



NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE CODE: INR 321

COURSE TITLE: Foreign Policy Analysis

National Open University of Nigeria
Headquarters
14/16 Ahmadu Bello Way
Victoria Island
Lagos

Abuja Annex
245 Mimiuel Adesujo Ademulegun Street
Central Business District
Opposite Arewa Suites
Abuja

e-mail: centralinfo@nou.edu.ng
URL: www.nou.edu.ng

National Open University of Nigeria

First Printed

ISBN:

All Rights Reserved

Printed by
For
National Open University of Nigeria

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Module 1

Understanding Foreign Policy

Unit 1	The nature of foreign policy
Unit 2	Foreign policy and national interest
Unit 3	National interest versus other interests
Unit 4	Globalisation: a new foreign policy approach

Module 2

Foreign policy analysis

Unit 1	Approaches to foreign policy analysis
Unit 2	Levels of analysis
Unit 3	Foreign policy environment
Unit 4	Problems of foreign policy analysis

Module 3

Foreign policy decision making

Unit 1	The Unitary Actor and Rational Decision Making
Unit 2	The bureaucratic politics of foreign policy decision Making
Unit 3	The Role of Leaders in Foreign Policy Decision Making
Unit 4	Constraints on Foreign Policy Making

Module 4

Means or capability factors and their impact on policy decisions

Unit 1	Structural Characteristics
Unit 2	Type of Government
Unit 3	Military Capabilities and Economic Development
Unit 4	Geographic Influences (Geopolitics)

Module 5

Foreign policies case studies

Unit 1	Phases of Foreign Policy of the United States
Unit 2	Phases of Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union
Unit 3	The Cuban Missile Crisis
Unit 4	American involvement in Vietnam Politics

UNIT 1: THE NATURE OF FOREIGN POLICY

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 What is Foreign Policy?
 - 3.2 What is Foreign Policy Making?
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References/Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

The actions of a state in the international arena results from individual choices – by its citizenry, its political leaders, its diplomats and bureaucrats – aggregated through the states internal structures. This unit examines this from inside out in determining the nature of foreign policy. Many of the goals, political, social, economic, and numerous others which states try to pursue in the international system cannot be achieved within the territorial confines of the national state. As a result, states need the active cooperation, even assistance of other states in the system to achieve their national objectives. This makes it necessary for the state to be in communication with its external environment. It is the totality of this interaction (communication) that is commonly referred to as foreign policy.

However, like many other concepts in international relations, the definition of the term “foreign policy” has been a subject of controversy. Sometimes, this controversy arises from different theoretical frameworks from which the subject is approached. It may relate to the whole importance attached to the state in ordering or controlling international activities in the contemporary world (Ojo & Sasey: 2002).

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit student should be able to:

- define foreign policy
- analyse problems associated with definition of foreign policy
- identify other related components of foreign policy.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 What is Foreign Policy?

With the emergence of modern nation states, modern international relations emerged as these nation-states device and followed certain principles, courses and standards that govern their interactions in the international community. Basically, no nation is an island, so it becomes imperative for nation states to interact with each other. These actions therefore formed the foreign relations of such states. Traditionally, these actions are guided by national foreign policies that are clearly in pursuit of national aspirations or interests.

The term “foreign policy” has been given different definitions by scholars, historians and diplomats. Foreign policy has been defined as “the actions of a state towards external environment and conditions usually domestic, under which these decisions are formulated”. Professor Gambari Ibrahim defined foreign policy as an interaction between identifiable domestic political forces and the dynamics of international political relations. Professor Olajide Aluko defined foreign policy as “an interaction between internal and external forces.” For Professor Osita Agbu, foreign policy could also be understood as the actions and reactions of states targeted at the external.

Foreign policy has also been described as the courses of action adopted by a nation in the interest of the welfare of its peoples. In other words, foreign policy of a state is pursued by the state in the interest of the welfare of its people. Professor F .S Northege defines foreign policy as a product of environment factors both internal and external to it. Keith R. Legg and James Morrison define “foreign policy as a set of explicit objective with regards to the world beyond the borders of a given social unit and a set of strategies and tactics designed to achieve these objectives. Also Joseph Frankel defines foreign policy as consisting of decisive actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and the others.

Professor Tunde Adeniran on the other hand agree with Frankel by saying that foreign policy by and large is the policy pursued by a state in its dealings with other states. According to him, foreign policy consists of three elements the first element is the overall orientation and policy intention of a particular country towards another. The second element is the objective that a country seeks to achieve in its relation or dealings with other countries and the third element of foreign policy is the means of achieving that particular goal or objectives.

For Professor George Obiozor, foreign policy deals with how and why a nation sets particular goals, orders its own governmental policy making machinery

utilizing its own human and natural resources to compete with other nations in the international arena.

Foreign policy could be defined as the governmental activity which concerns relationship between the state and other actors, especially other states in the international system. Put differently, foreign policy could be seen as the totality of all actions, decisions, overtures, or interactions between states in the international system. Such could be directed or based on economics, politics, culture or creating understanding or-co-operation (Adesola, 2004).

From the above definitions and many others, three identifiable components of foreign policy are obvious, one, the actions of a state; two, national or domestic interests, which influences these actions and three; external or foreign environment of a state towards which these actions are oriented. These three components are clearly closely related and dependent on each other. They act together and one influences the other. It is from this perspective that the foreign policy of a state evolves in the competitive international environment.

Policy as a term denotes planning which in turn suggests step-by-step procedure towards a known and defined goal. Yet, the realities of the behaviour of states show that decisions are taken to deal with new crises that may suddenly develop somewhere in the world. Very seldom are the nature and future implications of such crises so clearly defined that the foreign ministry of a country can make its decision in full and complete confidence that what it has done will surely enhance the fulfillment of its objective.

Therefore, foreign policy is here defined as the strategies governments use to guide their actions in the international arena. Foreign policies spell out the objectives state leaders have decided to pursue in a given relationship or situations. This includes the means of achieving the objectives.

The aim is to ensure that such states or international organizations maintain the existing pattern of behaviour, if the influencing state perceive such as contributing to the achievements of its own objectives. It may also be to change the present pattern by initiating a new set of policies, or by altering or halting the implementation of existing ones. For instance, Nigeria gave financial, political and diplomatic assistance to the Front Line States in Southern Africa in order to encourage those states to continue their anti-apartheid policy. On the other hand, she denied Chad access to the coast in order to force the N'djamena regime to make peace with other warring factions in the country.

Self-Assessment Exercise

How would you define foreign policy?

3.2 What is Foreign Policy Making?

Foreign policy making is as old as the first organised states and their conflicts with other states. Throughout the modern era, the issues, means, and ends of foreign policy making for nation-states have proliferated and changed significantly.

The popular image of foreign policy making is a council of wise people carefully and rationally choosing among alternatives until they find the one best able to fulfill national interests. Generally, policy making is a messy, imprecise process which varies considerably from one issue, time and government to the next. There are as many different policy making processes as there are issues.

Foreign policy making is thus a multi-faceted tug of war between different and often diametrically opposed experts, interest groups and public emotions. There are as many policy-makers as there are individuals and groups interested in any particular issue. However, some individuals and groups are obviously much more influential in shaping foreign policy than others.

It is perhaps more accurate to speak of national foreign policies than policy. This is because most nations do have a broad set of national goals and strategies which guide the formulation/making of specific policies affecting specified issues. For example, America's foreign policies from 1947 through 1990 generally operated under the guidelines of "containment". The foreign policy ends of many developing states are development and non-alignment, although the means to attain these ends vary considerably.

Self-Assessment Exercise

What is foreign policy making?

4.0 Conclusion

Foreign policy can therefore be seen as a type of policy that transcends the boundary of a given state. It is that type of action a state embarks upon in its interaction with other actors, member-states in the international environment, in the process of striving to attain its objectives and goals.

The concept, foreign policy denotes the authoritative action which governments take or are committed to take in order either to preserve the desirable aspects of the international environment or to alter its undesirable aspects. It also represents the range of actions taken by various sections of government of a state in its relations with other bodies or states acting on the international scene in order to advance the national interests of a particular state.

5.0 Summary

In this unit, foreign policy has been conceptualized as set of principles that define the objectives a given state pursues in the international arena in the process of its interactions with other international actors. Thus, it is established fact that a nation's foreign policy includes the specific goals that leaders pursue in the global system. The values that shape those goals and the means by which those goals are achieved.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- (i) What is foreign policy?
- (ii) Explain what you understand by foreign policy making

7.0 References/Further Readings

Frankel, Joseph (1967). *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making*. London: Oxford University Press.

Legg, Keith and Morison, James (1971) *Politics and the International System*, New York: Happer and Row.

Ojo, Olusola and Amadu, Sasey (2002). *Concepts in International Relations*, ILe-Ife:Classy Prints & Company.

Unit 2: FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 The Meaning of National Interest
 - 3.2 Linkage between Foreign Policy and National Interest
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References/Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

The concept “national interest” is a very complex word. Hence, there is no generally accepted definition of the concept. Scholars however, have put forward various definitions of the concept based on their understanding. They have also argued about how to determine national interest or who actually determines national interest. Competition to define the national interest is often intense, because while the goals and values that a state may pursue are virtually endless, the same is not true for the resources needed to realize them. Decisions must constantly be made about which goals to emphasize and which to neglect. The definition given to the national interest is a major factor affecting which values will be favoured. This is because not all foreign policies (and, therefore, the values that they protect) are compatible with a given definition of national interest.

Foreign policy has been defined as the specified goals that leaders pursue in the international system, the values that shape those specific goals and the means by which those goals are achieved. Foreign policies are justified because they further the national interest. Yet, as was the case with U.S foreign policy in Vietnam, invoking the “national interest” seldom ends disagreement over the wisdom of a course of action.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit the students should be able to:

- define the concept of national interest
- analyse the role of national interest to foreign policy formation
- discuss the linkages between national interest and foreign policy
- differentiate principles of national interest and foreign policy.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 Controversies over the Meaning of National Interest.

Why do governments do the things they do and do not do the things they seemingly could do? The answer is usually “national interest”. When Winston Churchill was asked for an explanation of Soviet behaviour, he replied “I cannot forecast to you the actions of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest (Kennedy, 1987).

National interests are evoked to justify virtually every act of a state, from generosity to genocide. And some states follow policies that in retrospect undermine rather than enhance national interests. The imperialism of Germany, Japan and Italy during the 1930s and 1940s, or Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was justified by the leaders of those countries as being in their national interest. But imperialism left those nations in ruins.

Consequently, national interest is an elusive term which has been described in various ways. Kaplan (1967) for instance, defines it as the interest, which a national actor has in implementing a defined system of action. Morgenthau (1967) conceives of it simply as politics among nations. To Jones (1970), national interest is a term used in political debate within a country to signal the case that the item of policy suggested will bring benefits not merely to its proponents but also to its opponents.

Frankel (1972), postulates that national interest is a key concept in foreign policy. In his view, it amounts to the total of all national values, national in both meaning of the word, both pertaining to the nation and the state. One general common sense definition describes it as the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts. This presupposes that every nation has a set of objectives or goals which gives life and meaning to the behaviour of such nation in international relations.

Some of these objectives or goals are central to the survival of the nation, while other are not so central to it even though they are integrated within the large interest of the international community. Strictly speaking, every nation strives to protect, promote and defend its objectives at all cost even to the point of going to war, if it felt that the pursuits of these objectives or goals are threatened. Hence, the totality of these objectives or goals is what constitutes national interest.

All states share some common interests-political independence, economic growth, cultural preservation, peace etc. The most obvious national interest is self-preservation and the greatest threat to that basic interest is for another state to invade and conquer it. The threat of foreign invasion are however, increasingly rare in international relations, since the end of the Cold War. Three other “core national values” in diminishing importance are the enhancement of a nation’s economic development, independence from the interference of others in one’s domestic affair, and preservation of the nations “way of life or culture”.

It is pertinent to note that in reality national interest is conducted, directed or determined by the ruling class or the political elites. It is the power that the (incumbent government most times) that select, pursue, or operationalise what a nation’s national interest is. This explains why it varies as regime changes. For instance, Tunde Idiagbon/Muhammed Buhari’s regime in Nigeria between 1983 and 1985 considered it, the interest of the nation not to collect the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Bank loan in spite of the parlous state of the Nigerian economy. But the successor, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida’s regime in 1986 chose to contract the loan (despite its stringent conditionalities).

National interest, apart from all else is useful for analytical purposes as it is a yardstick for actors in the international system. However, if the nations of the world do nothing but to rationalise their actions on the basis of parochial national interest, there would be more crises than what now obtains. The philosophy surrounding the concept is increasingly becoming devalued, given increasingly interdependence of states as well as the emergence of non-state actors who somewhat de-emphasize state centrism, and have been flagrantly and recklessly disregarding tradition and order of things concerning inter-state interactions.

3.2. Linkage Between National Interest and Foreign Policy

Foreign policies are justified because they further the national interests of nation-states. Although national interest is an ambiguous concept and therefore limited in its ability to guide policy, it is not altogether lacking in meaning and action. It directs the attention of policymakers to a category of goals that a state’s foreign policy should value most, national or societal goals. Goals that advance only the interests of certain individuals or groups are by definition not eligible for placement at the center of a state’s foreign policy. For a foreign policy goal or objective to be in the national interest, it must benefit more than a particular group or sector; it must promote the welfare of the country as a whole.

It must be stressed however that the articulation of the goals does not necessarily guarantee the successful execution of foreign policy. The extent to which a foreign policy goal/objective is achieved depends largely on the quality, character and disposition of policy makers, the prevailing political and economic circumstances,

the resource endowments of the state, the military capability, geographical location, population and a host of other factors.

The foreign policy of every country is at all times presumably designed to promote the national interest. As the national interest does not exist in abstraction, the quest of policy makers should therefore be how to identify and serve the national interest. This involves what is national, since there are many national interests in a particular situation.

The difficulties arise in the conflict of one interest with another, for example, in the clash of the interest in peace with the interest in preserving national institutions. Thus, the concept of national interest is a very useful one which policy-makers especially foreign policy-makers should bear in mind. It helps to place foreign as well as domestic policy in the framework of national policy, and it is a much-needed anti-dote to political shortsightedness and partisanship.

Finally, despite variation in meanings, national interests are the constant rather than the variables of international relations; it is likewise true that developments at home or abroad require a continual reassessment of those interests.

4.0 Conclusion

The formation and execution of foreign policy is determined to a large extent by the national interest of a nation. National interest is a key concept in foreign policy. It amounts to the sum total of all the national values. National interest is the general and continuing ends for which a nation formulates and executes foreign policy. This presupposes that every nation has a set of objectives or goals which gives life and meaning to the behaviour of such nation in international relations.

5.0 Summary

A nation's foreign policies are the specific goals and objectives that leaders pursue in the international system. This includes the values that shape those goals and the means by which those goals are achieved. National interest are the bedrocks upon which government base their foreign policy objectives. This means that foreign policies are formulated in order to promote national interest.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignment (TMAs)

- (i) What do you understand by "National Interest"?
- (ii) Evaluate the contributions of National interest to foreign policy formulation
- (iii) National interest is an ambiguous concept. Discuss.

7.0 References/Further Readings

Akinboye, Solomon & Ferdinand O. Ottoh (2005). *A systematic Approach*

to International Relations, Lagos: Concept publications Limited.

Hans, Morgenthau (1967). *Politics among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc.

Jones, Roy (1970). *Analyzing Foreign Policy: An Introduction to some Conceptional Problems*, London: Routledge Kegan Paul Ltd.

Morton, Kaplan (1967). *Systems and Process in International Politics*, New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc.

UNIT 3 NATIONAL INTERESTS VERSUS OTHER INTERESTS

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 National Interest versus Societal Interests
 - 3.2 National Interest versus Global Interests
 - 3.3 National Interest: Long – Middle – and Short term Goals
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References/Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

While the national interest is an ambiguous concept and therefore limited in its ability to guide policy, it is not altogether lacking in meaning. It directs the attention of policymakers to a category of goals that a state's foreign policy should value most- national or societal goals. Those goals that advance only the interests of certain individuals or groups are by definition not eligible for placement at the center of a state's foreign policy. To be in the national interest, a particular policy must uphold the common good and promote the welfare of the citizenry as a whole. We can identify three possible ways by which particularistic society interests can come to define the national interest as stated below.

2.0 Objectives

At the successful completion of this unit, you should be able to:

- differentiate between national interest and societal interest
- explain what is long term goals
- explain what is middle term goals
- explain what is short term goals

3.1. The National Interest versus Societal Interest

First, it is possible that one segment of society can come to dominate and control the policy process to the point where its views, and only its views, shape the content of foreign policy. Whatever disagreements exists within this elite class are over tactics and not the fundamental direction of policy. A concern for particularistic interests masquerading as the national interest in this fashion lies at the heart of the long-standing fascination with the influence of the military-industrial complex. The term was coined by C. Wright Mills in 1956 and was

given high visibility by President Eisenhower in his farewell address when he warned against its unwarranted influence and the dangers of misplaced power.

Many different formulations of the military-industrial complex argument exist, and efforts to prove its significant influence over policy have produced mixed results. All start from the assertion that although society as a whole does not benefit from military spending or the adoption of a definition of the national interest that centers on the existence of a hostile, threatening, and anarchic international system, certain segments of the society do prosper because of them. At a minimum, these segments include the professional military, industries heavily dependent on defense contracts, labour unions whose members work in these industries, and members of Congress, whose district are home to military installations or production facilities. Numerous linkages exist among these groups that help to forge them into a powerful political force able to impose its agenda on the political system as whole. Generals and Admirals upon retirement find employment with leading defense contractors. Congress people who formally oversee the military tend to come from districts in which exceedingly high levels of military spending take place. The military-industrial complex is not unique to capitalist societies. A similar phenomenon has been found to exist in socialist states. Composed of members of the professional military and intelligence services, managers of heavy industries, and the party and state ministries with responsibility in these areas, this constellation of forces consistently set Soviet priorities at the expense of forces engaged in the production of consumer goods, agricultural products, and public services.

Secondly, interest groups can gain control of a state's foreign policy through a process of building coalitions. Under this theory, no permanent elite group dominates the policy agenda. Instead, policy reflects the relative power of various groups within a society and their ability to translate that power into control over parts of the policy process. In essence, the government acts as an impartial umpire by judging who the winner is in the struggle to control policy and registering that victory by altering a policy to reflect the values of the dominant group or coalition of groups. Because power resources change over time, no group or sector of society is permanently able to control policy. Foreign policy and definitions of the national interest will change as new groups come to dominate the political landscape.

According to this pluralist view of policymaking, arms control policy within the United States, France, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere reflects the balance of political power between those groups in society that oppose arms control and those that support it rather than the interests of the military-industrial complex. The same holds true for foreign economic policy, human rights, and military interventions abroad. Many foreign-policy professionals and scholars take a dim

view of pluralism's impact on foreign policy. They see foreign policy and definition of national interest as too important to be left to a power struggle among societal groups who tend to be uninformed about world affairs and who often base their decisions on narrow definitions of self-interest or emotionalism. What is needed is the ability to recognize and to respond to the dynamics of world politics in a consistent and objective fashion. The pressure of competing interest groups trying to control policy work against this. Politics must stop "at the water edge" if policymakers are to pursue effectively the national interest.

Third, the process of defining the national interest may be overly influenced by bureaucratic politics. In this view, competition to control foreign policy is not carried out among groups within a society but between rival bureaucratic interests whose concern is not so much to solve a problem as it is to maintain (or gain) control over the formulation and implementation of policy. The foreign-policy bureaucracy is not a machine responding to the orders of the heads of government, but a series of competing fiefdoms each of which has its own view of what should be done. Selecting a foreign policy or a definition of the national interest is not so much a matter of finding a policy that will work as it is one of finding a policy around which a bureaucratic consensus can form. This is no easy task. Over time, governmental bureaucracies develop vested interests in policy areas, organizational routines on how to deal with problems, and memories of past policy battles. These combine to cause organizations to see problems differently. What to the military is a problem of placing added troops on the border to provide for greater defense may appear to the treasury to be an unacceptable increase in government spending, and to diplomats to be a provocative act that will produce war rather than ensure peace. Reaching a consensus becomes a time-consuming game in which the various preferences of the players are bargained into a single-position. Consequently, there is a tendency to hold to a consensus position as long as possible and to make only incremental or minimal changes in the direction of policy when forced to by events abroad.

3.2 The National Interest versus the Global Interest

Conflict of a different sort surrounds the debate over the relationship between the national interest and the global interest. Many realists view the two as incompatible and caution against giving primary to global interests over national ones. The primary obligation of policymakers is to provide for the security of the state in a competitive, hostile, and anarchic international system. Concepts like global interest and global community are illusions in a system in which there are no permanent rules or bonds uniting states. Self-help and self-interest are the keys to survival. Peace is not a condition that can be engineered into existence through the creation of institutions, signing treaties, or appeals to common interests, Peace is a condition that comes about when states pursue their own (limited) definitions of national interest.

Not all realists share this assessment. Arnold Wolfers found it to be shortsighted. He argued that states have two classes of goals: possession goals and milieu goals. Included in the former category would be efforts to acquire territory, to gain a seat on the UN Security Council, to get most-favoured-nation status as a trading partner, or to gain access to oil. Possession goals tend to be treated as zero sums in nature; that is, to the extent that one state “possesses” the goal, that goal is seen as being denied to another. In contrast, milieu goals are not so much possessed by a state as they are forming a common or shared environment within which states act. All states are able to partake of global prosperity, peace, stability, and respect for environmental pollution standards. Wolfers acknowledge that milieu goals are often no more than a means to realizing a possession goal, but he believes that this need not be the case. He cautions against downplaying the value of milieu goals simply because they can also be in the interest of other states. He argues that “it is wise for governments and peoples to be aware of-and in fact to stress-the element of national self-interest, however farsighted, that leads nations to improve the milieu by rendering services to others”.

Globalists take strong exception to the primacy given to the national interests of states by realists. They raise two points. First, the state is no longer the central unit in world politics whose interests must receive attention ahead of all others. The interests of regions, non-state actors, sub-state actors, international organizations, and the world as a whole must now also be given their due attention. As we have already seen, it is only recently that world politics has centered on the state. There is no reason to expect that it will always be so. John Herz argues that the history of world politics has been marked by the emergence of political units of ever-increasing size or rulers sought to establish defensible boundaries. Following this logic, the state can remain the central unit of world politics only so long as its borders constitute a “hard shell” behind which a population is secure from attack. Globalists argue that this is no longer the case. Advancing military technology coupled with terrorist attack has made it impossible for the state to protect its citizens, and economic interdependence has had a similar effect on the state’s ability to provide unilaterally for the socioeconomic needs of its population.

Secondly, globalists assert that the problems confronting policymakers today can not be solved within the context of a logical decision that places state interests at the centre. Successfully addressing the problems of overpopulation, environmental decay, nuclear proliferation, hunger, and poverty that face our endangered planet requires that we give precedence to the goals of the whole rather than to any of its individual parts. Globalists recognize that moving the global interest from a marginal concern to one that is center of world politics will not be easily realized. The state’s freedom to pursue its national interest will have to be restricted in favour of the global interest, and foreign policies will have to be framed in terms

of state responsibility for the global condition and not narrowly defined possession goals.

3.3 The National Interest: Long-, Middle-, and Short-term Goals

So far we have discussed what the national interest is not: It is not a clearly stated guide for action, and it is different from sub-national and the global interest. However, what is the national interest? How do we know when a goal or an objective is in the state's national interest? Many argue that the dynamics of world politics establishes a universal ranking system into which all foreign-policy goals can be placed. Three levels of goals (long-, middle-, and core) can be identified, which come together to form a triangle in which core goals form the base of the pyramid and take precedence over the pursuit of middle and long term goals. They are distinguished from each other by their importance to the survival of the state, the time element involved in realizing them, and the kinds of demands that pursuing these goals places on other states.

(i) **Core:** Core goals are those values and interest for which the state is willing to demand the ultimate sacrifices from its own people and to place the greatest demands upon others. The defense of its borders, the perpetuation of its political, economic, and social system, the control of strategically vital areas, and the realization of ethnic or religious unity are the most frequently pursued core goals. These are short-term goals whose realization is a prerequisite for the pursuit of all other foreign-policy objectives.

(ii) **Middle-Term Goals:** They are of three types. The first of these are efforts to improve domestic social and economic conditions through such international activities as entering into trade agreements, acquiring foreign aid, and gaining assured access to raw materials that are controlled by the states. The second of these are policies designed to enhance the state's international prestige. This is often done through diplomatic activity, participation in international cultural or technological exchange programmes, or displays of one's military capabilities through highly visible troop exercises or naval maneuvers that are designed to "show the flag." The third of these are efforts at self-extension or imperialism. These need not mean physically taking control of other states or extending one's boundaries. They may take the form of establishing spheres of influence, promoting the state's ideology abroad, or dominating foreign markets.

