Latvia and Russia was 8.5 times greater than the deficit of Latvia's total external trade.

The volume of Lithuanian exports to Russia amounted to 3.4 billion LTL (nearly 1 billion euros). Compared to 2004, exports increased almost 44%, which indicates that Lithuanian trade with Russia grew faster than Lithuanian trade in general. Altogether, Lithuania imported goods from Russia in the sum of 11.9 billion litas (3.4 billion euros). Within a year, imports grew 51.3%. In comparison with previous years, Russia's share in Lithuanian imports has been rising steadily, almost reaching the 1996 level in 2005 (29%).

As it is seen Baltic States and Russia have a great trade turnover in general. Anyway the trade balance with Russia always remained negative. That is mainly because Baltic States import oil, gas and other raw materials from Russia. Negative trade balance was emphasised in the recent years mainly due to the growing oil prices. Also this fact could be explained that export to Russia is more difficult than export to Baltic States which apply EU rules because Russia implies many non-tariff barriers such as quotas, strict licensees. Also, the devaluation of rubles in the last decade caused the cheaper Russian export to Baltic states meanwhile the commodities from Baltic region became more costly in Russian market. The same must be said about present economic crisis, when Russian government gradually devaluated rubles to keep its export alive.

So, these reasons caused deep trade deficit for Baltic countries. Only Lithuania had higher volume of foreign trade with Russia than other Baltic neighbours (Estonian exports to Russia were 155.9 million EUR and imports from Russia 491.4 million EUR in 2003, for Latvia respective figures were 137.5 million EUR and 405.3 million EUR, for Lithuania 548.5 million EUR and 1931.6 million EUR). As it is known now, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus have formed the Common Custom Union which came into force on July 1st. This growing custom wall nearby the Baltic States' borders will affect their economies as well. For example, Lithuanian Ministry of foreign affairs has estimated that

national exporters will pay 65 million litas (20 million euro) additional taxes only because of new tax system appeared in the custom union. That is to say some industries of the Baltic States might be seriously damaged and probably will get no prerogatives or exceptions from Russian government.

Such policies might distance the Baltic States from trade dependence on Russia in the long term, since Baltic States will be forced to search for new markets and make their industries more efficient. On the other hand, these industries will gain big loses in short term. It might be more painful in the light of current economic crises since unemployment rate is one of the highest among the European Union member states.

In any case the Baltic States will heavily be dependent on Russian natural resources including oil and gas. Countries pay the world price for these recourses even though they are located close by Russian borders. All of three Baltic States get nearly 90% of oil and 100% of gas from Russia. Moreover, the closure of the nuclear plant, built by the Soviets, in Lithuania, in 2010 increased the energy dependency upon Russia. As following Lithuania is planning to build new nuclear power plant and in this way to create common energy policy of the Baltic Sea region including the Baltic states, Poland and some of Scandinavian countries. Anyway, the real future of this project seems to be vague. There was an attempt to create some companies responsible of managing and organising this program but it was disbanded since it did not fulfill the requirements of the European law. Also countries do not agree on the distribution of the electricity among countries which causes the absence of the strategic investors since this project was extremely expensive.

Baltic States are of geopolitical importance for Europe as well as for Russia. Probably it was one of the reasons why Baltic States were accepted to NATO in 2004. Since then Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia try to integrate into the western structure. Of course, it does not make Russia to be happy at all since NATO is considered to be a threat to Russian national interests. The last spark occurred and NATO announced its plans to do military exercises in the Baltic States. These plans were declared shortly after France selling warship Mistral to Russia. This happened soon after Georgia-Russia military conflict as a symbol of mutual trust between Russia and France and response to Georgian aggression. Anyway, the Baltic States raised their concern about this warship that might be used against them. As a result NATO declared its plans about military exercises in the Baltic States, although NATO claimed there is no link between these two cases.

The relations between the Baltic States and Russia are sluggish and imply negative tendencies. Since the Soviet Union collapsed, the Baltic States try to “escape” from any aspect of influence of Russia. The main goals of the Baltic States were to integrate into Western structures such as European Union and NATO and these have been accomplished successfully. The fundamental purpose of such policy was to diminish the influence of Russia and by using the international instruments to negotiate with Russia about questions concerning the Baltic States. The main connections with Russia take place within following framework. Historically, the Baltic States demand to recognise the occupation of the Baltic States and reimburse the damage caused during the Soviet period. Russia reckons that it has already admitted the fact and does not see any reason why it should do that.

The Baltic States attempt to achieve its “historical justice” in any possible way. Economically the Baltic States try to channel its trade ties with Russia to other markets, although its competitive opportunities and development is not always capable for that. Even if the Baltic States are able to reduce the dependence upon Russia as a trading partner, they still heavily rely on Russian natural resources especially on gas and oil and barely can change that in the foreseeable future. The Baltic States do not present any economic importance for Russia. In terms of national security, the Baltic States use NATO to outweigh the possible Russian intervention despite the fact that neither Russia nor European partners do not claim that there are serious foundations for such intentions. Military exercises just frustrate Moscow and escalate distrust of the Baltic States. As a result Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia operate in western organisations in order to diminish influence of Russia and use them as a tool in “speechless negotiations” with Russia. Every time when any attempt of such kind is seen, Russia gives strong and operative response. Consequently the foreign policy of Russia towards the Baltic States is obviously reactive than proactive.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How is Europe’s relationship with the Baltic States essential for European security?

3.4 Russian Opposition to EU/NATO Expansion

Relations between Russia and the West have entered a new phase, characterised by co-operation in some areas and open confrontation in others. At home, the Kremlin muzzles the political opposition and tightens its grip over key industries. Abroad, Russia reasserts its place as a great power. The US has been quicker to redefine its relationship with the ‘new’ Russia than the EU. Less concerned about Russia’s internal

developments, Washington now mainly cares about getting Moscow's help (or at least avoiding its obstruction) on international issues such as the fight against terrorism. For the EU, working out a new strategy is more difficult, because of history, close trade and energy links, and geographical proximity, as well as internal divisions. But these challenges do not make a rethinking less urgent.

The list of disagreements between Russia and the EU is getting longer by the day: Russia's opposition to UN plans for Kosovo's independence; its moves to frustrate Europe's attempts to diversify energy supplies; blocked negotiations on a new EU-Russia treaty; angry mobs outside the Estonian embassy in Moscow; the Kremlin's No to Britain's extradition request in the Litvinenko murder; disagreements over how to resolve the 'frozen conflicts' in the Caucasus; and trade disputes over meat, raw timber and much else. Russia's political elite has never loved the EU. Now many deem it acceptable to be rude about it. One Russian politician recently described the EU as "the area people fly over to get to Asia". Another claimed that the EU was worse than the Soviet Union because it is run by the "diktat of bureaucrats". Russian officials have developed a habit of countering every EU criticism by pointing to Europe's own alleged failings, such as mafia activity in Southern Europe, economic protectionism or inadequate rights for minorities in the Baltic countries. Until recently, the EU's reaction to Russia's growing assertiveness has been a mixture of complacency, befuddlement and wishful thinking. Although the political rhetoric has become fiercer and day-to-day co-operation more tedious, the Union has been clinging to its objective of building a 'strategic partnership' with Russia, based on 'shared values'.

The EU-Russia summit in Samara on May 18th, 2007, showed that these days are over. The EU stopped pretending that its relationship with Russia is something that it is evidently not. The fact that the meeting produced few tangible results was in fact no disaster. In the past, EU leaders would not have dared to leave one of their six monthly summits with Russia without having launched (or re-launched) some initiative, programme or dialogue. This time the EU and Russia simply agreed to disagree. By the staid standards of EU-Russia relations, this meeting was refreshing in its openness and realism. It also restored at least a semblance of unity to the Union, which had hitherto looked hopelessly divided. Both Angela Merkel (who held the EU presidency at the time) and commission President José Manuel Barroso stressed EU solidarity, despite (or perhaps because of) Vladimir Putin's attempts to blame EU-Russia tensions on the "egocentrism" of some East European member-states.

The Samara meeting notably failed to unblock the negotiations on a new EU-Russia treaty, to replace the 1997 'partnership and cooperation agreement' (PCA). The treaty talks were supposed to instil a new sense of purpose into a stagnating EU-Russia relationship.

Russia has long tried to 'divide and rule' the EU countries, often successfully. In the past, European leaders such as Gerhard Schröder, Silvio Berlusconi and Jacques Chirac happily discarded pre-agreed EU positions in their attempts to forge a special relationship with Russia. Such divisions have weakened the position of the EU, and allowed the Kremlin to assert that the EU cannot be taken seriously.

Now that the most pro-Putin politicians have left the European stage, there is a better chance of EU unity. Angela Merkel has gained credibility by openly criticising Putin for eroding civil liberties, most recently at the Samara summit, where she admonished the Russian authorities for preventing Gary Kasparov and other opposition politicians from travelling to a protest march. Merkel has also made a much greater effort than Schröder to consult the new member-states in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, she has maintained Germany's traditionally close links to the Kremlin: she has met Putin many times since she took office; she has supported German investment in Russia; and she has backed the construction of the Baltic gas pipeline, which Poland as well as Denmark and Sweden are opposed to. German-Russian relations are characterised by pragmatism and an unusual amount of mutual goodwill. Going forward, the government wants to follow the concept of *Annäherung durch Verflechtung* (loosely translated as 'rapprochement through interdependence').

Rather than set grand objectives, Germany aims to foster change gradually, through multiple interactions and everyday contacts. France's president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has already distinguished himself from his predecessor by speaking out about Russia's democratic weaknesses. Chirac had hoped that the Paris-Berlin-Moscow alliance forged in opposition to the Iraq war would grow into a durable coalition that could help to counter-balance American hegemony. For Sarkozy, moving France back into the centre of the EU and restoring good relations with the US has taken priority over close ties with Russia. If Germany and France co-operated more closely on Russia policy, Italy's instinctively pro-EU premier, Romano Prodi, would surely follow.

UK-Russia relations, meanwhile, are frosty. The Kremlin has long been angry that the UK granted asylum to Boris Berezovsky, a tycoon who is one of Putin's most scathing critics, and Akhmed Zakayev, a Chechen separatist leader. London was unhappy when Gazprom wrested control over multibillion dollar gas projects from joint ventures led by Shell and BP. Tensions grew further over the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, a

former Russian spy who was poisoned with radioactive polonium in London in November 2006. Because the Russian authorities failed to help during the subsequent investigation, and refused to extradite the main suspect, Britain expelled four Russian diplomats in July 2007. Moscow then expelled four British diplomats and suspended security cooperation with the UK. Although some EU countries initially regarded the dispute as a bilateral matter, the Union did issue a statement expressing “disappointment at Russia’s failure to co-operate constructively with the UK authorities”. For Gordon Brown, the then British prime minister, there were clear benefits in ‘Europeanising’ the Litvinenko affair. Whereas the chances of the big EU countries developing a common approach to Russia seems to be growing eastward enlargement which has created new challenges for EU unity.

Almost a third of the EU’s gas and a quarter of its oil come from Russia. When Russia temporarily cut off gas supplies to Ukraine at the start of 2006, the EU launched a panicky debate about how to wean itself off an over-dependence on Russian energy. Many Russians were genuinely surprised that they should suddenly look so scary to the EU. “The more Europe frets about energy security, the more tempted Russia will be to play this card”, remarks one seasoned EU official. The EU’s dependence on Russia is not one-sided. Energy sales to the EU are Russia’s biggest source of foreign exchange. It is this money that helps to make Russia more stable, richer and self-confident. However, while the Europeans should not worry too much about Russia’s willingness to sell them gas, they do need to worry about its ability to do so. Russia’s gas output has been more or less stagnant for years, while domestic demand is growing briskly. Talk of a looming Russian ‘gas gap’ has become commonplace.

The International Energy Agency warns that underinvestment in Russia could mean that by the end of the decade Gazprom may not have enough gas to both fulfil existing export contracts and satisfy domestic demand. The Russian authorities say there is no such risk, perhaps hoping to plug any domestic shortages by buying even more gas from Central Asia. Not surprisingly, the EU is urgently looking for a way to build a more transparent and predictable energy relationship with Russia. The EU-Russia ‘energy dialogue’, launched in 2000, has produced few significant results, in large part because it was based on the assumption that Russia would progressively liberalise its energy markets. Instead, the Kremlin has consolidated Gazprom’s gas monopoly, and tightened its grip on the oil sector, most notably through the effective re-nationalisation of Yukos in 2003. By 2008 more than half of Russia’s oil production will be under state control.

The Russian government has also made it clear that it has no intention of ratifying the Energy Charter Treaty, a set of rather liberal international

rules for trade and investment in the oil and gas sector. The EU was hoping that Russia would accept some of the principles from this treaty in the post-PCA agreement, in return for a free trade agreement with the EU. However, Moscow has shown little interest in better EU market access: three-quarters of its exports to the EU consist of raw materials, which are hardly affected by trade rules anyway. Instead of the energy charter or the energy dialogue, Russia now promotes the concept of reciprocity as the basis for EU-Russia energy relations. Merkel, Barroso and other EU leaders have embraced the concept. Reciprocity sounds good; it has connotations of interdependence and win-win co-operation. However, the EU and Russia mean different things when they talk about reciprocity, in line with their very different approaches to energy policy: market and rules-based in the EU; state-controlled in Russia. For Europeans, reciprocity means a mutually agreed legal framework that facilitates two way investments. For Russia, reciprocity means swapping assets of similar market value or utility. Gazprom insists it will only allow European companies to invest in its gas fields if they give it access to lucrative distribution and sales businesses in Europe.

These two interpretations of reciprocity are not easily compatible. The EU cannot engage in the kind of top level deals that Russia favours without compromising its own principles on open markets, transparency and a level-playing field. Russia will not accept these European principles because they would undermine the state's grip on the energy sector. There is also a mismatch between the players on both sides. Gazprom, a government-controlled national monopoly, faces a plethora of big and small European energy companies, some private, some part-state owned, but all bound by EU rules. Since the EU is not making headway on the Energy Charter Treaty, while Gazprom is acquiring ever more downstream assets in the EU, it looks like the Russian idea of reciprocity is prevailing at present. Gazprom now has investments in at least 16 out of 27 EU countries. In three of the biggest EU gas markets – Italy, Germany and France – it already has some direct access to gas consumers. Not content with controlling pipelines, Gazprom is building power plants and gas storage facilities in various EU countries.

In conclusion, we can easily deduce from the above that Russia has become a test case for the enlarged EU's ability to formulate and follow a coherent foreign policy. Intra-EU divisions over Russia risk poisoning the atmosphere at EU meetings and could spill over into other areas. The way EU-Russia relations develop will have big implications for other EU policies too, most notably energy policy, enlargement, neighbourhood policy, and the EU's emerging strategy towards Central Asia and the Black Sea region. Thus formulating a more coherent and realistic policy towards Russia is clearly a priority for the European Union. The Europeans should not start from a position of pessimism.

There is no new Cold War. Today's Russia does not engage in proxy wars around the world. It does bully its neighbours, although these attempts often look more clumsy than imperialistic.

Russia, unlike the Soviet Union, is not trying to spread an anti-Western ideology around the world. On the contrary, it still insists that it is a democracy of sorts. If Russian rhetoric sounds angry and intimidating at times, this could be because Russian politicians are still smarting from what they see as their country's humiliating weakness in the 1990s. Moscow cherishes its renewed international influence. More often than not, it uses this influence to obstruct. But over Iran, Russia has shown that it can work constructively with the Europeans and the Americans, if its views are taken into account. Russia, by and large, sees itself as a civilised Western country that wants to be part of international clubs — not only the UN but also the WTO, the G8 and now the OECD. It wants to use its regained strength to renegotiate some of the deals — from disarmament treaties to trade agreements — that were struck when Russia was weak.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What is the role of energy in Russia's challenge of EU/NATO expansion?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Russia remains a major power in spite of its sharp decline at the end of the cold war. In the area of military capabilities, Russia remains a formidable force and must therefore be taken seriously. Even though there is still some nostalgic yearning for the old years of empire by many Russians however, it is unlikely that the country will enjoy the dominance and sway that the Soviet Union did during the cold war.

Rising price of oil and gas have strengthened Russia's economy considerably in the last decade but there remains viable concerns about its reliance on resource exports for its growth. Russia thus is faced with a major imperative of re-tooling its industries, driving up domestic demand for consumer goods and finding competitive markets for its exports. It must also open up its political space and allow deeper consolidation of its democracy. Without this, it cannot hope to reclaim respectability or power in the contemporary international system.

7.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have addressed the key factors that conditions Soviet/Russian policy. We also examined the impact of Marxist ideas on the Soviet Union in particular. In more recent issues facing Russia, we looked at the relationship it has with the Baltic States and its opposition to the eastward expansion of both NATO and the EU.

8.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Discuss Russia's use of the Oil Weapon in its relations with Europe.
- ii. Why is Russia opposed to the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO?
- iii. Describe Russia's relationship with the Baltic States.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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MODULE 3 REGIONALISM IN EUROPE

- Unit 1 The Vision of a United Europe
- Unit 2 The Treaty of Rome
- Unit 3 Incremental Regional Integration in Europe: The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty
- Unit 4 The European Union: Structure, Membership and Roles

UNIT 1 THE VISION OF A UNITED EUROPE

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
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- 5.0 Summary
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The idea of European unity is not a new one. Since the time of Napoleon, some form of unity or order in Europe had been the central goal of European diplomacy and statesmanship. Even the conception of developing a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe had been around for centuries. For instance, the concert system, the balance of power etc, were important movements towards peace and unity that were, of course, tempered by the realities of the times.

The Second World War experience was however a major watershed that put some haste, even desperation, into the vision of a united Europe. This was so because of the horrors of that war and the unprecedented devastation that toppled Europe from its position of global dominance. In this unit, we will examine the dynamics of the postwar ‘unity movement’ in Europe in order to find out its main drivers, its successes and challenges.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the foundations of the European unification agenda, its prime motivations and drivers
- explain the successes and challenges of specific sectoral integration projects like the European Defence Community, the Schuman Plan and the European Atomic Energy Agency.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Schuman Plan

In economic terms, coal and steel were vital raw materials. Coal was then still the principal source of energy, and the French Government, wanting to modernise its heavy industry, realised how much the steel industry in eastern France depended on substantial supplies of coal. But, at a time when the liberated countries were having difficulty in satisfying domestic demand, the only available coal deposits were to be found precisely in the Ruhr (since the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands had temporarily withdrawn from international trade). The creation of a European 'pool' for coal and steel would, therefore, allow France to counter the threat of a shortage in Europe and, at the same time, meet its own needs for raw materials, despite the foreseeable dissolution of the International Authority for the Ruhr. In a broader sense, the Schuman Plan also sought to increase European coal and steel output in order to boost economic growth overall. In addition, it hinted at a major reduction in producer and consumer prices.

From the political point of view, the Schuman Plan was based on the assumption that the integration of Germany into a permanent European structure was the best way to prevent it from being a threat to its neighbours and, at the same time, guarantee peace in Europe. It allowed for an improvement in Franco-German relations on the basis of mutual interests, while creating a climate of cooperation in Europe, since it put Germany on an equal footing, something which was of great symbolic significance. The independence of the High Authority, the supranational body responsible for the operation of the European coal and steel pool,

was also devised as a new way of counteracting the pursuit of narrow, national self-interests. Moreover, the United States, eager to see Western Europe rebuilt economically and militarily, urged France to take decisive steps, since the British had clearly expressed their aversion to a European customs union or to any supranational approach.

France, keen to normalise its political and economic relations with Germany, sought an original diplomatic solution. For Jean Monnet, commissioner-general of the French national planning commission, and for French foreign minister Robert Schuman, it was imperative that German heavy industry be integrated within an economic organisation that would provide an effective but not overly heavy-handed means of control. They believed that the solution was the establishment of a supranational authority responsible for governing coal and steel production in the two countries, with the possibility of extending it to other interested European countries. This was to be the main thrust of the Schuman Declaration of 9th May, 1950. For Germany, this was a guarantee that they would see the end of the IAR, an organisation they considered discriminatory. The invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops, an event which occurred less than a week after the opening of negotiations in Paris on the establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) between the Six (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), profoundly altered the international order. At a European level, the risk of war increased the demand for steel, temporarily removed the fear of overproduction and, in so doing, lifted the threat of closure for less profitable plants. This was a positive factor for the negotiations on the Schuman Plan, in which a large number of workers' and employers' trade unions were involved. The idea of a European industrial pool began to appear regularly in the French press at that time, and from then on it was openly discussed in diplomatic circles. Monnet was very open to those ideas, since he was also seeking a way to alleviate Franco-German tension, and he was concerned by the threats arising from the Cold War. He believed that it would be extremely difficult to build a European edifice from the top down, a method which was often called for by the federalist movements.

He foresaw, instead, a Europe that was built on a functional basis by integrating key sectors of the economy in order to create genuine solidarity between the partners. For this reason, from the spring of 1950 onwards, he began to consider the establishment of a common market based on the coal and steel sectors, which were vital for both civil and military industries. However, his plan differed from most of the international cooperation plans under consideration in the steel sector, since, from the outset, Monnet presented the coal and steel pool as an indispensable but transitional stage on the way to creating a European federation.

There were two main reasons why Jean Monnet proposed the pooling of coal and steel in 1950. The six member states of the future ECSC used coal more than any other fuel, and the Ruhr was the principal region for coal deposits. At that time, coal alone accounted for nearly 70 % of fuel consumption in Western Europe. Although the Six together with Great Britain accounted for only 20 % of total world coal production, they had an almost total monopoly over supplies in Western Europe. Coal from Eastern Europe was becoming more and more scarce, while American coal was still very expensive and could be bought only with dollars, which were exactly what Europe lacked. French steel companies imported most of their coal, and the pooling of Franco-German resources provided a guarantee of free access to coal from the Ruhr, even if the international authority for the Ruhr, in which France was actively involved, were to be abolished. The creation of a European pool made it impossible for Germany to sell its coal at high prices and, in so doing, cause difficulties for French industry.

Steel was the most important raw material for weapons manufacture and for industry in general. In the absence of any effective coordination of European plans for economic recovery, each country developed its own steel capacity in relative isolation, and this carried the risk of over-production. A more fundamental French concern was that steel production in Germany would be controlled by strong industrial cartels and that the steel would be used for weapons production, which was what the French feared most of all. The pooling of steel was therefore seen as a means of destroying the cartels' potential influence and preventing future rearmament. Finally, from a symbolic point of view, the pooling of steel necessarily meant that a new Franco-German war would be out of the question.

On 18th April, 1951, the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed in Paris by Robert Schuman for France, Konrad Adenauer for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Paul van Zeeland and Joseph Meurice for Belgium, Count Carlo Sforza for Italy, Joseph Bech for Luxembourg and Dirk Stikker and Jan van den Brink for the Netherlands.

The treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) created several institutions responsible for the pooling of Europe's coal and steel resources and, in addition, for maintaining peace in Europe:

- A High Authority assisted by a Consultative Committee
- A Common Assembly
- A Court of Justice

- A Special Council of Ministers

The high authority's supranational character was a major breakthrough. The members of the high authority did not actually represent their own country's interests but were under oath to defend the general interest of the member states. They enjoyed wide-ranging powers to help them achieve this aim. For example, they were able to intervene in national coal and steel markets but without being able to replace the existing businesses as such. The high authority's financial autonomy, which was guaranteed by a 'tax' based on a maximum 1 % levy on the turnover of coal and steel companies, reinforced its independence vis-à-vis the six governments.

The ratification of the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was completed without any major problems in most of the six signatory states. On the whole, only the communist MPs were fiercely opposed to the Schuman Plan, which they denounced as being an American imperialist, warmongering instrument directed against both the social interests of the workers and the Eastern Bloc countries.

In Belgium, the text was ratified in the Senate on 5th February, 1952 by 102 votes to 4, with 58 abstentions. The abstentions included the entire Socialist Group who was concerned about the repercussions that the ECSC would have on the country's mining industry. On 12 June 1952, the Chamber of Deputies in turn adopted the agreements creating the ECSC by 191 votes to 13, with 13 abstentions. In Germany, the Bundestag adopted the bill ratifying the Treaty on 11th January, 1952 by 378 to 143. The opposing forces included the Communists and Social Democrats. The Bundesrat followed suit on 1st February, 1952 and adopted a supplementary resolution on 1st July, 1952 which called on the Federal Government to ensure that the Allied High Commission abolished all the restraints on iron and steel production in Germany and that West Berlin was expressly included in the territory covered by the ECSC. In Italy, on 15th March, 1952 the Senate adopted the bill by a sitting and standing vote, while the Chamber of Deputies adopted the bill by 265 to 98 on 16th June, 1952. In Luxembourg, the Chamber of Deputies adopted the bill approving the Schuman Plan on 13th May, 1952 by 47 votes to 4, the four being cast by the Communist Group. In the Netherlands, the Second Chamber of the States-General adopted the bill on 31st October, 1951 by 62 votes to 6, the six cast by the Communist Group, while on 19th February, 1952, the First Chamber of the States-General adopted the bill by 36 votes to 2.

In France, however, ratification proved to be a far more delicate issue. The Communist MPs were opposed to any idea of a European

Community, which they deemed to be hostile to the Soviet Union, while the Gaullists had many reservations about the supranational character of the High Authority. In the National Assembly on 13th December, 1951, 377 MPs voted for the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and 233 against. The government was even forced to move a vote of confidence twice during the public debates. The MPs also adopted two amendments to the original text of the bill authorising the President of the Republic to ratify the treaty establishing the ECSC.

The amendments principally sought continued investment to support the French coal mining and iron and steel industries as well as to canalise the River Moselle. In the council of the Republic, the plan was threatened with failure when MPs from the conservative right wing joined forces with the Gaullists and Communists. Accordingly, the French Government had to make a number of promises to the councillors as regards the supply of coke to the French iron and steel industry before it secured ratification, on 1st April, 1952, by 182 votes to 32.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Why was the integration of the European coal and steel industries important to France?

3.2 The European Defence Community

In 1950, the Korean War and the Communist threat proved how pressing the need was for a European defence organisation that would necessarily include German armed forces. Moreover, the need for German rearmament was constantly repeated by an American Government anxious to thwart the ambitions of Communism in Europe.

Europe still held vivid and painful memories of the war and of German military occupation. The Communist threat had, however, become more apparent from the late 1940s onwards, and Western Europe became aware that German rearmament was in its interest and was a matter of some necessity. Even so, despite the Brussels treaty (1948), which set up a system of mutual assistance in the event of armed aggression, the Five (Great Britain, France, and the three Benelux countries) could not deal with the threat alone. Thanks to massive American support, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), established in Washington in April 1949, did guarantee the defence of Europe in an Atlantic context, but did not provide a practical solution to the problem of rearming Germany, which country was not a signatory of the treaty. Therefore, German participation in European defence was on the agenda, but the former Allies were of widely differing opinions as to how they thought

this should be brought about. Moreover, the situation in Germany was far from simple. In 1950, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had neither army, ministry of defence, nor of course a general staff. It still had no ministry of foreign affairs, yet its geographical position at the heart of Europe, as well as the fact that its eastern part had been removed, made it sure to be the literal battleground of any eventual East-West conflict.

In the summer of 1950, spurred on by the outbreak of the Korean War in June, which had made the Communist threat a reality, Jean Monnet, general commissioner of the National Planning Board, and the man behind the Schuman Plan, sought to organise European defence on a supranational level comparable to that laid down in the Schuman proposal. At about the same time, the USA asked their allies to plan for the rearmament of West Germany. But Monnet was also trying to ensure that Germany, aware that its role was becoming increasingly indispensable, did not lose sight of the plan for a coal and steel pool or harden in position in the negotiations concerning it. He put his proposal to René Pleven, French premier and former minister of defence, who in turn submitted it to the Conseil de la République before putting it to the French national assembly on 24th October, 1950.

The European Defence Community (EDC) was without doubt one of the most ambitious projects launched by the proponents of European unity in the 1950s. The attempt to form a European army, barely five years after the end of the Second World War was a highly symbolic act indeed. However, defence was considered a fundamental part of national sovereignty that few countries were prepared to give up.

In 1950, a few weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States demanded that France accept the rapid rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), because they were increasingly afraid that the Soviet Union, which had had nuclear capability since late 1949, would launch an offensive military campaign in Western Europe. At the same time, the French army was embroiled in Indo-China, and British units were involved in Malaysia. The 14 Western divisions based in Europe did not seem up to the task of taking on over 180 communist divisions. The West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, officially called for the right to raise an armed force capable of protecting the country from the threat posed by the East German 'People's Police'.

Keen that the establishment of a German army should be undertaken within the confines of a European structure, the French Premier, René Pleven, put forward to his European partners a plan proposing the constitution of a European army of 100, 000 men. The Pleven plan was to combine battalions from various European countries, including

Germany. The European army, though run by a European minister for defence and endowed with a common budget, would be placed under the supreme command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Negotiations began on 15th February, 1951. With American support, the members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) signed the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) on 27th May, 1952 in Paris. It differed from the French plan in several respects. The planned European army would consist of 40 national divisions of 13,000 soldiers wearing a common uniform, much more than originally proposed by France. The treaty also provided for the creation of a commissariat of nine members, having less extensive powers than those of the high authority of the ECSC, a council of ministers, and an EDC assembly with the task of drafting a plan for a European political authority. As those in federalist circles had wished, Article 38 of the treaty provided for the development of a plan for a federal structure to oversee and control democratically the planned European army. The EDC treaty, signed for a period of 50 years, could not, however, come into force until it had been ratified by all the signatory states.

Whilst France's five European partners were on the way towards parliamentary ratification of the EDC Treaty, an intense ideological dispute divided the majority of French political parties – so much so that Italy decided to wait for the results of the French vote before making its own decision.

The international economic and military situation was no more favourable to the EDC. For whilst France was suffering serious military setbacks in Indochina, the nationalist right, feared a further weakening of the French army. The death of Stalin in May 1953 and the signature of the armistice ending the Korean War, four months later, seemed to herald a period of détente in which the EDC no longer seemed quite as urgent. Furthermore, strong American pressure for ratification ended up irritating French députés who did not want their decision to be made for them.

In these circumstances, successive French premiers delayed ratification of a treaty openly criticised to an increasing extent by the French political community. Weakened by the successive governmental crises of the fourth republic, the new government under Mendès France, itself split between those for and those against the EDC met with considerable difficulties in its efforts to pass such a controversial bill. At the last minute, Mendès France, who himself had considerable reservations, even asked his European partners to modify certain aspects of the implementation of the treaty towards less supranationality, but his

efforts proved to be in vain. Not having been able to obtain these amendments, Mendès France refused to take the political responsibility of making ratification of the treaty the issue of a vote of confidence in his government.

While the treaty had already been ratified by France's partners, with the exception of Italy, which was ready to do so, the political friction and impassioned debates came to a head on 30th August, 1954 when the French National Assembly by 319 votes to 264 decided to postpone discussion of the document that would allow the President to ratify the EDC treaty. This procedural artifice meant that France had in effect rejected the proposal for a European army that it had instigated. The 'crime of 30th August' was for federalists the end, for the moment at least, of a process favourable to supranationality in Europe.

France's course of action met with considerable consternation in Western Europe and the United States. There was intense disappointment, calling for a rapid response. France, which had for many years been the champion of the European cause, found itself seriously discredited by its refusal to ratify the EDC treaty. The creation of the Western European Union (WEU) on 23rd October, 1954 provided but a feeble substitute for the EDC, and from 5th May, 1955 German rearmament went ahead regardless, despite France's reservations, under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It would not be until 1955, and the Messina Declaration, that the process of European integration could begin once more.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What role did the Korean War play in encouraging common European defence?

3.3 The Council of Europe

Founded in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Council of Europe is Europe's oldest political organisation. The organisation's founding act, the Statute of the Council of Europe, was signed in London on 5 May 1949. According to the Preamble, the aim of its members is the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international cooperation, the safeguarding of the principles of freedom, democracy and the rule of law and the promotion of social and economic progress.

The structure and the powers and responsibilities of the Council of Europe, which has two main bodies: a consultative assembly and a committee of ministers are the result of a compromise between those who favour a federalist model of European integration and the unionists,

who, seeking not to interfere with state sovereignty, prefer no more than intergovernmental cooperation.

The idea of convening a European assembly first arose at the congress of Europe, held in The Hague on 10th May, 1948 by the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity. The congress closed with the participants adopting a political resolution calling for the convening of a European assembly, the drafting of a charter of human rights and the setting up of a court responsible for ensuring compliance with that charter.

In July 1948, the French Government took up the idea launched at the Hague congress and proposed the establishment of a European assembly. But the British government was doubtful and called for more detailed information on how exactly such an assembly was to be convened. In order to clarify the matter, the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity drew up specific proposals and, on 18th August, 1948 presented them to the governments concerned in the form of a memorandum.

The French Government approved the proposals set out in the August 1948 memorandum and, supported by the Belgian Government, referred the plan to the Standing Committee of the treaty of Brussels on 2nd September, 1948. Consequently, France and Belgium submitted proposals to the other signatory states to the treaty of Brussels (Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) for the setting up of a European assembly which would have a consultative role and be responsible for representing the views of the European public. The assembly would consist of representatives appointed by the various national parliaments and would adopt resolutions by a majority of votes cast.

However, the British rejected the idea of an international institution whose members were not appointed by their governments. They envisaged the establishment of a ministerial committee whose composition would vary according to the issues to be addressed and which would be accompanied by parliamentary delegations and other experts.

On 26th October, 1948, in order to reconcile both positions, the consultative council of the Brussels treaty powers decided to establish a committee for the study of European Unity which, chaired by Edouard Herriot, met in Paris from November 1948 to January 1949. On 15th December, 1948, the committee entrusted the task to a sub-committee which then submitted a draft constituent text for a European Union. On 18th January, 1949 however, the British Government, which

was still lukewarm about the plan, submitted a new proposal. No agreement had been reached when the committee's work came to an end two days later.

Finally, on 27th and 28th January, 1949, the foreign ministers of the five Brussels treaty countries reached a compromise at a meeting of the consultative council of the Brussels Treaty Powers. This consisted in the setting up of a ministerial committee endowed with the power to take decisions and of a consultative assembly whose members were to be appointed in accordance with their own government's procedures, as had been requested by the United Kingdom, the five Powers then invited Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Norway and Sweden to attend the conference on the establishment of a council of Europe, held at St James's Palace in London from 3rd to 5th May, 1949. Following its signature on 5th May, the organisation's Statute entered into force on 3rd August, 1949 the date on which Luxembourg deposited the seventh instrument of ratification with the British Government.

The Hague Congress' request, in May 1948, that a charter of human rights be drawn up and that a court of justice be set up to be responsible for ensuring compliance with that charter, came to fruition in Rome on 4th November, 1950 when 12 council of Europe member states, together with the government of the Saar, an associate member, signed the convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights — ECHR). The ECHR entered into force on 3rd September, 1953 the date on which Luxembourg deposited the 10th instrument of ratification with the council of Europe's secretary-general.

Starting with the adoption of the ECHR, the council of Europe's great achievements clearly consists in the drawing up of a whole series of international treaties, with particular regard to the protection of human rights, which ratifying states are then obliged to respect. This is why the council of Europe may be defined as an organisation for conciliation based on cooperation on standards. The ratification of European agreements by council of Europe member states leads to the harmonisation of their legal systems.

Following the fall of the Berlin wall on 9th November, 1989 the organisation became the most appropriate structure for monitoring the democratisation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that had emerged in the post-communist era. Since 1989, the council of Europe has initiated specific legal cooperation programmes aimed at assisting the transition of applicant states to democracy. This involved assisting states in bringing their institutional, legislative and administrative structures into line with European democratic standards. On

9th October, 1993 in Vienna, this new policy of openness towards Central and Eastern Europe was formally announced by the Heads of State and government of the member states at the organisation's first summit.

Between 1989 and 1996, the organisation increased from 23 to 40 members. At the council of Europe's second summit, held in Strasbourg on 10th and 11th October, 1997 the Heads of State and government adopted an action plan for the enlarged, 40 member organisation aimed at extending its spheres of activity and adapting its structures and procedures accordingly.

In 2004, the council of Europe's 45 member states agreed to hold the organisation's third summit in Warsaw on 16th and 17th May, 2005. In 2007, the Council of Europe now has 47 member states.

As of May 2007, the council of Europe had 47 member states. Ten founding states signed the council of Europe's statute on 5th May, 1949: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

Other countries which have since signed the Statute: Greece and Turkey in 1949, Iceland in 1950, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1951, Austria in 1956, Cyprus in 1961, Switzerland in 1963 and Malta in 1965. The end of dictatorial regimes enabled Portugal to join in 1976 and Spain in 1977. Liechtenstein joined in 1978, San Marino in 1988 and Finland in 1989.

According to the Statute of the Council of Europe, the organisation's aim to achieve a greater unity between its members is pursued through its bodies, by discussion of questions of common concern, by agreements and by common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters, as well as by the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Through its various bodies, the council of Europe is, first and foremost, a meeting place and a forum for dialogue for its member states. The organisation's pursuit of a common approach to dealing with the major issues facing society — human rights, legal cooperation, local and regional democracy, social cohesion, health, bioethics, education, culture, heritage, sport, the environment — leads its bodies to adopt texts which act as non-binding recommendations to its member states, and, above all, results in agreements which are binding on the states which ratify them and become the basis for the harmonisation of European law. Amongst these agreements, the conventions adopted in

the sphere of human rights have, since the organisation's inception, been at the very core of its activities.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How useful has the council of Europe been in maintaining peace in Europe since its founding in 1949?

4.0 CONCLUSION

As is obvious from the above, European integration has come a very long way indeed. Its key benefits have been in the areas of peace and stability and economic growth. Its institutions have grown more complex and dynamic since the European Coal and Steel Community was formed in the 1950s and it is playing an increasingly important role in shaping the most pressing discourses shaping contemporary global politics.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have addressed the sentiments that drive the vision of a united Europe. We have also examined some specific early initiatives that have become a sort of foundation for European institution building and ultimately, integration. We looked at the Schuman plan, the EDC and Euratom. We also discussed the council of Europe and its many initiatives in areas like human rights, environment etc..

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. How has the council of Europe advanced the cause of European integration?
- ii. To what extent did the security situation in Europe at the end of the Second World War encourage the vision of European unity?
- iii. Discuss the EDC as an instrument of European integration.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 2 THE TREATY OF ROME

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

After the council of Europe and the ECSC, the treaty of Rome was signed to further drive the process of European integration. The units to be discussed here are essentially components of the Rome treaty that dealt with specific aspects of the integration agenda. The Common Agricultural Policy for instance had its general principles spelt out by the treaty even though the specific workings were only later worked out at subsequent meetings. In this unit, we will be discussing the key elements of the treaty of Rome in order to see how far it has gone in advancing the cause of regional integration in Europe.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- distinguish the overall significance of the treaty of Rome and understand the workings of its key elements
- describe comprehensively the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Common Agricultural Policy

The treaty of Rome defined the general objectives of a common agricultural policy. The principles of the common agricultural policy (CAP) were set out at the Stresa conference in July 1958. In 1960, the CAP mechanisms were adopted by the six founding member states and two years later, in 1962, the CAP came into force. The creation of a common agricultural policy was proposed in 1960 by the European commission. It followed the signing of the treaty of Rome in 1957, which established the common market. The six member states individually strongly intervened in their agricultural sectors, in particular with regard to what was produced, maintaining prices for goods and how farming was organised. This intervention posed an obstacle to free trade in goods while the rules continued to differ from state to state, since freedom of trade would interfere with the intervention policies. Some member states, in particular France, and all farming professional organisations wanted to maintain strong state intervention in agriculture. This could therefore only be achieved if policies were harmonised and transferred to the European community level. By 1962, three principles had been established to guide the CAP: market unity, community preference and financial solidarity. Since then, the CAP has been a central element in the European institutional system.

The 2003 reform and the 2008 Health Check decisions prepared the grounds for the CAP till 2013. A new budgetary and legal framework should be prepared post 2013. The communication paper has launched the institutional debate and it prepares the ground for the legal proposals on the future of the policy. The objective of the communication is to highlight key challenges and major policy issues regarding EU agriculture and rural areas. Therefore the communication does not provide a specific and detailed list of measures and policy instruments.

The CAP needs reforming: so as to better address the challenges of: food security; climate change and sustainable management of natural resources; and keeping the rural economy alive. It needs to:

- help the farming sector become more competitive and to deal with the economic crisis and increasingly unstable farm-gate prices.
- make the policy fairer, greener, more efficient and more effective and more understandable.

Earlier on, the commission held a public debate and a major conference on the future of the CAP. The vast majority of contributions identified three principal objectives from the CAP:

- Viable food production (the provision of safe and sufficient food supplies, in the context of growing global demand, economic crisis and much greater market volatility to contribute to food security); - Sustainable management of natural resources and climate action (farmers often have to put environmental considerations ahead of economic considerations – but such costs are not rewarded by the market); - maintaining the territorial balance and diversity of rural areas (agriculture remains a major economic and social driving force in rural areas, and an important factor in maintaining a living countryside).

The CAP has been roundly criticised by many diverse interests since its inception. Criticism has been wide-ranging, and even the European Commission has long been persuaded of the numerous defects of the policy. In May 2007, Sweden became the first EU country to take the position that all EU farm subsidies should be abolished (except those related to environmental protection).

Criticism of the CAP has united some supporters of neoliberal globalisation with the alter-globalisation movement in that it is argued that these subsidies, like those of the USA and other Western states, add to the problem of what is sometimes called Fortress Europe; the West spends high amounts on agricultural subsidies every year, which amounts to unfair competition.

In 2005, the HDR described the CAP as "extravagant ... wreaking havoc in global sugar markets. However, this report was written before the EU sugar reform took effect and its arguments are as such obsolete in 2010 where an increase in the world market price meant that world prices overtook the (much reduced after the recent sugar reform) EU reference price. As for sugar producers in the developing world, they now enjoy free access to the European market under the "Everything but Arms" agreement.

The 2005 HDR report also states "The basic problem to be addressed in the WTO negotiations on agriculture can be summarised in three words: rich country subsidies. In the last round of world trade negotiations rich countries promised to cut agricultural subsidies. Since then, they have increased them" an outcome hinted at in HDR 2003. Several reports from the latest negotiations in the WTO, however, contradict the theory of the 2005 HDR report. On July 29th, 2008 the WTO negotiations in the Doha round finally collapsed because of differences between the US, India and China over agricultural trade.

CAP price intervention has been criticised for creating artificially high food prices throughout the EU. High import tariffs (estimated at 18-

28%) have the effect of keeping prices high by restricting competition by non-EU producers. It is estimated that public support for farmers in OECD countries costs a family of four on average nearly 1,000 USD per year in higher prices and taxes. It is true as well that the average EU household today spends 15% of its budget on food, compared to 30% in 1960.

However there are several factors which cause food prices to rise, such as: climate change, energy, labour, transport, changing eating habits, amongst others. The price of food in supermarkets and shops has little to do with the CAP. For example, the price of cereals (which is subsidised very little by the CAP nowadays) is only 5% of the price of a loaf of bread (indeed, cereal prices have been falling for many years).