(iii) **Long-Term Goals:** These are "plans, dreams, and visions concerning the ultimate political or ideological organization of the international system. Whereas middle-term goals make specific demands against all states in the international system. Hitler's Thousand Years Reich, Japans Greater East Asia C-prosperity Sphere, the Soviet vision of world-wide communist revolution, and U.S. efforts to

make the world safe for democracy are some examples of long-term goals that are held by major powers.

4.0 Conclusion

Approached in this fashion, the concept of national interest appears to take on an objective meaning. Policymakers cannot simply state that they are acting in the national interest. Groups and individuals within a society cannot merely assert that their preferred goals are identical to the national interest. The corrections of these claims can be judged against the standards for placing goals in each of the three categories. On closer examination, however, this objective turns out to be largely illusory, and the concept of national interest still remains basically normative in nature. For, while this approach does not allow us to make distinctions between goals, the actual placement of a goal in one of the three categories is still a matter of judgment.

5.0 Summary

In this unit an attempt has been made to explain in detail other interests that play vital roles in determining foreign policy goals and objectives of nation states. These goals to a large extent determine the position of states in the international arena. These interests include the following: societal interests and global interests. We have also discussed the three levels of national goals which consist of long term goals, middle range goals and core goals establishing that the interests' nations attach to these goals vary according to situations in exception to core goals.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- i. Explain the following concepts with examples (a) Core interest (b) Middle Term Goals (c) Long term Goals.
- ii. Discuss the debate over the relationship between National Interest and Global Interest.
- iii. What is Societal Interest?

7.0 References

Falk, Richard (1972). *This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival*. New York: Vintage Press.

Glenn, Hastedt & Kay M. Knikrehm (1991). *Dimension of World Politics*, New York: Harper Collins.

Herz, John (1959). *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Wright, Mills (1956). *The power of Elite*, New York: Oxford University Press.

UNIT 4: GLOBALISATION: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 Foreign Policy in a Global Human Community
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References for Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

Globalisation is a force shaping power distribution in world politics today. It is important to note that globalisation refers to expanded economic integration and interdependence of states through international free trade, market economies, investments and capital flows. World trade has grown astronomically and huge multinational corporations (MNCs) and economic organisations (International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organisation) dominate global commerce. These trend-linked with the spread of global fiber optic network, digitalization, satellite communications, the world wide web and computer technology-have impacted on state-to-state power relationship dramatically

The exponential expansion of globalisation is introducing a new approach into the foreign policy framework by nation states, just as it is affecting traditional methods and other concepts in international relations. The question is whether globalisation has rendered obsolete traditional foreign policies that sovereign states pursued over the past centuries and to what extent?

It has been established, that states have long been the source of physical security, economic vitality and political independence for their citizens. Consequently, a state's foreign policy traditionally has focused on how to pursue its vital national interests; physical security, economic strength, and political security on the stage of world politics.

Over time, however, globalisation has brought porous borders and interdependence, thus facilitating the exchange of goods, ideas, and information, financial transactions, and institutions to connect people into a global human community. Does this mean that globalisation is displacing the older realism

(power politics) and idealism (international legal norms to govern state behaviour) as well as traditional balance of power and collective security mechanisms that have guided international relations and indirectly foreign policy behaviours of states over the century?

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- identify the changes in traditional methods of foreign policy approach
- link the reasons for the changes appropriately
- assess the effect of globalisation on foreign policy behaviour of nation states.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 Foreign Policy in a Global Human Community

On the affirmative, globalisation has clearly spawned a new international system. Porous borders and interdependence have undermined the capability of states to pursue security, economic growth, and political sovereignty through traditional uses of power, state-to-state relations, and balance of power or collective security mechanism.

Globalisation has placed states in a strategic straightjacket, and national interest must be redefined. Globalized partners benefit from globalisation and have a stake in maintaining their interdependent relations. Thus, they must redefine their priorities away from a strictly state-centered focus or risk losing their position in the globalizing system. The use of force to gain strategic advantage or to resolve disputes among globalizing states is presently irrational and increasingly unlikely. War between the great powers (United States, West European states, China, India and Japan) is almost unthinkable. Each operates within a strategic straight jacket imposed by globalisation.

There are the new power realities created by Globalisation: the information technology revolution, inter-dependence, and porous borders, through which the multiple forms of power flow. The new issues on national and international agendas cannot be solved by one country alone. New York Times columnist, Thomas Friedman writes that the “inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before- in a new way that is enabling individuals, corporations and states to reach around the world faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before”, simply means that we must think of foreign policies with new techniques and new agenda.

Friedman in his book, *The World Is Flat (2005)*, argues that the economic playing field has been leveled by the global fiber-optic network into which some three billion people are rushing, from other countries whose economies have

thrown off socialism. According to him, these are the recipients of outsourcing. Globalisation in effect has made the world one massive interconnected market place that challenges the traditional role of separate national interests and separate sovereign states.

Globalisation has produced six types of wars that states are losing because they have not adopted new strategies to deal with these struggles that now shape the world. The stateless decentralized networks that cannot be fought by traditional foreign policy techniques are terrorism, drugs, arms trafficking, intellectual property misuse, alien smuggling, and money laundering. United States is losing its war on terrorism and in fact attacking and occupying Iraq has increased the number of terrorists now opposed to the United States.

The attacks on the strategic points in the United States on September 2001 highlight the point that the globalized world in which we live is one where traditional foreign policy and powerful defense systems (including long-range missiles and nuclear weapons) may not prevent another major world crisis.

However, on the other side, while globalisation has created new realities within the international system, nation-states, and their government have not disappeared. They still remain key players on the international landscape, and realism and power politics in their foreign policies still make a difference. Globalisation has not created an international society of global citizens, and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) frequently have little independence apart from the government of their states. Globalisation has not seriously challenged the profoundly national nature of citizenship.

While human beings may engage in the life of globalized networks, the human identity remains national in character, an identity that resists cultural homogenization. Fundamentally, national identity still super cedes global or international identity. National identity is a powerful factor behind traditional state foreign policies and the national governments and people that lie at their foundation.

Some states remain far more powerful than others and their foreign policies are more dominant than others. Traditionally, United States of America's foreign policy and the power that backs it is a good example.

The major national security threat to the world today is terrorism. The primary responsibility of every state government is to protect its people. Islamic radicalism is non-state in nature. And therefore cannot be defeated by attacking another state as the United States did in Iraq. That attack multiplied the radical Islamic threat to America and attack of United Nations Offices by mobilizing radical Islamic

behaviours around the world. The United States must shed its state-centric thinking, a legacy of Cold War, and develop a new foreign policy approach in order to be able to combat terrorism.

4.0 Conclusion

Globalisation has actually spawned a new international system. Porous borders and interdependence have really undermined the capability of states to pursue security, economic growth and political sovereignty through traditional uses of power, balance of power or collective mechanisms. Examples of limitation on the traditional use of power include the failure of military force as demonstrated in the pitfalls of the United States- led war in Iraq, economic interdependence as illustrated when a downturn in a single state's economy affects the whole system. The rising price of oil undermines oil-dependent economies, including that of the United States. The European States are integrated in the European Union (EU) and Canada, the United States and Mexico are interdependent within North America Free Trade Association (NAFTA). The Southeast Asian and Latin American debt crises in the 1990s led to a global economic down turn. The events of the 1990s had repercussions on the global economy. This therefore calls for a rethink on foreign policies of nations requiring new techniques and new agendas.

5.0 Summary

In this unit, an attempt has been made to show the pros and cons of globalisation in the foreign policy approach of sovereign states. It is therefore important to point out that while globalisation may have created new realities within the international system resulting in global human community rivalries between great and small states, and while wars between states have become less common, wars within states (civil wars) have been distinctly on the rise. Outside states have found it necessary to intervene through or under the United Nations (UN) auspices to prevent such civil wars from spreading regionally. Meanwhile, a regional hegemony may attack another state with potentially serious consequences for external non-belligerent states as in the case of the Persian Gulf War precipitated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. These developments point to the continued need for traditional foreign policy tools in collaboration with new techniques and new agendas.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- (i) Globalisation has spawned a new international system. Discuss in relation to the call for new foreign policy techniques and agenda.
- (ii) Critically examine the impact of globalisation on foreign policy tools.

7.0 References for Further Readings

Friendman, Thomas (1999). *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York: Farrar Straus, and Giroux.

Friendman, Thomas (2005). *The World is Flat, A Brief History of the 21st Century*, New York: Farrar Straus

Nye, Joseph (2004). *American Power and the 2004 Campaign*, Project Syndicate. Project of 2009 newspapers.

MODULE:2 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSES

Unit 1 Approaches to foreign policy analysis

Unit 2 Levels of analysis

Unit 3 Foreign policy environment

Unit 4 Problems of foreign policy analysis

UNIT: 1 APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Contents

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Body

3.1 The Classical or Traditional Approach

3.2 The Scientific or Behavioural Approaches

3.2.1 The Decision Making Approach

3.2.2 The Comparative or Adaptive Perspective Approach

3.2.3 Incremental Decision-Making Approach

3.2.4 Game-Theoretical Analysis

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

7.0 References/Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

All perspectives on the subject of international relations contain statements about foreign policy. Historically, this has been the case because virtually all approaches to the study of international relations took the state to be the central actor. Thus, approaches as diverse as those concentrating on political economy, international society and Marxism have all included a notion of what the state is and how its foreign policy results, regardless of the way in which policy might be defined. Approaches to the study of foreign policy are therefore intrinsic to approaches to the study of international relations, even to those who deny the centrality of the state as an actor in the international society.

However, in this unit we center our study on the major approaches to the study of foreign policy. There are two broad approaches to the study of foreign policy: the traditional and the scientific or behavioural approach.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the different approaches to the study of foreign policy
- differentiate to the study of foreign policy
- appraise the contributions of various approaches to the understanding of foreign policy
- assess the different analysis of scientific approach.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 The Classical or Traditional Approach

This approach takes each national society as different and seeks explanation for its behaviour in the historical experiences and strategic realities by which it has been and is still being conditioned. It also makes a clear distinction between the domestic and external environments. The approach has therefore emphasized case studies or institutional analysis. It stresses the unique factors of time, place and people. A comparative analysis of foreign policy analysis can therefore not be contemplated.

3.2 The Scientific or Behavioural Approach

a) The Decision Making Approach

R. C. Snyder and his associates pioneered the decision making approach to the study of foreign policy in the 1950s. The basic assumption of the approach is that policies are not made by states but by individuals who act on behalf of the states. Thus, the analysis of state behaviour centers on these individuals and groups who represent their states. The approach therefore, discusses decision makers as individuals who arrive at their decision by confronting their values with their image of the environment. It utilizes both internal and external factors as they influence decision. The approach is useful in that it provides a new focus of interest to replace and supplement the traditional approach. Through it, all the roles, norms, goals, functions and perceptions of governmental organization in general as well as of the specific decision making unit, which is subject of analysis can be classified for analysis.

However, the approach suffers important limitations. First, it concentrates exclusively upon the images and perceptions of decision-makers (i.e. psychological environment) and ignores the objective reality that these reflect. Secondly, it merely helps us to understand the mechanics but does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the broader aspect of foreign policy. It does not, for example, show how the responses from the operational environment (i.e. the by-effects of decisions affect a foreign policy process in its course. Third, it reinforces the traditional distinction between domestic and international politics, whose boundaries are in reality continually blurred. Fourth, by its emphasis on the foreign policy of a single state, it often detracts from sustained efforts to understand the broader processes of international interactions. Finally, there is yet no theory of decision making that makes clear the relationships between the various variables identified both at the internal and external environments.

What the approach has so far produced amounts to little more than the setting out of categories which tell the researchers what data to collect and how to classify them but not how to use them.

b) The Comparative or Adaptive Perspective Approach:

This approach essentially focuses on how states adapt to their changing environments and how this affects their foreign policy options. It assumes that all nations can be viewed as adapting entities with similar problems that arise out of the need to cope with their environments. It therefore, seeks an understanding of state behaviour not in unique factors but in common ones, not through case study but through the comparative assessment, not through the applied inquiry that solves immediate problems but through the theoretical formulation that tests hypotheses and establishes general principles.

The approach has the advantage of making the analyst see highly specific purposes and activities of officials in a larger context. It also offers an intellectual challenge and promises of intellectual satisfaction. However, it does not concern itself with non-governmental activities, though it recognizes that these may have important consequences for what an official can accomplish through foreign policy. Besides, it is not specific on what the analyst is to compare. Should it be ends or means, decisions or outcomes, attributes or behaviours, nations or individuals, objective conditions or official perceptions, availability of resources available or strategies?

c) Incremental Decision-Making Approach:

This approach views decisions as being made incrementally i.e. decision makers raise options as the situation demands. This seems to make a lot of sense given the uncertainty associated with foreign policy.

Thus, decision makers cannot make decisions based on complete control over their internal and external environments. Besides information may not also be completely available to decision makers. Consequently, there is always a tendency, or the need for maneuvering as well as inevitable false starts etc. Due to pressure from both domestic and external environments, policy makers are sometimes not able to pursue what seems like the most rational line of action but those actions that they agree to pursue. The approach as a result utilises both the adaptive and bureaucratic models.

d) The Bureaucratic Political Approach:

This approach focuses attention primarily on individuals within a government and the interaction among them as determinants of a government's policy. Its emphasis is on the role of the bureaucrats. The assumption is that since politicians come and go, it is the civil servants who are permanently on seat and who possess the

expertise and that politician must of necessity rely on that expertise and their advice. Furthermore, the bureaucrats not only influence policy makers, but also implement policy after it has been formulated. The bureaucratic politics approach posits that any government policy is a result of bargaining among players positioned hierarchically in the government.

The bargaining follows regularized circuits. Both bargaining and outcomes are affected by a large number of constraints, particularly the organizational processes. The unit of analysis of this approach is government action.

A number of criticisms have been made against the approach. It has been argued that it concentrates too much on the policy-making process and not on the content of policy. It ignores the external environment which is important in the understanding of state behaviours. And besides, it has the tendency of exaggerating the role of bureaucrats. By concentrating on bureaucratic and organizational factors, it tends to ignore the values held by decision-makers. Finally, by portraying foreign policy decision-making as the outcome of bureaucratic politics; the approach removes responsibility from governments. It makes it much easier for politicians to deny responsibility for policy outcomes.

e) Game-Theoretical Analysis

The game theory is a way of putting into mathematical form the conflict or competition of interests and strategies between small numbers of “players” in order to deduce which strategies will yield the result most satisfactory to each others’ interests. Its basic assumption is the rationality of most players. It posits that each player has a set of well defined and mutually consistent basic objectives and will choose his policies in accordance with these objectives without mistake. Rationality also requires that each player should choose his strategies in consistence with the exceptions he can rationally entertain about other player’s behaviour.

4.0 Conclusion

Theories of foreign policy are intrinsic to the theories of international relations, even for those who deny the centrality of the state as an actor in international society. What has happened in the past decades is that the traditional notion of the state as being the fundamental unit of international society has come under attack. The state-centric perspective is argued to be outdated as new actors have come on scene and as new forces, predominantly economic have altered the nature of international relations by entangling states in a network of interdependence. For many, foreign policy analysis as a subject area was always problematic-since it was neither social scientific in the way claimed to be the case in the systems analysis of international relations nor historical in the sense of using evidence and mind sight to make sense of and give coherence to the perceptions of who had

made foreign policy decisions. By the late 1970s, these concerns seemed to be all too well supported by both the empirical enquiries that led many in international relations to proclaim the obsolescence of the state centric theory and by the theoretical impasse that foreign policy analysis had apparently reached.

Thus, in this unit we have used the two approaches the traditional or classical and scientific or behavioural approaches to the study of foreign policy to clarify how policy was explained by the major theories of international relations. These two approaches to the study of foreign policy attempts to explain foreign policy by treating states as members of a class of phenomena and seeks to generalize about the sources, and nature of their behaviour focusing on the decision making process in its varying aspects in order to produce explanations.

5.0 Summary

We have studied two approaches to the understanding of states' foreign policies vis-à-vis classical or traditional approach and scientific or behavioural approach. The classical approach rests in the historical experiences and strategic realities by which states' behaviour have been conditioned and are still being conditioned in the international arena.

The second approach studied is the behavioural or scientific approach. The basic assumption of the approach is that foreign policies are not made by state, but by individuals who act on behalf of states. Another focus of this approach is how states adapt to changing environments and how it affects their foreign policy, emphasizing that interaction among individuals within a government determines the government's policy.

Each of these approaches to the study of foreign policy has much to offer to the study of foreign policy analysis as an area of study. This is because each can explain parts of the international body politic that other theories cannot reach.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- (i) What are the differences between traditional and behavioural approaches to the study of foreign policy?
- (ii) Write short notes on (a) Decision making approach (b)Comparative or Adaptive Perspectives approach.

7.0 References / Further Reading

Ojo, OLusola and Amadu, Sasey (2002). *Concepts in International Relations*
Ile-Ife ,Nigeria: Classy Prints & Company.

Rosenau J. N. (1970). *The Adaptation of National Societies*, New York: Macaleb.

Harsanyi, John (1969). “*Game theory and Analysis of International Conflict*”, in Rosenau N. J. (eds.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, Revised Edition, New York; The Free Press.

UNIT 2: LEVELS FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Contents

- 1.0. Introduction
- 2.0. Objectives
- 3.0. Main Body
 - 3.1. Levels of Analysis
 - 3.2. Flawed Models of Foreign Policy Analysis
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References / Further Readings

1.0. Introduction

Basically, we analyse policy including foreign policy in order to interpret the actions of government, which is in order to understand why government does certain things. The process of understanding why implies an in-depth understating of the contents and actors behind a given policy. For instance, the actions of government in the international arena must be understood in terms of its correlation with the resources and the objectives of government and more importantly the philosophical bases underlying a given policy.

In analyzing foreign policy, we look at government decisions, why it makes certain decisions, what forces are behind the decisions made etc. Our task in foreign policy analysis is not only to evaluate the policy actions of a state but also to know its processes. This involves the input-output stimuli. Thus, in a broad context, we deal with interaction between internal and external stimuli in the process of foreign policy decision making.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you are expected to:

- analyse the reasons behind government actions
- highlight forces behind government decisions
- assess philosophical bases underlying a state’s foreign policy
- explain the contents and actors behind some external policies

3.0 Main Body

3.1 Levels of Analysis

Levels of analysis are the recognition of the existence of different levels of analyzing foreign policy. Generally, there exist five levels of analysis in foreign policy. Each of these can provide an insight into the foreign policy actions of a given state. It also presents a study approach to the examination of the state's foreign policy action. The levels of analysis are as follows:

(i) **Individual:** The Foreign Minister of a state can be taken as an individual. In conducting foreign policy study of such a state, attention is focused on activities or statements or writings of the Foreign Minister of the state. Using this level of analysis, we can for example collect all the speeches and writing of Henry Kissinger while in the office as American Secretary of State or Ojo Maduekwe, Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister, and on the basis of this, makes some analysis of United States foreign policy at that particular period.

However, even though this approach will provide useful insights into the foreign policies of the United States and Nigeria for example, it has limitations. The approach may lead to ignoring other levels of analysis which may also provide useful input into the foreign policy study.

(ii) **Legislature:** At this level, one can study the debate and contributions of the legislature as regards foreign policy. In the United States, and Nigeria for instance, both arms of the legislature have committees on foreign relations. The activities of such committee could be thoroughly examined and studied. The attitudinal posture and deliberations of these committee on the country's foreign relations matter a lot in conducting such a study, one is focusing attention on a broader spectrum (legislature) than the individual (Foreign Minister).

(iii) **Bureaucracy:** At this level of foreign policy analysis one is considering the activities of the various branches of bureaucracy vis-à-vis foreign relations. The process of decision-making which rests in the hands of the bureaucrats' quite often reflect all shades of opinion held by the bureaucrats. Problems encountered in reaching foreign policy decisions are also considered in this respect.

(iv) **National:** This is the next level of the process of foreign policy analysis of a state. This level includes the interest groups and it gives a broader picture of the foreign policy of a state. Articulate groups in the state express their views on what should constitute the foreign policy of their state. Government can ill-afford to ignore the opinion of this group while formulating the state's foreign policy.

(v) **International:** In the study of foreign policy, the external environment has a determinant role in shaping the foreign policy of a state. Here we study various external stimuli in the process of foreign policy. Assuming that there is war

between two countries, for example Liberia and Sierra Leone, the external stimuli will be the stimuli generated by a third party, like South Africa or Rwanda. When a state reacts to the external stimuli, the reaction will enhance the analysis of the foreign policy of the state.

3.3. Flawed Models of Foreign Policy Analysis

How and why do governments follow certain policies and reject or even not consider others? Analysts are deeply divided over this basic question and have presented different models or theories to explain foreign policy behaviour. Each model is provocative, but all fall short of providing an adequate understanding of the diversity and complexity of foreign policy making. We shall consider the following models: “the power balance or realist”, status quo or revisionist, the great individual and interdependence explanations.

(i) The Power Balance or Realist Explanation: This model sees foreign policy as essentially shaped by one’s relative power within the international system. States are monolithic actors which simply react to shifts in the regional or global power balance. Domestic politics plays no significant role in shaping foreign policy. Democratic or authoritarian, communist or capitalist, the state’s internal organization and ideology are unimportant in explaining why states do the things they do. The only important factor is power. States constantly try to increase their own power and offset the rising power of others in the international system. The behaviour of policies or states thus change with shifts in the international power balance.

People who make foreign policy decision are assumed to be “rational”; have access to enough information to make rational decisions and then choose that option which best advances their nation’s interests within the prevailing power balance. The realist perspective is both an explanation of and a strategy for state behaviour.

This “realist” view of states foreign policy is not as realistic as it may appear. Although foreign policy decision makers do constantly attempt to rationally make decisions, they can rarely do so. Real policy making is not a rational process. States are not unitary actors. They are composed of different human individuals and institutions which are incapable of flawlessly gathering and processing the information vital for every decision, and then rationally make and implement the best decision for a given situation.

Policy makers and institutions are forced to make dozens of important and routine decisions daily, and rarely have the time, information or ability to rationally evaluate the options. And even when foreign policy makers make a rational decision, they often lack the power to implement that policy as they wish. As

Henry Kissinger puts it, policy makers are locked in an endless battle in which the urgent constantly gains on the important. The public life of every political figure is a continual struggle to rescue an element of choice from the presence of circumstances” (Kissinger, 1979:37). Ted Sorensen (1963) reveals that, “each step cannot be taken in order”. The facts may be in doubt or in dispute. Several policies, all good, may conflict. Started goals may be imprecise. There may be many interpretations of what is right, what is possible, and what the national interest is.

While realist explanation offers a strategy for governments, it cannot explain why states do not always or even usually follow the dictates of power politics. For example, according to the realist theory, Great Britain and France should have intervened against Hitler in 1936 when German troops marched into the demilitarised Rhineland, rather than waiting until Poland was attacked in 1939. Realist theory can only point out that Great Britain and France should have intervened, it cannot explain why they did not.

(ii) Status quo or Revisionist: Another explanation of foreign policy is that states hold either a status quo or revisionist orientation towards the world and act accordingly, while all states strive to protect their national interests, most are contented with the international status quo and their place in it. War is caused by a few trouble makers who try to revise the power balance in their favour. For example, during the 1930s, ambitious authoritarian governments in Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union sought to expand their power and carve out huge empires in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. At first, hobbled by an isolationist public, the status quo powers watched helplessly as Japanese, Italian and German armies conquered one state after another eventually, however, the status quo states went to war. France and Great Britain after Germany attacked Poland, and the Soviet Union after the United States was directly attacked by Germany and Japan respectively.

What causes a nation to be revisionist or status quo? Some argue that a nation’s ideology is the most important factor, that democratic states are naturally peace-loving while authoritarian or revolutionary states are inherently aggressive. George Kennan argues that:

“A democracy is peace-loving. It does not like to go to war. It is slow to rise to provocation. When it has once been provoked to the point where it must grab the sword, it does not easily forgive its adversary for having produced this situation. The fact of the provocation then becomes itself the issue. Democracy fight in anger-it fights for the very reason that it was forced to go to war. It fights to punish the power that was rash enough and hostile enough to

provoke it-to teach that power a lesson it will not forget, to prevent the thing from happening again. Such a war must be carried to the bitter end (Kennan, 1951)".

Revolutionary states are naturally aggressive-they seek a "revolution without borders" in which their ideology is imposed everywhere. Revolutionary France, the Soviet Union and Iran all dispatched their agents to foment revolution elsewhere. The classical expression of a revolutionary ideology affecting a nations foreign policy was the 1793 declaration by France's revolutionary government that:

The French nation declares that it will treat as enemies every people who, refusing liberty and equality or renouncing them, may wish to maintain; recall or treat with the prince and the privileged classes, on the other hand, it engages not to subscribe to any treaty and not to lay down its arms until the sovereignty and independence of the people whose territory the troops of the Republic shall have entered shall be established, and until the people shall have adopted the principles of equality and founded a free and democratic government (Hayes, 1950).

Eventually the fires of revolutionary ardor burn out and the revisionist state becomes a status quo state. The French were exhausted by a decade of revolution and eagerly accepted Napoleon's dictatorship in 1799 although, that did not inhibit the emperor from attempting to conquer Europe. Similarly in Iran, a decade of revolution and foreign war reduced the government and the people's revolutionary fire. Following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the successor, President Rafsanjani attempted to re-establish normal relations with other states.

Like the realist model, the revisionist/status quo foreign policy model is also limited. Few states in history have been revisionist in the revolutionary sense of trying to overthrow and change the entire world order. Virtually all states are revisionist in the sense that they want things from each other-territory, open markets, finance and so forth. At times governments believe that their interest in a conflict is worth going to war to protect or enhance the interest. Some of these wars led to sweeping changes in the power relations among states.

(iii) The Great Individual Explanation: Does human-kind make history or does history make humankind? Is history simply the sum of countless decisions made by unique individuals, or do leaders, even the most powerful, operate under enormous political constraints? Some argue that the character of those in power is decisive in shaping a nations foreign policy. Leaders constantly face decisions. Their decisions reflect a complex mix of their personality, intelligence,

knowledge, view of history, fears, and ambitions. Because all individuals are different, various individuals will make different decisions on the same national issues.

Contrast the different positions of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill to Hitler's rise. During the Czechoslovakia crisis of 1938, while Churchill was advocating a strong British response, Chamberlain remarked. "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of which we know nothing (Winston, 1948). And what would have been the fate of Germany and the world had Hitler been killed rather than spared in World War I.

The great individual explanation is flawed as well. Clearly, great leaders do at times matter. Try to imagine the twentieth century without the birth of Lenin, Mao Tse Tung, or Adolf Hitler. Yet of all the countless decisions made by a succession of national leaders, few dramatically change the nation's direction. We will of course, never know how different leaders would have responded to the same situations. But every leader, even those with the most sweeping dictatorial powers, face both domestic and international constraints.

A leader is only as powerful in international relations as his or her nations. For example, since coming to power in 1969, Libya's President Muammar Qadhafi has attempted to create a North African empire with himself as its head. His ambition has been derailed repeatedly because his country lacks the strength, military powers, finance, technology and allies to take over the region. Other Arab states, the United States and France have intervened to thwart its attempts to intimidate surrounding governments.

(iv) Interdependence-Explanation: The interdependence explanation combines elements of international and national perspectives, and maintains that growing interdependence between states and democracy within states will bind them to the point where power politics becomes impossible. International relations will increasingly be shaped by shared interest and negotiation rather than force. And foreign policies will be based on global interest rather than national interests.

Self Assessment Exercise (SAE)

Do people make history or does history make people?

4.0. Conclusion

Each of the models studied under this unit is provocative, and flawed to a certain degree. However, collectively they provide very good guide for an adequate

understanding of the diverse and complex intricacies of foreign policy decisions of nation states.

Generally, there is no hard and fast rule about the type of level that one adopts in analysing the foreign policy of a state. It all depends on what an analyst wishes to study. Any level may have relevance to a particular case study. But for an objective analysis of the foreign policy of a state, it is better to combine all the levels. It augurs well to take data from each level that would significantly assist in the analysis of a country's foreign policy.

5.0 Summary

To try to understand foreign policy is to try to understand history. Why did things happen as they did? What alternatives existed, and why were they not followed? The answer varies from one policy and one government to the next. In every country, each policy is shaped by an often vastly different constellation of internal and external forces. On the other hand, the theory to guide an analyst into knowing these variations in order to understand foreign policy also varies. There is no level of explanation that is all exhaustive.

5.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- i. What are some of the models by which analysts attempt to understand how foreign policies are made?
- ii. What are the flaws in those foreign policy models?
- iii. What are the five components of the level of analysis matrix?

6.0 References for further readings

Akingboye, Solomon, Ferdinand & Ottoh (2005). *A Systematic Approach to International relations*, Lagos, Nigeria: Concept Publication Limited.

Kennan George (1951). *American Diplomacy, 1900 – 1950*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Henry Kissinger (1979). *The White House Years*, Boston: Little Brown

Ted, Sorensen (1963). *Decision-making in the white House*, New York, Columbia University Press.

Winston, Churchill (1948). *The gathering Storm*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

UNIT 3: FOREIGN POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 Domestic Environment
 - 3.2 External Environment
 - 3.3 Global Interest
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignment (TMAs)
- 7.0 References / Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

The setting in which foreign policy is made is very important and also to a large extent shape the policies. One of the unique characteristics of foreign policy is that it is a policy made in relation to other units or actors in the international system. Unlike domestic policies, the targets of foreign policy decisions are not domestic but entities external to the state or beyond the state boundary. The process of foreign policy decision making is therefore influenced by factors that are not only internal to the state initiating particular policies, but also by pressure from sources that are external to it. In other words, two environments of foreign policy can be identified the domestic and external environments.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- analyse foreign policy in the context of external and internal environments
- appraise the effect of environment on foreign policy decisions of nation states
- explain the impact of both internal and external environments on foreign policy formulation.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 The Domestic Environment

The domestic influences on foreign policy include a country's demography, political structure, its military strategic situation, geography, economy, political parties, lobbies and interest groups, and public opinion. The primary influence on foreign policy however, relate to the objectives, which the decision makers intend to achieve on the international scene.

These interests may be short term or long term, and they range from the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state to the welfare of citizen, prestige and even the preservation or promotion of values. The range of a state's objectives and the priority accorded each of these goals will no doubt have a salutary influence on the foreign policy options of a state. Some of the vital influential factors are:

(i) Topography: A country's topography exercises an important influence on its foreign policy. It provides opportunities as it imposes limitations on what is feasible both in domestic and foreign policy programmes. Its location, topography, its terrain, climate, size, population and distribution of natural resources will not only affect the socio-economic development within the country, but it also determines the country's needs vis-à-vis other states as well as access to other areas of the world. Whether a country is landlocked, whether it is located in an arid, or tropic or polar region, whether it has long coastlines or long borders with many neighbouring states have very important implications for a country's foreign policy.

The size of a country also has implications for strategy. Has it got long borders to protect? The small size of Israel explains why Israeli leaders are very sensitive to issues of territorial concessions. It was relatively easier for them to return Sinai to Egypt because, Sinai when demilitarized is large enough to give the Israelis enough warning time and space in case of a violation of peace by Egypt. On the other hand, it has not been possible to work out similar agreement on the West Bank and Golan Heights because of the small size of the territories involved and their location near Israeli coastal plains where over 80 percent of Israel's population is concentrated.

(ii) Natural Resources:

The natural resources that a state is endowed with can also be a decisive element or factors in its foreign policy. Is the country endowed with natural resources? Are some of these resources scarce world-wide? However, for these resources to have bearing on policy, the decision makers must not only be aware of their existence, they must also have the human, technological and financial capabilities to exploit them. Besides, whether the economy of a country is a strong or weak one is also crucial. A weak economy can limit the options available in foreign policy. The Arab world is endowed with large quantity of oil and thus provides a large proportion of Western Europe's oil supplies. The Arab nations employed this as a

weapon during the Arab-Israeli war when they had to place embargo on oil supplies to countries that supported Israel.

Another element in this regard is self-sufficiency in food production. The issue of food production can be used as an instrument of foreign policy to achieve certain purposes, particularly during wars. For instance, Germany realized this too well and fought to gain a comparatively early victory before its severely limited food supply exhausted. Nigeria successfully prosecuted the civil war because it had to block the avenues through which Biafra got food relief. It is no gain saying that political leaders always evolve ways of satisfying the needs of food and energy because they are the lifeblood of a nation.

The foreign policy of a state is often affected by the extent to which a country's economy is in deficit or surplus in terms of capital, technical skills and finance. What is the level of the country's industrialization? Is the country's degree of industrial capacity adequate to sustain a reasonable high standard of living and are the military forces and equipment adequate for its defence?

(iii) Population: The size and socio-economic status of a nation's population constitutes another intangible element of foreign policy. It is a quantitative factor which should be considered in the delineation of a country's foreign policy capacity. The importance of India and China in this regard is becoming evident, especially as countries have shown some measure of deference to them in view of their population. Nigeria is gaining some recognition because of the rate of growth of its population. States with smaller population do not enjoy such attention.

Population as an element of foreign policy, depends on other related elements e.g. quality of population, political leadership, degree of national morale, prestige etc. The Arab nations could not overwhelm the moral collectivity of Israel nor could America's might subdue the fighting spirit of the Vietnamese forces. In effect, large population may enable or prevent a state from achieving its foreign policy objectives depending on a number of other factors.

A country's population also indicate the limits and potentials of the country. Its number, the level of education and technical skill, its composition, structure and growth rate, whether it is homogeneous or heterogonous will influence policy options. Internal ethnic diversity may create political difficulties, which may consequently weaken a government. It may even create fertile grounds for anti-state activities by external enemies.

(iv) Industrial Element: Since the industrial revolution, nations have come to attach much importance to industrial growth. Countries such as the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Japan have all undergone some form of industrial and

military metamorphoses to emerge comparatively stronger in the contemporary global system. It was for instance, the industrial potentials of the United States that gave it an edge over others and hence victories to the allied powers in the World War II. The balance of power had since then been tilted in favour of America.

It is in response to technological advancement that the advanced countries are currently acquiring sophistication in their military capabilities. The super powers are using coercive diplomacy to suppress others from attempting to expand their own military technological capability. This is to ensure their continued dominance in international relations. For instance the current face off between North Korea and the international community for North Korea's nuclear weapon development.

A country that depends on external sources for military hardware to defend itself will not only have its foreign policy actions constrained in relation to the "giving states", but it is also bound to have sharp limits imposed on its foreign policy objectives, particularly those concerned with security and strategic issues. The size, quality and mobility of a country's armed forces are important factors when issues that have military implications are at stake.

(v) The Internal Structure of Decision Making

The structure of government also plays a role in shaping a country's foreign policy. The structure and the process of decision making varies from system to system and from country to country. The constitution of a state defines and sets limits, for examples, on the role of particular individuals or branches of government in foreign policy making.

The constitutional channels through which the decision making process flows also affect the nature of those decisions. In the United States, for example, the congress has a coordinating role with the Executive on foreign policy matters. In contrast, however, the former Soviet Union did not provide the Supreme Soviet with such a role. In Britain, foreign policy decisions are as a rule taken by the whole cabinet and the role and impact of the legislature is extremely limited. The House of Commons, unlike its American counterpart does not even have the power of ratification of treaties. It only exercises some pressure through "Question Time" and debates. The U.S. Congress on the other hand, exercises very strong influence especially in such areas as foreign aid and where annual appropriations are required. Congress can even initiate policy on limited scale through delays, foreign travels by individual and / or groups of legislators. In countries with less established constitutional practices like we find in Africa, the heads of governments are less hampered by constitutional limitations.

(vi) Public Opinion

The domestic public opinion sometimes influence the foreign policy of a country. It is difficult to generalize about the relationship between public opinion and a government's foreign policy objectives and diplomatic opinion. It is difficult to ascertain the impact of public opinion since it is largely uncrystalized. Besides, because of the sensitive nature of foreign policy, the general lack of adequate information on foreign countries and events and lack of sufficient interest in foreign policy on the part of the general public, public opinion is thought not to exercise such influence on policy makers. Joseph Frankel points out that even when information is available, the judgment of public opinion is often wrong. George F. Kennan stresses its slow reaction while Walter Lipman contends, that "The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at the critical junctures". Its weakness according to him lies in its invariable choice of the soft opinion.

It is difficult to be precise about the impact of public opinion in a particular country on a particular policy. Some decision-makers obey the dictates of public opinion, others disregard it. But all of them, even in military dictatorships strive to mould and re-orient it. As Reynolds aptly concludes, "the successful leader is the one who is sensitive to the movement of opinion and who diverts or re-orientes it perhaps, but who does not set himself in direct opposition to it. Lord Strang states thus:

"A government may fairly claim that it can be in a better position to judge the national interest than the public itself, it can hope that public doubts will respond in time to repeated and authoritative expositions of the government's case, or best of all that events themselves will vindicate the policy. It cannot be denied that public ventilation of issues of foreign policy, often at awkward moments has a hampering effect upon the flexibility, resourcefulness, and imagination with which diplomatic relations might otherwise be more fruitfully, conducted.

(vii) Pressure/Interest Groups

Political parties and pressure groups exercise influence on the foreign policy of states. However, the influences of such groups vary from country to country and from issue to issue. It also depends upon such variable as general strength or weakness of the government, whether there is a pending election or not, and the extent to which an unsatisfied group can politically harm leaders who resist it.

3.2. The External Environment

We stated earlier, that the very nature and aim of foreign policy makes the process of its decisions making susceptible to influences external to the state. This is expected. The international system to which foreign policies are directed is

composed of foreign independent states, entities over which the initiating state has no authority or jurisdiction. Decision makers must therefore be constantly aware of the interests of other actors in the system. Sufficient account must be taken of what these actors have done, or are doing or are likely to do in the future in response to a particular policy in question.

Account also has to be taken of the relative capabilities of interacting entities. Changes in the international power structure may, for examples bring about fundamental changes in the objectives and actions of states. Apart from international power configuration, the structures of international economic relations also affect the options available to states.

(i) International Law

The existence of international law and international ethical norms acts in greater or lesser degree to limit the freedom to maneuver of states in the system. It is true that international law is in many respects different from domestic law, it does not flow from the enactment of a body with authority to make laws like legislatures, and it is not enforceable like domestic law. It is mainly constituted by agreements among states on the conventions which are to guide states' mutual relations. Nevertheless, states in their own interests do observe these laws and norms most of the time, despite the absence of an enforcement agency.

(ii) International Organisations

A country's foreign policy option is also often affected by its membership of international organizations. The existence of many of these institutions which are established for a variety of reason's ranging from cultural to economic and political-strategic is a major feature of the post 1945 international system. Member states policies are usually affected by the nature of the particular institution and its policy objectives on the one hand and the affect of their institutional membership on the policies of other states towards them on the other hand. However, the degree to which member state's policies are affected by their membership is a function of value attached to a particular membership of the organization. But if it is military alliance, member states policies are generally affected and even determined by the constitution of the alliance.

4.0 Conclusion

It should be noted that the importance of any particular factor is dependent on the policy-maker's image of the situation, which is the psychological environment. It is not uncommon to find participants in the process of foreign policy decision-making having different perceptions of policy objectives as well as of the realities of the environment.

Different beliefs, values and wants of people create in their minds certain expectations and desires about information concerning their environment. The crucial determining factor is therefore the decision-makers perception of their environment. Policy makers are however cognizant of the dangers for policy outcomes inherit in the existence of a wide gap between the psychological and operational environments. They therefore, make efforts to narrow such gaps, particularly by ensuring that they have as much information as possible by relying on more than one source of information.

Self Assessment Examination (SAE)

Opinions are divided about the importance of public opinion on foreign policy decision-making. Discuss

5.0 Summary

States and the global system make-up two distinct levels: the state level encompasses domestic characteristics, and the global or international system level encompasses all actor relationships and the changes in these relations over time. Although these two traditionally discrete realms have become increasingly fused in what is called interment decision making, as the need for leaders to coordinate their domestic and foreign policies has increased with the globalisation of international relations, this categorical distinction is still useful for purposes of analysis.

External environment of foreign policy include all activities occurring beyond a state's borders that affect the choices made by its official and the people they govern. Such factors as the content of international law, the number of military alliances and the changing levels of international trade sometimes profoundly affect the choices of decision-makers. Internal environment on the other hand are those that exist at the level of the state, not global level. Here attention focuses on variations in states attributes, such as demographic, geography, military capabilities, levels of economic development, and types of governments, that may influence different actor's foreign policy choices.

7.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- i. Using Nigeria as an example, explain how the structure of government in the past ten year plays a role in shaping a country's foreign policy.
- ii. Discuss the effect of external environment on foreign policy making
- iii. Using Nigeria as an example, explain how the structure of government in the past ten year plays a role in shaping a country's foreign policy
- iv. Using United States of America as an example, explain how the structure of

Government plays a role in shaping a country's foreign policy

=

7.0 References for further Readings

Frankel, Joseph (1967). *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making*, London: Oxford University Press.

Ojo, Olusola and Amadu Sesay, (2002). *Concepts in International Relations* Ile-Ife, Nigeria: Classy Prints & Company.

Reynolds, P. A. (1982). *An Introduction to International Relations Second Edition*, London: Longman.

UNIT 4: PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 Level of Analysis Problem
 - 3.2 Theoretical Frameworks
 - 3.3 Establishing Boundaries
 - 3.4 Scope of Subject
 - 3.5 Source of Materials
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References for Further Readings.

1.0 Introduction

The study and history of foreign policy analysis contained a number of problems and weaknesses which have contributed in preventing the development of theory. It is important to note that the field mirrors many of the central methodological problems in the nexus between social science and history. Foreign policy analysis has not been able to resolve these neither have any other discipline. In addition to the specific problems and weaknesses, one must add the critical issues of what constitutes an explanation, and whether scientific method is applicable to the analysis of human behaviour.

In fairness, these form parts of much wider debates on the philosophy of history and social sciences, it is not surprising that such problems remain unresolved, but foreign policy analysis would do well to be aware of their methodological assumptions and of the weaknesses as well as the strengths of any particular method. Given that their training has tended to be in either history or social science, it is all too easy and convenient to accept *a priori* the soundness of a particular methodology. Just as it is common to talk of decision-makers being trapped by closed belief systems so this also applies to those studying them.

Indeed, the history of foreign policy analysis both in Britain and the United States indicate how beguiling are the paradigms in which the study is undertaken, in a very important way the very division of the sub-field into identifiable schools

adhering either to a particular methods or to particular middle range or grand theories has served to foreclose discussion on the central area of method. Precisely because each approach has its utility in explaining events so it is convenient to leave on one side doubts as to the coherence of its structure and the assumptions it makes as to questions of method and epistemology. Nevertheless, in the history of foreign policy analysis, there have been five major problems in the study of foreign policy Analysis. These problems are discussed below.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to do the following:

- to identify the problems confronting foreign policy analysis
- to discuss what have been the pitfalls in the study of foreign policy
- to clarify how foreign policy was explained by the major theories of International Relations before the sub-field of foreign policy analysis.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 The Problem of the Level of Analysis.

The subject can be approached from different levels of analysis, with each, creating different concerns for the analyst. The analysis of foreign policy can be done from the standpoint of the individual, or the state or the international system. For example, any foreign policy action can be viewed in terms of its relationship from individual perceptions or in terms of its relationship to the structure and organizations of the state, or in terms of its impact on, and relationship to the external setting in which it takes place.

The systematic approach often concentrates the attention of the analyst on the foreign ministry and government, and tends to regard the domestic context as one of the background factors of policy making. On the other hand, the nation state level analysis tends to see partisan conflict, interest group, pressure and elite opinion as rather more central to the formulation of foreign policy.

Furthermore, is the qualitative analysis of foreign policy as represented by some scholars. Their works indicate the inherent problems of inductive quantitative, research: that is, the work is concerned with describing not explaining the foreign policies of states. All too often quantitative work ends up being an exercise in elegant mathematics, with the findings telling us nothing about foreign policy, but about the utility of certain forms of data manipulation. Each study develops certain measures for dealing with the data and discusses their utility in comparison to those of other studies; this does little to advance the understanding of why states do what they do. It also reflects the weaknesses of the simple positivist notion of social science in its implications about the theory that can be built. This is not to

say that data has no place in foreign policy analysis, but that cannot be analyzed only in terms of its relationship to certain quantitative measures.

Quantitative analysis in foreign policy analysis is in danger of becoming an enclosed area of study that concentrates not on foreign policy behaviour but on the advantages and disadvantages of certain quantitative techniques. To repeat the old adage, correlation is not causation, and to the extent that the analysts of foreign policy dealt with the issues of how best to obtain correlation coefficient, the risk is that the subject will not address the real important relationship between data and behaviour and it would become an exercise on how best to describe rather than on how best to explain.

3.2 Theoretical Frameworks

The search for a general theory is another problem of foreign policy analysis. Despite the efforts of those engaged in comparative foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s, a general theory did not emerge. This was not for lack of research in this area, nor lack of finance. Those approaches that claimed to lead to general theory failed, in most cases never getting beyond the pre-theory or even data collection stage, for the simple reason of their epistemological assumptions, it was assumed that if everyone used the same concepts, collected data, tested hypothesis, then theory would emerge. How this was to happen was not specified. The pre-theory led to considerable research with many attempts to offer rank-orderings of the potency of the source of variables for certain types of states. Yet once this had been achieved, there was no easy way of turning findings into theory.

There is no amount of data that can lead to the entirely separate cognitive act of creating theory. Even if the pre-theory led to an unambiguous ranking of the source-variables for each genotype of hate, upon which all those engaged in this research could agree, the assumption that this would lead to theory seems unrealistic. This is not arguing that such findings would be trivial, nor to suggest that they would lead to theory seems very questionable. That the work on the pre-theory could not even lead to unambiguous finding merely highlights, the problems of coherence and logical structure that the model faced.

Consequently, the subject can be approached within different theoretical frameworks. They affect the analyst's choice of focus. There are bound to be differences not only in the focus of study but also in the choice of questions asked and the conclusions reached by analysts who are, for example convinced adherents of power politics and those who are utopian idealists. In like manner, differences are easily distinguishable between the 'classical' or traditional and the scientific adherers. James Barber and Michael Smith rightly observed, "Foreign Policy has witnessed the confrontation of behavioural and more traditional approaches, the juxtaposition of science and human judgment" (Barber and Smith, 1974).

There has been the unwillingness of those working in the discipline to undertake cumulative study. Stated broadly, there has been little in the way of testing the theories that have been developed. For example, how many studies have tested Allison's bureaucratic politics approach, or Janis's think approach, to name only two of the most widely-cited theories? The study of foreign policy has simply not indicated willingness on the part of those who work in it to test theories of others. While some approaches do suffer from serious problems of operationalization, this does not apply to all approaches, and the absence of tests of theories has constituted a serious impediment to the development of the study of foreign policy.

3.3 Establishing the Boundaries

According to William Wallace as cited in Ojo and Sesay (2002), there are two aspects of the boundary problem in the study of foreign policy. First, to policy makers as well as students, the subject of foreign policy bridges the boundary between the nation-state and its international environment. And second, to students of foreign policy, it straddles the boundary between two academic disciplines: the study of domestic government, commonly called political science, and the study of international politics and diplomacy, commonly referred to as international relations. Both of these aspects of the problem have given certain distinctiveness and a certain peculiar difficulty to the study of foreign policy. It is for example difficult to separate what is entirely domestic from foreign policy issues. Immigration issues are often not just issues of internal security; they have important consequences for foreign policy.

The result has been the rather surprising reliance on the seductive notion of the national interest. Despite very serious deficiencies that have been found with the term (national interest) it is still very popular with foreign policy makers. But its continued popularity in many foreign policy studies has hindered the development of the subject. The precise reason that makes it so popular with practitioners is that it can be used to mean whatever the user wishes. In international relations, the term has a common sensual appeal because it is still convenient to think of each state as having interest within a society of states.

There is also the problem of the inability to agree on what the state is and what foreign as opposed to domestic policy consists of. In the last two decades or so, conceptions of both the state and of the distinction between domestic and foreign policy have shifted back and forth. As the Cold War led to *détente* and as this gave way to a possibility of a Second Cold War, foreign policy analysts have altered their views on what this thing called the state is, on what its foreign policy consists of and on how this can be demarcated from domestic policy. It is therefore not surprising that foreign policy analysis has faced serious problems given that these

issues are central to its identity and to its way of studying international relations. Nevertheless, it has posed very serious problems for the subject area, and all the indications are that this will continue.

3.4 The scope of the subject

It is important to note that there are also other problems of the study of international relations as a whole. In essence, and to differing degrees, they apply to many of the other main areas of the discipline, yet they seem to have had a more marked impact on foreign policy analysis than other sub-fields. This is because foreign policy analysis is at the intersection of four main epistemological, methodological and even ontological difficulties that apply to varying extents to all areas of the study of international relations.

The analyst is therefore faced with the problem of the extent and the diversity of the terrain to be covered by the subject. This is particularly so, because of the diverse character of and the importance attached to the subject from state to state or from one system to another. For example, the nature of foreign policy process, indeed the whole problem of foreign policy is different in democratic states from that in non-democratic states, in developed countries from that in developing countries, in great powers from small or weak states etc. Furthermore, it should be recognized that the foreign policy of a country is not just simply a result of certain processes of deliberation within the governmental institutions of the particular country. To have a complete picture of the foreign policy of a country one needs a full and detailed account of all the foreign policies of other states in the international system. This in no doubt seems beyond the bounds of human ability.