Some critics of the common agricultural policy reject the idea of protectionism, either in theory, practice or both. Free market advocates are among those who disagree with any type of government intervention because, they say, a free market without interference will allocate resources more efficiently. The setting of 'artificial' prices inevitably leads to distortions in production, with over-production being the usual result. The creation of Grain Mountains, where huge stores of unwanted grain were bought directly from farmers at prices set by the CAP well in excess of the market is one example. Subsidies allowed many small, outdated, or inefficient farms to continue to operate which would not otherwise be viable. A straightforward economic model would suggest that it would be better to allow the market to find its own price levels, and for uneconomic farming to cease. Resources used in farming would then be switched to a myriad of more productive operations, such as infrastructure, education or healthcare.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

To what extent has CAP aided the industrialisation of European agriculture?

3.2 The European Economic Community (EEC/EC)

The vast majority of economists agree that trade, by allowing specialization, enhances efficiency. But as Adam Smith observed, the division of labour (the degree of specialisation) is limited by market size. International trade is an obvious way of increasing market size.

Since World War II, countries have reduced barriers to trade mainly through multilateral negotiations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A central premise of the GATT is non-discrimination: countries should give all GATT members the same

access to their markets. The main exemption to that rule is free trade areas. Partners to free trade agreements are allowed to exempt one another's goods from import duties while maintaining tariffs and/or quotas on products from other GATT countries.

The European Economic Community (EEC), the most prominent example of a free trade area, actually is what economists call a customs union. Whereas member nations in a free trade area remove all barriers to trade among themselves, in a customs union they also adopt uniform tariffs on goods and services from outside the union. The EEC is currently attempting to transform itself from a customs union to a true common market in which capital and labour, and not just goods, are allowed to flow freely from one country to another.

The EEC's impact has been significant. In 1960 more than 60 percent of the trade of the community's 12 members was with other parts of the world. Now more than 60 percent stays within the European grouping. Where the EEC contented itself initially with removing internal barriers to trade, it has since expanded into the regulation of domestic markets and monetary unification.

The European Community is an amalgam of three separate communities: the European Coal and Steel Community, established by the Treaty of Paris in 1951 to regulate production and liberalize Europe's trade in coal and steel products; the European Atomic Energy Community, formed by the Treaty of Rome in 1957; and the European Economic Community, also created by the Treaty of Rome. All three were established to encourage political and economic cooperation among member countries, notably France and Germany, that had repeatedly warred with each other. By 1967 the institutions of the European Economic Community (or Common Market) became common to all three communities. Today it is conventional to refer to the European Community (aka the EC or the Community) in the singular, whether one means the Economic Community or all three initiatives.

The EC initially consisted of six Western European nations—Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany. Britain, Ireland, and Denmark were admitted in 1973. Three southern European countries were allowed to join once they installed democratic governments—Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986. Other Western European countries (Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland) belong to the European Free Trade Association, or EFTA (as did Britain, Ireland, and Denmark before 1973). EFTA has traditionally concentrated on trade liberalisation, in contrast to the EC's more ambitious agenda of economic and political integration.

The EC's most important achievement has been its customs union. It was completed in 1968, when each of the six members abolished tariffs and quotas on goods from the other five member countries and adopted a common external tariff on goods from the rest of the world. The evolution from a free trade area to a customs union followed inevitably: had the participants maintained different external tariffs, exports from, say, Japan could have been imported through the low-tariff countries and transhipped to the others, circumventing the high tariffs. The customs union has propelled the growth of intra-Community trade from less than 40 percent to over 60 percent of the total trade of the participating countries.

In 1988, with European integration gathering momentum, the governments of the EC member states appointed a committee, chaired by Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, to study the feasibility of complementing the single market with a single currency. After the Delors Report appeared, the EC governments appointed an Intergovernmental Conference to prepare amendments to the Treaty of Rome. The proposed amendments—the Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union—were presented at the Dutch town of Maastricht in December 1991.

The Maastricht Treaty proposes replacing the EC's twelve national currencies with a single currency and creating a European Central Bank (ECB). These goals are to be achieved in three stages. Stage I, which began in July 1990, is marked by the removal of capital controls (as already mandated by the SEA) and attempts to reduce differences in national inflation and interest rates and to make intra-European exchange rates more stable. In Stage II, to start in January 1994, national economic policies will converge further and a temporary entity, the European Monetary Institute, will coordinate member-country policies in the final phases of the transition. If the council of ministers, made up of ministers of economics or finance from each national government, decides during Stage II that a majority of member countries meet the preconditions for monetary union, it may recommend that the council of heads of state vote to inaugurate stage III, establishing the ECB and giving it responsibility for monetary policy. To prevent stage II from continuing indefinitely, however, the treaty requires the EC heads of state or government to meet before the end of 1996 to assess whether a majority of EC countries satisfy the conditions for monetary union. Stage III will begin in any case no later than January 1, 1999. In this case, stage III may proceed with only a minority of EC countries participating.

When stage III begins, exchange rates will be irrevocably fixed. The ECB will assume control of the monetary policies of the participating

countries. It will decide how and when to replace the currencies of the participating countries with the new European currency. It may do so on the first day of stage III, or it may instruct its operating arms, the national central banks, to intervene to stabilise the exchange rates among their national currencies until these are replaced by a single currency.

Monetary integration is more controversial than the Single Market Program. Denmark rejected the Maastricht Treaty in its June 1992 referendum, and France nearly did the same three months later.

No one questions that there are benefits from using one currency instead of twelve. For one thing, a single European currency will save on transactions costs: the EC's economists estimate the savings at 1 percent of EC GNP. And removing the uncertainty created by exchange-rate fluctuations will encourage additional intra-European trade and investment.

There is, however, no free lunch. Forcing all European countries to run the same monetary policy and to maintain the same interest rates will deprive Europe's national governments of a policy tool traditionally used to address their own macroeconomic problems. When Italy has had a recession not shared by other EC countries, its central bank (the Bank of Italy) has reduced interest rates, expanded the money supply, and devalued the exchange rate, with the goal of boosting domestic demand and moderating the recession. With no exchange rate to devalue and with monetary policy turned over to the ECB, this response will no longer be possible. Europe had a taste of this problem in 1991 and 1992, when high interest rates in Germany, together with the fixed exchange rates of the European Monetary System that already tied European monetary policies together, drove interest rates up throughout the EC. As this experience reminds us, a monetary policy common to all 12 EC countries will be useful for moderating only those business cycle fluctuations that are common to the twelve countries. Insofar as European countries experience cyclical expansions and contractions at different times, their sacrifice of monetary autonomy may cost them a lot.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Why are the trade related benefits of the EEC programme relatively low?

3.3 The European Free Trade Association

In July 1956, following the 'Spaak Report', which set the scene for the re-launch of European integration, the United Kingdom submitted to the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) a proposal known as 'Plan G', to study the feasibility of an association between the

Six and the other OEEC Members in the form of a free trade area. The proposal provided for the progressive abolition of all customs duties and other barriers to trade between member states, though each would retain the right to set the level of customs duties and establish trade policy in relation to third countries.

An Intergovernmental committee of experts, chaired by Reginald Maudling, the British Paymaster-General, was set up to examine the feasibility of a large free internal market. However, the French took an anti-British stance, withdrawing their support from the Maudling Committee, while the other European partners hesitated as to which side to support. The project was rejected on 14th December, 1958. The signing of the Treaty of Rome in March of the previous year had laid the foundations for the European Economic Community (EEC), despite the favourable reaction to the British proposal in some German and Dutch economic spheres. While the Benelux countries and Germany had a genuine interest in developing trade with the United Kingdom, the six were also aware of the risks of a free trade area. These included an economic element — in the absence of a common tariff, the more protectionist countries would benefit more than their liberal partners — and a political element, for the idea of a European federation would be sidelined if the free trade area succeeded.

When General de Gaulle took up office on 1st June, 1958, he hammered a nail into the coffin of the British proposal. General de Gaulle and the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer were striving above all to enhance solidarity among the six. Following a vain attempt to delay the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, the British supported the signature, on 4th January, 1960 of the Stockholm Convention, creating the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with seven founding members, namely the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal. In terms of trade, Western Europe was divided between the six and the seven.

After the British delegation's withdrawal in November 1955 from the work in Brussels of the Intergovernmental Committee created by the Messina Conference, the government in London was faced with two options: either to allow integration to continue on the continent, at the risk of finding itself quickly isolated, or to come up with an alternative. The United Kingdom certainly did not want to end up with a common market based on a customs union with an external tariff, which could harm its privileged trading position in the sterling zone and with the Commonwealth. Peter Thorneycroft, the Minister for Trade, lost no time in setting up working groups to look at speeding up the abolition of tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions in Europe.

The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), created in 1948 to administer the Marshall Plan of economic aid for Europe, immediately appeared to be the structure most capable of responding to Britain's concerns. Having tried in vain to undermine the current negotiations between the six member states of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which they viewed as 'Little Europe', the British then decided they would prefer to establish a regional free trade zone excluding agricultural products, a project known as Plan G. The British government, invited in the meantime to join the Val Duchesse negotiations on the common market and Euratom, proposed to send an observer to Brussels but refused to consider the Spaak Report as the basis for future negotiations. The six rejected this out of hand.

Having tried and failed to win time in order to have a clearer idea of whether Europe's relaunch was likely to succeed, the British submitted their plan for a large free trade area to the OEEC Council of Ministers on 17th July, 1956. Two days later, the OEEC Council of Ministers decided to set up a working group, known as the Group of Seventeen, to study the establishment of a multilateral system combining the customs union of the six and the other OEEC member states. On a proposal from Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister, Baron Jean-Charles Snoy et d'Oppuers, the secretary-general of the Belgian Ministry for Economic Affairs and head of the Belgian delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom, led the working group.

The British thus hoped to be able to establish a close link between the two European projects and to have direct access to information on the progress of the Val Duchesse negotiations. For London, the free trade area was intended to meet three objectives: giving the United Kingdom a more clearly defined position if the Imperial Preference System with the Commonwealth were maintained, confirming its dominant role in the OEEC, and enabling it to retain influence over the development of European integration through close links between the free trade area and the common market.

With this formula, the British officials wanted to abolish obstacles to trade between the member countries of the area for industrial products only, while maintaining for each of these countries an individual customs tariff vis-à-vis countries outside the area. However, Spaak feared that the British initiative was just a tactical ploy to delay the relaunch, which he regarded as vitally important, and he refused to view the British plan as an alternative solution. The USA, which actively supported the efforts of the six, also warned the government in London against any action that would hamper the implementation of the future common market.

It was not until 13th October, 1957 therefore, that the OEEC council decided to set up a steering committee in the form of an Intergovernmental committee chaired by Reginald Maudling, the British government's paymaster-general. Two weeks later, Maudling handed the 17, a note recommending the internal dismantling of customs tariffs and the abolition of quotas following the same stages as those in the EEC Treaty. He also proposed to introduce controls on the origin of industrial products in order to counter the risk of deflection of trade.

However, the definition of the origin of products, the application of safeguard clauses and the harmonisation of tariffs led to serious clashes between the British and French delegations, particularly when, in March 1958, the French Government put before its EEC partners a new plan which did not go as far as the British plans for a free trade area, but provided for a multilateral association arrangement with the other OEEC member countries. The French authorities, however, occupied from May onwards by the armed uprising in Algiers, dragged their feet. Led by Ambassador Roger Ockrent, the head of the Belgian delegation to the OEEC, the Six nevertheless prepared a joint memorandum on the European Economic Association. But it was not until the end of the Venice conference, also attended, on 20th September, 1958 by the EEC Commission, that the Six reached agreement. One month later, the Ockrent Report was put before the OEEC.

The negotiations between the 17 became bogged down, however, and on 15th November General de Gaulle, French president for the last six months, unilaterally rejected the British plan for a free trade area. One month later the discussions were definitively suspended. The three Benelux countries' attempts at conciliation came to nothing. In spring 1959, seven OEEC member countries reacted to this failure by opening new negotiations with a view to setting up a smaller free trade area themselves that would give them some of the benefits of eliminating customs barriers. On 20th November, 1959 the representatives of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden and the United Kingdom initialled the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Treaty in Stockholm.

In 1958, following the failure of negotiations between the Member States of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) to conclude an agreement on a free trade area, the main concern of the countries that were not members of the new European Economic Community (EEC) was to avoid being left on the sidelines of Western European integration. They therefore decided to establish their own convention.

In Stockholm on 4th January, 1960, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom signed the convention establishing the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to be based in Geneva. The Seven together comprised a market of 90 million people. Finland became an associate member of EFTA on 27th March, 1961 and a full member in 1986, and Iceland acceded in 1970. While EFTA was established to counterbalance the emerging EEC, it never sought to be its rival, pursuing exclusively economic goals. In addition, EFTA operated on a strictly intergovernmental basis.

Its highest institution was the Council, which was assisted by an advisory committee representing the economic sector, a committee of parliamentarians and technical committees. EFTA was a flexible organisation with a secretariat limited to a maximum of 100 staff and headed by the council. It operated at the level of ministers or permanent representatives and was based in Geneva.

Its fundamental objective was to ensure free trade in industrial goods. The status of fish and agricultural products varied depending on whether they were processed (and thus generally subject to free trade) or non-processed (in which case they did not fall within the scope of the Convention). Non-processed products were, however, the subject of bilateral agreements and preferential regulations. In parallel, common regulations on competition, the opening up of public procurement and the alignment of technical regulations made the mechanism complete. EFTA did not provide for any form of economic integration or set any common external customs tariff.

The activities of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) principally entailed cooperation with the European Economic Community (EEC). The conclusion of a free trade agreement with the EEC and the entry into force of common definitions relating to rules of product origin ensured the almost totally free movement of industrial goods.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What was the main focus of the EFTA?

4.0 CONCLUSION

The above suggests that there are still major problems and challenges associated with the specific letters of the regional project in Europe. For one, the European Economic Community is for instance accused of not adding much economic value to member states and there are still

concerns for the implications of these processes for the sovereignty of states. Be that as it may however, it is undeniable that these efforts and other like them have been very useful in smoothening the space for more recent advances like the creation of the Eurozone.

9.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we examined the key elements of the Treaty of Rome. We looked at the Common Agricultural Policy; its successes, failures and contemporary challenges. We also discussed in similar fashion, other projects like the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area. We also touched on cooperation between these various programmes and how it has helped to solidify the idea of European unity.

10.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. What is the implication of the EEC/EC programmes for the Sovereignty of individual states in Europe?
- ii. Compare and contrast the EEC/EC and the EFTA.
- iii. What are the main criticisms of the CAP programme?

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UNIT 3 INCREMENTAL REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE: THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

While the Treaty of Rome set the general parameters for many specific integration policies, it had to be revised by the 1980s to allow for a more robust process that takes into account the realities of a changing world. In this unit, we will address some of those revisions to the treaty in order to demonstrate the gradual deepening of European integrations and its expansion to include states in Southern and later Eastern Europe.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the connection between the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, the European Monetary Union and the Treaty of Rome
- explain the specific letters of each of these treaties and demonstrate the connection between them.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Single European Act

This was the first major revision to the Treaty of Rome. It was christened the Single European Act and was agreed to in 1985. It set a target date of 1992 to create a true common market in Europe. The *Europe 1992* proposal mandated about states to follow a comprehensive set of 300 directives from the European Commission, aimed at eliminating non tariff barriers to free trade in goods, services, labour and capital within the EC. The issues tended to be complex and highly technical. For instance, professionals licensed in one state should be free to practice in another; but licensing requirements were, at that time, not exactly uniform. The commission's bureaucrats worked hard to smooth out such inconsistencies and create a uniform set of standards. Each national government had to pass laws to implement these measures.

The single European Act also gave new push to the creation of a European central bank, which was situated in Frankfurt, Germany, and a single currency and monetary system. These were long standing goals that have since been accomplished. As long as the economies of European states were tied to separate states with separate central banks, efforts to maintain fixed exchange rates were difficult.

The 1992 process moved economic integration into more political and thus controversial areas, eroding sovereignty more visibly than ever before. It also deepened a trend toward the EU's dealing directly with provinces rather than with the states they belong to- thus beginning to hollow out the state from below as well as from above. However, Europe 1992 continued to put aside for the future the difficult problems and military integration.

3.2 The Maastricht Treaty

The Treaty of the European Union (TEU), also known as Treaty of Maastricht for having been signed in that Dutch town, constitutes a turning point in the European integration process. By modifying the previous treaties -Paris, Rome and Single European Act-, the initial economic objective of the community, building a common market, was outstripped and, for the first time, a distinctive vocation of political union was claimed.

The Treaty of Maastricht changed the official denomination of the EEC. Henceforth, it will be known as European Union. The term union is used from the very beginning of the treaty to clearly convey the advancement

in a historical project. This way, the article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union affirms that: "This treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among European states. The Treaty has a structure based on three pillars, according to the artificial parlance created by those who devised and edited it. The metaphor used refers to a TEU made up as an Greek temple sustained by three pillars:

- the first pillar, the central one, alludes to the Community dimension and comprises the arrangements set out in the EC, ECSC and Euratom Treaties, i.e. union citizenship, community policies, economic and monetary union, etc.
- the new pillars, the lateral ones, are not based on supranational competences as the previous one, but in the cooperation among the governments: the second pillar is the Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the third one refers to Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

The Treaty of the Union instituted as one of the objectives of the union the search of social and economic cohesion among the diverse regions and countries of the community. To achieve it, it was agreed that a denominated Cohesion Fund, created in 1994, would provide less developed regions and countries with financial aid focused on sectors as environment or transport infrastructures. The member states eligible to receive this aid were those whose GDP per capita was inferior to 90% of the union average and comply with convergence criteria. The *Cohesion countries* were Spain, the most benefited state, Greece, Portugal and Ireland.

The TEU has also meant a noticeable advancement in the EU competences in fields as economic and monetary policy, industrial policy, Transeuropean networks and transport policy, educational networks, etc. In spite of these reforms, the common agricultural policy (CAP) still absorbed more than a half of the whole union budget.

As regards educational affairs, the TEU limited the union role to promote intergovernmental cooperation. The European union launched different programmes (Socrates, Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci) to facilitate contacts and combined work among European students and teachers.

Regarding the European Union institutions, the TEU introduced important changes: the Parliament increased its competences, the ministers council was denominated henceforth council of the European Union, the Commission received the official name of commission of the European communities, the court of justice, the Court of Auditors and the Economic and Social Committee reinforce their competences,

a committee of the regions was established, and, the founding of the European Central Bank was foreseen at the beginning of the third phase of the economic and monetary union.

As far as the second pillar is concerned, the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) allows one to undertake common actions in foreign policy. The European Council, where decisions must be adopted unanimously, agrees the principles and general orientations of the CFSP. The Treaty on European Union raised Western European Union (WEU) to the rank of an *integral part of the development of the Union* and commissioned it the mission of elaborating and implementing decisions and actions with defence implications.

The foundation of the Europol (European Police Office), embryo of a future European police, was one of the most outstanding changes in this sphere. It is also necessary to point out that in 1990 the denominated Schengen convention that developed the Schengen Agreement, was signed so as to build a European Union without frontiers.

The ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht by the national parliaments was brimmed with difficulties. The symbolic year of 1992 was gloomed by three crisis that broke the pro-Europe impulse brought about by the signing in Maastricht of the TUE on 7th February, 1992:

- a. Firstly, Europe went through a serious and deep economic crisis that caused governments and public opinion to focus on economic problems, setting aside the European construction;
- b. Secondly, there were serious monetary tensions that challenged the European Monetary System and the objective of the economic and monetary union (EMU);
- c. Thirdly, the EU appeared unable to implement a common foreign and security policy in the crisis of Yugoslavia, and kept powerless observing how war came back to our continent after many years of peace.

In these conditions, the first ratification process took place in Denmark. The 'NO' to the Treaty of Maastricht won in a referendum for a scarce difference of 50,000 votes. A *eurosceptical* wave extended to the other member countries. However, the ratifications of the Treaty were gradually taking place in the rest of the countries. In France, the 'YES' won with a scarce 51.4% of the votes in favour of the TEU. Negotiation with Denmark started and the Copenhagen government was granted with a special protocol, known, in the EU parlance, as *opting out* clause, that is to say, the possibility of not following the other members when the third phase of the EMU began -a similar clause got United Kingdom

when TEU was signed- and in all defence matters. On 20 May 1993, Danish people approved in a referendum this agreement with 53.8% of YES votes.

The Treaty of Maastricht came into force on 2nd November, 1993. The treaty foresaw their own future revision in view of the successive enlargements of the union. In spite of the difficulties that the union was going through and the dramatic transformation of the world in those years, the candidatures to accession to the EU continued being submitted to Brussels: Austria in 1989, Malta and Cyprus in 1991, Finland, Norway and Switzerland in 1992. This last country retired its candidature a few months later after a referendum.

Negotiations with Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway began in 1993 and were quite easy due to the high economic development of those countries. The ratification of the Treaties was accomplished in 1994. However, Norwegian people rejected again the accession to the EU. The 'NO' to the European Union won in a referendum with 52.2% of the votes. It was the second time that Norway refused to join the community.

On 1st January, 1995, the fourth enlargement of the EU took place with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden. The *Europe of the 15* was born. In early 1996, in the European council of Turin, an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) commenced with the purpose of elaborating a new treaty that reformed the treaty of Maastricht. The objectives were focused on developing the Europe of citizens, fomenting the EU role in international politics, reforming the institutions and tackling a new enlargement to the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe. After a long and intricate negotiation, the member states governments reach an agreement in the European council held in Amsterdam on 16-17th June, 1997. The treaty of Amsterdam was born.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How does the Maastricht Treaty constitute a turning point in European integration?