Thus, because foreign policy analysis has to take into account the perceptions of those who make decisions at the same time as it attempts to relate state behaviour to process or structural factors, it highlights the problems of any theory of human behaviour. The easiest way out of this is to eschew any generalization and proceed on a case-by-case, basis of course; it is obscured to pretend that this solves the problem as case study analysis reflects powerful, of implicit, theoretical dispositions and assumptions. Just because a historical case study does not have the pretensions of a general theory does not mean that it does not involve (questionable) notions of causation especially at the level of why actors do what they do. The failure of general theories in foreign policy analysis does not mean that one can retreat to a safe-ground of non-contentious, non-theoretical case studies.

3.5 Lack of Information

The nature of foreign policy creates a problem of information for the analyst. Foreign policy is a most sensitive aspect of government activity. A lot of what goes into its making is, therefore shrouded in secrecy. Besides, discretions as well as misinformation characterize all modern diplomacy. The analysts thus, encounter the difficulties of getting at the facts before the files are opened. Yet, the analysis of the foreign policy of a state entails the consideration of some matters which no academic observer can be entirely privy.

Sometimes, a former participant in government, like a foreign minister or head of government may write his reminiscences in a newspaper or publish a book of memoirs to supplement regular source of matter. These are no doubt very helpful, even if they have to be treated with reserve. It is the almost absence of such writings by former practitioners in third World Countries, particularly in Africa that makes analyzing the foreign policy of those states more difficult. And the adoption in most African countries especially Nigeria, the British concept of a permanent professional civil service that is immune from public criticism and debarred from public comment has meant that the possibility of inside information filtering into the public is blocked.

Another difficulty relates to the controversy over the definition of actors in international relations. Foreign policy is seen purely as state action. As J. P. Nestle stresses, "for almost all intents and purposes, the state acts for the society internationally, and internal matters relating to foreign affairs are a state prerogative" (J. P. Nestle 1967). Yet the comprehension of states' foreign policies often involve a clear understanding and appreciation of the political role of non-governmental entities in the international system.

Self assessment Examination (SAE)

Discuss theoretical framework as a problem to the study of foreign policy analysis.

4.0 Conclusion

Foreign policy analysis has been at the intersection between a set of fundamentally problematic issues that have had implications for all areas of the study of international relations. This explains the peculiar difficulties that have beset the development of the subject areas and underlies the current breakdown of consensus on how best to undertake the study of foreign policy analysis. It would be misleading to suggest that there is an easy way out of this problem and it is unlikely that the subject area will achieve consensus on how to study foreign policy precisely, because the impact of these factors (problems) have been so marked.

This syndrome has led some to portray foreign policy analysis as a pseudo-science, a diagnosis made all more appealing given the grandiose claims advanced

by those who claimed that this “normal science” would lead to general theory. The manifest failure to turn this claim into a reality has led to a considerable loss of momentum in the subject, and has resulted in a severe identity crisis. Yet, there is a strong belief that foreign policy analysis has much to offer for the study of international relations.

Foreign policy does not form patterns; it is to be explained by structure and processes that are common, if to variable extents among different states, and the explanation it provides are more economical than other theories of state behaviour. The obvious failures of the grandest scheme have blinded the practioners to their successes. There is no ‘truth’ out there waiting for discovery of one and embracing theory. The scholars and practioners are therefore in business of dealing with competing theories and explanations, and in this light foreign policy analysis has aided, and will continue to aid the study of international relations.

5.0 Summary

The study of foreign policy is fraught with a number of difficulties. These problems are in part due to the very nature of the subject itself, and also to the current state of development of the discipline. Understanding the foreign policy of a particular country entails examining a mix of factors- historical, ideological, geographical, economic, political and cultural. Often, centered on the state as a major actor, foreign policy making and implementation is unavoidably elitist as the decision making process mainly involve the executive, the foreign ministry and sometimes the legislative. The pursuit of National Interest is often articulated by the political and economic elite and manifested as foreign policy.

Finally, foreign policy analysis focus on the state and on the content of foreign policy has been particularly problematic given the recent empirical developments discussed above. Not only does foreign policy analysis have to deal with a shifting and variable notion of the state, it also has to deal with a rapidly changing relationship between foreign and domestic politics and the change that this implies for the domestic setting, and influence upon foreign policy.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignment (TMAs)

- i. The nature of foreign policy creates problems of information for the analyst. Explain the problems and suggest ways out.
- ii. How does “establishing boundaries” constitute a problem to the study of foreign policy?
- iii. In what way has the study of foreign policy analysis aided and will continue to aid the study of international relations?

7.0 References for further Readings

Nestle J.P. (1974). “*The States as a Conceptual Variable in World Politics Vol. XX*”, Barber & Smith (eds.) *The Nature of Foreign Policy*, Edinburgh: Holme McDougal.

Ojo, Olusola and Amadu Sesay (2002). *Concepts in International Relations II*-Ife, Nigeria: Classy Prints & Company.

MODULE 3: FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

Unit 1 The Unitary Actor and Rational Decision Making

Unit 2 The Bureaucratic Politics of foreign Policy Decision Making

Unit 3 The Role of Leaders in Foreign Policy Decision Making

Unit 4 Constraints on Foreign Policy Making

UNIT 1: THE UNITARY ACTOR AND RATIONAL DECISION MAKING

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 States as Unitary Actors
 - 3.2 Policy Making Rational Choice
 - 3.3 Impediments to Rational Choice
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References for further Readings

1.0 Introduction

When we speak generally about foreign policy and the decision-making processes that produce it, we mean the goals that official leading states (and all other transnational actors) seek abroad, the values that underlie those goals, and the means or instruments to pursue them. According to the Realist School of Thought, the primary goal of foreign policy is to ensure state survival.

From this view point, strategic calculations about national security are the determinants of policy-makers' choices. Domestic politics and the process of policy making itself are of secondary concern. Based on this, the unitary actor and rational decision-making assumes that foreign policy making consists primarily of adjusting the state to the pressure of the global system and in the process; the essential properties (actions) remain the same among the individual state.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- assess the states being referred to as unitary actors
- discuss policy making in the light of rational choice
- highlight the impediments to rational choice by policy makers
- explain how changes at the global level affect state actions.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 States as Unitary Actor.

Realism and especially neutralism emphasize that changes at the global level of foreign policy analysis determine state action. It assumes that foreign policy making consists primarily of adjusting the state to the pressures of an anarchical global system whose essential properties will not vary. Accordingly, it presumes that all states and the individuals responsible for their foreign policies confront the problem of national survival in similar ways. Thus, all decision makers are essentially alike in their approach to foreign policy making. Verbal, (1969:225) put it this way:

“If they follow the (decision) rules, we need know nothing more about them. In essence, if the decision makers behave rationally, the observer, knowing the rules of rationality, can rehearse the decisional process in his own mind, and if he knows the decision maker’s goals, can both predict the decision and understand why that particular decision was made”.

Because Realists believe that leaders’ goals and their corresponding approach to foreign policy choices are the same, the decision-making processes of each state can be studied as though each were a unitary actor—a homogeneous or monolithic unit with few or no important internal differences that affects its choices.

One way to picture this assumption is to think of states as billiard balls and the table on which they interact as the global system. The balls (states) continuously clash and collide with one another and the actions of each are determined by its interactions with the others, not by what occurs inside it. According to this Realist view, the leaders who make foreign policy, the types of governments they lead, the characteristics of their societies, and the internal economical and political conditions of the states they head are unimportant. Thus, unitary actor—a transnational actor (usually a sovereign state) is assumed to be internally united, so that changes in its domestic opinion do not influence its foreign policy as much as do the decisions the actor’s leaders make to cope with changes in its global environment.

3.2 Policy Making as a Rational Choice

The decision making processes of unitary actors that determine national interest are typically described as rational. We define rationality or rational choice here as purposeful, goal directed behaviour exhibited when “the individual responding to an international event...uses the best information available and chooses from the universe of possible responses that alternative most likely to maximize his or her goals’ (verbal, 1969). Scholars describe the rationality as a sequence of decision-making activities involving the following intellectual steps:

(i) Problem Recognition and Definition: The need to decide begins when policy makers perceive an external problem and attempt to define objectively its distinguishing characteristics. Objectivity requires full information about the actions, motivations, and capabilities of other actors as well as the character of the international environment and trends within it. The search for information must be exhaustive, and all the facts relevant to the problem must be gathered.

(ii) Goal Selection: Next is that those responsible for making policy choices must determine what they want to accomplish. This disarmingly simple requirement is often difficult. It requires the identification and ranking of all values such as security, democracy and economic prosperity in a hierarchy from most to least preferred.

(iii) Identification of Alternatives: Rationality also requires the compilation of an exhaustive list of all available policy options and an estimate of the costs associated each alternative.

(iv) Choice: Finally, rationality requires selecting the single alternative with the best chance of achieving the desired goal(s). For this purpose, policy-makers must conduct a rigorous means-end, cost benefit analysis guided by an accurate prediction of the probable success of each option.

Policy makers often describe their own behaviour as resulting from a rational decision-making process designed to reach the “best” decision possible. Indeed, some past foreign policy decisions do reveal elements of this idealized process, well described by former U. S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger when he observed that;

An effective decision making process must ... reflect well-thought-out policy choices, that is, they must answer these questions: what are we trying to achieve, or what are we trying to prevent”. What consequences do we expect from this decision, and what steps do we have in mind for dealing with them? What is the cost of the proposed action”. Are we willing to pay that price, and for what length of time? (Kissinger, 1999).

The elusive quest for rational decision making was illuminated in the crises that the second Bush administration faced. Most members of the closed circle of George W. Bush’s U. S. advisers in September 2001 claimed that they were faithfully following the rules for rational choice in their declared war against “global terrorism” following 9/11/2001, and in their decision to attack dictator Saddam Hussein of Iraq. For Example, the administration in the latter case launched a campaign in public diplomacy to persuade all states that it was in their

best interest to recognize the danger posed by the high probability that Iraq had illegally obtained weapons of mass destruction, and it took its argument to the United Nations (UN). The message was clothed in the language of deliberate logistical choice to convince skeptics that the costs and benefits of all options had been carefully weighed.

However, like beauty, rationality lies in the eyes of the beholder, and reasonable, clear, thinking people can disagree and often do disagree about the facts and about the wisdom of foreign policy goals. Note that counter argument of Bush's war planning were also couched in terms of rationality-criticism that attacked the premises on which Bush's big plans for a major war were biased. For example, one Australian observer complained that "unless Bush can mount a more persuasive case that Saddam is uniquely dangerous, Iraq's overthrow by force would send a powerful message that 'might is right' and that the United States alone determines the rules of the game. This would be a repudiation of norms that have governed the conduct of international relations for the past half-century".

This argument demonstrated as constructivism warns that rationality is a decision-making goal to which all international actors aspire but that it is difficult to determine when the criteria for rational choice have been met. This raises the question- what are the barriers to rationality?

3.4 Impediments to Rational Choice

Despite the apparent application of rationality in these crises, rational choice is often more an idealized standard than an accurate description of real-world behaviour. Theodore Sorenson, one of President Kennedy's closest advisers and a participant in the Cuban missile deliberations has written not only about the steps policymakers in the Kennedy administration followed as they sought to follow the process of rational choice, but also about how actual decision making departed from it. He described an eight-step process for policy making that is consistent with the model we are describing.

- (i) Agreeing on the facts
- (ii) Agreeing on the overall policy objective
- (iii) Precisely defining the problems
- (iv) Canvassing all possible solutions
- (v) Listing the possible consequences that follow from each solution
- (vi) Recommending one option
- (vii) Communicating the option selected and
- (viii) Providing for its execution.

But he explained how difficult it is to follow these steps, in this way:-

...each step cannot be taken in order. The facts may be in doubt or dispute. Several policies, all good, may conflict. Several means, all bad, may differ. Stated goals may be imprecise. There may be much interpretation of what is right, what is possible, and what is in the national interest (Sorensen, 1963).

Despite the virtues rational choice promises, the impediment to its realization in foreign policy making are substantial. Some of the barriers that make errors in foreign policy so common are human, deriving from deficiencies in the intelligence, capability and psychological needs and aspirations of foreign policy decision makers. Others are organizational, because most decisions require group agreements about the national interest and the wisest course of action. Reaching agreement is not easy, however, as reasonable people with different values, often disagree about goals, preferences and probably results of alternative options. Thus the impediments to rational policy making are not to be underestimated.

Scrutiny of the actual process of decision making reveals other hindrances. Available information is often insufficient to recognize emergent problems accurately, resulting in decision made on the basis of incomplete information. Moreover, the available information is often inaccurate, because the bureaucratic organizations, political leaders, on advice, screen, sort and rearrange it.

Compounding the problem is decision maker's susceptibility to cognitive dissonance- they are psychologically prone to block out dissonant, or negative information and perceptions about their preferred choice and to look instead for information that justified that choice. They are also prone to decisions on the basis of "first impression, or intuition, or that amorphous blending of what is with what could be". This is what we call imagination even though, there is a great body of data suggesting that formal statistical analysis is a much more better way of predicting everything than intuition, even of experts.

In addition, determining what goals best serve national interests are difficult, especially in the realm of foreign policy, which risks are high and there is much uncertainty. Decision making often revolves around the difficult task of choosing among values, so that the choice of one option means the sacrifice of others. Further, there is seldom a sufficient basis for confidently making choices. Consequently, so many decisions seem to produce bad unintended consequences. People tend to avoid the challenge of searching for option to realize priority goals. This accounts for the tendency for after-the-fact decisions to frequently require later re-evaluation. Decision makers are then disappointed to discover that what they thought was not nearly as valuable as other things are actually important.

There seldom exists a confident basis for making foreign policy decisions. Alongside uncertainty, many decisions tend to produce negative unintended consequences, what economists call externalities. Decision makers' inability to rapidly gather and digest large quantities of information constrains their capacity to make informed choices. Because policy makers' work with overloaded policy agendas and short deadlines, the search for options is seldom exhaustive. In the choice phase, then decision makers rarely make value maximizing choices. Instead of selecting the option with the best chance of success, they typically end their evaluation as soon as alternative appears that seems superior to those already considered. Rather than optimizing by seeking the best alternative, decision makers are routinely content to choose the first option that meets minimally acceptable standards. Because they frequently face such difficult choices that make it impossible to choose without compromising competing preferences, often only choices that appear "good enough" and available are selected, costs and benefits are not carefully calculated.

In short, decision makers are prone to rush to judgment. They rapidly estimate whether rival options are good or bad, react to these nastily constructed classifications, and then are content to settle with the relative goods as oppose to the best.

Self Assessment Examination (SAE)

What are the impediments to rational decision making?

5.0 Conclusion

Many studies from political psychology and behavioural economics demonstrate that most individuals do not behave according to rational choice' model of decision making. They do not cautiously evaluate all available options and choose the optimal solution. Instead, they tend to use "rules of thumb" that permit them to make quick choices to simplify complexities. These decision rules create biases and miscalculations in peoples' decision making capabilities.

Thus, rational foreign policy decision making is more an ideal than reality. However, we can still assume that policymakers aspire to rational decision-making behaviour, which they may occasionally approximate. But as a working proposition, it is useful to accept rationality as a picture of how decision process should work as well as a description of key elements of how it does work.

5.0 Summary

Policymakers often describe their own behaviour as resulting from a rational decision making process designed to reach the best decision possible. Despite the image that policymakers seek to project, and although they can sometimes absorb new information quickly under great pressure and take calculated risks through

deliberate planning, more often the degree of rationality bears little relationship to the world in which officials conduct their deliberations.

Decision makers are those individuals greatly shaped by the socially accepted shared understanding of national interests and foreign policy within their own policy-making community and culture. Consequently these dominating ideas inevitably reduce their capacity to make fully rational choices.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- (i) All decision makers are essentially alike in their approach to foreign policy making. Discuss.
- (ii) Discuss policy making in the light of rational choice.
- (i) What are the impediments to rational decision making?

7.0 References for Further Readings

Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow (1999). *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crises*, 2nd ed., New York: Longman.

Kegley, Charles (2007). *World Politics: Trend and Transformation. Eleventh Edition* Belmont, U. S. A: Thompson Wadsworth.

Hermann, Charles, Kegley Charles & Rosenan, Hermann (1987). *New directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Boston: Allen & Unwin.

UNIT 2: THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 Bureaucratic Efficiency and Rationality
 - 3.2 Limit of Bureaucratic Organization
 - 3.3 Attributes of Bureaucratic Behavior
 - 3.4 Consequences of Bureaucratic Behavior
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignment (TMAs)
- 7.0 References for further readings

1.0 Introduction

In today's world, states' extensive political, military, and economic relations require dependence on large scale organizations. Leaders turn to these organizations for information and advice as they face critical foreign policy choices. Although this is more true of great power nations than of small nation, even those without large budgets and complex foreign policy bureaucracies seldom make decisions without the advice and assistance of many individuals and administrative agencies. Organizations perform vital services, enhancing the state's capacity to cope with global circumstances.

In the United States, for instance, the State Department, Defence Department, and Central Intelligence Agency are all key participants in the foreign policy machinery. In Nigeria, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and staff from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) are the key role players in the making of foreign policy.

Other agencies also bear responsibility for specialized aspects of the U. S. foreign relations such as the Treasury, Commerce, and the Agriculture departments. Similar agencies characterize the foreign affairs machinery of most other major

powers, whose governments face many of the same foreign policy management challenges.

3.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, students should be able to:

- analyse bureaucratic efficiency and rationality in foreign policy decision making
- highlight the limits of bureaucratic organization behaviour in foreign policy making
- evaluate the consequences of bureaucratic behaviour
- explain the different agencies involved in foreign policy decision making.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 Bureaucratic Efficiency and Rationality

Bureaucratic management of foreign relations is not new. However, with the internalization of domestic politics during the twentieth century, the growth of large scale organizations to manage foreign relations has spread more than ever before. Bureaucratic procedures based on the theoretical work of the German Social Scientist Max Weber are commonplace, primarily because they are perceived to enhance national decision making and efficient administration.

Bureaucracies increase efficiency and rationality by assigning responsibility for different tasks to different people. They define value and standard operating procedures that specify how tasks are to be performed; they rely on record systems to gather and store information; they divide authority among different organization to avoid duplication of effort, and they often lead to meritocracies by hiring and promoting most capable individuals.

Bureaucracies also permit the luxury of engaging in forward planning to determine long-term needs and the means to attain them. Unlike heads of states whose roles require attentions to the crises of the moment, bureaucrats are able to consider the future as well as the present. The presence of several organizations can also result in multiple advocacies of the rival choices, thus improving the chance that all possible policy options will be considered.

Every state, whatever its strength or type of government is heavily influenced by its bureaucracy. The dividing line between decision makers and bureaucrats is often hazy, but we can say that bureaucrats are career government personnel, as distinguished from those who are political appointees or elected officials. Although, political leaders legally command the bureaucracy; they find it difficult to control the vast understructures of their governments.

Bureaucrats sometimes do not agree with their country's foreign policy. Instead they favour another policy option based on their general sense of their unit's mission. How any given policy will effect the organization is also an important factor in creating bureaucratic perspective. Often what a given bureaucracy will or will not favour make intuitive sense.

The military of any country will almost certainly oppose arms reductions or defence spending cuts because such policies reduce its resources and influence. Thus, generally bureaucratic organization of any country tries to influence the foreign policies of their country in the following ways:

(a) Filtering Information: This is one way that bureaucrat's influence policy. Foreign policy decision makers depend on staff for information, and what they are told depend on what subordinates choose, consciously or unconsciously, to pass on.

(b) Recommendations: It is another source of bureaucratic influence on foreign policy. Bureaucracies are the source of considerable expertise, which they use to push the agencies preferred position. One scholar, after analyzing bureaucratic recommendations in several countries, concluded that "leaders often face an option funnel". This means that advisers narrow the range of options available to leaders by presenting to them only those options that the bureaucratic organization favours. This recommendation strategy, the analyst continued often decided what national leaders would do even before they consider a situation (Rourke, 2007).

(c) Implementation: This is another powerful bureaucratic tool. There are a variety of ways by which bureaucrats can influence policy through the way they carry it out. As the investigation into the 9/11/2001, terrorist attack on U.S. revealed. It was discovered that the terrorist were able to carry out the attacks in part because of flaws in the implementation of the U.S. anti-terrorist policy. Evidence showed that government agencies failed to share information or otherwise cooperate, that they discounted the terrorist threat, and that they ignored information that pointed to an impending attack.

3.2 The Limits of Bureaucratic Organisation

What emerges from this description of bureaucracy is another idealized picture of the policy-making. Before jumping to the conclusion that bureaucratic decision making is a modern blessing, we should emphasize that these propositions tell us how, according to organizational theory, bureaucratic decision making should occur. They do not tell us how it does occur. The actual practice and the foreign policy choices that results depict a reality of burdens and not just benefits.

The first element in the bureaucratic politics model is the way large-scale bureaucratic organizations contribute to the policy-making process by devising Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) – established methods to be followed in the performance of designated tasks. These routines however, effectively limit the range of viable policy choices. Rather than expanding number of policy alternatives in a manner consistent with the logic of rational decision making, what organizations are prepared to do shape what is and is not considered possible.

Governmental politics, the second element in the bureaucratic model is related to the organizational character of foreign policy making in complex societies. Not surprisingly, participants in the deliberations that lead to policy choices often define issues and favour policy alternatives that serve their organization interests. “Where you stand depends on where you sit” is a favourite aphorism reflecting these bureaucratic imperatives.

Consequently, many students of governmental politics observe that professional diplomats typically favour diplomatic approaches to policy problems, whereas military officers routinely favour military solutions. Because the players in the game of governmental politics are responsible for protecting the nation’s security, they are obliged to fight for what they are convinced is right. The consequences is that “different groups pulling in different directions produce a result, or better a resultant- a mixture of conflicting preferences and unequal power of various individuals-distinct from one person or group intended”. Rather than being a value maximizing process, then policy making is its self an intensely competitive game of politics. Thus, one explanation of why states make the choices they do lies not in their behaviour vis-a vis one another but within their own governments. And rather than presupposing the existence of a unitary actor, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion” (Alinson, 1971).

Furthermore, fighting among insiders within an administration and the formation of factions to carry on battles over the direction of foreign policy decisions are chronic in nearly every country but especially in democracies accepting of participation by many people in the policy making process. Splits among key advisers over important foreign policy choices have been frequent. However, such conflicts are not necessarily bad, because they force each side to better explain its view point, and this allows heads of state, the opportunity to weigh their competing advice before making decisions. But battles among advisers can lead to paralysis and to rash decisions that produce poor results.

That possibility became evident in the fall of 2002, when serious divisions within George W. Bush’s administration developed over how and why the president’s goal was to wage war against Saddam Hussien in Iraq. Fissures became

transparent as key officials opened a debate in public over how best to invade another country, or even the wisdom of an invasion as opposed to the continuation of containment through diplomacy. On one side emerged an influential cabal of super hawks, the so-called get-Saddam hard-liners eager to use America's overwhelming military power and unconcerned about the reactions of long-time U. S. allies to such a unilateral military undertakings.

3.2 Attributes of Bureaucratic Behaviour

Besides the influence that bureaucratic organizations exert on the policy choices of political leaders, several other characteristics associated with the way they effect the decision making environment warrant scrutiny.

One characteristic derives from the proposition that bureaucratic agencies are parochial. According to this argument, every administrative unit within a states' foreign policy-making bureaucracy seek to promote its own purpose and power. Organizational needs such as large staff and budgets come before the state's needs, sometimes encouraging the sacrifice of national interest to bureaucratic interest as bureaucrats come to see their own interests as the states. Bureaucrats fight for survival, even when their usefulness has vanished. Rather than thinning and cutting back, governments usually add much more bureaucracy by adding new layers, a phenomenon Paul C. Light terms "the thickening of government".

As a corollary, bureaucratic parochialism breeds competition among the agencies charged with foreign policy responsibilities. Far from being neutral or impartial managers desiring only to carry out orders from the head of state, bureaucratic organizations frequently take policy positions designed to increase their own influence relative to that of other agencies. Characteristically, they are driven to enlarge their prerogatives and expand the conception of their mission; they seek to take on the responsibilities of other units and to gain powers that go with those responsibilities. Thus, organizations driven by the need to enhance their own importance and not always the national interest determine nation's foreign policies.

To protect their interests, bureaucratic organization attempt to reduce interference from and penetration by political leaders to whom they report as well as other agencies within governments. Because knowledge is power, a common device for promoting organizational exclusivity is to hide inner workings and policy activities from others. The "invisible government" operating within the U. S. National Security Council during the Reagan administration illustrates this

syndrome, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North used his authority as a staff member of the Council to orchestrate a secret arms-for-hostages deal with Iranian

government, part of what became popularity known as the Iran-contra affair (Kegley Jr., 1993).

The natural proclivity of professionals who work in large organization is to adapt their outlook and beliefs to those prevailing they where work. This reinforces the tendency of bureaucracies to act as entities unto themselves. Every bureaucracy develops a shared “mind set” or dominant way of looking at reality akin to the “group think” characteristic of the cohesiveness and solidarity that small groups often develop (Janis, 1982). An institutional mind-set discourages creativity, dissent, and independent thinking; it encourages reliance on standard operating procedures and deference to precedent rather the exploration of new options to meet new challenges.

3.4 The Consequences of Bureaucratic Policy Making

A corollary of the notion that bureaucracies are often self-serving and guardians of the status quo finds expression in their willingness to defy directives by political authorities they are supposed to serve. Bureaucratic unresponsiveness and inaction sometimes manifest themselves as lethargy. At other times bureaucratic sabotage is direct and immediate as vividly illustrated again by the U. S. experience in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. While President Kennedy sought to orchestrate U.S. action and bargaining, his bureaucracy in general, and the Navy in particular, were in fact controlling events by doing as they wished.

“The bureaucracy chose the orders it liked and ignores or stretches others. Thus after a tense argument with the Navy, Kennedy ordered the blockages line moved closer to Cuba so that the Russians might have more time to draw back. Unbeknownst to Kennedy, the Navy was also at work forcing Soviet submarines to surface long before Kennedy authorized any contact with Soviet ships. And despite the president’s order to halt all provocative intelligence, an American U-2 plane entered Soviet air space at the height of the crisis. When Kennedy began to realize that he was not in full control, he asked his Secretary of Defence to see if he could find out just what the Navy was doing. McNamara then made his first visit to the Navy command post in the Pentagon. In a heated exchange, the Chief of Naval Operations suggested that McNamara return to his office and let the Navy run the blockade (Gelb and Halperin, 1973 in Kegsley Jr. 2007)”.

Bureaucratic resistance is not only inertial force promoting status quos foreign policies. The dynamic of governmental politics which reduce policy choices to political tug of war, also retard the prospects for change. From the perspective of

the participants, decision making is a high-stakes political game in which differences are often settled at the least common denominator instead by rational cost-benefit calculations. As former U. S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger described the process.

Each of the contending factions within the bureaucracy has a maximum incentive to state its case in its extreme form because the ultimate outcome depends to a considerable extent, on a bargaining process. The premium placed on advocacy turns decision making into a series of adjustments among special interests—a process more suited to domestic than to foreign policy... The outcome usually depends more on the pressure or the persuasiveness of the contending advocates than on a concept of overall purpose. (Kissinger 1969 in Kegley Jr., 2007).

Bureaucratic recalcitrance is a recurrent annoyance that leaders throughout the world experience, in authoritarian and democratic political system alike. Bureaucratic resistance to change is one of the major problems reformers in the Soviet Union and the other centralized communist countries of Eastern Europe encountered, which impaired their efforts to chart new policy directions and to remain in power and eventually caused their disintegration.

The foreign policy process in China operates similarly. It is subject to the same vicissitudes of subjective perception, organizational conflict, bureaucratic politics and factional infighting that bedevil other governments. And in the United States nearly every president has complained at one time or another about how the bureaucratic ostensibly designed to serve his government has undercut his policies. The implementations of foreign policy innovations thus pose a major challenge to most leaders.

Self Assessment Examination (SAE).

Discuss the attributes of bureaucratic Organizations.

4.0 Conclusion

The sub- state actors closest to the foreign policy process are state's bureaucratic agencies maintained for development and execution of foreign policy. Different states maintain different foreign policy bureaucracies but share some common elements. Bureaucratic management of foreign policy is not new. It was in evidence long ago in Confucian China, but is a peculiar modern phenomenon. Bureaucratic procedures are commonplace throughout the world in large measure because of the perception that they enhance rational decision making and efficient administration.

Thus, the dividing line between decision makers and bureaucrats is often not properly defined. However, it is important to note that bureaucrats are career governmental personnel as distinguished from political appointees or elected officials. Legally, political leaders are to command the bureaucracy but they find it difficult to control the numerous sub-structures of their governments.

5.0 Summary

From this unit, what emerges from the study is that bureaucracy is another idealized picture of the policy making process. Bureaucratic decision making is not in all ramifications a modern blessing. However, we should emphasize that the foregoing propositions tell us how bureaucratic decision making should occur, they did not tell us how it does occur. It is important to stress that the actual practice and the foreign policy choices that result show that bureaucracy produces burdens as well as benefits.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- (i) What do you understand by Bureaucracy efficiency and rationality?
- (ii) Discuss the major attributes of bureaucratic behaviour.
- (iii) Analyze the consequences of bureaucratic behaviour.

7.0 References for Further Reading?

Kegley, Charles, Jr. (1993). *World Politics, Trend and Transformation*,
Forth Edition New York: St. Martins Press.

Irving, Janis (1982). *Crucial Decision: Leadership in Policymaking and Crises Management* New York: Free Press.

UNIT 3: THE ROLE OF LEADERS IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 Leaders as Makers of World History
 - 3.2 Factors Affecting the Capacity of Leaders to Lead
 - 3.3 Heads of Government and other Political Executives
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References/Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

The course of history is determined by the decisions of the political elites. Leaders and the type of leadership they exert shape the way in which foreign policies are made and the consequent behaviour of states in world politics. “There is properly no history, only biography”. This is how Ralph Waldo Emerson encapsulated the view that individual leaders move history.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit students should be able to:

- understand the role of leaders as foreign policy decision-makers
- value leader as makers and movers of world history
- assess factors affecting leader’s capacity to lead
- explain the changes in history-making individual model.

4.0 Main Body

3.1 Leaders as Makers of World History

The history-making individual’s models of foreign policy decision making equates states actions with the preferences and initiatives of the highest government officials. We expect leaders to lead, and we assume new leaders will make a difference. We reinforce this image when we routinely attach the names of leaders to policies as though the leaders were synonymous with the state itself as well as when we ascribe most successes and failures in foreign affairs to the leaders in charge at the time they occur.

Citizens are not alone in thinking that leaders are the decisive determinants of state's foreign policies, and by extension world history. Leaders themselves seek to create impressions of their own self importance while attributing extraordinary powers to leaders. The assumptions they make about the personalities of their counterparts, consciously or unconsciously, in turn influence their own behaviour. Moreover, leaders react differently to the positions they occupy. All are influenced by the role or exceptions that by law, and tradition steers the decision makers to behave in conformity with prevailing expectations about how the role is to be performed.

Most people submissively act in accordance with the customary rules that define the roles they hold, behaving as their predecessors tended to behave when they held the same position. Others however, are by personality or preference more bold and ambitious, and they seek to decisively escape the confines of their new role by redefining how it will be performed.

One of the difficulties of leader-driven explanations of foreign policy behaviour is that history movers and shakers often pursue decidedly irrational policies. The classic example was Adolf Hitler, whose ruthless determination to seek military conquest of the entire European Continent proved disastrous for Germany. How do we relate such behaviour with the logic of realism? That theory says that survival is the paramount goal of all states and that all leaders engage in rational calculations that advance their country's' aspiration for self advantage. But this theory cannot account for the times when the choices leaders make ultimately prove counter productive. If the realists are correct, even defects in states' foreign policy-making processes cannot easily explain such wide divergences between the decisions leaders sometimes make and what cold cost benefit calculations would predict.

We can explain this divergence in part by distinguishing between procedural rationality and instrumental rationality. Procedural rationality is the foundation of the realist's billiard ball image of world politics. It views all states as acting similarly because all decision makers engage in the same cool and clearheaded ends-means calculations based on a careful weighing of possible course of action, but realism downplays leader's capacity to lead through rational procedural choices.

Realism discounts leaders by assuming that global constraints limit what leaders can do. Because the global systematic imperatives of anarchy or interdependence are so clear, leaders can only choose from a limited range of alternatives if they are to exercise rational leadership and maximize their state's movement towards

its goals, only certain actions are feasible (Herman & Hagan 2004 in Kegleys Jr. 2007).

Instrumental rationality is another angle of the realist's assumptions. It pictures leaders as powerful decision makers who are able, "based on their perceptions and interpretations to build expectations, plan strategies, and urge actions on their governments about what is possible" (Hamann & Hogan, 2004). In this respect, leaders do actually lead and are important. They are rational instruments because they have preferences on which they choose. When faced with two or more alternative options, they can rationally make the choice that they believe will produce the preferred outcome.

The implications of these seemingly semantic differences are important. The idea of instrumental rationality demonstrates that rationality does not connote super human calculating ability, omniscience, or an Olympian view of the world, as is often assumed when the rational actor model we have described is applied to real world situations. They also suggest that an individual's actions may be rational even though the process of decision making and its product may appear decidedly irrational. Why did Libya's leader the mercurial Muammar Qaddafi, repeatedly challenge the United States, almost goading President Ronald Reagan into a military strike in 1980? This is because, we can postulate, Qaddafi's actions were consistent with his preferences, regardless of how "irrational" it was for a fourth-rate military power to take on the world's preeminent superpower. This and many other examples serve as a reminder of the importance of the human factor in understanding how decisions are made. Temptation, lack of self control, anger, fear of getting hurt, religious conviction, bad habits, and overconfidence all play a part in determining why leaders make the kinds of decisions they do.

3.2 Factors Affecting the Capacity to Lead

Despite the popularity of history-making individuals, care must be taken in ascribing too much importance to individual leaders. Their influence is likely to be subtler, a probability summarized by former U. S. President Bill Clinton in 1988 when he observed, "Great Presidents don't do great things. Great Presidents get a lot of other people to do great things".

Most leaders operate under a variety of political, psychological, and circumstantial constraints that limit what they can accomplish and reduce the control over events. In this context, Emmet John Hughes, concluded that all Americas past Presidents from the most venturesome to the most reticent have shared one disconcerting experience- the discovery of the limits and restraints decreed by law, by history, and by circumstances that sometimes can blur their clearest designs or dull their sharpest purposes.

The question at issue is not whether political elite lead or whether they can make a difference. They clearly do both. But leaders are not in complete control, and their influence is severely constrained. Thus, personality and personal political preferences do not determine foreign policy directly. What is relevant then, is not whether leader's personal characteristics make a difference, but rather under what conditions their characters are influential. Margaret G. Hermann observed that the impact of leaders is modified by at least six factors: (i) What their world view is (ii) What their political style is like (iii) What motivates them to have the position they do (iv) Whether they are interested in and have training in foreign affairs (v) What the foreign policy climate was like when the leader was starting out his or her political career and (vi) How the leader was socialized into his or her present position. World view, Political style and motivation tell us something about the leader's personality, the other characteristics give information about the leader's previous experiences and background (Hermann, 1988).

The impact of leader's personal characteristics on their state's foreign policy generally increase when their authority and legitimacy is widely accepted by citizens or, in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, when leaders are protected from broad public criticism. Moreover, certain circumstances enhance individuals' potential influence. Among them are new situations, that free leaders from conventional approaches to defining the situation, complex situations involving many different factors, and situations without social sanctions, which permit freedom of choice because norms defining the range of permissible options are unclear.

A leader's political efficacy or self-image- that persons belief in his or her own ability to control events politically, combined with the citizenry's relative desire for leadership will also influence the degree to which personal values and psychological need governs decision making. For example, when public opinion strongly favours a powerful leader, and when the head of state has an exceptional need for administration, foreign policy will more likely reflect that leaders inner needs. Thus, Kaiser Wilhelm III's narcissistic personality allegedly met the German people's desire for a symbolically powerful leader and German public preferences in turn influenced the foreign policy that Germany pursued during Wilhelm's reign, ending in the World War I.

Other factors undoubtedly influence how leaders can shape the state's choices. For instance, when leaders believe that their own interest and welfare are at stake, they tend to respond in terms of their own private needs and psychological drives.

When circumstances are stable however, and when leaders egos are not entangled with policy outcomes, the influence of their personal characteristics are less apparent.

The amount of information available about a particular situation is also important. Without pertinent information, policy is likely to be based on leader's personal likes or dislikes, conversely, the more information leaders have about international affairs the more likely they are to engage in rational decision making.

Similarly, the timing of a leader's assumption of power is significant. When an individual first assumes a leadership position; the formal requirements of that role are less likely to restrict what he or she can do. That is especially true during the "honeymoon" period routinely given to new heads of states, during which time; they are relatively free of criticism and excessive pressure. Moreover, when a leader assumes office following a dramatic event like a landslide election or the assassination of a predecessor, he or she can institute policies almost with a free hand as "constituency criticism is held in abeyance during this time.

A national crisis is a potent circumstance that increases a leader's control over foreign policy making. Decision making during crises is typically centralized and handed exclusively by the top leadership. Crucial information is often unavailable, and leaders see themselves as responsible for outcomes. It is therefore not surprising that great leaders customarily emerge during periods of extreme tumult. A crisis can liberate a leader from the constraint that normally would inhibit his or her capacity to control events or engineer foreign policy change.

History abounds with examples of seminal importance of political leaders who emerge in different times and places and under different circumstances to play critical roles in shaping world history. Mikhail Gorbachev dramatically demonstrates an individual's capacity to change the course of history. Many experts believe that the Cold War could not have been brought to an end, nor communist party rule in Moscow terminated and the Soviet States set on path towards democracy and free enterprise, had it not been Gorbachev's vision, courage and commitment to engineering these revolutionary, system-transforming changes. Ironically those reforms led to his loss of power when the Soviet Union imploded in 1991.

3.2 Heads of Government & Other Political Executives

In most countries, the executive branch is the most important part of the policy making process. This is especially true in national security policy and foreign policy. The most powerful figure in the executive branch is usually the country's head of government. A step below, but still of note are the leader's cast of other political executives such as the ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of

defence. The degree to which the head of government dominates foreign policy is based on numerous factors. This includes the type of government, the type of situation, and the type of policy. Three other important factors are the chief executive's formal powers, informal powers and leadership capabilities. The three are elaborated here under.

(i) Formal Power are the specific grants of authority that a country's constitution and its statutory (written) documents give to various offices and institutions. Most chief executives for example are the commander in chief of their country's armed forces. This gives them broad, often unilateral authority to use the military.

(ii) Informal Powers is second source of authority for political executives. It is easier for people to identify with and look for leadership toward an individual than towards an institution, and this gives the chief executives considerable prestige and political influence that cannot be found in constitution or laws. For instance, more than any other political figures, the chief executive personifies the nation. This is especially true in world affairs and doubly so in crises where a president personifies the nations and embodies "we" in dealings with "them". The nations focus on the chief executive also means that he or she is expected to lead. As one classic study of the U. S. presidency has to put it. "Everybody now expects the man inside the white House to do something about everything". Presidential prestige also means that they receive considerable more news media attention than any other political actor.

(iii) Leadership capabilities is the third factor chief executive has. These capabilities include administrative skills, how well a president organizes and manages his or her immediate staff and the government bureaucracy, legislative skills, the ability in a democratic system to win the support in the national legislature, public persuasion abilities, the ability to set forth a clear vision and to speak well and otherwise project positive image that will win public support, and intellectual capacity, level of intelligence and ability to use it pragmatically to formulate policy. However, we submit that measuring such qualities is very difficult.

4.0 Conclusion

The hero-in-history model may be compelling, but we must be cautious and remember that leaders are not all-powerful determinant of state's foreign policy behaviour. Rather, they shape decision making more completely in some circumstances than in others. The impact of personal factors varies with the context, and often the context is more influential than the leader.

Thus, the ability of the hero-in-history model of foreign policy is questionable and subject to further research to establish the utility effectively. Presently, at the very least, the hero-in-history model appears much too simple an explanation of how states react to challenges from abroad. Most world leaders follow the rules of the “game” of international politics, which suggest that how states cope with their external environments is often influenced less strongly by the types of people leading them than by other factors.

5.0 Summary

States respond to international circumstances in often similar ways, regardless of the predispositions of those who lead them. This may account for striking uniformities in state practices in a world of different political systems and turbulent change. In this case, political realists postulate about nations’ foreign policy goals, which are hypothesized to derive from the national calculation of opportunities and constraints and stress survival above all else.

5.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- i. What are the factors affecting leader’s capacity to lead?
- ii. Discuss the six factors that modify leader’s impact on foreign policy decisions according Margaret M. Hermann.

7.0 References/Further Readings

Hagan, Joe & Margaret G. Hermann (2004). *Leaders, Groups, Coalitions: Understanding the People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking*, Boston: Blackwell.

Hermann, Margaret G. & Bengt, Sunderlius (1988). *Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis, Theories and Methods* Upper Saddle River: N. J. Prentice Hall.

Kegley Charles Jr (1993). *World Politics, Trend and Transformation, Forth Edition*, New York: St. Martins Press.

UNIT 4: CONSTRAINTS ON FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 Group Psychology
 - 3.2 Crises Management
 - 3.3 Perceptions
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References/Further References

1.0 Introduction

Foreign policy choice occurs in an environment of uncertainty and multiple competing interests. On occasion, it is also made in situations that threaten national values, when policy makers are caught by surprise and quick decision is needed. The stress these conditions produce impairs leaders' cognitive abilities and may cause them to be preoccupied with sunk costs, short-run results and post-decisional rationalization, to react emotively rather than as analytical thinkers.

Thus, a variety of impediments stand in the way of the foreign policy decisions, fortunately it is possible to design and manage policy-making machinery to reduce their impact. Multiple advocacy, sub grouping, formal options systems, second-chance meetings and the use of devil's advocates are among the procedural tools

often recommended for this purpose. However, none can transform foreign policy making into a neat, orderly system. Policy making is a turbulent political process; one that involves complex problems, a chronic lack of information, and a multiplicity of actors.

2.0 Objectives

At the successful completion of this unit, you should be able to:

- analysis of the constraints on foreign policy making
- examine the prospects out of the constraints
- evaluate of the recommended tools to overcome the constraint
- appraisal of the implications of group psychology for foreign policy decision making.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 Group Psychology

What are implications of group psychology for foreign policy decision making? In one respect, groups promote rationality by balancing out the blind spots and biases of any individual. Advisors or legislative committees may force a state leader to reconsider a rash decision. And the interactions of different individuals in a group may result in the formation of goals that more closely reflect state interests rather than individual idiosyncrasies. However, group dynamics also introduce new source of irrationality into the decision making process.

Group think refers to the tendency for groups to reach decisions without accurately assessing their consequences, because individual members tend to go along with ideas, they think the others support (Janis, 1972). The basic phenomenon is illustrated by a simple psychology experiment. A group of six people are asked to compare the lengths of two lines projected on a screen. When five of the people are secretly instructed to say that line "A" is longer, even though any one can see that line B is actually longer, the sixth person is likely to agree with the group rather than believe his or her own eyes.

Unlike individuals, group tends to be overly optimistic about the chances of success and thus more willing to take risks. A Participant suppresses their doubts about dubious undertakings because everyone else seems to think an idea will work. Also, because the group diffuses responsibility from individuals, nobody feels accountable for actions.

The rational inclination of professionals who work in large organizations is to adopt their outlook and beliefs to those prevailing where they work. As constructivism would illuminate, every bureaucracy develops a share mind-set, or dominant way of looking at reality, akin to groupthink characteristic that small group often develop (Janis, 1982). An institutional mind-set or socially, constructed consensus discourages creativity, dissent and independent thinking. It encourages reliance on standard operating procedures and deference to precedent rather than the exploration of new options to meet new challenges. This results in policy decisions that rarely deviate from conventional preferences.

Groupthink is often cited by scholars as a process governing policy decision making that leads to riskier choices and more extreme policies that ultimately fail miserably than likely would have been made by individuals without the pressures of peer groups. The U. S. war in Iraq also provides cautionary examples about the risks of misinformation, misperception, wishful thinking, and groupthink in managing a major foreign policy initiative.

The structure of decision making which include the rule for who is involved in making the decision, how voting is conducted, etc can affect the outcome especially when no single alternative appeals to a majority of participants.

Experienced participants in foreign policy formulation are familiar with the techniques for manipulating decision-making process to favour outcomes they prefer. A common technique is to control a group's formal decision-rule. These rules include the items of business the group discusses and the order in which proposals are considered especially important when participants are applying. Probably most important is the ability to control the agenda and thereby structure the terms of debate.

State leaders often rely on an inner circle of advisers in making foreign policy decisions. The composition and operation of the inner circle vary across governments. For instance, President Lyndon Johnson had "Tuesday lunches" to discuss national security policy with top national security officials. Some groups depend heavily on information consultations in addition to formal meetings. Some leaders create a 'kitchen cabinet' – a trusted group of friends who discuss policy issues with the leader even though, they have no formal positions in government. For instance, Israel's Golda Meir held many such discussions at her home, sometimes literally in the kitchen. Russian president Boris Yeltsin relied on advice of his bodyguard, who was a trusted friend.

Self Assessment Examination (SAE)

What are the implications of Group Psychology for foreign policy decision making?

3.2 Crisis Management

The difficulties in reaching national decisions, both for individual and for groups are heightened during a crisis. Crises are foreign policy situations in which outcomes are very important and time frames are compressed. Crisis decision making is harder to understand and predict than is normal foreign policy making.

In a crisis situation, decision makers operate under tremendous time constraints. The normal checks on unwise decisions may not operate. Communications become shorter and more stereotyped, and information that does not fit a decision maker's expectation is more likely to be discarded simply because there is no time to consider it. In framing options, decision makers tend to overlook creative options while focusing on the most obvious ones. (In the United States, shifting time constraints are measurable in a doubling or tripling of pizza deliveries to government agencies as decision maker's work through mealtimes).

Groupthink occurs easily during crises. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy created a small closed group of advisers who worked together intensively for days on end, cut off from outside contact and discussion. Even the President's communication with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was

reported through Kennedy's brother Robert and the Soviet Ambassador cutting out the State department. Recognizing the danger of groupthink, Kennedy left the room from time to time-removing the authority figure from the group to encourage free discussion. Through this and other means, the group managed to identify an option (a naval blockade) between their first two choices (bombing the missile sites or doing nothing). Sometimes leaders purposefully designate someone in the group known as devils advocate objecting to ideas (Goldstern & Pevehouse 2009).

Participants in crisis decision making not only are rushed, but experience severe psychological stress. As most of us have experienced, people usually do not make decisions wisely when under stress. Stress amplifies the biases already discussed. Decision makers tend to overestimate the hostility of adversaries and to underestimate their own hostility towards those adversaries. Dislike easily turns to hatred, and anxiety to fear. More and more information is screened out in order to come to terms with decisions being made and to restore cognitive balance. Crisis decision making also leads to physical exhaustion. Sleep deprivation sets in within days as decision makers use every hour to stay on top of the crisis. Unless decision makers are careful about getting enough sleep, they may make vital foreign policy decisions under shifting perceptual and mood changes.

Because of the importance of sound decision making during crises, voters pay great attention to the psychological stability of their leaders. Before Israeli Prime Minister Yitshak Rabin won election in 1992, he faced charges that he had suffered a one-day nervous breakdown when he headed the armed forces just before 1967 war. Not so, he responded, he was just smart enough to realize that the crisis had caused both exhaustion and acute nicotine poisoning, and he needed to rest up for a day in order to go on and make good decisions.

Whether in crisis mode or normal routines, individual decision makers do not operate alone. Their decisions are shaped by the government and society in which they work. Foreign policy is constrained and shaped by sub-state actors such as government agencies, political interest groups and industries.

Tensions between top political leaders and foreign policy advisers or foreign policy bureaucracies are one form of interagency tension in the formulation of foreign policy. Certain agencies traditionally clash and an endless tug of war shapes the foreign policies that emerge.

3.3 Perceptions

There is an ancient philosophical debate over whether there is an objective world or whether everything is only what we perceive it to be. Whatever the answer to that debate may be, it is clear that we all view the world through perceptual lenses

that distort reality at least to some degree. All the elements of foreign policy decision makers that we have been discussing, and others help shape perceptions.

Whatever their source, perceptions have a number of characteristics that influence global politics. To demonstrate this, let us take a look at four common characteristic of perceptions.

(i) Actors tend to see opponents as more threatening than they may actually be. The nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran alarmed many Americans. One survey found that 71% of Americans considered Iran a threat to regional stability and 77% saw North Korea in the same way. By contrast, in the other twenty countries surveyed, only 40% believed Iran to be a force for instability and just 47% perceived North Korea in that light.

(ii) Actors tend to see the behaviour of others as more planned and coordinated than their own. During the Cold War, Americans and Soviets were mutually convinced that the other side was orchestrating a coordinated global campaign to subvert them. Perhaps put more accurately, former U. S. Secretary of States Henry Kissinger had described the two super powers as behaving like “two heavily armed blind men feeling their way around a room, each believing himself in mortal peril for the other whom he assumes to have perfect vision”. Each according to Kissinger “tends to ascribe to the other side a consistency, foresight, and coherence that its own experience belies (Kissinger, 1982).

6.0 Actors find it hard to understand why others dislike, mistrust, and fear them. President George W. Bush captured this overly positive sense of self during a press conference when he pronounced himself “amazed that there’s such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us... Like most Americans, I just can’t believe it because I know how good we are”. Others are less sure of America’s innate goodness. One recent survey found that 60% or more of poll respondents in countries as diverse as Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey and Russia thought that the United States posed a military threat to them.