3.3 Monetary Union

Among the European states, EMU officially stands for Economic and Monetary Union. Other countries also use EMU to refer generally to the European Monetary Union. EMU is the agreement among the participating member states of the European Union to adopt a single hard currency and monetary system. The European Council agreed to name this single European currency the Euro. The European states

decided that the EMU and a single European market were essential to the implementation of the European Union, which was created to advance economic and social unity among the peoples of Europe and to propel Europe to greater prominence in the international community.

In 1979, the European Council adopted the European Monetary System, known as EMS, which employed an exchange rate mechanism, or ERM, to encourage participating countries to keep the fluctuations of their currency exchange rates within an acceptable band. The permissible limits of the ERM were derived from the European Currency Unit, or ECU, a referential currency calculated from an average of the participating countries' national currencies. In 1988, Jacques Delors, the president of the European Commission, chaired a committee which proposed a three-stage plan to reach full economic union, including the establishment of a European Central Bank and a single currency which would replace any existing national currencies. With each stage, the monetary policies of the participating countries would become more closely entwined, culminating in full convergence in the EMU.

Plans for the EMU were formalised in provisions within the Maastricht Treaty, which founded the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, and subsequently ratified by all of the member states. Some countries approved the treaty by a public vote, while other countries ratified the treaty through a legislative vote. The treaty set up the conditions, or "convergence criteria," which each member state in the European Union must meet before it could join the EMU. These conditions for EMU membership were considered necessary because when the member states join the EMU, domestic economic crises in one member state will affect all of the other member states. To participate in the initial formation of the EMU, each member state had to meet the following five convergence criteria by 1998: (1) the national legislation governing the country's financial system had to be compatible with the treaty provisions controlling the European System of Central Banks; (2) the country had to achieve a rate of inflation within 1.5% of the rates in the three participating countries with the lowest rates; (3) the country had to reduce its government deficits to below 3% of its gross national product; (4) the country had to keep its currency exchange rates within the limits defined by the ERM for at least two years; and (5) the country had to keep its interest rates within 2% of the rates in the three participating countries with the lowest rates.

Eleven of the 15 European Union member states initially qualified to join the EMU in 1998. Those states were: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. As part of the EMU, these 11 countries now make up the world's second-largest economy, after the United States. Some

analysts have suggested that only by using flexible definitions did Belgium and Italy meet the deficit-related criteria. Two countries, Greece and Sweden, failed to meet the convergence requirements in time to join the EMU in the first round. Sweden failed to satisfy two of the conditions: laws governing Sweden's central bank were not compatible with the Maastricht Treaty and the currency exchange rates in Sweden were not sufficiently stable for the previous two years. Greece failed to meet all of the requirements. These countries will be reevaluated every two years to determine if they meet the requirements for joining the EMU. The two remaining members of the European Union, the United Kingdom and Denmark, chose not to join the EMU immediately. Both of these countries made provisions in the Maastricht Treaty that preserved their right not to join the EMU. To ensure stable currency exchange rates among all of the European Union member states, the currencies of those states that did not qualify to join the EMU or that chose not to participate in the EMU initially were linked to the single European currency of the EMU, the euro, by a new currency exchange rate mechanism, known as ERM2.

On January 1, 1999, the currency exchange rates of the 11 participating member states became permanently fixed, marking the beginning of the third and final phase of the EMU. On this date, the euro became a legal currency. Citizens in participating countries now can write checks, use credit cards, and write traveller's checks denominated in euros. Banks and businesses now have the option of using euros to transact business. The production of the first euro coins and banknotes began on January 1st, 1999. An estimated 12 billion banknotes and 80 billion coins will be minted initially. On 1st January, 2002, the participating countries must begin to remove their national currencies from circulation. By the first of July 2002, the old national currencies will no longer be legal tender, and all transactions from that date forward in the participating EMU states must be conducted in euros. Once they are retrieved from circulation, the old national coins and banknotes will be destroyed.

As an integral part of the EMU, a new monetary institution was founded in Frankfurt, Germany-the European Central Bank, or ECB. The ECB sets monetary policy for the EMU independently from the influence of any of the national governments or any other outside influence. The ECB together with the central banks of all of the states in the European Union form the European System of Central Banks, or ESCB, which is charged by statute with maintaining price stability. The ESCB implements the monetary policy of the ECB, and administers the foreign exchange reserves of the participating member states, among other tasks. The conversion to a single European currency provides a number of advantages. Use of the common euro eliminates the currency exchange fees from the cost of doing business between the European states.

Companies will be able to quickly compare prices with their competitors, which may encourage competition and may result in lower prices for consumers. By encouraging stability and efficiency, proponents of the EMU hope that the use of the euro will stimulate economic growth and may reduce the unemployment rates in the participating member states. International investors will likely diversify their portfolios with euros, encouraging more investment in the European continent. The European states want the euro to become one of the premier currencies in the international financial market, alongside the dollar and the yen.

Concerns about the EMU centre on the loss of national sovereignty for each of the individual participating states. Some fear that the participating states may not be able to pull out of a national economic crisis without the ability to devalue its national currency and encourage exports. Others worry that the participating European states will be forced to give tax breaks to compete with each other and that companies may have to lower wages for their employees and to lower prices on goods that they produce. Because taxes continue to be levied at the national level and not by the EMU, tax policy cannot be used as a tool to help individual states that may be experiencing an economic downturn.

In this way, the EMU differs from the United States which has both a single federal monetary policy and a primarily centralized tax system. In the United States, the residents of an individual state with a lagging economy can pay less tax and the residents of another state with a soaring economy can make up some of the tax deficit. In the EMU, because tax policy is not centralised, the other states cannot help out an individual participating state that is economically troubled by shouldering a greater proportion of the tax burden. Also, because the participating EMU countries vary so much culturally, the labour force in these countries is not nearly as mobile as between the states of the United States. Because the labour force is fairly stationary, problems of high unemployment may persist in certain individual EMU states while other countries may not be able to fill positions with qualified employees. Finally, some countries (like the United Kingdom) may fear that joining the EMU may pull their country down to the economic equivalent of the least common denominator, saddling them with the economic problems of countries with a less successful economy.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe events leading to the launch of the EMU.

4.0 CONCLUSION

It should be recognised that these treaties were neither clean breaks from the past nor were they novel acts but rather, a deliberate attempt to deepen the work of the Treaty of Rome. The single European act of 1992 was in particular, a major turning point in Europe's approach to integration. It set the parameters for expansion and through the EMU and similar projects; it eventually helped create the Eurozone.

9.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have discussed the revisions to the Treaty of Rome and identified their general adherence to time honoured principles of European integration. Beyond this however, we discussed the specific goals, institutions and principles that undergird projects like the EMU. We also analysed the events, sentiments and politics that surrounded the launching of these projects and how they have fared since then.

10.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. What are the main criticisms of the EMU?
- ii. Describe the challenges faced in relation to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 4 THE EUROPEAN UNION: STRUCTURE, MEMBERSHIP AND ROLES

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Structure
 - 3.2 Membership
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit takes our earlier discussions of European integration even further. It does so by looking at the institutions, structures and roles of the European Union; a body that now encapsulates much of the various programmes promoting European unity. This is particularly important because the creation of a coherent unit like the EU was one of the key goals of the integration project. Even though the EU does not embody all the dreams of the various interests who desire integration in Europe, it has gone a long way in resolving some of the most difficult questions.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- identify and analyse the main bodies of the EU and their key goals, roles and challenges
- describe the evolutionary process of EU institutions and how this has helped the cause of European integration
- recognise the member countries of the EU as well as the different stages at which the ascension negotiations for candidate countries are.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Structure

The organisational and institutional system of the European communities and of the European Union, based on it since 1993, is complicated. It results mainly from the fact that this system and decision making mechanisms connected with it have been shaped in the course of many years' evolution of the European communities and institutions connected with them. The European Union is an organisation which develops permanently and in connection with this its organisation still undergoes changes. The aim is to perfect this system so that it is best adjusted to the enlarging community and changing social, political and economic conditions. The treaty of Lisbon, accepted in 2009, leads in this direction.

The European Union should be viewed from a perspective of an interstate organisation created by the founder countries (member states). This organisation was created on the basis of *the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union*, signed on 7th February, 1992 (TEU). The treaty entered into force on 1st November, 1993. In *The Treaty on European Union* the founder countries did not assign legal personality to the European Union on the international arena. In this document it was only written that "By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union (...)". The European Union did not have its own institutional structure. If we commonly talk about „Union's institutions" until recently we meant the European Communities' institutions. The European Council, in accordance with art four of the TEU, was the only organ of the European Union.

The European Union cannot be classified as a typical interstate organisation or a federation or a confederation of countries. The optimal definition of the European Union was suggested by professor Jan Barcz, a distinguished Polish lawyer, according to whom the European Union is a specific organisational structure which is not a legal person (until *The Treaty of Lisbon* entered into force, the insertion by the editorial staff), functioning on the basis of an international agreement and undergoing constant development. In pursuance of the TEU, "The union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation (...)". Three Pillars represented them: the First Pillar "European Communities", the second Pillar II "Common Foreign and Security Policy", the third Pillar "Policy and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters".

The first Pillar was a continuation of economic co-operation of the European community executed before the TEU entered into force. Its aim was to tighten economic co-operation among the European Union's member states in the scope of a single market and customs and monetary union. The functioning of the first Pillar was based on a communal regime community integration method, which meant that all the European Union's member states had to strictly conform to common agreement pertaining to the functioning of the economic and monetary union and the communal law regulations in this sphere.

The goal of the second Pillar was to coordinate foreign policies of the European Union's member states. The purpose was the protection of common values, interests and integrity of the community, strengthening its international safety, peacekeeping in the world, support of international co-operation as well as development and strengthening of democracy. The functioning of the second Pillar was based on the intergovernmental co-operation method, which meant that the co-operation among the European Union's member states in the sphere of common foreign and security policy took place at the level of governments of the individual member states. The lack of the communal regime in the second Pillar caused the fact that individual member countries of the community did not always conform to common decisions pertaining to foreign and security policy.

The third Pillar initially encompassed co-operation in justice administration and internal affairs, and from 1999 police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. Its goal was to assure internal safety of the European Union. The purpose was to conduct coordinated policy among others in the sphere of fight against drug addiction and drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism, as well as protection of external borders of the community. Similarly to the second Pillar, the functioning of the third Pillar was based on the intergovernmental co-operation method.

The European Union's organisation system based on the three pillars was abolished when the *Treaty of Lisbon* entered into force on 1st December, 2009. At this moment the European Union became legal personality on the international arena and took over competencies previously belonging to the European community. Law, on the basis of which the European communities and the European Union functioned until that time, termed communal law, became law of the European Union.

Until the *Treaty of Lisbon* entered into force, the European Union did not form institutions separate from those created in the treaties establishing the European Communities (the European Coal and Steel community, the European Economic Community the European

community and the European Atomic Energy Community). Only the European community had legal personality and had their own institutions. The institutions of the European Communities were the institutions of these Communities and not of the European Union created when *the Treaty on European Union* (TEU) entered into force. However, the TEU charged the communal institutions with the realisation of particular activities belonging to common tasks of the European Union's member states.

Main Institutions

- The European Parliament
- The European Council
- The European Commission
- The Court of Justice of the European Communities
- The Court of First Instance
- The European Court of Auditors

Advisory Bodies

- The Committee of the Regions
- The European Economic and Social Committee

Financial Bodies

- The European Central Bank
- The European Investment Bank
- The European Investment Fund

Inter-Institutional Bodies

- The Office of Official Publications of the European Communities
- Publications Office
- The European Personnel Selection Office
- The European Administrative School

Decentralised Bodies (Agencies)

- Community agencies
- Common foreign and security policy agencies
- Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters agencies
- Executive agencies

Other Specialised Bodies

- The European Ombudsman
- The European Data Protection Supervisor

The European council constituted a separate category which was not included in the communal institutions (as the only body of the European Union). Mainly the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council take part in the decision making process in the European Union. So far only the European Commission had the right of legislative initiative, thus it could put forward applications for new legal acts. Both the European Parliament and the European Council act jointly with the European Commission in the process of communal law constituting. Decision making procedures in the European Union are described in details in the treaties. Every new legislative proposal of the Commission must have its legal foundation in the treaties. The decision making process is very complicated. Three basic decision making procedures are applied in it - codecision, consultation and agreement.

The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, TL, also called the Reform Treaty, introduced a unified organisational structure of the European Union and gave legal personality to the Community. According to the provisions of the TL, the European Union functions on the basis of two hitherto basic documents, that is *the Treaty on European Union* (TEU) and *the Treaty establishing the European Community* (TEC), which were amended by the establishments of the International Conference on 29 October 2004 during which a draft of *the European Constitution* was accepted. The settlements of first part of *the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe* were included in the TEU, whereas the communal policy principles contained in the third part of the Constitutional Treaty were added to the TEC. As mentioned before, the TL, gave legal personality to the European Union. The European Union became a legal successor of the European Community (EC). The Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) was renamed to *the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* (TFEU). The new treaty abolished the three pillar organisational system of the European Union, retaining certain separateness within the community, related to the previously functioning the Second and Third Pillars. The implementation of the TL provisions results in the division of the community's competences into three areas:

- the European Union's competences (the realisation of the EU's goals and foreign policy and safety)
- shared competences (in which communal/union's law takes precedence over national law of the European Union's member

states, excluding certain areas which are in the competence of the member states)

- competences in which decisions are made independently by the individual member states of the European Union.

The TL changed the way of leadership in the council of the European Union. The hitherto six months' Presidency of the member states the European Union was substituted by the leadership conducted commonly by three member states for 18 months. Also a function of a president of the European council was established, termed informally "the President of the European Union". The treaty strengthened the role of the European Parliament, providing it with new competences in the sphere of the creation of communal law, budgetary issues and political control. For the first time the citizens of the European Union's member states gained the indirect right of legislative initiative. The implementation of the TL provisions results in the change in the European Commission composition. It was decided that from 2014 on the European Commission will be composed of the representatives of two to three of the Community's member states and the individual countries will nominate commissioners in a rotating system. The TL appointed the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, whose aim is to lead the European External Action Service.

One of the most important changes introduced by the TL is the voting system in the Council of the European Union. The hitherto voting system by the qualified majority voting (the Nice Treaty System) is to be valid till the end of October 2014 and then a double majority voting system will be introduced (55% of the EU's states representing at least 65% of the community's population). Additionally a stipulation was made that till 31st March, 2017. Each member state of the European Union will be able to demand repetition of particular voting according to the Nice System. From 2017 on it is planned to move totally to the double majority system (retaining a safety mechanism enabling member states to delay decision taking for a particular period of time even when they don't have the required blocking capacity (a mechanism analogous to the Ioannina compromise).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention the main bodies running the EU.

3.2 Membership

The EU currently has 27 member countries, which have transferred some of their sovereignty – or lawmaking authority – to the EU. A number of other countries have applied to become members of the EU.

The member countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, and Finland. Others are France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The EU also has candidate countries that are at the moment undergoing preparatory reforms for membership. They are Croatia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Iceland.

There are also states that are potential candidate countries. These include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Montenegro and Serbia.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Mention the EU candidate countries.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The EU is growing and will continue to see growth in the economic, political and social spheres in the foreseeable future. The community appears quite effective in tackling its major challenges and even though it faces, at the moment an economic recession, its role in the global economy, as well as international politics is growing. One of the reasons is the growing effectiveness of the EU's institutions and their equally growing coherence.

9.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have primarily discussed the institutional evolution of the EU, its structures and roles in the integration project. We found that the EU has a strong power of attraction as is evidenced by the desire of states like Turkey to join it. It is also evident that the EU's institutional effectiveness has been strengthened over time and that it can now play a more coherent role on the global stage.

10.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. How did the treaty of Lisbon shape the institutional structures of the EU?
- ii. In what three categories can EU membership be divided and why?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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MODULE 4 THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

- Unit 1 An Overview of EU-US Relations
- Unit 2 The United States and European Security
- Unit 3 EU-US Relations in Afghanistan, Iran, Russia etc

UNIT 1 AN OVERVIEW OF EU-US RELATIONS

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 The Bond of Mutually Shared Values
 - 3.2 Some European Institutions and EU-US Relations
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

European civilisation is by far the most dominant foundation for what is now regarded as the American way. It is therefore no surprise that the US retains a very deep, vibrant and productive relationship with Europe. The relationship spans areas of both high and low politics. From security to agriculture, from education to science and from trade to the arts; the transatlantic relationship appears to be the single most important one in the contemporary international system.

In this unit, we intend to explore two main areas of that relationship. The first one relates to cultural affinity. This is what we will call the ‘bond of mutually shared values’. In this, we will look at how similar values in democracy, human rights, freedom etc make it easy, and perhaps even inevitable, that these two powers will work closely together. The other one explores the development of European institutions that aid and facilitate the EU-US relationship. This area is important because it helps us to properly situate specific issue-based cooperation.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the nature of mutually shared values in Europe and the US
- explain how this smoothens rough edges in a highly productive and long lasting relationship
- identify the relevance of specific institutional developments within the structures of the EU
- demonstrate the relevance of these structures for strengthening the EU-US relationship.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Bond of Mutually Shared Values

Unique in both breadth and depth, the European Union's partnership with the United States often lends itself to superlatives: the biggest, the deepest, and the longest-lasting. In fact, the transatlantic economic partnership is a key driver of global economic prosperity and represents the largest, most integrated, and most enduring relationship in the world. The two transatlantic partners account for half of the global economy, and according to the WTO, in 2008 the EU and the U.S. combined accounted for close to 40 percent of world trade. Together, the EU and the U.S. provide the bulk (80 percent) of official development assistance worldwide. However, it is the shared allegiance to deeply held values that is the core of the EU-U.S. relationship and that instils within it the strength to meet 21st century challenges, including globalisation and the emergence of new powers and a multi-polar world. Both the EU and the U.S. are committed to the rule of law, the democratic process, respect for human rights, alleviating poverty, and a free and fair market economy as essential to modern societies.

European Commission president José Manuel Barroso has linked transatlantic values to common interests: He notes "Why do the U.S. and the EU promote regulatory and legal mechanisms to solve their political and economic conflicts? Because the rule of law is a value we share. Why do we condemn the use of force by authoritarian regimes against

their own people? It is because we value individual rights, democracy, and freedom. Why do we lead the world in development policies? It is because we believe in solidarity, and the value of all human beings.

Why have we spent the last 60 years promoting global free trade? Because we value economic freedom, and the wealth and stability it creates.” Such common values, in addition to the deeply interdependent transatlantic economy and the trust and confidence that has been built up through many years of collaboration, make the EU and the U.S. natural partners to tackle global issues through mechanisms like the Transatlantic Economic Council and the EU-U.S. development dialogue. The EU and the U.S. work together to eliminate obstacles for free and fair commerce, to jointly target poverty, and to help societies in transition build the institutions necessary to ensure the rule of law.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What values connect the EU and U.S?

3.2 Some European Institutions and EU -US Relations

As the EU continues to evolve—becoming stronger, more visible, more unified, and more efficient—it is becoming an ever more effective partner to the U.S. in addressing global and regional concerns. Over the past year the European Union has been transformed by a new treaty; a newly appointed 27-member European Commission; a newly elected European Parliament; a European Council headed by a new permanent President; a common foreign service in the making, led by the newly created inter-institutional position of EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy; a new phase in the EU-U.S. relationship following the election of President Barack Obama; and the first EU ambassador to the United States.

Although the EU and the U.S. established diplomatic relations in the early 1950s, formal cooperation was introduced in 1990 with the Transatlantic Declaration, which launched regular presidential summits. Five years later, the EU and the U.S. adopted the New Transatlantic Agenda, which governs the relationship and outlines a joint action plan revolving around four major goals. These are promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world, responding to global challenges, contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations and finally, building bridges across the Atlantic.

As the EU’s political and legal personality has evolved, active cooperation between the EU and the U.S. has expanded to encompass

areas including counterterrorism, crisis management, energy and energy security, the environment, research and development, and education and training. The first formal EU-U.S. summit under the Obama administration took place in Washington, D.C. in November 2009 and resulted in two new important tools for transatlantic cooperation. Launched at the summit, the EU-U.S. Energy council is a new cabinet-level group focused on issues including global energy problems.

According to a December 2009 study conducted for the European Commission—the EU's executive arm—tackling existing non-tariff measures for trade and investment between the EU and the U.S. would produce substantial economic benefits on both sides of the Atlantic. For the U.S. benefits from aligning the non-tariff measures are estimated at €1 billion annually in increased GDP and a six percent rise in exports to the EU. Cost savings would be generated primarily in electrical goods, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, financial services, and insurance. For the EU, aligning non-tariff measures and regulatory convergences could translate into a potential annual gain of €122 billion in GDP and a two percent increase in exports to the U.S. Cost savings would accrue mainly from gains in motor vehicles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, food, and electric goods.

Tackling non-tariff measures can yield major benefits for the EU and the U.S. energy security, new technologies, energy policy, and research. Additionally, after a hiatus of more than a decade, the EU-U.S. development dialogue was re-launched in Washington D.C. on April 25, 2010. Designed to tackle poverty at the global level, its priorities include the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), food security, and climate change.

The Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) advances EU-U.S. economic integration by bringing together governments, the business community, and consumers to work on key areas where greater regulatory convergence can reap rewards on both sides of the Atlantic. Currently chaired by EU trade commissioner Karel De Gucht and Michael Froman, U.S. deputy national security adviser for international economic affairs, the TEC provides a high-level forum to address such complex areas as investment, the financial markets, mutual recognition of accounting standards, and secure trade, as well as more technical regulatory issues. Of particular value is the opportunity to defuse transatlantic trade disputes through consultation on standards as they are being formulated, rather than after the fact. A new EU-U.S. innovation dialogue aims at spurring growth, productivity, and entrepreneurial activity, by sharing best policy practices and improving the policy environment for innovative activities by drawing on talents and ideas from both markets. TEC is advised by representatives from the

Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue, the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, and labour.

European Commission vice-president and EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy annual summits, held alternately in the EU and the U.S., take place between the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council and the president of the United States. The most recent summit took place in Lisbon, Portugal in November 2010. The Senior Level Group (SLG), comprising senior EU and U.S. State department officials, prepares for EU-U.S. summits with the support of a joint task force which meets regularly to oversee the day-to-day implementation of summit decisions. Thematic dialogues ensure that a wide range of actors contributes to the EU-U.S. policy process by encouraging legislators, businesspeople, consumers, scientists, academics, and citizens' groups to build and sustain links with their transatlantic counterparts.

The Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD) between the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament fosters ongoing dialogue between American and European lawmakers on issues ranging from foreign policy to trade and economics to energy and the environment. The TLD, which attracts high-ranking members of both the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress as participants, contributes to a more harmonised approach to issues of mutual concern and works to pre-empt disputes before they occur by promoting awareness of the transatlantic impact of legislation and regulation and allowing for an exchange of ideas to resolve possible conflicts. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, and Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue all provide input to the Transatlantic Economic Council.

An EU-U.S. Transport and Border Security Dialogue involving the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice began in 2004. EU-U.S. cooperation in crisis management, conflict prevention, and capacity building is reflected in the partners' stabilisation efforts in the Balkans and Kosovo. Cooperation on regional challenges (including Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Middle East) is intensifying and includes a greater focus on civilian capacity-building to ensure long-term stability. The EU-U.S. Science and Technology Agreement expands ongoing transatlantic scientific cooperation. Since 1999, joint research activities have been undertaken in a number of fields such as medical research, biotechnology, environment, materials science (including nanotechnology), and non-nuclear and renewable energy. The EU-U.S. Education policy forum strengthens education cooperation across the Atlantic and provides for the exchange of ideas on challenges and trends in the areas of higher education reforms. "As the EU develops

a more powerful and unified foreign policy voice in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, our transatlantic partnership will continue to grow.”

The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) brings together representatives from more than 60 consumer organisations in the EU and the U.S. to develop joint consumer policy recommendations. TACD helps safeguard consumer rights and welfare on both sides of the Atlantic, and it focuses on issues including financial services, food and product safety, trade, intellectual property, climate change, net neutrality, and nanotechnology. The Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD) between the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament fosters ongoing dialogue between American and European lawmakers on issues ranging from foreign policy to trade and economics to energy and the environment. The TLD, which attracts high-ranking members of both the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress as participants, contributes to a more harmonised approach to issues of mutual concern and works to pre-empt disputes before they occur by promoting awareness of the transatlantic impact of legislation and regulation and allowing for an exchange of ideas to resolve possible conflicts.

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SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss two EU institutions that facilitate cooperation with the US.

4.0 CONCLUSION

This relationship has strengthened immensely in the last five decades. Even though there have been series of sharp disagreements, it has not threatened, in any fundamental sense, the continued vibrancy of the relationship. A good example is the disagreements over the Iraq invasion and the placement of nuclear tipped missiles and/or missile defence systems in parts of Europe. Overall however, the EU-US relationship is one of the most enduring and perhaps important partnerships in modern international system.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit we have discussed a brief overview of the EU-US relationship. We identified the strong role a shared value system and civilisation plays in building, strengthening and sustaining the transatlantic relationship. We also provided a short introduction to our subsequent discussions on more substantive aspects of this very important relationship.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Identify and discuss three institutional initiatives aimed at strengthening the transatlantic relationship.
- ii. How have shared values impacted on the transatlantic relationship?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 2 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 EU/NATO
 - 3.2 The Nuclear Umbrella
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Security is one of the main areas of the transatlantic relationship. There is immense cooperation between Europe and the US in the area of security. Dating to the world wars, the US has played a very important role in European security. At the end of the war in 1945, the US practically served as a guarantor of European peace and security, particularly in relation to the threat posed by the defunct Soviet Union. There have been strains in this relationship but it has generally endured since that period. In this unit, we will take a look at two important elements of that security cooperation. These elements are NATO and the US nuclear umbrella.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the relationship between the EU and NATO and to see how NATO objectives generally align with those stated out in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)
- describe the role of the US nuclear umbrella during the Cold War and its declining relevance in the Post Cold War period.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 EU/NATO

Strong bilateral relationships between the United States and individual European countries remain a vital foundation for transatlantic relations. At the same time, the relationship between the United States and the European Union has been taking on a growing significance. The EU has become an increasingly important interlocutor for the United States because its 27 member countries now take common decisions and formulate common policies in a wide range of areas—including many economic and social issues and a growing number of law enforcement and judicial matters—at the level of the EU institutions.

The EU is also continuing efforts to develop a stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). In December 2009, the EU adopted the Lisbon Treaty, introducing reforms intended to enhance the credibility and coherence of the EU's foreign policy voice, and to streamline the EU's institutional arrangements and decision-making procedures.

Members of congress and officials in the Obama administration have stated their support for the initiatives of the Lisbon Treaty and affirmed their intention to work closely with the new institutions and arrangements launched by the treaty.

NATO remains the preeminent security institution of the Euro-Atlantic community. Like the EU, NATO, too, has been experiencing dramatic change in recent years. Since the end of the Cold War, the alliance has added 12 new member states from central and Eastern Europe. Also during this time, NATO has sought to redefine its mission. Some members maintain that NATO should return to focusing on collective territorial defense and deterrence, while others believe NATO's relevance depends on "out-of-area" expeditionary operations and an ability to address new types of global security threats.

While NATO has worked to transform itself and develop new capabilities, most observers contend that more resources are needed should NATO decide to fully commit itself to challenges such as stabilisation and reconstruction operations, crisis management, counterterrorism, energy security, or cyber security. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010, the 28 member countries approved a new Strategic Concept document that provides an updated vision for the alliance.

NATO and the European Union (EU) share common values and strategic interests, and are working side by side in crisis-management operations. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Allies underlined their determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership, as agreed by the two organisations.

At Lisbon, the allies welcomed recent initiatives from several allies and ideas proposed by the secretary-general to improve NATO-EU cooperation. Building on these initiatives and on the guidance provided by the new strategic concept, they encouraged the secretary-general to continue to work with the EU high representative and to report to the council on the ongoing efforts in time for the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Berlin, in April 2011.

NATO's new strategic concept, adopted at Lisbon, commits the alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with NATO's international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.

The strategic concept clearly states that an active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values.

NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. The allies welcome the entry into force of the European Union's Lisbon treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential.

NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. The allies are determined to make their contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which they will:

- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations
- enhance practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field
- broaden political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives
- cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.

Institutionalised relations between NATO and the European Union were launched in 2001, building on steps taken during the 1990s to promote

greater European responsibility in defence matters. The political principles underlying the relationship were set out in the December 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP. With the enlargement of both organisations in 2004 followed by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union in 2007, NATO and the European Union now have 21 member countries in common.

NATO and EU officials meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of common interest. Meetings take place at different levels including at the level of foreign ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defence advisors. There are regular staff contacts between NATO's International Staff and International Military Staff, and the European Union's Council Secretariat and Military Staff as well as the European Defence Agency.

Permanent military liaison arrangements have been established to facilitate cooperation at the operational level. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU Military Staff since November 2005 and an EU Cell was set up at SHAPE (NATO's strategic command for operations in Mons, Belgium) in March 2006.

The NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP, agreed on 16 December 2002, reaffirmed the EU assured access to NATO's planning capabilities for its own military operations and reiterated the political principles of the strategic partnership: effective mutual consultation; equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and NATO; respect for the interests of EU and NATO members states; respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations.

As part of the framework for cooperation adopted on 17 March 2003, the so-called "Berlin-Plus" arrangements provide the basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management by allowing the European Union to have access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations, including command arrangements and assistance in operational planning. In effect, they allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged.

In July 2003, the European Union and NATO published a "Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans". Jointly drafted, it outlines core areas of cooperation and emphasises the common vision and determination both organisations share to bring stability to the region.

Together with operations, capability development is an area where cooperation is essential and where there is potential for further growth. The NATO-EU Capability Group was established in May 2003 to

ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and EU capability development efforts. This applies to initiatives such as the EU Battle Groups, developed within the “Headline Goal” for 2010, and the NATO Response Force, and efforts in both organisations to improve the availability of helicopters for operations.

Following the creation, in July 2004, of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to coordinate work within the European Union on the development of defence capabilities, armaments cooperation, acquisition and research, EDA experts contribute to the work of the Capability Group.

Both NATO and the European Union are committed to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They have exchanged information on their activities in the field of protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. The two organisations also cooperate in the field of civil emergency planning by exchanging inventories of measures taken in this area.

Since the enlargement of NATO and the European Union in 2004 and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union in 2007, the organisations have 21 member countries in common.

In parallel, NATO recognised the need to develop a “European Security and Defence Identity” within the organisation that would be both an integral part of the adaptation of NATO’s political and military structures and an important contributing factor to the development of European defence capabilities.

In January 2001, an exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency formalised the start of direct relations between NATO and the EU. Since then, considerable progress has been made in developing the NATO-EU strategic partnership, though its full potential is yet to be realised.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

In what way does a strong bilateral relation with individual European states strengthen the US’s relationship with the EU?

3.2 Challenges of the Nuclear Umbrella

Another very important part of EU-US security cooperation is what has been described as the nuclear umbrella. The US guaranteed the security of its allies in Europe during the Cold War largely through the so called

nuclear umbrella. This defence strategy was hinged on the commitment of the US to fight, with nuclear weapons if necessary, to defend its allies in the case of attack by the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War has however significantly reduced, or even removed, the threat of a nuclear attack from Russia, the Soviet Union's successor state. As a consequence, questions are now being raised as to the continued relevance of the so called nuclear umbrella. Most controversial is the continued deployment of tactical (short and intermediate range) nuclear tipped missiles in parts of Europe and the training and arming of non nuclear states for the possible delivery of nuclear weapons.

Some of the sharpest criticism of the nuclear umbrella comes from the supposed beneficiaries themselves; that is European states. They argue that the continued adherence to this strategy betrays a fixation with Cold War military doctrines that have little or no relevance to contemporary reality. They point, for instance, at the emergence of new threats like terrorism which such nuclear weapons cannot possibly counter. This position has been strong within Europe for some time now.

At every juncture and following every reductions and modification of the posture, NATO bureaucrats have reaffirmed the importance of maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe. The justifications are poorly explained and muddled, consisting of remnants of Cold War rationales about a Russian threat, vague missions such as war prevention, ambiguous suggestions like deterring proliferation of weapons mass destruction, and dubious claims about nuclear weapons providing a unique link between Europe and its North American allies.

What characterises these justifications is an infatuation with Cold War rationales and a fear of taking the next bold step to finally bring Europe out of the Cold War: At a time when NATO and the United States seek a new partnership with Russia and are concerned over the security of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, the interests of the alliance are not served by keeping hundreds of nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe. The presence of these weapons is a continuous irritant to normalizations and an unnecessary and counterproductive factor in Russian military planning.

At a time when both Europe and the United States are engaged in high-profile diplomatic nonproliferation efforts around the world to promote and enforce non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, deploying hundreds of such weapons in non-nuclear NATO countries and training the air forces of non-nuclear NATO countries – in peacetime – to deliver these weapons in times of war is at cross purposes with an effective non-proliferation message. All of the non-nuclear NATO countries that host nuclear weapons on their U.S. Nuclear weapons in European territory

(Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey) have signed the 1970 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) under which they pledge: "... not to receive the transfer ... of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly...."

Likewise, as a nuclear weapons state party to the NPT, the United States has committed itself to: "... not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly...."

There is also the issue of safety. Throughout the 1990s, NATO and U.S. officials assured the public that the nuclear weapons in Europe were secure, only to admit in internal upgrade programs and inspections that serious concerns existed. At one point in 1997, they found, this even included the risk of an accidental nuclear detonation. Despite efforts to improve nuclear proficiency of its nuclear personnel, the U.S. Air Force continues to experience serious deficiencies. In 2003, the pass rate for air force nuclear surety inspection hit an all-time low, with only half of the inspections resulting in a pass (the historical pass rate is 79 percent).

And then there is the question of how forward deployment fits the new reality of war on terrorism. Are the benefits of deploying 480 nuclear weapons at a dozen installations throughout Europe justified considering the potential threat from a terrorist attack? In October 2003, Tunisian born Nizar Trabelsi was sentenced to 10 years in prison for plotting to bomb the Kleine Brogel air base in Belgium. Trabelsi joined the al Qaeda terrorist network and planned to drive a car containing a bomb into the canteen of the base to kill American soldiers. Two accomplices received lesser sentences. Trabelsi said he did not plan to detonate nuclear weapons stored at the base.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the U.S. government has changed the way it views security of its nuclear weapons. Prior to 2001, the nuclear weapons security philosophy was based on the premise that "people would try to steal them," according to National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Director Linton Brooks. But now it is obvious that there are individuals who are willing to sacrifice their lives just to create a nuclear incident, he said. As a result, NNSA has expanded its security perimeters so that potential attackers can be stopped farther away from a nuclear facility.

Finally, there is the question of burden sharing and whether this long-held principle of NATO nuclear planning is eroding. Although a third of the U.S. forward-deployed nuclear bombs in Europe are earmarked for deliver by half a dozen non-nuclear NATO countries, many of those

countries are showing signs of retreating from of the nuclear mission. Nuclear weapons were removed from Greece in 2001, Italy only has nuclear weapons on one national air base, and Germany also only has nuclear weapons left on one national air base and closed another base in 2003. And Germany may phase out its nuclear mission altogether with its planned replacement of the Tornado aircraft with the Eurofighter in the next decade.

In conclusion, a final review of the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is long overdue. This time, the U.S. Congress and European parliaments must ask tough questions about the rationale for the deployment. They should not be content with vague justifications from the past about nuclear weapons “preventing war” or “providing a political link between Europe and North America.” The focus must be on exactly who the enemy is and where the targets are for these weapons, which essential and unique benefits the weapons provide to NATO’s security that cannot be met through other means, and how the training in peacetime of pilots from non-nuclear countries to deliver nuclear weapons in wartime matches European and U.S. nonproliferation messages.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the Cold War relevance of the nuclear umbrella.

4.0 CONCLUSION

As can be gleaned from the two units we have discussed, the US is a very critical component of the European security architecture. Even though European states like France in particular have characteristically worked to create an independent military defence capability, it appears that if there is ever a war with a major power like Russia or China, Europe will still have to depend significantly on the US. Even its ability to project power in defence of its interests in distant theatres like Africa and Asia depends on American political and military support. The ongoing military interventions in Libya provide a very important illustration.

America’s decisive military superiority is a product of both its superior advances in weapons technology and widespread political opposition to military spending on offensive capabilities in key states like Germany. Overall, both Europe and its American ally benefit from this strong bond. While the US can count on Europe for political support (at least most of the time) and of course military contributions in times of war,

Europe is able to concentrate on economic growth by freeing funds from expensive military ventures and diverting them to social issues.

11.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we addressed the intimate security relationship between the US and Europe. We looked at the most successful military defence alliance in history; NATO, and also discussed the US nuclear umbrella over Europe and the challenges it now faces. Overall, all the issues we addressed demonstrated the vibrancy and dynamism of the transatlantic relationship and its relevance to contemporary international stability.

12.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. How does the 'nuclear umbrella' undermine the broader goal of non proliferation?
- ii. Do you think that the development of an independent EU military capacity will undermine NATO?

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UNIT 3 EU-US RELATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, RUSSIA ETC

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Afghanistan
 - 3.2 Iran
 - 3.3 Russia
 - 3.4 Counter Terrorism, Economic Relations
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

While the preceding unit has helped us to appropriately understand the general nature of the transatlantic relationship, particularly in the area of security, this unit will look at specific states and issues and try to operationalise our earlier understanding of the relationship. Afghanistan, Iran and Russia have selected for two general reasons. First, the three states have been, to varying degrees, major sources of disagreement and conflict within the EU and between the EU and the US. Second, the issues at stake in these states; terrorism in Afghanistan, nuclear proliferation in Iran and emerging power challenge to the west in Russia; represent three of the most pressing concerns for European international politics in the twenty first century. Operationalising our analysis with these states therefore gives insight into critical international relations issues of our age and how Europe engages with them.

As noted above, how to react to issues in states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Russia have been, to varying degrees, irritants in the transatlantic relationship. There has been an attempt to balance different perceptions and interests in order to present a common and unite front. Of course, this is not to suggest that there is unity even within Europe itself or that it presents a common front with regard to these issues. The different perceptions of threat and appropriate action have sometimes hindered the smooth operation of the alliance. However, as what we will be discussing below demonstrates, there are still many areas of consensus that has allowed differences to be easily smoothed out and decisive action taken.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the specific issues attached to EU-US policy in states like Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan
- describe US-EU relations with regard to counter terrorism and economy.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Afghanistan

Many observers argue that Afghanistan remains the most urgent and important international security issue for the transatlantic alliance. As of October 2010, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) consists of more than 130,000 troops from 46 countries, including all 28 members of NATO.

With considerable force increases in 2009-2010, these numbers represent a substantial commitment of alliance and partner country resources. In addition, following two U.S. strategic policy reviews in 2009, the alliance and its partners have been pursuing a strategy that emphasises the integration of civilian and military efforts, the promotion of governance capacity and economic development, and the training of Afghan army and police forces.

Despite this range of efforts, it remains uncertain whether sufficient progress is being made to begin drawing down military forces and transferring more responsibility to the Afghan authorities by president Obama's stated target date of July 2011. Leaders at NATO's Lisbon summit agreed to 2014 as the goal for ending the ISAF mission. Some officials and analysts have asserted that the international strategy is working, both in terms of state-building and combating the Taliban and the insurgents. On the other hand, insurgent violence continues to cause instability in many parts of the country and serious questions persist about corruption, the Afghan economy, and the self-sufficiency of Afghan institutions. Although precise definitions for success or failure in Afghanistan vary, the outcome has major ramifications for the future of NATO—possibly either reaffirming NATO's central role in addressing 21st century security threats or, alternately, raising difficult questions about the utility, and by extension the fundamental role and purpose, of the alliance.

Afghanistan also represents a test of cohesion for the alliance. Considerable segments of the public in Europe have never been sold on their country's participation in Afghanistan, and strong public opposition to the war in many European countries has been pressuring governments to define an exit strategy and a timeline for withdrawal. On top of flat or shrinking European defence budgets and persistent shortfalls in military resources, an atmosphere of economic austerity in Europe offers an additional challenge to those seeking to justify their country's deployments.

The debate about extending the Netherlands' participation in ISAF brought down the Dutch government in early 2010, causing the country to end its combat mission in August 2010 and begin withdrawing its contingent of nearly 2,000 troops. Although no immediate changes are foreseen by the other major contributors, additional strains are likely to be felt in 2011. The continued commitment of European countries to the mission in Afghanistan is an important tone setter in transatlantic relations, and questions about alliance unity or the equality of burden sharing in Afghanistan could affect the strength and cohesion of the transatlantic partnership.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Have the challenges of the Afghanistan campaign undermined the transatlantic relationship?

3.2 Iran

Transatlantic cooperation regarding Iran's nuclear program has been close and extensive. Since the discovery of Iran's covert enrichment activities in 2002, the "EU-3" (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have led diplomatic efforts to curtail them. In 2006, China, Russia, and the United States joined the EU-3 to form the "Permanent Five Plus One" (P5+1) negotiating group, and EU high representative Catherine Ashton has now been leading talks with Iran on behalf of the P5+1. Between 2006 and 2008, the EU-3 and the United States successfully pushed for United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval of three rounds of limited sanctions on Iran (Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803).

Early in 2009, the Obama administration indicated a willingness to increase direct U.S. engagement in talks with Iran. European leaders welcomed and encouraged this prospect, although emphasizing that it should be closely coordinated within the P5+1 framework. During direct negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran in October 2009, the United

States, France, and Russia advanced a proposal to enrich Iranian uranium outside the country for use in an Iranian research reactor. Iran declined to formally accept this proposal, however, and would not agree to a date for continued negotiations, leading the United States and the EU to pursue further U.N. sanctions in early 2010. Despite a last minute attempt at mediation by Brazil and Turkey, the UNSC voted in June 2010 to authorize a tougher new round of sanctions (Resolution 1929) targeting the Iranian financial and energy sectors.

In July 2010, the EU announced it would apply these U.N. authorisations to implement its toughest sanctions yet: measures include a ban on new investment, equipment sales, technical assistance, and technology transfers to Iran's gas and oil industry; a ban on trade support measures such as export credit guarantees and on insurance contracts longer than two years; a ban on new relationships with Iranian financial institutions and on Iranian banks opening new branches or subsidiaries in the EU; a new requirement in which bank transfers over €10,000 (about \$13,000) to or from Iran must be reported to national authorities, and transfers over €40,000 (about \$52,000) must be authorised; a ban on insurance and reinsurance of Iranian government institutions; a ban on Iranian air cargo flights in and out of the EU; increased inspections of ships suspected of carrying prohibited articles; and an extension of travel bans and asset freezes to more than 40 additional Iranian companies and officials.