7.0 Actors and others tend to have similar images of one another. Between countries and even between leaders, it is common to find mirror-image perception. This means that each side perceives the other in roughly similar terms. An example is the mutual threat that exists between the United States and Muslim Countries. Americans and citizens of Muslim countries share a mirror image of hostility toward one another.

Note: The question of Americans was “Do you think Muslim world considers itself at war with the United States? The question in Muslim Countries was, “How worried are you, if at all that the U. S. could become a military threat to your

country someday?” Are you very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, or not at all worried? (Rourke, 2007).

4.0 Conclusion

A crisis decision or policy is one in which vital interests are at stake, there is the threat of violence, and a limited time in which to respond. The time constraints and high stake limits those involved in decision making to a small group of advisors around the leaders.

Groupthink is the propensity for members of a group to accept and agree with the group’s prevailing attitudes, rather than speaking out for what they believe. In other words, it refers to the tendency of groups to reach decisions without accurately assessing their consequences, because individual members tend to go along with the ideas they think the others support.

Crises management takes a high toll psychologically and physiologically. Both individual misperception and group psychology encourage overconfidence and excessive optimism among decision makers. All these elements constrain foreign policy decision makers from being rational most of time by constraining them from taking certain actions while propelling them towards others.

4.0 Summary

Crisis management is very difficult. Given the time constraints it is impossible to have all the information necessary to make a clear, rational choice among alternative policies. Thus, foreign policy decision makers make the best decisions based on their perceptions of the situation and on what information they can collect and process within time. Unable to gain access to all the information they need and unable to make sense of what information they have received, foreign policy decision-makers often fall back on pre-existing stereotypes about their opponent’s characteristics and behaviour and the outcome of previous similar situations. They tend to believe the worst about their opponents and judge any action in that light.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- (i) Analyze the psychological constraints on foreign policy decision makers.
- (ii) Give a critical appraisal of the implications of group psychology for decision makers.
- (iii) Discuss the four common characteristics of perceptions.

7.0 References/Further Readings

Goldstein, Johnson and John, Pevehouse (2009). *International Relations, Eight Editions* New York: Pearson Longman.

Kegley, Charles (2007). *World Politics Trend and Transformation, Eleventh Edition* Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.

Kissinger, Henry (1982). *Years of Upheaval* Boston: Little Brown.

Irving, Janis (1972). *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, Houghton: Mifflin.

Rourke, John (2008). *International Politics on the World Stage, Twelfth Edition*, New York: McGraw-Hill.

**MODULE 4: MEANS OR CAPABILITY FACTORS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON POLICY DECISIONS**

Unit 1 Structural Characteristics

Unit 2 Type of Government

Unit 3 Military Capabilities and Economic Development

Unit 4 Geographic Influences (Geopolitics)

Unit 1: STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 The Organisation of Authority
 - 3.2 Scope, Level and Intensity of Interaction
 - 3.3 Power Relationships
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References / Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

All systems, whether it is the international system, your country's system, or the immediate, local system in your university international relations class, have identifiable structural characteristics. Countries may be theoretically free to make any foreign policy decision they want, but as a practical matter, achieving a successful foreign policy requires that the country make choices that are reasonable within the context of the structural realities of the international systems.

The structural characteristic of the international system to a large extent determines the actions of actors within the system. The international system is a mostly horizontal authority structure. As such, it is largely anarchic, it has no overarching authority to make rules, settle disputes and provide protection. Thus, the game is the "survival of the fittest" thereby making every actor within the system to be cautious of its foreign policy towards others as the success or failure of such policies depend solely on its capabilities to protect its interests.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- assess the structural characteristics of the international system
- differentiate between vertical authority structure and horizontal authority structure
- explain the level and scope of interactions among international actors
- Evaluate power relationships.

4.0 Main Body

3.1 The Organization of Authority:

The structure of authority for making and enforcing rules, for allocating assets, and for conducting other authoritative tasks in a system can range from hierarchical i.e vertical to anarchical i.e horizontal. Most systems like your class and country tend toward the hierarchical end of the spectrum. They have a vertical structure in which subordinate units are substantially regulated by higher levels of authority. Other systems are situated towards the horizontal authority structure end of the continuum. There are few, if any higher authority in such systems and power is fragmented.

The international system is a mostly horizontal authority structure. It is based on the sovereignty of states. Sovereignty means that countries are not legally answerable to any higher authority for their international or domestic conduct. As such the international system is a state-centric system that is largely anarchic. It has no overarching authority to make rules, settle disputes, and provide protection. The anarchical nature of the international system has obvious impacts even on national policies of states. Consider defense spending for instance, the debate has always been whether it is high, too low, but no nations ever suggest that the government spend zero and eliminate the country's military entirely. Because states in the international system depend on themselves for protection and if a state is threatened, there is no international line to call for help, given this anarchical self-help system, it is predictable that states will be armed.

While the authority structure in the international system remains decidedly horizontal, change is under way. Sovereignty is declining and even the most powerful are subject to a growing number of authoritative rules made by international organization and by international law. Countries still resist and even often reject international government organization (IGOs) governance, but increasingly they also comply with it. In 2006, for example the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled in favour of a U. S. allegation that the European Union (EU) was violating trade rules by using health regulations to bar the importation of genetically modified foods. The ruling gladdened U. S. government, but it was disappointed in another ruling that year which upheld an European Union complain that U. S. tax breaks given to Boeing and other aircraft manufacturers were acting as a subsidy that gave Boeing an unfair advantage over European Airbus under World Trade Organization rules.

In both cases, as often occurs, the losing side grumbled lightly and hinted it might not comply, but history shows that countries do eventually change their practices, when international communities under any international origination stand against them. People in most countries are sensitive about their sovereignty, yet they also are becoming more willing to accept the idea that their country should abide by IGO decisions.

3.2 Scope, Level and Intensity of Interactions

Another structural characteristic of any political system is the scope or range, frequency and intensity or level of interaction among the actors. In your class for example, the scope of interactions between you and both your facilitators and most of your classmates is probably limited to what happens in the course, is not very intense, and is confined to two or three hours of class time each week over a single semester. At the international system level, the scope, frequency and level of interaction among the actors is not only often much higher than in your class but has grown extensively during the last half century. Economic interdependence provides the most obvious example. Countries trade more products more often than they did not long ago, and each of them even the powerful United States, is heavily dependent on others for sources of products that it needs and as markets for products it sells. Without foreign oil, for example, U. S. transportation and industry would literally come to a halt. Without extensive exports, the U. S. economy would stagger because exported goods and services account for about 15% of the U. S. GNP (Rourke, 2007).

Information about expanding trade does not, however fully capture the degree to which the widening scope and intensifying level of global financial interactions are increasing transnational contacts at every level. For individuals, modern telecommunications and travel have made personal international interactions, once relatively rare, now commonplace. Communications are also expanding the scope, level and intensity of communication. Satellite-transmitted televisions have revolutionized communications, most recently, alJazeera, the Arab-based news network, has added an around the-clock English-language broadcast. Trillion of phone calls, letter, and e-mail messages add to globalisation of human interaction, and the internet ignores borders as it connects people and organizations around the world as if they were in the next room. All these international interactions is making global interests to play a major determining role in the formulation of foreign policies of sovereign states even more than their national interests.

3.3 Power Relationship

Countries' foreign policies are determined and also restrained by the realities of power in the international system, much like individuals are limited by the distribution of power in more local systems. The conduct of actors in the international system is heavily influenced by power considerations, such as the number of powerful actors and the context of power.

(i) The Number of Powerful Actors

Historically, international systems have been defined in part by how many powerful actors each have (Wilkinson, 2004). Such an actor, called a power pole, can be either of the following: (a) Single country or empire (b) an alliance or (c) A global inter-governmental organization such as United Nations (UN) or

(c) A regional inter-governmental organization such as the European Union (EU).

These poles are particularly important to the Realist approach and its concern with the balance of power. Sometimes, the term is used to describe the existing distribution of power as in the current balance of power greatly in favour of the United States. More classically, though the theory of balance of power politics put forth by Realists holds that: (a) all states are power seeking, (b) ultimately, a state or bloc will attempt to become hegemonic, that is dominate the system, and (c) other states will attempt to block that dominance by increasing their own power and/or cooperating with other states in an anti-hegemonic effort.

Some scholars further believe that the number of power poles in existence at any one time helps determine how countries are likely to act. According to this view, it is possible to identify patterns or rules of the game for the system. And as a result classification of foreign policy is based upon the fundamental relationship of the actors and a situation from the point of view of actor. Thus, given a situation, the actor may choose any of the following policies:

(i) Insulation: The actor insulates itself from the situation or may lack the capacity to engage in the situation. In other words, a country may have an interest in a situation but it does not attempt to control or prevent other actors in the situation from gaining control over its own domain. Neutral countries are the clearest examples of policies of insulation.

(ii) Engagement: A country becomes involved in a situation and shares control over the situation with other actors who participate in it. Countries vary substantially in the number of situations in which they are engaged. And there are several reasons which may account for this variation; the capacity of the actors is the most important. The various foreign policies of the allied forces in the Gulf crisis fall under this with the United States expansionist quest. Nigeria's foreign policies towards Liberia under Ibrahim Babangida and towards Chad under Olusegun Obasanjo as military heads of state are also examples.

(iii) Expansion: A country may seek to extend its control beyond the domain that it controlled before embarking on policies of expansion. The underlying interest in expansion policies of states is usually to increase its power in the international system and such countries do not share control over situations in their external environments, they attempt to monopolize control of situations. In other words, the central problem to analyze is control, whether over other actors or the environment.

However, no country can achieve its objective alone and every country is dependent upon the response of other countries. Actions and interactions shape

situations and situations in turn influence actors. And change does occur within the actors themselves. As a result, despite the constant interaction and adjustment process, we still look for independent variables within countries and dependent variables (a part from power) in the environment.

Consequently, it is useful to regard the situation as the independent variables and the actors as the dependant variables. Foreign policy involves constant adjustments both within states and between states and the situations in which they are interested. In determining foreign policy therefore, defining factors which preserve continuity and explaining how they operate goes hand in hand with identifying factors which tends to produce change and explain how they function.

(iv) Constant Adjustments: Constant adjustments also occur in the interaction among countries. For instance, if a country initiates a policy, it may find that the reaction of other states require it to make additional decisions, which modify, change drastically, or reserve the original initiative. Thus, long term policies may be cast in very broad terms followed by constant shifting and specification of more precise goals and means as opportunities arise.

Broadly speaking, countries have continuing and constant policies for given situations. Under certain conditions however, situations are transformed. Transformation means one or more of the essential features of the situation changes. For instance, the balance of power system maybe oligopolistic i.e involving more than two major states. When the control over the international system is reduced to two major states, a transformation to a bipolar system is said to have occurred. This is a shift in political coalition that dominates the policy-making process.

In other words, since fissures and disagreements are found in any government, it is possible for a predominant coalition in the dominant process to give way to another coalition with different preference. This differs from the first in the absence of a complete change over in government. The winning coalition may not necessarily gain control on all issues. It simply wins on a given issue or set of issues.

(v) Development of New Structure in the Government: For instance, a democratic political system transformed into an authoritarian system in which legislative controls gives way to increased executive authority. In other words, such a constitutional change will impact on the domestic political system and extend to foreign policy.

Change, however it comes about, involves choice. The identification of situations are the result of the foreign policies of the actors interested in them, transformation

occurs as the result of changes in the foreign policies of actors whose policy actions produce the situation.

4.0 Conclusion

Foreign policy as we can see is a vital aspect of world politics, and power is one of its key components. To focus on the links between some kind of power/influence and foreign policy is a valid approach because without some kind of power, it is difficult to have an effective foreign policy.

Foreign policy techniques and strategies – from diplomacy that promotes the legitimacy of a country's values or suicide bombings that express the radical ideals of a proselytizing Islamic crusade are how key actors on the international system pursue goals and objectives. They do so by translating available power into specific actions designed to influence other actors.

States operate in an international political system that seemingly has no world government to regulate interstate relations, no legal authority here than the sovereign state actors, no world executive to implement decisions, no world legislature or international legal system with teeth, and no world military to enforce peace within the system. Rather, the international system is a horizontal authority structure. However, this environment appears to be gradually shifting as we now have global governance of several global issues like globalisation, the environment, trade, technology and so on.

5.0 Summary

Foreign policy is a major aspect of world politics and the structural characteristics of the world system is a major determinant of roles of actors and their foreign policy actions. Foreign policy refers to the course of action pursued by a government in its dealings with other states on the global scene. Foreign policy is put into play by decision makers of the world's states and their governments, but other players, such as International Government Organization (IGO) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) including militant Islamic Organizations like Al Qaeda also make decisions that affect the foreign policy of states. Each of these actors try to employ some form of power and influence to achieve desired objectives or control of the international system.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- i. What are the major structural characteristics of the international system?
- ii. Explain the organization of authority of the International System
- iii. Write short notes on (a) Insulation (b) Engagement (c) Expansion Policies

7.0 References for Further Readings

Kegley, Charles and Eugene R. Witt Kopf (1993). *World Politics Trend and Transformation Fourth Edition*, New York: St. Martins Press.

Norman, Palmer Perkins, Howard (2007). *International Relations, Third Revised Edition*, Delhi, India: A. I. T. B. S. Published.

Rourke, John (2008). *International Politics on the World State, Twelfth Edition*, New York: McCraw Hill.

UNIT 2: TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

Content

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 Democracies' Foreign Policy Performance
 - 3.2 Consequences of the Spread of Democracy
 - 3.3 Public Opinion
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments
- 7.0 References / Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

The nature of the political system of a country is a very important factor that affects the states' foreign policy behaviour. Types of government demonstrably constrain important choices, including whether the use of force is threatened and whether the threat is carried out. Here, the important distinction between liberal democracy (representative Government), on one end of the spectrum, and autocratic (authoritarian or totalitarian) rule, on the other becomes significant.

In neither constitutional democracy sometimes called "open" nor autocratic "closed" political systems can political leaders long survive without the support of organised political interests, and sometimes the mass citizenry. But in democratic systems, those interests are likely to be politically potent, spread beyond the government itself, and active in their pressure on the government to make policy choices that benefit them.

Public opinion, interests groups, and the mass media are more visible parts of the policy-making process in democratic systems. Similarly, the electoral process in democratic societies more meaningfully frame choices and produce results about who will lead than typically occurs in authoritarian regimes, where the real choices are made by a few elites behind closed doors. In short, in a democracy, public opinion and preferences often matter, and therefore differences in who is allowed to participate and how much they exercise their right to participate are critical determinants of foreign policy choices.

2 Objectives

At the successful completion of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the impact of the political system of a country on its international behaviour
- appraise foreign policy performance of some democracies
- discuss the importance of interest groups in foreign policy formulation
- highlight channels of public opinion influence on foreign policy.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 Democracies' Foreign Policy Performance

Public preference helps shape democratic society's foreign policies. However, this does not deny the fact that elitism impacts on them. Often, but especially when international crises erupt, decisions are made even in democratic governments by a small ruling elite, and opposition is usually silenced. The military industrial complexes obstructively evident in many countries are examples of elite groups sometimes believed to exercise disproportionate control over defense policy-making, in both turbulent and calm times. However, the rival model known as pluralism, which sees policy making as an up-ward-flowing process in which competitive domestic groups pressure the government for policies responsive to their interests and needs is a peculiar democratic phenomenon whose pervasiveness is widespread even if its effects are sometimes difficult to pinpoint.

The proposition that domestic stimuli and not simply international events are a source of foreign policy is not novel. In ancient Greece for instance, Tycydides observed that what happened within the Greek city-states often did more to shape their external behaviour than what each did towards the others. He added that Greek leaders frequently behaved in ways designed not to influence relations with the targets of their actions, but instead, the political climate within their own polities. Similarly, leaders today sometimes make foreign policy decisions for domestic political purposes. For example, when bold or aggressive acts abroad are intended to influence election outcomes or divert public attention from economic woes.

Some see the intrusion of domestic politics into foreign policy making in democratic political system as disadvantage that undermines their ability to deal decisively with foreign policy crises or to bargain effectively with less democratic adversaries and allies. As the French political sociologist, Alexis Tocqueville put it more than a century ago, in the management of foreign relations, democracies are "decidedly inferior" to centralized governments because they are prone to "impulse rather than prudence". Democracies are slow to respond to external dangers but once, they are recognized, and they tend to overreact to them. There are two things that a democratic people will always find difficult to do Tocqueville mused, "to start a war and to end it". In contrast, authoritarian regimes can make decisions more rapidly, ensure domestic compliance with their decision, and

perhaps be more consistent in their foreign policy. But there is a cost; authoritarian regimes often are less effective in developing an innovative foreign policy because of subordinate's pervasive fear of raising question. In short, the concentration of power and the suppression of public opposition can be both disadvantageous as well as advantageous.

Democracies are subject to inertia. They move slowly on issues because so many desperate elements are involved in decision making and because officials in democracies are accountable to public opinion and must respond to pressure from a variety of domestic interest groups. Groups mobilize to exercise influence over the future direction of their country's foreign policies, especially on issues highly important to them. A crisis sufficient enough to arouse the attention and activity of a large proportion of the population may need to erupt in order for large changes in policy to come about.

3.2 Consequences of the Spread of Democracy

The impact of government type on foreign policy choice has taken on great significance following the rapid conversion of many dictatorships to democratic rule. These liberal government conversions have occurred in four successive waves since the 1800s. The first wave occurred between 1878 and 1926 and the second between 1943 and 1962. The third wave began in the 1970s when a large number of non-democratic countries began to covert their governments to democratic rule and the fourth wave began after the Cold war ended in 1991 and escalated in the 2000s. In a remarkable global transformation from post world history, the one radical idea that democracy is the ideal form of decision making triumphed. Today, as the year 2006 began, according to Freedom House three-fourths of the worlds countries were fully or partially democratic (Kegley Jr. 2007).

This transformation has prompted widespread speculation that we may be witnessing the end of history-meaning that is the end of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government. If this trend continues, the contagious expansion of democratic states could transform the war-prone pattern of past international system and this could only be propelled by new types of foreign policies.

The recent growth of democracy has emboldened neo-liberals to predict that a democratic peace will develop-that a twenty-first century increasingly dominated by liberal democracies will be a safer century. The reasons for this prophecy vary however; they rely on the logic that Immanuel Kant outlined in his 1795 *Treatise Perpetual Peace*. Kant believed democracies would act very differently than non democracies in their foreign relations; they would form a separate peace with each other. The bases for this prediction rested on Kant's recognition that in

democracies leaders are accountable to the public. Thus, because ordinary citizens have to supply the soldiers and bear the human and financial cost of imperialistic policies, they would constrain leaders from initiating foreign wars especially against other liberal democracies similarly constrained by norms and institutions that respect compromise and civil liberties. From this reasoning derived the neo-liberal democratic peace argument that liberal democracies are natural forces for international peace.

The tradition of political idealism provides support for this prediction and empirical evidence buttressing it. Whereas democracies experience just as many wars as non-democratic polities because they may be target of dictatorships' aggression, they almost never initiate wars against one another. In addition, democracies are prone to seek each other as alliance partners-a communitarian effect evident since World War II that arguably has contributed to the obsolescence of large scale war.

3.3 Public Opinion

Many domestic actors seek to influence public opinion i.e. the range of views on foreign policy issues held by the citizens of state. Public opinion has greater influence on foreign policy in democracies than in authoritarian governments. But even dictators must pay attention to what citizens think. No government can rule by force alone. Every government needs legitimacy to survive. It must persuade people to accept (if not to like) its policies, because in the end policies are carried out by ordinary people-soldiers, workers, and bureaucrats.

Because of the need for public support, even authoritarian governments spend great effort on propaganda i.e. the public promotion of their official line to win support for foreign policies. States use television, newspapers and other information media in this effort. For instance when China invited President Nixon of America to visit in 1971 the Chinese government mounted a major propaganda campaign to explain to its people that the United States was not so bad after all. In many countries, the state owns or controls major mass media such as television and newspapers, thereby mediating the flow of information to its citizens, however, new information technologies with multiple channels make it harder to do this presently.

Journalists serve as the gatekeepers of information passing from foreign policy elites to the public. The Media and government often conflict, because of the traditional role of the press as a watchdog and critic of government actions and powers. The media try to uncover and publicize what the government wants to hide. Foreign policy decision makers also rely on the media for information about foreign affairs.

Yet the media also depend on government, the size and the resources of the foreign policy bureaucracies dwarf those of the press. These advantages give the government great power to manipulate journalists by feeding information, in order to shape the news and influence public opinion. Government decision makers can create dramatic stories in foreign relations through summit meetings, crises, actions and so forth. Bureaucrats can also leak secret information to the press in order to support their own point of view and win bureaucratic battles. Finally, the military and the press have a running battle about journalist's access to military operations, but both sides gained from the open access given to journalists "embedded" with U.S. forces in Iraq in 2003.

In democracies where governments must stand for election, an unpopular war can force a leader out of office, as happened to U. S. president Lyndon Johnson in 1968 during the Vietnam War. On the other hand, a popular war can help secure a government mandate to continue in power, as happened to Margaret Thatcher in Britain after the 1982 Falkland Island War.

Occasionally, a foreign policy is decided directly by a referendum of the entire citizenry. In 2005, referendums in France and the Netherlands rejected a proposed constitution for the European Union, despite the support of major political leaders for the change. Even in the most open democracies, states do not merely respond to public opinion. Decision makers enjoy some autonomy to make their own choices and they are pulled in various directions by bureaucracies and interest groups, whose views often conflict with the direction favoured by public opinion at large. Moreover, public opinion is seldom united on any policy, and sophisticated polling can show that particular segments of the population (regions of the country, genders, income groups, races, etc) often differ in their perceptions of foreign policy issues. So a leader may respond to the opinion of one constituency rather than the whole population. Public opinion varies considerably over time on many foreign policy issues. States use propaganda in dictatorships or try to manipulate the media in democracies to keep public opinion from diverging too much from state policies. In democracies, public opinion generally has less effect on foreign policy than on domestic policy. National leaders traditionally have additional latitude to make decisions in the international realm. This derives from the special need of states to act in a unified way to function effectively in the international system, as well as from the traditions of secrecy and diplomacy that remove international relations from the realm of ordinary domestic politics. In Japan, public opinion is a major political force restraining the military spending of the government, its commitment of military forces beyond Japan's borders, and especially the development of nuclear weapons which is within Japan's technical abilities. They are suspicious of any increase in the size or role of military forces, and dead set against Japan having nuclear weapons. In this regard, public opinion constrains the state's conduct of foreign policy and has slowed the pace of change.

The attentive public in a democracy is the minority of the population that stays informed about international issues. This segment varies somewhat from one issue another, but there is a core of people who care in general about foreign affairs and follow them closely. The most active members of the attentive public on foreign affairs constitute the foreign policy elites; these are people with power and influence who affect foreign policy. These elites include people within the government as well as outsiders, such as businesspeople, journalists, lobbyists, and professors of political science. Public opinion polls show that opinions sometimes (but not always) differ considerably from those of the general public, and sometimes from those of the government as well.

Governments sometimes adopt foreign policies for the specific purpose of generating public approval and hence gaining domestic legitimacy. This is the case when a government undertakes a war or foreign military intervention at a time of domestic difficulty to, distract attention and gain public support, taking advantage of the “rally round the flag” syndrome (the public increase support for government leaders during war time), at least in the short term. Citizens who would readily criticize the government’s policies on education or health care often refrain from criticism when the government is at war and the lives of the nation’s soldiers are on the line. Policies of this sort are often labeled diversionary foreign policy. Unfortunately, it is always difficult to tell whether a state adopts a foreign policy to distract the public, because leaders would never admit to trying to divert public attention.

However, wars that go on too long or are not successful can turn public opinion against the government and even lead to a popular uprising to overthrow the government. In Argentina, the military government in 1982 led the country into war with Britain over the Falkland Islands. At first, Argentines rallied around the flag, but after losing the war, they rallied around the cause of getting rid of the military government and they replaced it with a new civilian government that prosecuted the former leaders. In 2006, President Bush’s popularity, which soared early in the Iraq War, plummeted as the war dragged on, and voters threw his party out of power in Congress.

Self Assessment Examination (SAE)

Discuss how public opinion determines the foreign policy issues of the government of your country.

4.0 Conclusion

These observations about the ways states’ attributes relate to their foreign policy making processes highlight the extent to which internal conditions, not just those external ones captured in the billiard ball model influence foreign policy choices.

Contrary to political realism structural model, which presumes only the existence of unitary actors, it is apparent that type of government, domestic pressure on politicians, grassroots movements, and whether leaders are answerable to the public can make a decisive difference in the goals states pursue abroad. Thus, the degree of freedom citizens enjoy constrains their leader's choices, shapes the manner in which policy decisions are implemented by their government, and influence the pattern of international interactions.