Many observers were surprised at how far these latest EU measures went, observing that they send a strong signal and bring U.S. and European sanctions policy on Iran into a broad alignment. Although the United States has strongly supported EU-3 efforts in this issue, in the past some Americans have pointed to European economic ties with Iran as a sign of European reluctance to press Tehran too hard, urging Europeans to adopt tighter sanctions. Some differences remain—observers note that the new EU measures do not ban the sale of refined petroleum products, leading critics to assert they still fall short of the restrictions imposed by recent U.S. legislation (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195). The EU takes its cues on sanctions strictly from the U.N.—since Resolution 1929 did not specifically authorise banning sales of refined petroleum, the EU does not consider there to be a legal basis for such measures to be implemented as a common EU policy. Individual member states may take separate action and pressure their national firms not to do such business with Iran. Many European financial and energy firms have reportedly pulled out of Iran voluntarily, although some reportedly continue to do business there.

In addition, the EU has long opposed the U.S. Iran sanctions act as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. While most analysts believe that sanctions are having a substantial economic effect on Iran, and possibly significant political and social effects as well, it appears more doubtful that sanctions are influencing the country's commitment to its nuclear program and ambitions. No clear strategic consensus exists between U.S. and EU policymakers regarding next steps if sanctions fail to achieve the desired results, or even on a specific timeline or criteria for judging the success or failure of sanctions. Iran has indicated an interest in including additional topics—such as broader questions of regional security and economic issues—in possible future negotiations, rather than limiting talks to its nuclear activities. Without a more cooperative Iranian approach to the nuclear issues, however, it appears unlikely that the United States and the EU are prepared to broaden the topics of discussion.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What are the mutually shared interests that bind the EU and US in Iran?

3.3 Russia

In the aftermath of its August 2008 conflict with Georgia, relations between Russia and the West reached what some observers consider their lowest point since the end of the cold war. In fact, relations had already grown increasingly tense in recent years, with numerous issues—including past and prospective NATO enlargement, and Western support for the independence of Kosovo—serving as points of irritation and contention. Against this backdrop, officials and observers in Europe and the United States have also expressed concern about what is perceived as the increasingly authoritarian character of the Russian government and its assertiveness and quest for influence in the Russian “Near Abroad” and beyond. Many European countries have complex and interdependent relationships with Russia in terms of energy and economics, and EU member states have had a difficult time formulating a common approach to their eastern neighbour.

The Obama administration's “reset” initiative appears to have helped alleviate some of the tension that had built up. In April 2009, following an initial meeting between president Obama and president Medvedev, leaders at NATO's 60th anniversary summit decided to resume the meetings of the NATO-Russia Council, which had been suspended due to the Georgia conflict. President Obama travelled to Moscow for a summit in July 2009, and the two sides reached an agreement allowing the transit of U.S. military material through Russia to Afghanistan, among other areas of cooperation. The administration's September 2009

decision to alter U.S. plans for missile defence installations in Poland and the Czech Republic diminished a primary source of past friction, and negotiations continue about Russia's potential role in a joint missile defence system. In March 2010, the United States and Russia concluded negotiations on the new START treaty, in June 2010 Russia backed UNSC 1929 authorising tougher international sanctions against Iran, and in September 2010 Russia cancelled the sale of air defence missile systems to Iran. President Medvedev also accepted an invitation to attend the NATO summit that was held in Lisbon in November 2010.

At the same time, considerable U.S. and European concerns and objections remain regarding Russian policy on many issues, including Georgia and Russia's recognition of the breakaway provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia's unilateral suspension of its obligations under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and matters of internal governance and human rights. Russian officials have been advocating for talks about a new European security architecture, a proposal that some analysts view as an attempt to undermine NATO. Europe has for some time been divided between those who believe in a firm, vigilant stance toward Russia, and others inclined more toward pragmatism and engagement. Of the former, notably countries such as Poland and the Baltic states some see in Russia a potential threat to the political independence and even territorial sovereignty of themselves and neighbours, and look to a U.S. approach that robustly guards against Russian assertiveness. Some officials and observers in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, concerned that U.S. dealings with Russia could have effects detrimental to their security interests and to the cohesion of NATO, were initially vocal in expressing their concerns about the U.S. "reset" policy. Some fear that improved relations with the United States could embolden Russia in its actions toward neighbours, leading in turn to regional instability. Advocates of engagement, on the other hand, notably countries such as Germany, France, and Italy, assert that the maintenance of extensive ties and constructive dialogue is the most effective way to influence Russia.

They argue that Russia should be viewed as a strategic partner and observe that Russian cooperation is important on issues such as Iran, climate change, arms control, and energy. A measure of Polish-Russian rapprochement appears to have helped diminish the sharpness of inter-European divisions about Russia. Relations were improved by the joint commemoration and recognition of the World War II Katyn massacre and by the sympathetic cooperation which followed the airplane crash that killed the Polish president and high-ranking Polish officials on their way to the commemoration ceremony in Russia.

Regarding energy, the EU as a whole is dependent on Russia for more than one-quarter of its gas and oil supplies, a number expected to grow substantially over the next 20 years. For some individual countries, dependence on Russian gas is already much greater. Cut offs—as occurred most recently in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009—have major implications for wider European energy security. Although that dispute was nominally about payment, some analysts have described a trend in recent years in which Moscow seems to use energy supplies as an instrument of foreign policy. Additionally, in recent years Russia has been actively engaging in bilateral energy deals with a number of European countries and acquiring large-scale ownership of European energy infrastructure, while not applying Western standards of transparency and market reciprocity regarding business practices and investment policy. There is concern in the United States over the influence that Russian energy dominance could have on the ability to present European—and, by consequence, transatlantic—unity when it comes to other issues related to Russia. For this reason, some have expressed the desirability of decreasing European reliance on Russian energy through diversification of supply, and supported European steps to develop alternative sources and increase energy efficiency. Analysts have also advocated the development of a common European energy policy that would push Russia to introduce more competition and transparency in its energy sector.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe EU-US cooperation in relation to Russia.

3.4 Counter Terrorism, Economic Relations

Homeland security and counterterrorism also continue to rank at the forefront of transatlantic concerns. Following the attempted bombing of a transatlantic flight in December 2009, terrorism alerts and suspected terrorist plots in 2010 have reinforced that Europe remains both a primary target of radical Islamist terrorists and a potential base for cells seeking to carry out attacks against the United States.

In the years since the 9/11 attacks, U.S.-EU cooperation on counterterrorism has been strong. Spurred on by 9/11, the March 2004 bombings in Madrid, and the July 2005 bombings in London, the EU has sought to strengthen and coordinate its internal counterterrorism capabilities. While the EU has thus been increasing its relevance in this area, bilateral intelligence sharing and cooperation between the United States and individual European countries also remains key for efforts to disrupt terrorist plots and apprehend those involved.

U.S. and EU officials from the cabinet level down maintain regular dialogues on issues related to homeland security and counterterrorism, and relevant U.S. and EU agencies have established cooperative relationships that include information sharing and, in some cases, an exchange of liaison officers. In early 2010, new U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance entered into force following their approval by the U.S. Senate in 2008. The treaties, which were negotiated in 2003, are largely intended to promote transatlantic cooperation that aids prosecutors dealing with terrorism cases. The treaties update and harmonise the bilateral agreements between the United States and EU member countries and streamline extradition and assistance procedures. The United States and the EU also actively work together to track and counter the financing of terrorism, in forums such as the Financial Action Task Force and through information sharing deals such as the U.S.-EU "SWIFT agreement." Under a 2004 U.S.-EU agreement on customs cooperation and the U.S. Container Security Initiative, U.S. customs officers stationed at a number of European ports help screen U.S.-bound cargo containers. Additionally, a U.S.-EU agreement on sharing the passenger name record (PNR) data of U.S.-bound air passengers has been provisionally in force since 2007.

Although overall counterterrorism cooperation is strong, numerous areas of tension exist. European concerns over data privacy have affected cooperation on the SWIFT and PNR agreements. The EU considers data privacy a basic right, and the EU has strict regulations protecting personal data. In early 2010, the European Parliament voted against final approval of the SWIFT agreement on the grounds that it did not sufficiently protect the privacy of citizens' personal data. The United States and the EU subsequently re-negotiated the agreement with added safeguards, and the European Parliament approved the new version in July 2010. However, similar privacy concerns have been raised ahead of negotiations and an eventual Parliament vote on a new PNR agreement. Some observers assert that a broader U.S.-EU framework agreement on principles of privacy and data protection would help ease European concerns and promote closer cooperation.

In addition, European opposition to the U.S. death penalty could impede extradition deals in some terrorism cases, and many Europeans consider U.S. provisions for 100% screening of U.S.-bound cargo containers as unrealistic and financially burdensome to ports and businesses. U.S. and EU officials have discussed ways to strengthen airport security, but many Europeans are strongly opposed to the installation of "full body" security scanners at European airports. European interest in the detention centre at Guantánamo Bay appears to have declined since the Obama administration took office, but there are still concerns in Europe about human rights and the treatment of detainees, objections which

long stood at the centre of European criticism of U.S. counterterrorism practices during the Bush administration. U.S. officials have been concerned that rendition-related criminal proceedings against CIA officials in some EU states may put vital counterterrorism cooperation between U.S. and European intelligence agencies at risk. Lastly, although some EU member states include Hezbollah on their national lists of terrorist organisations, the EU has for years resisted adding Hezbollah to its common list, despite repeated entreaties from members of congress and U.S. administrations.

Another very important area that features strongly in the transatlantic relationship is in the economic arena. The global financial crisis and the ensuing recession of 2008-2009 have affected the transatlantic economic relationship and tested the political relationship. Promoting stability in financial markets and restoring strong economic growth are overriding priorities for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic.

The United States and the European Union have the largest trade and investment relationship in the world. In 2009, the value of the two-way transatlantic flow of goods, services, and income receipts from investment totalled approximately \$1.25 trillion. U.S. and European companies are also the biggest investors in each other's markets—total stock of two-way direct investment came to about \$3.2 trillion at the end of 2009. Additionally, transatlantic economic activity provides an estimated 14 million jobs in the United States and Europe.

With the United States and the EU together comprising more than half of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the transatlantic economic relationship is also the world's most influential in terms of shaping standards and regulations. U.S.-EU cooperation has been the key driving force behind efforts to liberalise world trade.

A coordinated response to the crisis has been outlined in a series of G-20 meetings since late 2008, and this initially focused on avoiding protectionism. While numerous European countries undertook stimulus measures in 2009, however, European leaders have since resisted U.S. calls for greater stimulus spending, opting instead to introduce budgetary austerity programs. A number of EU member states have been severely impacted by the crisis, with some facing highly problematic deficit and debt situations. Starting with Greece in spring 2010, followed by Ireland in November, and threatening Portugal and possibly Belgium, Spain, and Italy, a Euro-zone debt crisis has been slowly playing out which could call into question the viability of the euro, the common currency shared by 16 EU member states.

The United States has extensive export and investment interests in Europe that are affected by the Euro-zone crisis. For the longer term, analysts are concerned that economic difficulties in Europe could act as a brake on U.S. growth and the world economy. A dawning age of austerity in Europe could also impact transatlantic cooperation on international issues including defence and development assistance. In addition, there is a wider debate between the United States and the EU and within the G-20 about how to deal with imbalances in competitiveness, consumption, and trade flows in the world economy. On a global scale, this discussion focuses largely on China, but is also mirrored with regard to Germany's role within the Euro-zone. Germany has strongly rebutted criticism of its national economic model, which is based on exports and wage restraint.

While the majority of the transatlantic economic relationship is smooth and mutually beneficial, trade disputes persist over issues such as poultry, subsidies to Boeing and airbus, hormone treated beef, and bio-engineered food products. Differences with countries in the developing world have been the primary reason why the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has stalled but the inability of the United States and EU to agree to a common position on agricultural subsidies has not helped matters. The United States and the EU have made a number of attempts to reduce remaining non-tariff and regulatory barriers to trade and investment. The Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), headed on both sides by cabinet/ministerial-level appointees, was created in 2007 and tasked with advancing the process of regulatory cooperation and barrier reduction.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How vibrant do you consider the EU-US economic relationship?

4.0 CONCLUSION

As we can see from the above, the wide range of EU-US relations is indicative of both challenges and opportunities. The relationship however remains very strong and enduring. This vibrancy nonetheless, there are areas of very sharp disagreements that may undermine the relationship. Overall however, there is relative consensus on the perceptions of threat and opportunity in diverse areas from Iran to Russia. Where there is relative discord is often in the area of how to react to a problem.

11.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we discussed the workings of the transatlantic alliance in states like Iran, Russia and Afghanistan. We also looked at counter terrorism and of course, economic cooperation. We also examined the impact of the 2008 economic crisis on the alliance in relation to the opportunities it presented and challenges it posed.

12.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Identify and discuss the main issues affecting EU-US relations with Russia.
- ii. How has terrorism strengthened the transatlantic relationship?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Johnson, D. & Robinson, P. (2005). *Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations*. London: Routledge.

Keohane, D. (2005). *The EU and Counter Terrorism*. Brussels: Center for European Reform.

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MODULE 5 CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 21st CENTURY EUROPE

Unit 1	Terrorism and Global Security
Unit 2	Immigration and the Challenge of Multiculturalism
Unit 3	EU Expansion
Unit 4	Europe and the Rise of Global Environmentalism

UNIT 1 TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY

CONTENTS

1.0	Introduction
2.0	Objectives
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	3.2 EU Efforts at Combating Terrorism
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is not new, and even though it has been used since the beginning of recorded history it can be relatively hard to define. Terrorism has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Obviously, a lot depends on whose point of view is being represented. Terrorism has often been an effective tactic for the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to the secretive nature and small size of terrorist organisations, they often offer opponents no clear organisation to defend against or to deter.

That is why preemption is being considered to be so important. In some cases, terrorism has been a means to carry on a conflict without the adversary realising the nature of the threat, mistaking terrorism for criminal activity. Because of these characteristics, terrorism has become increasingly common among those pursuing extreme goals throughout the world. But despite its popularity, terrorism can be a nebulous concept. Even within the U.S. Government, agencies responsible for different functions in the ongoing fight against terrorism use different definitions.

This unit addresses Europe's approach to the problem of terrorism. It provides a general overview of terrorism and then examines, step by step, Europe's efforts at combating the problem.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe contemporary terrorism and adequately analyse how it undermines global security
- describe and analyse Europe's efforts at combating the scourge.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 An Overview of Terrorism

Terrorism has a negative impact on global security, which affects every nation because they are all so intricately connected to one another. This connection is fundamental because terrorism has been in practice throughout history and throughout the world. It is affecting global security in the 21st century because it is becoming more rampant. Terrorism affects the foreign policy of many nations. A huge amount of lives have been destroyed, and properties worth billions also destroyed. People live in perpetual fear of insecurity, because they do not know the next turn of events, or where it would take place. As a result of modern and sophisticated technology, the world has been reduced to a global village, hence the impact of terrorism on global security. It affects the whole world. Terrorism threatens the security of a nations.

International terrorism continues to pose difficult challenges to state and human security in the international system. Apart from the fear of insecurity terrorism brings about, it also reflects in economic decline, unemployment, inability to pay salaries of workers, debt burden; it brings about poverty and a general sense of frustration amongst the victims.

Terrorism involves acts dangerous to human-life. They are a violation of the criminal laws of any state, so that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. The acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. The act of terrorism transcend national boundaries in terms of the means of which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetuation operate or seek asylum.

Terrorism is a war about identity-politics, the exclusive claim to power on the basis of identity, be it ethnic, religious, or linguistic. And this kind of conflict

cannot be channelled into peaceful directions. And because the world has entered a new era of interdependence, it has not learnt how to adjust its institutions and its traditions of government to the new conditions. And the world is so closely knitted together now that it is no longer possible for a nation to run amok on one frontier while her neighbour on another is hardly aware. Every war threatens to become a world war.

Terrorism is threatening the viability of a nation-state, there by bringing about economic crisis, instability, etc.

Terrorism is a threat to tourism, energy-sector, civil-aviation, maritime, transportation and civil transportation. The problem of terrorism has refused to go away' instead, it has kept people in perpetual fear, robbing people of freedom and security. The nature of terrorists groups are similar whether conventional terrorists or information warrior. Conventional terrorist traditionally have operated as members of larger terrorists organisations. Throughout history, cases in which individuals unaffiliated with any group have carried out major terrorists acts are rare. It does not mean that, terrorist members have never acted alone while on a mission (i.e. suicide bomber). Although, one or two people may carry out a violent tactic or operation, a larger base of people and support exists elsewhere for them.

Each terrorist whether a group or individual relies on the organisation of which individual is a member. Terrorists organisational structure is similar to that of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. The hierarchy of terrorist organisations demands that an extensive leadership and support structure exist if it is to survive or succeed in its goals. The organisation is composed chiefly of the hard-core leadership, active cadre, active support and passive support. The leaders in a terrorist organisation play important roles. The organisation's complexity depends upon the skills of the insurgent leaders in identifying, integrating and coordinating the different tasks and rules essential to combat operations, training, communications, transportation, information and supervision. The leaders are the heart of the terrorist organisation. The leaders profile emphasises their ability to plan better than other members. The leaders usually come from higher economic classes, and are usually dedicated group of professionals, with background in medicine, law or philosophy.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What is the impact of new media technologies on terrorism?

3.2 EU Efforts at Combating Terrorism

With the suicide bombing attacks on London in July 2005, anti-terrorism has become the absolute top priority for Europe. The EU anti-terrorism policy, in place since the 2001 US attacks and extended after

the 2004 bombings in Madrid, is being stepped up and will be updated on an ongoing basis.

Europe has suffered from terrorism from various sources for decades (eg ETA, IRA) and a policy of increased judicial co-operation between member states had already been agreed as part of the Tampere programme when the attack against the US took place in 2001.

Immediate reaction to the twin tower attacks was the September 2001 anti-terrorism action plan, followed by a framework decision defining terrorist offences and aligning the level of sanctions between member states. Following the Madrid bombings, the council issued a declaration against terrorism and appointed Gijs de Vries as counter-terrorism co-ordinator. The action plan is updated every 6 months, most recently in December 2010. From December 2005, the commission also produced a scoreboard showing the level of implementation of action plan measures.

The Hague programme, adopted in November 2004 to succeed Tampere, includes a number of ambitious measures on exchange of information, border control, security of travel documents and police and judicial co-operation. In December 2004, the council adopted specific measures on combating terrorist financing, civil protection policy, and prevention of recruitment, critical infrastructure protection and external security policy.

Following the London attacks in July 2005, EU interior ministers held an extraordinary meeting where they agreed that all measures already decided on should be implemented as a matter of urgency. These include:

- European evidence warrant
- strengthening of Schengen and visa information systems
- biometric details on passports
- combating terrorist financing (see below)
- prevention of recruitment and radicalisation
- greater controls over trade, storage and transport of explosives.

In September 2005, the Commission came up with a further package including a proposed directive on data retention, a communication on radicalisation and a decision to allocate €7 million to prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks.

In December 2005 the Council of justice ministers approved a new strategy for counter terrorism. Its main aim is to set out EU policy clearly and comprehensively for the general public. A set of

slides accompanied by written details explains the strategy under four broad objectives: prevent, protect, pursue and respond.

Across these four categories, the strategy seeks to link strands from different policy areas and emphasise the close interaction of measures at member state, European and international level.

The European arrest warrant, introduced in Jan 2004, replaces old extradition procedures and has been implemented in all member states, the last being Italy on 21 July 2005. A commission report in February 2005 held it to be a success, from the fact that 104 people have been surrendered under the warrants in an average of 45 days (the previous average was nine months). There have, however been arguments in Germany and some other member states that implementing legislation breaches national constitutional rights.

The December 2005 justice council, reached agreement on a framework decision for a European evidence warrant. This will create a standard form warrant for obtaining objects, documents and data in cross-border cases. After translation as appropriate, it will be capable of immediate execution (ie without court approval).

Specific criminal and therefore anti-terrorist measures are within the competence of the member states only. The main role of the EU, therefore, is *co-ordination* and the greatest emphasis so far has been on the exchange and sharing of information among member states. A specific programme to create a Legal Enforcement Network (LEN) which will facilitate exchange of information between police forces has been launched. Other main agencies promoting co-operation are Europol, Eurojust and latterly, the European Border Agency. Also, within the council, a body called SitCen brings together external and internal intelligence experts to co-ordinate strategies.

From 2005, biometric data was included in passports and, eventually, visas, which were made computer-readable. The Schengen Information System (SIS) already stores data on persons wanted for arrest, those to be refused entry to the EU, missing persons and persons to be put under surveillance. Biometric identifiers will be stored on the second generation SIS II.

An external borders agency (FRONTEX) to co-ordinate between member states, provide training for border guards and carry out risk assessments formally was also opened in July 2005. A proposal for a corps of external border guards is under consideration. The commission has also put forward proposals to extend police powers of surveillance and pursuit of suspects in border areas.

A proposal that telephone companies and internet providers be compelled to keep details (not including content) of all phone calls, e-mails and website visits was first put forward by the UK, France and Sweden in 2004. It did not succeed following doubts over the legal procedure used and firm rejection by Parliament. In September 2005 the commission published a new proposed directive whereby phone call data (mobile and fixed) would be kept for one year and internet communications for six months. The cost of the system is to be met by member states. In parallel to this, the commission published proposals on 4th October, 2005 for a framework decision on data *protection*, seen as necessary to balance the increased exchange of personal data between member states being necessitated by the fight against terrorism and organised crime.

Following the US anthrax scare, fears have been raised that terrorists could resort to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. In June 2003, the commission adopted a communication on preparedness and response to biological and chemical agent attacks. DG Health has issued guidelines on the management of specific bioterrorist disease outbreaks and general guidelines for the public.

The Council has also finalised a new CBRN programme which sets out steps to be taken to prevent an attack and (were an attack to happen) to limit its consequences (i.e. risk assessment, protecting critical infrastructure and co-operation between emergency services). This will be complemented by a European programme for critical infrastructure protection and a crisis alert system to be called ARGUS.

The third money laundering directive was adopted by the Council on 20th September, 2005. It extends the existing provisions to terrorist crimes and is designed to reflect the recommendations of the international Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FAFT). It provides that suspicious transactions of €15000 or more must be reported to special national financial intelligence units by the bodies covered by the directive (e.g. financial institutions, accountants, lawyers, estate agents and casinos). These measures have been highly controversial.

In December 2005, the Commission put forward a communication on terrorist financing with two aims:

- to develop a code of practice common amongst member states on generating and exchanging information that can lead to the cutting off of terrorist funding

- to tighten up the financial transparency and accountability practices of not-for-profit organisations through a code of conduct.

Radicalisation and recruitment are also major areas of the EU's anti-terrorism efforts. This strand of anti-terrorism policy, an element that emerged in the 2004 action plan, is increasing in importance. Many are arguing, particularly since it was discovered that the London bombers had been living in the UK, that looking at the reasons why young men are resorting to such action is key. In September 2005, the commission published a communication which analyses ways in which the radicalisation of individuals can be deterred through education (both in schools and through the internet), integration policies, interfaith dialogue and the promotion of inter-cultural understanding. The December 2005 Council approved a paper outlining the work in this area.

EU action against terrorism has been predicated on the preservation of fundamental rights and liberties as enshrined by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Some of the member state actions, however, have been heavily criticised for riding roughshod over these principles and EU policies have been questioned for being overly influenced by the US, which has pushed its own approach at international level through the G8.

The EU network of independent experts in fundamental rights has expressed concern over the looseness of the definition of 'terrorism' in the 2002 framework decision, a definition most member states have simply taken in to their own legislation. As the commission of 'terrorist' offences is being met with the curtailment of ordinary liberties, a more precise definition is required. It also takes the view that member states must provide control mechanisms within their legislation to protect fundamental rights.

Statewatch has published a report showing trends towards greater secrecy and less accountability in organisations dealing with terrorism. It details plans for information gathered by undercover surveillance (such as phone-tapping) to be available EU-wide, unproven intelligence evidence to be used in courts, the criminalisation of preparatory terrorist acts and "control orders" in the UK. The author of the report, Statewatch editor Tony Bunyan, says that the initiatives "herald a new, dangerous, era of pre-emptive state action where the emphasis is shifted from bringing people before the courts to face criminal charges to targeting all those suspected of involvement or even allegedly "supporting" terrorism". In April 2005, Statewatch also launched, together with the American Civil Liberties Union, an international

campaign against mass surveillance, warning that anti-terror measures are endangering fundamental freedoms.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How effective have EU counter terrorism efforts been?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Terrorists are improving their sophistication and abilities in virtually all aspects of their operations and support. The aggressive use of modern technology for information management, communication and intelligence has increased the efficiency of these activities. Weapons technology has become more increasingly available, and the purchasing power of terrorist organisations is on the rise. The ready availability of both technology and trained personnel to operate it for any client with sufficient cash allows the well-funded terrorist to equal or exceed the sophistication of governmental counter-measures.

Likewise, due to the increase in information outlets, and competition with increasing numbers of other messages, terrorism now requires a greatly increased amount of violence or novelty to attract the attention it requires. The tendency of major media to compete for ratings and the subsequent revenue realised from increases in their audience size and share produces pressures on terrorists to increase the impact and violence of their actions to take advantage of this sensationalism.

Today, most experts believe that certain parts of the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan are turning out to be the main power centers for terrorism. Decades of lawlessness and corruption have seen Islamic terrorist groups fill the power vacuum in this region and continue to turn out an alarming number of religiously motivated terrorists.

European anti terrorism policy is adapting itself to these new realities. Efforts in Afghanistan, Libya etc are evidence of the EU's commitment to fighting not only the military battles but also, the social problems that allow terrorist ideas to take root.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit we discussed a general overview of the problem of terrorism and its implications for global security. We also examined the EU's anti terrorism measures and noted how it has become greatly expanded and more effective since 2001. We also noted the cooperation between the EU and other stakeholders like the US and within the EU itself as a result of a general perception of terrorism as a global rather than national problem.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Discuss the implications of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US on Terrorism.
- ii. Discuss at least five initiatives of the EU in its counter terrorism efforts since 2001.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Spence, D. (2007). *The European Union and Terrorism*. London: John Harper Publishing.

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UNIT 2 IMMIGRATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 An Overview of Multiculturalism
 - 3.2 Immigration and Multiculturalism

3.3	Cultural Diversity and Migration in Europe
4.0	Conclusion
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7.0	References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Globalisation has unprecedentedly increased the movement of people all over the world. The developed world in particular has seen very huge population movements that are indications of both the power of attraction these states have for less fortunate citizens of the developing world and the ability of even the average people in the developed countries to travel for tourism purposes. One of the implications of these population movements is the growing challenge of multiculturalism. As we will see later, the increase in foreign permanent immigrants has deepened social and economic tensions in many countries and has even been a source of inter-state conflict.

In this unit, we will be addressing these issues in the context of Europe. We will look broadly at the issue of multiculturalism and try to situate it within Europe. We will also look at one of the most pressing concerns of European multiculturalism. This is the question of Muslim immigrants in predominantly Christian Europe.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the concept of multiculturalism
- demonstrate the role of religion in notions of multiculturalism in Europe.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 An Overview of Multiculturalism

In the contemporary debate, both proponents and opponents of multiculturalism tend to ignore the tension between multiculturalism the ideology and the multicultural reality of different societies. This reality presents serious challenges to a society's political, economic and educational institutions, as distinct groups lay claim to collective resources. Differences in social and economic position among these groups, moreover, are a recipe for resentment and conflict.

Perhaps surprisingly, however, the main opponents of the West are Westerners themselves, who attack rationalism, science, and legitimate authority. But at its core, true multiculturalism relies on loyalty to a particular group and insistence on its unique value. By nature, such groups place the authority of the collective ahead of the claims of the individual. How does group loyalty fit with the Western opponents' hostility to authority? It can't, of course. Multiculturalism is not really multicultural, and in fact owes more to Western individualism than to non-Western traditional cultures. Multiculturalists, ignoring facts about cultures in which they claim membership, cannot conceive of a culture that does not celebrate the rights of the imperial individual, yet they attack individualism.

The United States ranks as the primary example of a democratic multicultural society, and it has owed its success to distinctly Western values and institutions—including individualism. And yet the attempt to level all distinctions of talent, endowment, and culture raises the alarming prospect of tyranny; one need only consider the history of socialism in this century. A solution may lie in respecting other cultures while retaining loyalty to one's own. That, in turn, requires a better understanding of history.

Cultural imperialism and multiculturalism were therefore two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, a Stoic guru went to Egypt to instruct the Egyptians about wisdom and boldly declared that, "to a wise man, everything is Greece." On the other hand, the same period was characterised by an increasingly anxious search for personal salvation, to be found in putatively exotic lore or alien wisdom. But this wisdom was not really alien. Since the Greeks did not learn other languages, they found not the reality of other cultures but a projection of their own aspirations. The search for salvation culminated in Christianity, which brought true multiculturalism to Greece. Although it spoke the language of Greek philosophy and Roman morality, it introduced elements that really were deeply alien to Greek civilisation: the Judaic focus on the power and justice of God and a unique promise of individual salvation. All cultures have displayed deep ambivalence toward strangers, who pose a challenge to the fixed system of ritual, folkways, and traditions. Whether these strangers are ultimately treated with hostility or

admiration depends heavily on the vitality of the “receiving” culture. When a culture loses its inner security, strangers appear more threatening. Members of a culture may react by thinking, “That stranger knows something I don’t, so I have to change,” or, “He is corrupt and will seduce us. We need to emphasise differences.” But change is inescapable, since even the act of resisting change causes change, and intercultural contact is its principal source. The perceived discrepancy between oneself and outsiders provokes innovation.

This overview can be concluded with some remarks on the merits and perils of teaching multiculturalism in the classroom. We can begin by recalling that contrary to current myth, Western civilisation has been uniquely interested in other cultures throughout history. Medieval Europeans were fascinated by their Islamic opponents. Renaissance Europe explored the globe. The enlightenment invented world history and cultural anthropology. And 19th century scholars established the disciplines of comparative religion, orientalism, and linguistics. And in the 20th century, especially after 1945, William H. McNeill led a campaign to replace surveys in Western civilization with world history. But no sooner did he begin to make headway than the whole field was captured by radical multiculturalists with an agenda at least as ideological as the “Eurocentric” one they sought to dislodge. Thus, the multicultural critics charge that Europeans (and Americans) have always measured other cultures by their own standards, imagined that all other civilisations would follow the Western path to modernity, and studied the world only to subdue, exploit, and make it over in their own image.

Rather than true multicultural teaching, therefore, our schools often promote curricula that disparage the history of the West as racist, sexist, imperialist, while depicting all other cultures as innocent and victimised. There is a need for students to learn about other cultures, but honesty and an end to all double standards is important to this process. For the only way to sustain a multicultural society such as the United States and, to a lesser extent Europe, is to value the contributions of all heritages and the elements of common humanity they share.

SELF -ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What are the chief notions of multiculturalism?

3.2 Immigration and Multiculturalism

The presence of more and more significant percentages of immigrants in the European social landscape it is not only a quantitative fact, with several consequences on many social and cultural dynamics. Different

quantitative levels of so many indicators do not only produce a quantitative change. All together, they produce and create new problematics, new processes of interrelation, etc. In a word, they produce a qualitative change. Nothing less than a different type of society: quite different from the one imagined with the rise of the Nation State, and its founding principles. Among the other changes, one of the more visible and visibilised is the so called 'return' of cultures – and particularly religions (which are profoundly embedded in cultures, and vice versa; not by chance, even if we tend to forget it, cult and culture share the same ethimology) – in the European public space.

Indeed, the presence of immigrants of different cultural and religious background is one of the 'engines', so to speak, that pushes the society into a change that is much 'larger' than their presence: in fact, it has important if not decisive effects also for the host society (an expression that should be used with some irony: this connotation is becoming less credible now than in the past).

The immigrants do not arrive naked, so to speak: they bring with themselves, in their suitcases, among other things, also visions of the world, traditions, histories, faiths, practices, values, moral systems, images and symbols. And they turn to them as indispensable identity references (We prefer this more neutral word, instead of identity systems, for reasons that will be more clear in the following pages: in particular because identities, form the subjective point of view, are all but systems – a word that have a too 'coherent' connotation). More than this, they often turn to these references – or, better, use them – not only individually, but also collectively and as communities.

In Europe the introduction of the use of the term "multiculturalism" marked the passage from an immigration perceived only as economic and temporary to a permanent presence of populations. In several countries, it still appears as a fact that multiculturalism is giving a new form (trans-forming) to the public spheres and civil societies of the new Europe. However, discussion is sporadically starting on the side from which it should be approached. In the United Kingdom for instance, for a long period, the emphasis has often be put on race, on the use of categories such as black, and white for the autochthones. Also "general" ethnic categories have been raised, such as Asians – categories that, precisely, underestimate the cultural factor and ignore the religious one, as well as overestimating the importance of others. These categories have not a sufficient heuristic validity in interpreting phenomena of incomprehension or even of inter-comprehension, which have precisely a cultural character.

It appears politically significant to approach the spectacular reversal of positions on the Netherlands, which has gone from an advanced multiculturalism, precisely on the sense of encouraging “policies of recognition”, to policies that would seem more markedly assimilationist, in the form of a liberalism aiming essentially at the individual: where equality before the law is accompanied by active policies not so much of cultural valorisation but of the promotion of equal chances for the individual. Thus the traditional system of “pillars” is abandoned, apparently without excessive regret, and which had been under discussion for over a decade and which would have lost any meaning following the secularisation and individualisation that went with it, in favour of initiatives targeted only at single disadvantaged individuals, but understood precisely as such and not as a category (neither religious nor ethnic, nor the more general one of immigrants, is maintained as such). It is worthwhile underlining however, the active and almost voluntaristic role of politics of this approach which is not limited to leaving the field to the free and autonomous forces of the market: evidence of this is the Law on the civic integration of new arrivals (*Wet inburgering nieuwkomers*), passed in 1998, which includes the allocation of Euro 100 million only for the training of recent immigrants (Entzinger, 2000). And, in principle, one could add that this is not only a need for the newcomers: the so-called autochthonous populations share the same problematic, which has serious implications on many levels, from the meaning of political participation and democracy, to the idea of commitment to certain unifying values, etc.

It is no coincidence that the debate on the communities, on their existence and persistence and on their bond with identities – including religious – once again becomes topical. Taylor (1992) put forward the well-known theory that our identity “is moulded, in part by the recognition or non-recognition or, often, by a misunderstanding by others”, opening the multicultural debate with his book, or at least making a significant contribution to its diffusion. Kymlicka (1995) articulated his thought underlining that the subject is not capable of exercising his own individual freedom anywhere except in a context that makes personal choice possible and gives it meaning, with the invitation to respect the rights of minorities to widen the sphere of individual rights.

The passage from the term of minorities to that of community is frequent and imperceptible: in the common debate they are very often equivalent. A further difficulty comes from the fact that the term community tends to be polysemic and lend itself to each interpretation; above all, its use is very different in the “high” academic-scientific register and in the “low” register of common speech but also of policies: as a scientific concept, community has no value; as a tool for the

creation of the social imagination, it occupies a fundamental place and is destined to last.

The language of the social actors is even more explicit, strongly insisting on the concept of community. The Muslim community (-ies) for instance, are among those who frequently utilise this vocabulary. But this “communitarian temptation” is present everywhere, in the majority religions as well as in the historical minorities: Jewish representatives have also willingly talked of “community of communities”, for instance. Some important Muslim exponents theorise that integration can work better if it comes through the community and not individuals.

Even if, perhaps, aware of the mistrust that weighs on the idea of community, some European Muslim intellectuals propose a version that is conceptually on the defensive, talking of “community against communitarianism” (Ramadan, 1999). Moreover, the term has often been used, with a certain unawareness, which betrays deep-rooted processes of thought, by the language of the media and of social and political operators. The discourse on the community, both by the civil authorities and by minority groups has become a notion “as vague as it is comfortable” which both invoke without defining, as has been noted: a fundamental resource of ethnic (but also religious) mobilisation which has led to the emerging ‘politics of religion and community’ (Vertovec and Peach, 1997).

It should be noted that this attempt of “community objectification” takes place in a space which is in its turn being de-communitised. I am referring to the European space itself which, starting off from a self-definition in terms of “common market” , then reached the stage of calling itself “European economic (only) community”, is today self-classified as the “European Union”: a less committed term and also emotionally less inclusive. The term “union” in fact, unlike “community”, does not evoke a shared culture (Abélès, 1998). A reflection of community self-organisation however seems indispensable for an understanding of the processes of insertion and integration.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Multiculturalism will remain a major issue for Europe in the foreseeable future. For one, the economy of Europe cannot afford to shut out many highly talented immigrants who arrive every year. These people, irrespective of their colour, religious creed or political persuasion can contribute immensely to the development process in the continent. However, it must be acknowledged that issues like terrorism have made immigration and multiculturalism a lot more complex. It has elevated

immigration to a national security issue which deepens resentment of foreigners and challenges Europe's reputation as tolerant and liberal.

13.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we discussed multiculturalism and immigration in general. We discovered that multiculturalism emerged when it became apparent that the permanent presence of large populations of immigrants, both legal and illegal, is inevitable and even necessary for continued growth in Europe. We also addressed the special situation of Muslim immigration into Europe and its implications for the multicultural character of the continent.

14.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Discuss multiculturalism as a concept.
- ii. What is the implication of terrorism on the integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe?

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UNIT 3 EU EXPANSION

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 EU Institutional Perception of Expansion
 - 3.2 Key Challenges of EU Expansion
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The EU has grown from a community of six to 27. In the process, its economy has grown to nearly rival the US and its global political and diplomatic clout has grown tremendously too. There are however still major problems associated with what is considered the most successful regional experiment in history. The recent and ongoing Eurozone debt crisis and economic recession, among other things, raises questions as to the continued validity of many of the assumptions that underpin the EU. The challenge to EU expansion by Russia and the difficult question of Turkey also raises serious concerns about the future of the EU.

This unit addresses these and related questions. It examines the institutional dynamics of EU expansion and comprehensively analyses the many challenges it faces.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe and analyse the motivations behind EU expansion
- explain the institutional factors surrounding EU expansion and the challenges that it faces.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 EU Institutional Perception of Expansion

The fifth enlargement of the EU has helped to consolidate democracy and the rule of law in Europe. It has enhanced economic opportunities and increased the weight of the EU in tackling global challenges such as climate change, competitiveness and the regulation and supervision of financial markets. Over the last five years, the enlarged EU has demonstrated its capacity to work together to address the important

challenges it faces. Enlargement is one of the most effective foreign policy instruments of the EU.

The European Union's current enlargement process takes place against the background of a deep and widespread recession. The crisis has affected both the EU and the enlargement countries. Over the same period, the EU received three new applications for membership by Montenegro (December 2008), Albania (April 2009) and Iceland (July 2009). These applications further demonstrate the EU's power of attraction and its role in promoting stability, security and prosperity.

Progress with reforms in the enlargement countries has allowed them to move through successive stages in the accession process. Accession negotiations with Croatia are nearing the final phase. Accession negotiations with Turkey have reached a more demanding stage requiring a new impetus for reform. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has made significant progress in meeting key challenges. The Commission is preparing an opinion on the application for membership from Montenegro. It is also preparing an opinion on the application of Iceland. It stands ready to prepare an opinion on the application from Albania, once invited to do so by council. For all the Western Balkans countries concerned, further progress could result in the countries being granted candidate status when they have demonstrated their readiness.

The countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey have still, to different degrees, substantial work ahead in meeting the established criteria and conditions. The pace of reform is often slow. The international economic crisis adds to the strains. In several cases, bilateral questions unduly affect the accession process. In the light of these challenges, the renewed consensus on enlargement, as agreed by the December 2006 European Council, continues to provide the way forward. This policy is based on the principles of consolidation of commitments, fair and rigorous conditionality and good communication with the public, combined with the EU's capacity to integrate new members.

The EU has improved the quality of the enlargement process. In particular, greater focus is now given at an early stage to the rule of law and good governance. The accession process provides strong encouragement for political and economic reform. It is in the EU's strategic interest to keep up the momentum of this process, on the basis of agreed principles and conditions.

The EU's enlargement policy allows for a carefully managed process where candidates and potential candidates approach the EU in line with the pace of their political and economic reforms as well as their capacity to assume the obligations of membership in accordance with the

Copenhagen criteria. In the Western Balkans, regional cooperation remains key and constitutes a central element of the stabilisation and association process. The Treaty of Lisbon reforms the enlarged union's institutions to enable it to adapt its policies to a fast-moving world. In particular in relation to enlargement, the treaty will ensure an institutional framework that should allow a smooth adaptation of the union's institutions once a new member state joins the EU, and will amend the accession procedure; hereby the European parliament and national parliaments will be notified of applications for membership.

The establishment of a visa-free regime for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia at the beginning of 2010, based on the commission's proposal, demonstrates that reforms bring tangible benefits for citizens. The commission also tabled similar proposals for Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina in mid-2010, the countries having met the conditions set.

As regards the Cyprus issue, the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities are entering a decisive phase of negotiations on a comprehensive settlement under the auspices of the United Nations. The Commission supports their efforts and provides technical advice on issues within EU competence. This unit sets out the progress made and the key challenges faced by the countries engaged in the enlargement process. It outlines the European Commission's approach to guiding and supporting their efforts.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How has EU expansion promoted the rule of law?

3.2 Key Challenges of EU Expansion

This unit addresses key issues that currently affect the enlargement process of the EU. The EU, through its enlargement policy, is making strenuous efforts to tackle these challenges but the prime responsibility remains with the countries concerned.

The first key challenge relates to deepening and spreading economic crisis in the euro-zone. The global recession has affected, to different degrees, the economies of the Western Balkans and Turkey. The EU is assisting the enlargement countries to alleviate the impact of the crisis and pave the way for sound recovery, in coordination with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Economic activity in the Western Balkans and Turkey has contracted sharply since the second half of 2008, following reduced demand for their exports, less foreign direct investment and lower cross-border lending. Fiscal positions deteriorated in all economies. Unemployment, already high in several

countries, started to rise further. The economic downturn in the Western Balkans and Turkey in 2009 is of the same magnitude as the EU average, but less severe than in the EU member states that were most affected. However, in all countries the macroeconomic situation remains fragile.

Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina obtained IMF support, as in both countries external imbalances widened and public finances were particularly affected, due to previous expansionary policies. The unfolding of the crisis in the enlargement countries, particularly its impact on the real economy, including on the employment and social situation, is continuing. Recovery will take time, as economic activity in the main trading partners is projected to pick up only slowly. Capital inflows to stimulate domestic demand are likely to remain subdued. Short-term measures have been taken to mitigate the social impact of the crisis for the most vulnerable parts of society. In the medium term, ensuring a sound fiscal policy is of great importance, with emphasis on more efficient and effective public spending and on investment.

Employment policies and social protection measures are needed to address structural unemployment and protect vulnerable groups. The response to the crisis needs to take into account the need for sustainable development and the challenge posed by climate change and give priority to measures leading to a safe and sustainable low-carbon economy. EU related reforms contribute to enhanced competitiveness and openness and to a legal framework conducive to trade and investment. Measures to consolidate the rule of law, including the fight against corruption, are essential for improving the business climate.