5.0 Summary

Foreign policy is a complex outcome of a complex process. It results from the struggle of competing themes, competing domestic interests, and competing government agencies. No single individual or group opinion, agency, or guiding principle determines the outcome. Thus, the aggregate state interests and policies frequently come to conflict with the interests and policies of other states.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- i. Should political leaders represent their constituents' views in foreign policy?
- ii. The nature of political system of a country is a national attribute that affects the states' foreign policy behaviour. Discuss.
- iii. What do you believe is the most important factor in states' making foreign policy decisions?

7.0 References/Further Reading

Goldstein, Joshua and Pevehouse, John (2009). *International Relations, Eight Edition*, New York: Pearson Longman.

Kegley, Charles Jr. and Wittkopf (1993). *World Politics: Trend and Transformation, Fourth Edition*, New York: St. Martins Press.

Rourke, John and Richard, Cyprus (1992). *Direct Democracy and International Politics: Deciding International Issues through Referendums*, Boston: Rienner.

Unit 3: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Content

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 Economic Realities
 - 3.2 Military Capabilities
 - 3.3 Norms
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References/Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

The level of economic development a state enjoys affects the foreign policy goals it can pursue. Generally, the more economically developed a state is, the more likely it is to play an activist role in the global political economy. Rich states have interests that extend far beyond their borders and typically possess the means to pursue and protect them. States that enjoy industrial capabilities and extensive involvement in international trade also tend to be militarily powerful in part, because military might is a function of economic capabilities.

The United States today stands out as a super power precisely because it benefits from a combination of vast economic and military capabilities, including awesome nuclear weapons capabilities. This enables the United States to practice unrestrained globalism, its “imperial reach” and interventionist behaviour are seemingly not limited by wealth or resources. For this reason, Gross National Product (GNP) is often used in combination with other factors to identify great powers and by itself is an important element in predicting the extensiveness of states, global interests and involvement.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- explain the importance of a buoyant economy in states international behaviour
- explain why Gross National Product is important in identifying great powers
- discuss might as a function of economic capabilities.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 Economic Realities

Economically advanced states are active globally. However, this does not mean that their privileged circumstances dictate adventuresome policies. Rich states are often the ones that have much to lose from onset of revolutionary change or global instability and usually perceive the status quo as best serving their interests. As a result, they often forge international economic policies to protect and expand their envied position at the pinnacle of the global hierarchy.

System-level analysis contended that the economic realities of the International system help shape the choice that countries make. Again, this is the same in systems from the global to your local level. Thus, levels of productivity and prosperity also affect the foreign policies of the poor states at the bottom of the hierarchy. Some dependent states respond to their economic weakness by complying subserviently with the wishes of the rich on whom they depend. Others rebel defiantly, sometimes succeeding (despite their disadvantaged bargaining position) in their resistance of effort by great powers and powerful international organizations to control their international behaviour.

Interdependence is one of the economic facts of life that influence state's behaviour. For example, many studies conclude that increasing economic interdependence promote peace as countries become more familiar with one another and need each other for their mutual prosperity. This is why it is said that international system has economic facts of life that help shape behaviours of states. Natural resource production and consumption patterns also influence the operation of the system. From this perspective, the U. S. military reaction to Iraq's attack on Kuwait in 1990 and its threat to the rest of the oil rich Persian Gulf region were virtually foreordained by the importance of petroleum to the prosperity of the United States and its economic partners. As U. S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III explained to reporters, "The economic life-line of the industrial world runs from the Gulf and we cannot permit a dictator...to sit astride that economic lifeline (Rourke, 2008). World politics is strongly influenced by the reality in the international system that much of the world's petroleum is produced in the Middle East and consumed in North America, Europe and Japan.

Economic interdependence or outright dependence also constrains a nation's foreign policy. For instance, because America's economy is so economically intertwined with Japan's, America would probably never seriously retaliate against Japan's neomercantilist policies for fear that both countries would be plunged into a deep depression. Developing countries which depend on world currency markets or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for finance must promise to reduce spending, devalue their currency, and free markets in return for loans.

Perfect freedom is impossible for states in the international system just as it is for individuals within a state. Those very constraints motivate states to maximize their independence within an existing state system and shift the system's rules in their favour. States seek to control what they depend on or lessen the extent of their dependence. This explains quite a bit of the behaviour of states, their imperial thrusts to widen the scope of their control and their autarchic strivings toward greater self-sufficiency.

3.2 Military Capabilities

The fundamental problem facing states and non-states actors in world politics is how to balance their power resources and commitments while leaving a comfortable surplus power in reserve. As a result whenever such a balance exists, there will be a wide spread domestic support for a states' foreign policy. However, if commitments exceed power, the result will be a foreign policy that is characterized by "insolvency" and deep domestic dissension (Glenn & Kay 1990). Avoiding this is a perpetual problem that policy makers encounter as they put together a foreign policy and define their states' national interests.

Conflict and the use of coercive force to deter, contain, and win conflict and implement policy are characteristic features of politics. In modern world politics where there exists nothing approaching a world state, world law, a monopoly of coercive force, a consensus on justice or a political order generally recognized as legitimate, military means are central to the attainment of goals by most states. Their presence or absence, level and quality directly affect foreign policies, whether those policies seek to attain, use, maintain or restrict military means. However, in more recent time, the convergence of global interests and the embrace of global governance may serve to moderate conflicts.

Military capabilities are of great importance in any calculus of relative state power. It is therefore, not surprising that the most influential states today are the greatest military powers rather than the greatest moral powers. Today, states may have at least three different kinds of military capabilities namely: nuclear forces, conventional forces and people's war. These draw on different kinds of technology and have different costs. They are useful for very different purposes and states that are very weak in one at times, may be strong in another.

The hardware of nuclear capability has shifted from aircraft with atomic bombs to missiles with war heads. A first and second-strike counter value deterrent is the facility necessary to qualify as a first-class nuclear power. And two states, America and Russia so qualify. Three states – Britain, France and China have dependent, inadequate or primitive nuclear capabilities. France and China at least aspire to the first rank. However, first nuclear rank today does little enough good for those who have it, for two reasons:

- i. The fact of nuclear stalemate
- ii. A general and prudent unwillingness at the present time to accustom the world to the use of nuclear weapons – make the positive utility of these ultimate weapons extremely limited.

This limitation makes their use, purpose other than the second blow in a mutual nuclear confrontation dubious. For a great power, nuclear weapons are unnecessarily costly and worthless. And they are also almost useless in the majority of international transactions. From the foregoing, given the greater service ability of conventional and sub conventional forces in the nuclear age, the possession of nuclear power permits and assures only a certain limited independence from the influence of other nuclear states, and not much more of that than most economically powerful states have in any case. The nuclear stalemate makes conventional forces as relevant as ever in principle. The great conventional forces of the present century are those of the United States with world mobility, the former Soviet Union with hemispheric mobility and China with limited sub-continental mobility.

The main active functions of modern conventional forces include: intervention or counter intervention in foreign revolutions, showing the flag, symbolic violence and the routine work of broadening or sustaining sphere of influence, mutual support to allies in return for their previous or pledged aid, probes of weak spots at the frontiers of enemy power, support and escalation of external insurgencies or counter insurgencies, direct assault on foreign territory or on enemy states and regimes.

Their main passive functions include defense by deterrence, occupation of an 'imperial', sphere and actual defence from foreign invasion or penetration. It is important to point out that large conventional capabilities remain necessary for states with world interests, large ambitions, or large and specific local enemies, if they intend to be capable of maintaining those interests, advancing those ambitions and achieving a sense of security against those enemies.

For those who seek the prestige of being first class powers, the current nuclear systems are necessary. The systems involve a swiftly evolving technology that compels ceaseless competition for superiority, but they are costly and dangerous. The use of large and highly mobile conventional forces is still the most useful tools of states.

3.3 Military – Industrial Complex – A case study

A military–industrial complex is a huge interlocking network of government agencies, industrial corporations and research institutes, working together to supply a nation's military forces. The military – industrial complex was a response

to the growing importance of technology (nuclear weapons, electronics, and logistics in the Cold War military planning). Because of the domestic political clouts of these actors, the complex was a very powerful influence on foreign policy in both the United States and the defunct Soviet Union during the cold War.

States at war have long harnessed their economic and technological might for the war effort. But during the Cold War, military procurement occurred on a massive scale in peacetime, as the super powers raced to develop new high-technology weapons. The race created a special role for scientists and engineers in addition to the more traditional role of industries that produce war materials. In response to the Soviet Satellite Spuknik in 1957, the United States increased spending on research and development and created new science education programme. By 1961 President Dwight Eisenhower warned in his farewell speech that the military-industrial complex (a term he coined) was gaining “unwarranted influence” in United States Society and that militarization could erode democracy in the United States. The size of the complex gave it more political clout than ordinary citizens could master. Yet its interests in the arms race conflicted with the interest of ordinary citizens in peace.

The complex encompasses a variety of constituencies, each of which has an interest in military spending. Corporations that produce goods for the military makes profit from government contracts. So do military officers whose careers advance by building bureaucratic empires around new weapon systems. And so do universities and scientific institutes that receive military research contracts - a major source of funding for scientists in Russia and the United States.

Subcontractors and parts suppliers for big U.S. weapons projects are usually spread around many states and congressional districts, so that local citizens and politicians join the list of constituents benefiting from military spending. Early funding for the Strategic Defence Initiative (or Star Wars) was given to each military service branch, the Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and hundreds of private contractors. Recently, a similar phenomenon has emerged in the European Community, where weapons development programmes have been parceled out to several European States. A new fighter jet is less likely to be canceled if one country gets the contract for the wings, another for the engines, and so forth.

Executives in military industries, as the people who best understand their industries, are often appointed as government officials responsible for military procurement decision and then return to their companies again- a practice called the “revolving door”. In democracies, military industries also try to influence public opinion through advertising that ties their products to patriotic themes. Finally, U. S. military industries give generous campaign contributions to national

politicians who vote on military budget, and sometimes bribes to officials as well. Military industry became an important source of Political Action Committee (PAC) money raised by members of Congress.

When the Cold War ended, the military industrial complex in both superpowers endured cutbacks in military budgets. In Russia, military industries formed the backbone of a political factions seeking to slow down economic reforms and continue government subsidies to state owned industries. They succeeded in replacing Russia's Prime Minister with an industrial manager in late 1992. In the United States, meanwhile, the lingering influence of the military-industrial complex may help explain why Congress kept funding certain Cold War weapons (such as the Sea Wolf and B-2bomber) after their purpose seemingly disappeared. (Glodstein and Pevehouse, 2009)

4.0 Conclusion

One of the major problems facing states in international politics is how to balance their power resources and commitment while leaving a comfortable surplus of power in reserve. Walter LipMann, an American journalist who wrote of this problem in 1943 argued that, when such a balance exists, there will be wide spread domestic support for a state's foreign policy. Should commitments exceed power; the result will be a foreign policy that is characterized by "insolvency", "bankruptcy" and deep domestic dissension.

Avoiding this so-called Lippman Gap is a perpetual problem that policymakers encounter as they put together a foreign policy and define the states national interest. It is not unique to the United States or to the twentieth century. In the *Rise and fall of the Great powers*, Paul Kennedy argues that the fundamental problem facing every great power is balancing its short-term security needs with its long term needs to preserve a healthy and productive economy that is based on modern technology, because it is rapid and sustained economic growth that generates the resources that allow states to pay for the instruments of military power.

Kennedy's survey concluded that of all the surveys none have succeeded in maintaining such a balance. Inevitably, imperial overreach sets in, with military commitments and spending exceeding the economy's ability to pay for them. The result is economic slow down, which when compiled with rapid economic growth in other states, leads to the loss of the great power status.

5.0 Summary

The realist proposition that states internal capabilities shape their foreign policy priorities is supported by the fact that states' preparations for war strongly

influence their later use of force. Whereas all states may seek similar goals, their ability to realize them will vary according to their military capabilities.

Military capabilities limit a states range of prudent policy choices. They act as mediating factors on leaders national security decisions. However, military capability to a large extent depends on the level of economic and industrial development a state enjoys. Rich states have interest that extend far beyond their borders and typically possess the means to pursue and protect them. The United States today stand out as a superpower precisely because it benefits from a combination of vast economic and military capabilities.

5.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- i. How does economic development influence a state's foreign policy goals?
- ii. The nuclear stalemate makes the conventional forces as relevant as ever in principle. Discuss
- iii. Military Capability and a strong foreign policy are functions of economic development. Discuss.

7.0 References/Further Readings

Glenn, Hastedt and Kay, Knickrehm (1999). *Dimensions of World Politics*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

Kegley, Charles Jr. (2007). *World Politics: Trend and Transformation, Eleventh Edition*, Belmont: Thompson Wadsworth.

Goldstein, Joshua and Jon C. Pevehouse (2009). *International Relations, Eight Edition*, New York: Pearson Longman.

Unit 4: GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION (GEOPOLITICS)

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 Geographic Influence on Foreign Policy
 - 3.2 Characterizing a State's Foreign Policy
 - 3.3 Flexibility of the Capability Factors
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments
- 7.0 References/Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

One of the most important factors that influence a state's foreign policy behaviour is its location and physical terrain. The presence of natural frontier for example may profoundly guide policy maker's choices. The United States has prospered because vast oceans separate it from Europe and Asia. The advantage of having oceans as barriers to foreign intervention, combined with the absence of a powerful neighbour, permitted the United States to develop into an industrial giant and safely practiced isolationism for more than one hundred and fifty (150) years. Another example is the mountainous Switzerland, whose topography has made neutrality an attractive foreign policy options.

Similarly, maintaining autonomy from continental politics was for centuries an enduring theme in the foreign policy of great Britain, an Island country whose physical separation from Europe served historically as a buffer-separating it from entanglement in major-power disputes on the continent, preserving this protective shield was a long-standing priority for Britain and helps to explain why the country has been so hesitant in the past to accept full integration into the European Union (EU).

2.0 Objectives

At the successful completion of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the influence of geography on foreign policy
- explain how national roles of a State characterise its foreign policy
- discuss four national roles

3.1 Geographical Influence on Foreign Policy

How countries act towards others is shaped by the number of neighbouring states on their borders and whether they are protected from invasion by natural barriers such as mountains and oceans. Until recently, the separation of the United States

from Eurasia encouraged an isolationist policy during many periods in U. S. history. Topography, location and other geographical factors have influenced the foreign policy priorities of Great Britain, Germany, China, Finland and States in South America.

Most countries are not insular; however, they have many states on their borders, denying them the option of non-involvement in world affairs. Germany, which is located in the geographical center of Europe, historically has found its domestic politics and foreign policy preferences profoundly affected by its geostrategic position. Germany in the twentieth century struggled through no less than six radical changes in governing institutions, each of which pursued very different foreign policies; (i) Kaiser Wilhelm II's empire (ii) The domestic Weimar Republic (iii) Adolph Hitler's authoritarian dictatorship and imperialistic wars seeking to establish a thousand year Reich to rule the world, its two post world war II successors, (iv) The capitalist Federal Republic in West Germany and (v) the Communist Germany Democratic Republic in East Germany and finally (vi) a reunited Germany at the end of the Cold War, now committed to liberal democracy and full integration in the European Union.

Each of these governments was preoccupied with its relations but responded to the opportunities and challenges presented by Germany's position in the middle of the European continent with different foreign policy goals. For each government, however, isolationist withdrawal from involvement in continental affairs was not a viable geostrategic option.

In much the same way, extended frontiers with the former Soviet Union shaped the foreign policies of China and Finland. Finland's neutrality in the Cold War helped ensure its survival in the face of a powerful and threatening neighbour. China on the other hand, long regarded its relationship with the defunct Soviet Union as unequal, and in the late 1960s, the communist giants clashed militarily as the Chinese sought to rectify past injustices. The unequal treaties between China and outside powers, which encapsulated other perceived injustices resulted in part from China's vast size and indefensible borders, which until China's rise to power, made it an easy target for the great power that had carved it into spheres of influence in previous centuries.

Like China, the Latin American countries reside geographically near a much stronger power, the United States, whose capabilities are in part a function of geographical resources. Latin America has long been the object of studied interest and frequent intervention by the giant to the north. The U. S. presence provoked bitter response among Latin American countries for many decades, because they could not compete on an equal footing with the U. S. economic and military powerhouse. Their foreign policy of resistance to so-called Yankee imperialism

was driven by their vulnerable circumstances. Understandably, many other poor Global South countries without significant resources also see that given weak geo-economic condition, their foreign policy goals should be geared to opposing imperialism-what former Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser defined as “the subjugation of small nations to the interests of big ones”

History is replete with other examples of geography’s influence on states’ foreign policy goals; this is why geopolitical theories are valuable. The geopolitics school of Realist thought and political geography generally stresses the influence of geographic factors on state power and international conduct. Illustrative of early geopolitical thinking is Alfred Thayer Mahan’s *The Influence of Sea power in History (1890)*, which maintains that control of the sea shaped national power and foreign policy states with extensive coastlines and ports enjoyed a competitive advantage.

However, not only location but also topography, size (territory and population), climate, and distance between states are powerful determinants of individual country’s foreign policies. The underlying principle behind the geopolitical perspective is self-evident; leader’s perceptions of available foreign policy options are influenced by the geopolitical circumstances that define their states place on the world stage.

3.2 Characterizing a State’s Foreign Policy

National roles of a state are an approach that is used for characterizing a state’s foreign policy. This approach to characterizing states behaviour operates at a high level of generalizations. It is not concerned with specific foreign –policy acts but with a states general orientation towards world politics. K. J. Holsti defines this to be “general attitudes and commitments towards the external environment and its fundamental strategy for accomplishing domestic and external objectives and for coping with persistent threats”. A state’s orientation is not revealed in any foreign-policy act but is a way of characterizing the cumulative impact of large numbers of foreign policy actions taken over long period of time.

We can characterize a state’s general orientation towards world politics in a number of ways. On a most general level, isolationism, nonalignment, multilateralism, and imperialism are terms frequently employed for this purpose. Holsti suggests that we can think in more specific terms and identify national role orientations for states. National roles incorporate the basic fears and aspirations of policymakers, as well as economic, geographic, domestic, and systemic constraints on states’ actions. States are not restricted to holding one national role orientation at a time, nor is it impossible for states to adopt new national roles or shed old ones. The important point is that national roles have a greater staying power than does the impact of an individual policymaker’s personality. This

allows analysts to make prediction about how a state will act under given circumstances. For illustrative purposes, we will discuss four national roles.

(i) Some states see themselves as bastions of revolutions. They believe that they have a duty to organize or lead revolutionary movements around the world. Such leadership requires that they give some combination of moral, monetary, economic, or military aid to revolutionaries who share their vision of international relations. Holsti concluded that the United States and the defunct Soviet Union tend to hold this role orientation. The United States sees itself as having a duty to promote democracy abroad while Soviet Union then repeatedly pledged its support to anti capitalist national liberation movements in the Third World.

(ii) States may also see themselves as regional leaders. In this national role orientation, states believe that they should be in the fore front of all regional diplomatic, military, or economic initiative. Egypt has long adopted this role orientation in the Middle East, while Nigeria from independence in 1960 adopts Africa as the centerpiece of its foreign policy and assumes the position of “giant of Africa”. This national role propels Nigeria to play a “big brother” role in West Africa sub-region. A good example is its leadership in almost every peace-keeping operation in the region through ECOMOG forces. China sees itself as occupying a similar position in Asian politics.

Again, both superpowers have adopted this role orientation. The United States sees itself as leader in the Western Hemisphere, and the Soviet Union then, but now Russia sees itself as leader in Eastern Europe.

(iii) A faithful ally national role orientation stresses the identity of interests between itself and another state. This similarity may be rooted in historical or ideological bounds, or in the perception of a common threat, and it produces a tendency to support its ally almost in reflex-type fashion in international disputes. British foreign policy has shown such a tendency in the postwar era in its support for U. S. diplomatic and military initiatives.

(iv) Our last example is that of mediator-integrator. In this role orientation, the state sees itself as a regional or global “fixer”. Frequent participation in United Nations (UN) and multinational peacekeeping efforts and international conferences characterize the behaviour of states adopting this role orientation. Canada, France, Hungary, Yugoslavia and the Scandinavian countries are prime examples of states that have adopted this national role. During its involvement in Vietnam, the United States can be seen as having adopted three national role orientations. Regional leader, regional protector, and defender of the faith.

3.3 Flexibility of the Capability Factors

The direct utility of the economic means of policy as tools of action is strictly limited. But the level of a country's economic development, its rate of economic growth and the proportion of its population that can be supported while not directly engaged in production are nonetheless strikingly most important characteristics. Economic means are most important for their convertibility and flexibility. It is that flexibility which therefore warrants attention as it relates to the flexibility of other factors of capabilities. There is an oligopoly of capability, a very unequal stratified world society. This creates a narrow oligarchy of world influence.

Flexibility is an important quality, possessed in different measure by different brands of capability. The quality is that of breadth, in application and in use. The U. S. nuclear deterrents were useless in waging a war in Vietnam. In principle, a threat of massive destruction and suicide is neither credible nor sufficiently dedicated to make such final adjustments. By contrast, persuasive diplomacy is applicable, in principle and in that sense diplomatic capabilities are more flexible than nuclear-strike forces. A high quality diplomatic corps is capable of doing more and more varied things than a high quality second-strike force. The criterion of flexibility ought to be applied in the evaluation of any state's total capabilities along with the more conventional criteria of effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and orientation to actual problems.

Thus, there is the need to know not only whether a state is prepared to meet its actual challenges, whether it is adequately prepared to meet them and whether its level of preparedness is attained at the lowest possible cost, but also whether it is ready to meet a very broad spectrum of probable and possible challenges, (threats and opportunities) of strikingly different types.

Economic capability is the most broadly convertible power factor. But the capability for collective action and (indirectly) the ego-demographic base are also potential sources of capabilities directly applicable for foreign policy, even though they may not themselves be directly applicable to. Thus, the larger a state's Gross National Product (GNP) and per capita income, the more this highly flexible economic capability it has and the more variety it can introduce into its actual means of action. Similarly, a united, organized, literate, skillful, obedient, and dedicated population would provide a state with a large capacity for collective action, useful to increase its economic means or enlarge its conventional forces. It is more normal for private ties, political dissidence and disaffection, personal independence and political education and skepticism, or general ignorance to limit economic productivity and the will to conform politically.

On the other hand, the collective volition of an organized mass renders hostile subversion, propaganda threats, bribes, boycotts, and violence ineffective, it can even liberate emotional and physical energies otherwise untapped. An astute

leadership can mobilize these energies, materialize them for mass war. Such collective militancy, if long sustained, may be as flexible as a heavily industrialized and political penetration, propaganda cadres, and sub conventional forces (which are especially difficult to support without self- sustained morale and motivation).

Economic capabilities and collective capacity represent highly flexible but potential capabilities, while other actual capabilities have a varying breadth of application. Eco-capabilities are more material, more measurable, steadier, more subject to control, and easier to turn to a wide range of services.

4.0 Conclusion

The world's oligopoly of economic production is interchangeable with potential constellations of influence. Regional, sub-regional and the world wide wealth and geographical location are factors to reckon and so also is military capabilities, extent servitudes and alignment, statements and will to influence the international environment and other power factors. These factors do enlarge or diminish the actual influence of any state. An operating inequality of influence is inferred from the inequality of capabilities even as an oligarchy of world political influence is in actuality not in complete and one-to-one correspondence to the oligopoly of eco-capability.

5.0 Summary

An international oligarchy of influence tightly stratified and smaller than the international oligopoly of economic, military and geographic capabilities exists due to the fact that the states are unequally endowed with these capability factors. The United States of America is a world power, whose presence is felt in most regional subsystems of which it is often the chief member.

The influence of any state is reduced through the existence or location in it's region of several powers of the same rank, sometimes these powers are hostile and the hostility could be long lasting. For instance, Libyan influence, the influence of Ghana and of South Africa are much reduced by Nigeria's presence.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignment (TMAs)

- i. Identify and explain the four national roles by which a state's foreign behaviour can be characterised
- ii. The United States is a "World Power" whose presence is felt in most regional subsystems. Discuss.
- iii. What do you understand by flexibility of capability factors?

7.0 References/Further Reading

Glenn, Hastedt and Key M.Knickrehm (1991). *Dimensions of World Politics*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

Holsti, J (1988). *International Politics. A Framework for Analysis 5th edition*, Enylewwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Kegley, Charles Jr. (2007). *World Politics; Trend and Transformation, Eleventh Edition*, Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.

Richard, Falk (1972). *This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposal for Human Survival*, New York: Vintage.