Regarding the EU's support, pre-accession assistance has been programmed to support the banking sector, infrastructure projects, SMEs and job creation, including in rural areas. €200 million in grants from the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) have been allocated for this purpose, which will leverage investments for at least €1 billion, co-financed by IFI loans. The commission has proposed that the co-financing requirement for beneficiary countries in IPA assistance be reduced. The commission provided direct budget support through IPA to Serbia to mitigate the effects of the financial and economic crisis. In addition, the commission proposed to the council to approve a macro-financial assistance in the form of a €200 million loan to Serbia. These possibilities are open to the other countries, if needed.

In both cases the financial assistance is conditional, including upon an agreement with the IMF on sound macroeconomic policies. The commission works closely with the IFIs, which have committed

themselves to increase their lending to the Western Balkans and Turkey to more than €5 billion in 2009.

The rule of law is also a major challenge in some countries wanting to join the EU. The Western Balkans and Turkey continue to face major challenges related to the rule of law, in particular the fight against corruption and organised crime. These issues are key for a functioning democracy and economy and largely condition the EU accession process. They also affect, sometimes in a disproportionate way, public perceptions of enlargement in the EU. Substantial efforts are being made in the enlargement countries to address the problems.

The EU continues to use the full potential of the enlargement process to support this work and monitor closely the results. Corruption is prevalent in many areas and affects the every-day life of citizens and the business environment. Areas which require particular attention include public procurement and privatisation, the judiciary, the financing of political parties and transparency in public administration and government. An independent and impartial judiciary and prosecutors specialised in the fight against corruption and related crimes are essential, as are a depoliticised and professional police and administration. Well drafted legislation and effective implementation are needed in areas such as public procurement, intellectual property rights, financial control, audit, and the fight against fraud.

Additional efforts are needed to fight against organised crime which remains a problem throughout the region. Law enforcement agencies will have to become more effective and to work together in order to overcome international criminal organisations. In line with the renewed consensus on enlargement and taking into account experience from the fifth enlargement, the rule of law is a key priority which needs to be addressed by the countries concerned at an early stage of the accession process. With EU assistance, some progress has been made in putting into place effective legislation and structures to fight corruption and organised crime but rigorous implementation and enforcement of laws are necessary to achieve tangible results. Some €80 million of IPA assistance in 2009 have been allocated for strengthening the judiciary and law enforcement. The commission has conducted peer assessment missions with member state experts on the judiciary, the fight against corruption and organised crime in candidate countries and will intensify such missions. The use of benchmarks in the accession negotiations and the visa liberalisation dialogue has provided incentives for reform.

The commission has continued its support for regional judicial, police and prosecutor cooperation in the fight against organised crime and corruption. The Western Balkan countries need to enhance judicial cooperation within the region to ensure an efficient functioning of their justice systems. In this regard, addressing the problem of impunity for

war crimes and other serious crimes is of particular importance. To this end, the countries should review the existing restrictions in their legal frameworks for extraditions of own nationals and transfer of proceedings.

The commission will continue to support partner countries in the fight against corruption and organised crime. However, effective and sustainable results can only be achieved with the necessary political will and real commitment by the authorities in the countries concerned. The commission will rigorously monitor the progress achieved on the ground, focusing on results.

In most enlargement countries, freedom of expression also remains an issue of concern. In general, while the main elements of the legal framework for protecting freedom of expression and the media are in place, undue political pressure on media and the rising number of threats and physical attacks against journalists as well as some remaining legal obstacles give rise to serious concern. These issues need to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

Bilateral questions, including border issues, are also increasingly affecting the enlargement process. Bilateral issues should be resolved by the parties concerned and should not hold up the accession process. Between 2009 and 2010, for instance, the border issue between Slovenia and Croatia held back the accession negotiations with Croatia. The negotiating frameworks with Croatia and Turkey, agreed by all member states, stipulate that the EU expects candidate countries to resolve any border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, including if necessary jurisdiction of the international court of justice. Finding mutually acceptable solutions, and concluding agreements, on outstanding issues with neighbouring countries is also part of the stabilisation and association process.

The EU commission expects all parties concerned to make every effort towards solving outstanding bilateral issues with their neighbours along these lines. Where appropriate, the commission appears ready to facilitate the search for solutions, at the request of the parties concerned. The agreement in principle between Croatia and Montenegro to settle border demarcation at Prevlaka through the international court of justice is encouraging with respect to the possibility of resolving issues in the nearest future. All parties involved in such bilateral disputes have the responsibility to find solutions in a spirit of good neighbourliness and bearing in mind the overall EU interests. This will reinforce the effectiveness of the renewed consensus on enlargement which confirms

that the pace of a country's progress towards the EU is determined by the pace of its reforms.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How do border disputes impact on EU ascension talks?

4.0 CONCLUSION

The above suggests that even though there is much reason for optimism with regard to the EU's future, there are many unanswered questions. It is also evident however that the organisation is deliberate, methodical and effective in the way it addresses these questions. It is also quite clear that EU expansion is being driven by a very strong institutional framework that has developed the ability to smoothen the rough edges that will inevitably emerge in a project as large and complex as this.

13.0 SUMMARY

In addressing the above, we looked at specific institutional initiatives like the ENPI, the ECAA etc and demonstrated their overall collective relevance to EU integration and expansion. We also dwelt on the many challenges the EU faces in its expansion project. Some of these include border disputes between candidate states and the human rights record of states like Turkey.

14.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. It is often argued that EU expansion strengthens the organisation's weight in tackling global issues. Discuss.
- ii. What challenges currently face the EU at its present stage of expansion?

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UNIT 4 EUROPE AND THE RISE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTALISM

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 An Overview of Global Environmental Concerns
 - 3.2 European Environmental Challenges in a Global Context
 - 3.3 Cultural Diversity and Migration in Europe
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The global environmental problem has been a major preoccupation of the EU and many of its countries individually. This concern for the implications of rapid man induced changes to the global ecosystems and biodiversity is not unconnected to prevailing notions of global interconnectivity that has elevated the environment into a global concern.

In this unit, we will discuss the broad contours of Europe's engagement with global environmentalism and how it has become a leader in the movement to institute greener growth and industrialisation.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the nature, evolution and implications of global environmentalism
- explain the role of Europe.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 An Overview of Global Environmental Concerns

The variety of life on Earth, its biological diversity, is commonly referred to as biodiversity. The number of species of plants, animals, and microorganisms, the enormous diversity of genes in these species, the different ecosystems on the planet, such as deserts, rainforests and coral reefs are all part of a biologically diverse Earth. Appropriate conservation and sustainable development strategies attempt to recognise this as being integral to any approach. In some way or form, almost all cultures have recognised the importance of nature and its biological diversity for their societies and have therefore understood the need to maintain it. Yet, power, greed and politics have.

It has long been feared that human activity is causing massive extinctions. Despite increased efforts at conservation, it has not been enough and biodiversity losses continue. The costs associated with deteriorating or vanishing ecosystems will be high. However, sustainable development and consumption would help avert ecological problems. Preserving species and their habitats is important for ecosystems to self-sustain themselves. Yet, the pressures to destroy habitat for logging, illegal hunting, and other challenges are making conservation a struggle.

Another important environmental issue is climate change. Except on the fringes of academic and political discourses where there is still widespread disagreement, there is a general consensus that the climate is changing. The earth is warming up, and there is now overwhelming scientific consensus that it is happening, and human-induced. With global warming on the increase and species and their habitats on the decrease, chances for ecosystems to adapt naturally are diminishing. Many are agreed that climate change may be one of the greatest threats facing the planet in recent years. It is shown in increasing temperatures in various regions, and/or increasing extremities in weather patterns.

Research has shown that air pollutants from fossil fuel use make clouds reflect more of the sun's rays back into space. This leads to an effect known as global dimming whereby less heat and energy reaches the earth. At first, it sounds like an ironic savior to climate change problems. However, it is believed that global dimming caused the droughts in Ethiopia in the 1970s and 80s where millions died, because the northern hemisphere oceans were not warm enough to allow rain formation. Global dimming is also hiding the true power of global warming. By cleaning up global dimming-causing pollutants without tackling greenhouse gas emissions, rapid warming has been observed, and various human health and ecological disasters have resulted, as witnessed during the European heat wave in 2003, which saw thousands of people die.

The world mostly agrees that something needs to be done about global warming and climate change. The first stumbling block, however, has been trying to get an agreement on a framework. In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) to assess the scientific knowledge on global warming. The IPCC concluded in 1990 that there was broad international consensus that climate change was human-induced. That report led way to an international convention for climate change, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), signed by over 150 countries at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.

The United States plus a few other countries, and many large corporations, have been against climate change treaties due to the fear of the threat to their economy and profits if they have to make substantial changes. However, as more climate change science has emerged over the years, many businesses are accepting this and even asking their governments for more action so that there is quick clarification on the new rules of the game so they can get on with their businesses.

For many years, large, influential businesses and governments have been against the idea of global warming. Many have poured a lot of resources into discrediting what has generally been accepted for a long time as real. Now, the mainstream is generally worried about climate change impacts and the discourse seems to have shifted accordingly. Some businesses that once engaged in disinformation campaigns have even changed their opinions, some even requesting governments for regulation and direction on this issue. However, a few influential companies and organisations are still attempting to undermine climate change action and concerns. Will all this mean a different type of spin and propaganda with attempts at green washing and misleading information becoming the norm, or will there now be major shift in attitudes to see concrete solutions being proposed and implemented?

For a number of years, there have been concerns that climate change negotiations will essentially ignore a key principle of climate change negotiation frameworks: the common but differentiated responsibilities.

This recognises that historically:

- Industrialised nations have emitted far more greenhouse gas emissions (even if some developing nations are only now increasing theirs).

Rich countries therefore face the biggest responsibility and burden for action to address climate change.

Rich countries therefore must support developing nations adapt—through financing and technology transfer, for example.

This notion of climate justice is typically ignored by many rich nations and their mainstream media, making it easy to blame China, India and other developing countries for failures in climate change mitigation negotiations. Development expert, Martin Khor, calculated that taking historical emissions into account, the rich countries owe a carbon debt because they have already used more than their fair quota of emissions.

There have been attempts to address these problems. For instance, flexibility mechanisms were defined in the Kyoto protocol as different ways to achieve emissions reduction as part of the effort to address climate change issues. These falls into the following categories: emissions trading, joint implementation and clean development mechanism. However, these have been highly controversial as they were mainly included on strong US insistence and to keep the US in the treaty (even though the US eventually pulled out). Some of the mechanisms face criticism for not actually leading to a reduction in emissions, for example.

One of the efforts at tackling the climate change crisis was the Climate Change Conference (also known as COP 16), held in Cancún, Mexico in the December 2010. This conference came a year after the Copenhagen conference which promised so much but offered so little. It also came in the wake of WikiLeaks' revelations of how the US in particular tried to cajole various countries to support an accord that served US interests rather than the world's. What resulted was an agreement that seems much watered down, even an almost reversal, from original aims and spirit of climate change mitigation. In effect, the main polluters (the industrialised nations) who should have borne the brunt of any emission reduction targets, have managed to reduce their commitments while increasing those of the developing countries; a great global warming swindle if any!

The earlier Climate Change Conference (also known as COP 15), held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in the middle of December, 2009 was even worse. There was a lot of hope and optimism before this conference that a meaningful climate negotiation could be agreed to, as climate change concerns are increasing rapidly. Instead, a mixture of posturing from nations such as China and the US, and the inability for nations to agree on numerous issues led to a meeting failure. But amongst the various

reasons for failure are concerns that repeatedly show themselves every year at these climate conferences. There have been similar conferences in Poznan (2008), Bali (2007) and Montreal (2006). These conferences, as well as others in places like Buenos Aires have served little more than the purpose of creating awareness for the environmental challenges the world faces.

Energy security is a growing concern for rich and emerging nations alike. The past drive for fossil fuel energy has led to wars, overthrow of democratically elected leaders, and puppet governments and dictatorships. Leading nations admit we are addicted to oil, but investment into alternatives has been lacking, or little in comparison to fossil fuel investments. As the global financial crisis takes hold and awareness of climate change increases, more nations and companies are trying to invest in alternatives.

Another problem is population growth. The human population of the planet is estimated to now have passed 6 billion people. But are large numbers themselves a problem? Europe for example, has higher population densities than Asia. There are more than two sides to the debate on whether population numbers equate to over-population or not. Does population affect and put stress on the environment, society and resources? Existing consumption patterns as seen in Europe and North America can put strain on the environment and natural resources. But how much of the environmental degradation we see today is as a result of over-population and how much is due to over-exploitation due to consumerism and geopolitical interests? Especially when considering that "globally, the 20% of the world's people in the highest-income countries account for 86% of total private consumption expenditures - the poorest 20% a minuscule 1.3%", according to the United Nations development programme's 1998 human development report.

How do human rights, conflict, trade/development patterns, and the environment come into all this? Poverty is the number one health problem, in developing and developed nations alike. Structural adjustment policies, for example, from the IMF have not helped in many situations as social expenditure has had to be cut back. This has led to less investment in health, education and other basic services (things that have led to a better quality of life in Europe after the Second World War). Coupled with corrupt rulers and dictators, often backed by the powerful nations, due to national geopolitical interests, a large number of people have suffered.

The state of the World, 1999 report from the Worldwatch Institute suggests that the global economy could be seriously affected by environmental problems, such as the lack of access to enough resources to meet growing population demands. Environmental degradation can

contribute to social and political instability, which can lead to security issues. This has not currently been addressed by the foreign policy of many nations. Already around the world we are seeing an increase in violence and human rights abuses as disputes about territories, food and water are spilling into wars and internal conflicts.

By ensuring women's rights can be upheld, and realising that women play a crucial role in the development of society, many underlying issues which lead to conflict and problems can be tackled more effectively. Better care, education and rights for women mean that children should also benefit. This can eventually allow a society to enjoy more rights and the society can be enriched. Yet these very same provisions are being cut back, oftentimes as a result of harsh structural adjustment policies imposed by the IMF.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

What is the linkage between environmental issues and economic development?

3.2 European Environmental Challenges in a Global Context

There is a two-way relationship between Europe and the rest of the world. Europe is contributing to environmental pressures and accelerating feedbacks in other parts of the world through its dependence on fossil fuels, mining products and other imports. Conversely, in a highly interdependent world, changes in other parts of the world are increasingly felt closer to home; both directly through the impacts of global environmental changes, or indirectly through intensified socio-economic pressures.

Climate change is an obvious example. Most of the growth in global greenhouse gas emissions is projected to occur outside Europe, as a result of increasing wealth in populous emerging economies. In spite of successful efforts to reduce emissions and a decreasing share in the global total, European societies continue to be major emitters of greenhouse gases.

Many of the countries that are most vulnerable to climate change are outside the European continent, others are our direct neighbours. Often these countries are highly dependent on climate-sensitive sectors such as farming and fishing. Their adaptive capacity varies, but is often rather low, in particular due to persistent poverty. The links between climate change, poverty and political and security risks and their relevance for Europe have been extensively analysed.

Loss of biodiversity in other regions of the world affects European interests in several ways. It is the world's poor that bear the brunt of biodiversity loss, as they are usually most directly reliant on functioning ecosystem services. Increases in poverty and inequality are likely to further fuel conflict and instability in regions that are already characterised by often fragile governance structures. Moreover, reduced genetic variety in crops and cultivars implies future losses of economic and social benefits for Europe in such critical areas as food production and modern healthcare.

Global extraction of natural resources from ecosystems and mines grew more or less steadily over the past 25 years, from 40 billion tonnes in 1980 to 58 billion tonnes in 2005. Resource extraction is unevenly distributed across the world, with Asia accounting for the largest share in 2005 (48% of total tonnage, compared with Europe's 13%). Over this period, a relative decoupling of global resource extraction and economic growth took place: resource extraction increased by roughly 50% and world economic output (GDP) by about 110%.

Nonetheless, resource use and extraction is still increasing in absolute terms, outweighing gains in resource efficiency. Such a composite indicator does not, however, reveal information on specific resource developments. Global food, energy and water systems appear to be more vulnerable and fragile than thought a few years ago, the factors responsible being increased demand, decreased supply, and supply instabilities. Over-exploitation, degradation and loss of soils are relevant concerns in this regard. With global competition and increased geographic and corporate concentration of supplies for some resources, Europe faces increasing supply risks.

In spite of general progress in the area of environment and health in Europe, the global human toll of environmental health impacts remains deeply worrying. Unsafe water, poor sanitation and hygiene conditions, urban outdoor air pollution, indoor smoke from solid fuels and lead exposure and global climate change account for nearly a tenth of deaths and disease burden globally, and around one quarter of deaths and disease burden in children under five years of age. It is again poor populations in low latitudes that are affected most heavily.

Many low- and middle-income countries now face a growing burden from new risks to health, while still fighting an unfinished battle with the traditional risks to health. The World Health Organisation (WHO) forecasts that between 2006 and 2015, deaths from non-communicable diseases could increase worldwide by 17%. The greatest increase is projected for the African region (24%) followed by the eastern Mediterranean region (23%). Europe is likely to be faced with the

increased problem of emerging or re-emerging infectious diseases that are critically influenced by changes in temperature or precipitation, habitat loss and ecological destruction. In an increasingly urbanised world, which is tightly linked by long-distance transport, the incidence and distribution of infectious diseases affecting humans is likely to increase.

Europe's direct neighbourhood — the Arctic, the Mediterranean and the eastern neighbours — is worth particular attention here due to the strong socio-economic and environmental links and the importance of these regions in EU external policy. Furthermore, some of the world's largest reservoirs of natural resources are in these regions, which is of immediate relevance to a resource-scarce Europe.

These regions are also home to some of the world's richest and yet most fragile natural environments which are facing multiple threats. At the same time, concerns remain related to many transboundary issues like water management and air pollution deposition shared between Europe and its neighbours. Some of the main environmental challenges in these regions include:

- While Europe is contributing directly and indirectly to some of the environmental pressures in these regions, it is also in a unique position to cooperate to improve their environmental conditions, particularly through fostering technology transfer and helping to build institutional capacity. These dimensions are increasingly reflected in European neighbourhood policy priorities.
- A range of unfolding trends are shaping the future European and global context, and many of these are outside the realm of Europe's direct influence. Related global megatrends cut across social, technological, economic, political and even environment dimensions. Key developments include changing demographic patterns or accelerating rates of urbanisation, ever faster technological changes, deepening market integration, evolving economic power shifts or the changing climate.

In 1960, the world's population was three billion. Today, it is about 6.8 billion. The United Nations Population Division expects this growth to continue and that the global population will exceed nine billion by 2050, according to the 'medium growth variant' of their population estimate. However, uncertainties are apparent, and forecasts depend on several assumptions, including for fertility rates. As such, by 2050, the world population could thus exceed 11 billion or be limited to eight billion. The implications of this uncertainty for global resource demands are huge.

In contrast to the global trend, European populations are expected to decline and age significantly. In its neighbourhood, population decline is particularly dramatic in Russia and large parts of Europe. At the same time, northern African countries along the southern Mediterranean are witnessing strong population growth. In general, the wider region of Northern Africa and the Middle East has experienced the highest rate of population growth of any region in the world over the past century.

The regional distribution of population growth, the age structure, and migration between regions are also important. Ninety percent of the population growth since 1960 has been in countries classified as 'less developed' by the United Nations. Meanwhile, the world is urbanising at an unprecedented rate. By 2050, about 70% of the global population is likely to live in cities, compared with less than 30% in 1950. Population growth is now largely an urban phenomenon concentrated in the developing world, particular Asia, which is estimated to be home to more than 50% of the global urban population by 2050.

Furthermore, the speed and scope of scientific and technological progress influences key socio-economic trends and drivers. Eco-innovation and eco-friendly technologies are of key relevance in this regard; European companies are already relatively well-positioned in global markets. Supporting policies are relevant both in terms of facilitating market entry of new eco-innovations and technologies as well as increasing global demand.

In the longer-term perspective, developments and technology convergence in nanoscience and nanotechnologies, biotechnologies and life-sciences, information and communication technologies, cognitive sciences and neuro-technologies are expected to have profound effects on economies, societies and the environment. They are likely to open up completely new options for mitigating and remedying environmental problems including, for example, new pollution sensors, new types of batteries and other technologies for energy storage, and lighter and more durable materials for cars, buildings or aircrafts.

However, these technologies also give rise to concerns about detrimental effects on the environment, given the scale and level of complexity of their interactions. The existence of unknown, even unknowable, impacts poses a great challenge to risk governance. Rebound effects might also jeopardise environmental and resource-efficiency achievements.

Since many of the global drivers of change operate beyond Europe's direct influence, Europe's vulnerability to external change could increase markedly, particularly accentuated by developments in its direct neighbourhood. Being a resource-scarce continent and neighbour to

some of the world's regions most prone to global environmental change, active engagement and cooperation with these regions can help address the range of problems that Europe is facing.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How have European states reacted to environmental problems?

4.0 CONCLUSION

The EU has provided important encouragement of the green movement. While the US and China have often been clogs in the wheel of progress towards a binding international agreement on climate issues, the EU has mostly canvassed for string international action. This environmental activism has, once again, brought up images of a continent that is the centre of human civilisation.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the implications of the changes going on in the environment for Europe. We have also noted the interconnected nature of environmental issues and how the EU's institutions have adapted to an increasingly complex environmental movement. We also looked at specific programmes like the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and tried to identify its overall impact on Europe's environmental agenda.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- i. Discuss Energy security as an environmental concern.
- ii. What impact does globalisation have on environmental issues in Europe?

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