Module 5: FOREIGN POLICIES CASE STUDIES

Unit 1 Phases of Foreign Policy of the United States

Unit 2 Phases of Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union

Unit 3 The Cuban Missile Crisis

Unit 4 American involvement in Vietnam Politics

UNIT 1: PHASES OF FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objective
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 Main Principles of American Foreign Policy
 - 3.2 The Monroe Doctrine & Its Corollary
 - 3.3 Roosevelt's Policy of Good Neighbour.
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References/Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

The foreign policy of the United States of America, like that of any other country is conditioned by her history, geography, social and economic system, economic and military capability and the international environment. As in the case of all other countries, the United States foreign policy is always guided by her national interest, and is largely influenced by the views and policies of leadership. It is only leadership which keeps changing more often than any other factor. It is expected that her foreign policy would also change accordingly. But that does not happen. National interest is the primary concern for any foreign policy decision-maker. Therefore, generally there is not much change in the U. S. foreign policy until a revolutionary change occurs in the international scenario.

Americans have a belief that their foreign policy is based not so much on power politics in the world, as on certain ideals and moral values that they cherish. Americans consider themselves to be protectors of democracy and champions of freedom. The United States entered both the two world wars because that was in her national interest and in keeping with the ground realities of international politics. However, the U. S. insisted that she was fighting the war to end totalitarianism and militarism to make the world safe for peace and democracy. United States has passed through conflict between international reality and her own idealism. There has always been conflict between theory and practice, between realism and idealism. But, national interest of the United States has been the permanent factor that guides the decision makers of the foreign policy.

3.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to do the following:

- discuss the main principles of American foreign policy

- highlight on the Monroe doctrine and its corollary
- evaluate Roosevelt's policy of "good neighbour"

3.0 Main Body

3.1 The main principles of American foreign policy:

Generally the United States foreign policy has been based on three main principles stated as follows:

First, President Jefferson had initiated, in 1801 the principle of "peace commercial and honest friendship with all nations entangling alliances with none". In fact, this was in pursuance of the policy initiated by George Washington himself. In his farewell address, the first president had said, Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation..., it must be unwise for us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties..., "He added "our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course". The United States at that time wanted only to have commercial relations with European countries. At the most, she would go in for temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. The United States followed the policy of isolation and refused to be dragged into European politics.

Secondly, The Monroe Doctrine enunciated by President Monroe in 1823 played a major part in the American foreign policy. It was declared that the United States had never involved herself in the European power politics, or indented to do so in future. And at the same time the United States would not permit any European power to interfere in the independence of any of the Republics on the American continent. President Monroe told the U. S. congress on December 2, 1823:

"The United States had not intervened, and never would intervene in wars in Europe; but they could not... in the interest of their own peace and happiness, allow the allied European powers to extend their political system to any part of America, and try to intervene in the independence of South American Republics... we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their political system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety".

Consequently, Monroe Doctrine became the basis of American foreign policy for almost a century. It was a warning by the United States to the European powers to keep their hands off and not to intervene in the Western Hemisphere. The United States was not interested in Europe. And, while asking European powers to keep away from the Republics, U. S. assumed to herself the power to come to their help

in the event of any attack on them by European powers such as France, Prussia, Spain and Austria.

The reason why Monroe Doctrine was enunciated was the apprehension that Spain was trying after the Congress of Vienna, to conquer her former colonies in South America that she had earlier lost. Therefore, American warning was administered but the underlying idea was American isolation as far as European politics is concerned. There were some Americans who did not even like America participation in the Red Cross on the basis of isolationism.

Thirdly, the policy of open door associated with the name of Secretary of State John Hay (initiated in 1899) was concerned with the Far East, and its aim was to enable equal facilities for trade and commerce in the far East to all states of Europe and to the United States of America. In other words, no country should establish itself as a colonial power, and none should intervene in the power politics of that region.

The most important of these principles during better the part of the nineteenth century was the Monroe Doctrine. This was as noted above directed mainly against Spain but also France, Prussia, and Austria. However, it was not against Britain. The latter was in fact, expected to support the U. S. Policy in due course America used this doctrine to promote her imperialist designs. Texas was annexed in 1845. When it was resented by Mexico, there was a U. S. – Mexico war as a result of which, the United States acquired New Mexico and Upper California through the Treaty of 1848.

A new dimension was added in 1904 when President Theodore Roosevelt assumed the “exercise of an international police power” to keep the wrong-doers away from Venezuela. Thus, the U. S. assumed the right of intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries. According to J.W.Pratt. “Uncle Sam assumed the role of international policeman, kind to the law abiding but to lay a stern hand upon little nation’s that fall into disorder or defaulted in their obligations”. The idealist, President Wilson added another dimension when he said that the United States would support democratic regimes in Latin’s American countries. He said he would frown upon revolution in the neighbouring Republics’ and teach the South American Republics to elect good men”.

Thus, having served notice on the European powers to keep off Latin America, the United States continued to assert its monopolistic rights, and regarded the region as her exclusive sphere.

The three principles mentioned above namely: Neutrality, Monroe Doctrine and Open Door can be easily summed in one word, isolation. Americans then

consistently insisted on the utility of isolation. The United States did not wish to involve herself in the disputes, conflicts and politics of Europe and she would not allow any European country to interfere in the Americas. But this policy of isolation has never been absolute for the following reasons:

Firstly, the United States has remained aloof if there has been necessary balance of power in Europe, but she did not hesitate to intervene in European politics when the balance was disturbed. As Schuman noted, the policy of isolation has actually been a shadow of balance of power between major international actors.

Secondly, the United States interpreted its policy, particularly the Monroe Doctrine to mean that they had the exclusive right to intervene in South American Republics. Thus, while European nations must keep away, the United States must have freedom to involve herself in South America.

3.2 The Monroe Doctrine and its Corollary

The Monroe Doctrine was American warning to the Europeans not to promote their imperialistic ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, and also an assurance that U.S. would stay away from Europe. Britain was the principal supporter of U.S. policy in Europe. The United States observed neutrality even after the First World War began in 1914. But, as the chances of victory of the central powers brightened the U. S. began responding to the Anglo-French needs. The sinking of American ships (carrying supplies for the Allies) by German submarines led to U.S. entry into the First World War in April 1917. But even before her entry as an allied power the United States had been lending millions of dollars to the Allies, mainly to Britain.

When U. S. entered the war, President Wilson the prophet of peace, repeatedly said that the U. S. was fighting the war to end all future wars, to protect democracy and to establish lasting peace. One important reason why the United States joined the war was the necessity to restore European balance that the central powers had disturbed. When President Monroe declared on December 1823 that the American continents were “henceforth not to be considered as subjects for colonisation by European powers” he laid down the principle of America for Americans. Monroe Doctrine was based on a unilateral stance of the United States. It was not the outcome of any consultation with the Latin American countries. The Monroe Doctrine saved South American States from further European imperialism.

An attempt was made in 1825-26 at the initiative of Simon Bolivar (the liberator of South America) to keep the United States away from Latin America. A conference of all the states of the region was convened at Panama on October 1, 1825 to which United States was also invited. However, the Americans showed no

enthusiasm in the conference because they wished to use the Monroe Doctrine for their commercial enterprise. Nothing came out of the Panama conference which wanted to put the United States at par with the European powers.

The United States began its penetration into Latin America. Texas was annexed in 1845, which as mentioned earlier led to a war with Mexico in 1846 resulting in the occupation of New Mexico and Upper California. After the American Civil War and subsequent industrial revolution in the U. S., Latin American countries were used for investment of dollars and dumping of surplus products. After the war of 1898 in which Spain was defeated, the United States acquired Cuba, Guam, Philippines and Puerto Rico. According to President Taft, the objective of U. S. policy was to use dollars instead of bullets.

By the end of nineteenth century, the United States had assumed to herself the role of sole defender of Latin America and promoter of her commerce in the region. Britain, France and the Netherlands already held areas in the Caribbean and Germany was then trying to establish herself in the area. So in order to secure Latin America even further, President Roosevelt issued a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine” on December 6, 1904. Thus, the United States assumed the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Latin American countries and adjust their political disorder to prevent European interference. While Monroe had denied, the right of interference became an instrument of offence. Earlier in 1895 Secretary of State, Olney had asserted that United States was the Supreme power in the Western Hemisphere and her wishes were laws for the peoples of the region.

P. T. Moon, therefore, commented that the means used by the United States were surprisingly similar to the means of European imperialism. During the first decade of the twentieth century, Panama became a protectorate of the United States, America got the right of adjusting all foreign and domestic obligations of Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua was next victim of dollar imperialism.

Meanwhile, Pan-Americanism had begun to grow with the first conference held in 1889 at Washington. The relations between the United States and Latin American Republics would never become cordial. For example, when the United States entered into the first world war in 1917, only eight of the Latin American countries followed her and declared war on Germany. The United States called the “Colossus of the North” emerged more powerful from the war. And when she did not join the League of Nations most of the Latin American countries became members of the League to contain U. S.

3.3 Roosevelt’s Policy of “Good Neighbour”

Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected in 1932. In his inaugural speech, as new President in March 1933, he made an important policy announcement. He

declared, “I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbour – the neighbour-who resolutely respects himself and because he does so, respects the right of others”. Speaking later to the Pan-American Union, the President said, “You’re America and mine must be a structure built of confidence cemented by a sympathy which recognizes only quality and fraternity”. It was agreed at the seventh Pan-American conference at Montevideo in 1933, that “no state had the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another” and in December 1933 Franklin Roosevelt said that “...the definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention”.

In pursuance of the Policy of Good Neighbour” initiated by President F. D. Roosevelt, America demonstrated its friendship when the U. S. marines were withdrawn from Haiti in 1933. The U. S. administration relinquished control over Cuban finances, and renounced the right of intervention in her internal affairs. In 1936, the United States gave up the right of intervention in the internal affairs of Panama. President Roosevelt emphasized the need for mutual consultation at the Buena’s Aires conference in 1936, in the event of any threat from aggressor states of Europe. However, at that time this idea was dropped. But at the Lima Conference in December 1938, it was agreed that in case of a threat of aggression or likely breach of peace even if one of the member countries of the Pan-American Union requested, that foreign ministers of all the member countries, will meet, from time to time, in different capitals and decide upon a common approach. Thus, as Longman and Mitchell say, not only the United States, but twenty one American countries became the interpreters of the Monroe Doctrine.

Meanwhile certain difficulties arose in the effective implementation of the policy of good neighbour. Mexico nationalized all the railways and acquired thirteen American and four Brazilian oil companies. In spite of this provocation, President Roosevelt did not resort to military action against Mexico, thereby introducing a new chapter by Franklin Roosevelt in the relations between United States of America and Latin American States. He reversed the policy that his cousin Theodore Roosevelt had initiated in 1904.

4.0 Conclusion

During the past two centuries, America has tried to regulate the behaviour of numerous countries particularly in the Western Hemisphere and the Far East. Most foreign policy makers of America tried to follow the policy of isolation until the United States, suddenly found herself in the position of super power after the Second World War.

The hero of the First World War, President Wilson was an idealist who wanted to establish lasting world peace. He failed as Palmer Perkins say “Americans like to think of their country as the goddess of liberty holding high touch of freedom as a

beacon light to all peoples of the world”. The Americans have tried to formulate their foreign policy on the above assumption, but have often interfered with independence of other countries. However, when they intervene in the international affairs of another country, they argue that they were doing so to serve the principles of freedom and democracy.

5.0 Summary

The three main principles of the United States foreign policy namely neutrality, Monroe Doctrine and Open Door can easily be summed in one word, isolation. Many Americans were not even in support of their country’s participation in Red Cross programmes on the basis of isolationism. However, the principle of isolation was not all inclusive as American usually interferes in the affair of other nations on the guise of defending the principles of democracy.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- i. Write short notes on the following: (a) Neutrality (b) Monroe Doctrine and (c) Open Door Policy
- ii. Explain President Roosevelt foreign policy of “Good Neighbour”.

7.0 References/Further Readings

Glenn, Hustedt and Kay, Knickrehm (1991). *Dimensions of World Politics*, New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Khanna U.N. (2004). *International Relations, Fourth Revised Edition*, New Delhi, India: Vika Publishing House.

Palmer, Norman and Howard, Perkins (2007). *International Relations, Third Revised Edition*, Delhi: A. I. T. B. S. Publishers.

Rourke, John (2008). *International Politics on the World Stage, Twelfth Edition*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

UNIT 2: PHASES OF FOREIGN POLICY OF SOVIET UNION

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 A Continuation of Traditional Policies
 - 3.2 Different Phases of Soviet Foreign Policy
 - 3.3 Soviet Union and the Axis
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignment (TMAs)
- 7.0 References/Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

Foreign policies are usually formulated to protect and promote the national interest, however in the case of Soviet Union; a lot of emphasis was laid on ideological factor also. The former Soviet Union, being the first country to have been the outcome of a proletarian revolution, was determined to pursue the goal of world revolution, at any rate for the first few years after Lenin came to power. We made mention in Module Four of some of the factors that influence foreign policy-making. We have also emphasized the importance of national interest and said that regulation of the behaviour of other countries to suit one's own interest is part of the instruments of foreign policy.

Usually, as environmental of foreign policy changes, the policy makers also adjust their policy accordingly. The Soviet Union was not exception. However, its emphasis on the ideology of Marxist- Leninism put it in a slightly different category. According to Edward Crankshaw, in its distant objectives the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is less obscure and more coherent than that of any other country. The objectives embrace the ultimate victory of the world proletariat under the leadership of Moscow. Marx and Engels had declared in the Communist Manifestoes: "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrowing of all existing social ends". Thus, the programmes of world revolution distinguishing the Soviet Union from all other states during the inter-war years.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit you will be able to;

- explain the peculiarity of Soviet foreign policy
- assess the factors that affected Soviet foreign policy

- discuss the extent to which Soviet foreign policy propagated the Communist ideology of world revolution.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 A Continuation of Traditional Policies

The factors that influenced the Soviet foreign policy included historical and traditional policies, geographical considerations, internal political problems, economic situation and the general international situation. The morale of people and character of leadership also had their impact on the foreign policy. But Soviet Governments believed that its duty to promote communism, world revolution and victory of the proletariat was an additional factor that influenced its foreign policy. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union was not consistent. Rather, the Soviet leadership appeared to regard world revolution as imminent, and then as a remote expectation, as a goal to be placed in the forefront of their policies and then which can be relegated at least temporarily to the ideological closet. The ideal of world revolution was therefore, the ultimate objective of the Soviet foreign policy, though at times it had to be given a back seat for strategic reasons. It was never lost sight of or abandoned. Zinoviev, head of the Comintern, himself said in 1925 that it had its “slow and heavy” phase and that “contrary to our early expectation it may take years to ripen”

Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution, in 1917, the new regime sued for peace. Lenin’s Government had pulled the country out of the First World War and subsequently made peace with Germany through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Germany had imposed harsh and severe terms, and the erstwhile allies of Russia turned hostile. They blamed the new Russian rulers for peace with the enemy and intervened in the civil war that followed. However, Trotsky’s Red Army succeeded in defeating the designs of the anti-communist forces aided by the major capitalist powers.

Thus, both on ideological and practical grounds the Soviet Union had decided to destroy capitalism and promote revolutions. However, Soviet Government had decided as early as 1919, to entrust the task of world revolution to the Moscow-headquartered Third international, or the Communist International (the Comintern). Legally, it was an international movement of the Communists and the Russians were but one of the participants. But the Western leaders regarded the Comintern as an organ of the Soviet Union government. Infact the Western Leaders concluded that both the Soviet Government and the Comintern were guided by the same people-the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party.

A question that was frequently asked was whether the Soviet foreign policy was really only a continuation of Czarist policy or it was really based on entirely

different approach. As already stated, the Western view was that the Soviet policy was simply old wine in new bottles. It was said that the Soviet policy was “but that of Czarist Russia writ large”. George Kennon, the U. S. diplomat, once remarked that he could piece together certain observations of Czarist foreign office of 1883 and submit them to his Government, with slight changes as the policy of the Soviet Union.

Many other Western observers used to point out that nearly all of the policies followed by the Soviet Union were a natural and logical continuation of historic Russian policies. But the prominent communist writers like Karl Radek, resented any comparison between Czarist and Soviet policies. He said that to attempt to represent the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as a continuation of Czarist policy is ridiculous. The non-communist writers argued that just as Czarist Russia right from the time of Peter the Great had tried to expand its vast territory. The communist rulers have also done precisely the same. The Czarists had always tried to consolidate their empire, acquire windows to the West, and to gain access to the oceans without abandoning their self-imposed isolation. The Soviet leaders also showed the same tendencies of expansion, and the same over-zealous attitude. It was pointed out after the Second World War, that the Soviet Union had expanded almost to the fullest extent of Czarist aspirations, with the only expectation of Turkish Straits.

Both the views have points of truth. There is no doubt that after the Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet foreign policy was naturally influenced by Marxian concept of inevitability of destruction of capitalism and victory of the proletariat. With this conviction expansion of communism in other countries become the most significant principle of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Opposition of capitalist countries replaced the traditional policy based on struggle for power and balance of power. Soviet Union could not be expected in the first decade after the revolution to enter into the kind of alliances that the Czar had concluded with Britain and France. The new regime was hostile to America and Japan as well for the active support that they gave to the white rebels during the civil war.

On the contrary, it became Soviet policy to support all anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movements all over the world. Soviet foreign policy-makers were convinced that scientific socialism was destined to be victorious. Therefore, non-communist regimes had to be opposed so that world revolution could become a reality. When Stalin won the struggle for power against Trotsky, the emphasis was shifted from immediate world revolution to socialism in one state at a time. This meant that Stalin retained world revolution as the ultimate goal but adopted strategic understanding with the West whenever it became essential to strengthen Soviet socialism and promote his countries national interest.

Where national interest was concerned, Soviet leadership could not ignore the geographical constraints like the Czarist Russia, it was necessary for the Soviet Union to seek warm water ports both in the South and the West. The seas in the north and east are frozen for most part of the year. She had the problem of reaching out to the Baltic and the Mediterranean as the outlet (strait) from the Black sea had been under Turkey. Therefore, Soviet policy could not deviate from the search for peaceful approach to the warm waters, and the traditional clash of interest between Russia and Turkey could not be ignored.

Similarly, a powerful Germany had been a cause of anxiety for Russia, and before the First World War she had to conclude the alliance with Britain to be able to contain Germany power. The same situation had to be tackled on a bigger scale as soon as Hitler came to power in Germany and he made it clear that it was his aim to expand the Third Reich eastwards, at the cost of Soviet Union. Earlier, though Soviet Union and Germany had entered into the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, Germany was a vanquished and disarmed country and Soviet Union was being denied recognition by Western Powers.

However, the western view was that expansion was essential feature of the foreign policy of both Czarist Russia and Soviet Union. The later regime was seeking expansion in the name of promotion of workers interest and fight against fascism and capitalism. Lenin had himself said, we are living not merely in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of Soviet Republic, side with imperialistic states for a long time is unthinkable. Thus, Soviet foreign policy was certainly based on the goal of destruction of non-communist states, even when there was a talk of existence; it was only to prepare for the conflict.

3.2 Different Phases of Soviet Foreign Policy

(i) The Dream of World Revolution (1917-21)

In the first phase of its foreign policy, the Lenin Government's dream of world revolution remained only an ideal, as it had to contend with numerous difficulties both at home and abroad. The Bolshevik revolution was a serious challenge to the Western countries, and Russia's defection from the Allied camp was strongly resented. The Soviet Union only sued for peace and did not join the enemy. Lenin's slogan "land, bread and peace". The peace conferences from December 20, 1917 to February 10, 1918 failed to achieve its purpose. Trotsky declared "No wars no peace". The German resumed hostilities and reached close to Petrograd. Once again Lenin asked for peace and Germany imposed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on her terms on March 3, 1918. The peace concluded by communist regime with Germany hardened the Western attitude, which intervened in the civil war that followed. Lenin had to fight against his own people in the civil war as well as the capitalist powers who were involved in the intervention.

During this phase, neither Soviet Union could make any progress in the direction of world revolution, nor could the western powers overthrow the Bolshevik regime. Contrary to the expectations of Soviet Union no other country had any proletarian revolution, and the exhausted allied armies found themselves incapable to defeat Russian (communist) government. Thus, the first forty years of Soviet Proletarianism did not have any significant impact on international relations.

(ii) Diplomatic Recognition and Defensive Isolation (1921 – 34)

In the first few years of its existence the Soviet Union had failed to secure recognition from most of the countries that mattered. By 1921, the counter-revolutionary activities, the Civil War and Western capitalist international had all been crushed or withdrawn. On the other hand, the burning desire of the Soviet leadership for world revolution had also subsided as its futility was recognized by the new regime. Meanwhile, the internal economic condition had worsened to the extent that compromise with capitalism, at least in small measure had become unavoidable. Consequently, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was adopted to restore order in the internal economy.

This policy, while accepting the ultimate goal of nationalization and public-sector ownership of economy, admitted that in certain areas such as small-scale industry, petty business and small farming, some concession would have to be made for private ownership. In international sphere, Soviet Union initiated steps to secure diplomatic recognition and renew trade with the capitalist countries. There was no alternative. The new approach had three objectives, (a) to ensure that Germany did not join the capitalist block, (b) to ensure diplomatic recognition from Western powers; and (c) to consolidate on the achievements of the Revolution and reorganize the Soviet economy.

During this second phase, which we have called the period of diplomatic recognition and defensive isolation, the Soviet Union became a strong supporter of world peace and disarmament. Infact, she even proposed total disarmament, rather than only reduction of armament. After initial hesitation, Soviet Union not only signed the Kellogg-Brain Pact but became a strong advocate of its expansion. But neither the United States nor Soviet Union recognized her or cooperated with the League of Nations. The League was considered as an institution of exploiters and plunderers.

(iii) Cooperation with the West (1934-38)

Two important developments took place in the first three years of the decade of 1930s. Japan emerged as powerful militarized state in the Far East. She attacked China's Manchuria province in 1931 and established a puppet regime called the Republic of Manchukuo. Thus, Japan posed a serious threat to the Soviet Union. A militarized Japan was also a threat to the United States. The League of Nations

failed to protect China and punish Japan. Secondly, in January 1933, Hitler assumed the office of German Chancellor, and proceeded to destroy the post-war order. The repeated anti-communist and anti-Soviet pronouncement of Nazis, posed a potential threat to very existence of Soviet State. Faced by these two hostile powers, one in the east and the other in the west-Soviet Union proceeded to reorient her foreign policy. She extended her hand of friendship to the Western democracies who responded favourably. Soviet Union gave up the negative approach of non-aggression pacts and decided to enter into positive alliances of friendship and even military pacts. Soviet Union gave up the policy of defensive isolation. As the aggressive intentions of fascist powers became clear, she proposed a multilateral Eastern Pact of Mutual Assistance, and assigned pacts of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia.

(v) China and the United States: Soviet Union's principal concern was to strengthen herself against Japan and Germany. She restored diplomatic relations with China, and sought diplomatic recognition from the United States. It was for the first time, at the world economic conference in 1933 at London that the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union established contacts and exchanged views.

(vi) Soviet Union joins the League of Nations. Soviet Union had been consistently opposed to the League of Nations, and the political order created after the First World War. She was against status quo and advocated revision of treaties for a more just order. But after Hitler came to power and advocated revision of treaties, Soviet Union changed her stance and adopted the policy of association with the League of Nations and maintenance of status quo. So, Soviet Union changed her policy regarding League of Nations and became its member in 1934 with the status of a big power and permanent membership of the council. France was largely responsible for bringing the USSR in the League.

4.0 Conclusion

It is concluded that there were many similarities between the Czarist and Soviet foreign policy. Yet the ideological commitment of world revolution made the Soviet policies different in approach, even if they were similar in content. As was the case with any other country, both internal and external factors were responsible for frequent shifts in the Soviet foreign policy between the two world wars.

5.0 Summary

After the Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet foreign policy was naturally influenced by Marxian concept of inevitability of destruction of capitalism and victory of the proletariat. And with this conviction, expansion of communism in other countries became the most significant principle of the Soviet Union till the national economic

meltdown when they started making some overtures to capitalist nations and also employing some economic liberation in their national economy.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignment (TMAs)

- i. Analyze the three phase of Soviet Union foreign policy.
- ii. What was the main principle of the foreign policy of Soviet Union in between the two world wars?
- iii. Why did the Lenin Government fight against his own people?

7.0 References/Further Readings

Khanna, V. N. (2004). *International Relations, Fourth Edition* New Delhi, India: Vikas Publishing.

Glenn, Hastedt and Kay, Knickrehm (1991). *Dimensions of World Politics*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

Marion, Schwartz (1975). *The Domestic Policy the USSR: Domestic Factors*, Encino: Calif Dickenson.

Vernon, Aspaturian (1980). "Vulnerabilities and Strengths of the Soviet Union in a Changing International Environment the Internal Dimension", Erik, Hoffman Fredrick, Flernon Jr.(eds.), *The Conduct of Soviet Union Foreign Policy*, New York: Adine.

UNIT 3: THE CBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 The Conflict in Cuba
 - 3.2 Dilemma in Foreign Policy Making in the Cuban Missile Crises
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)
- 7.0 References / Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

The crisis in Cuba in the autumn of 1962 was undoubtedly the most dangerous of all post World War crisis. The world appeared to be close to a major war. It could have resulted in a war. The Island of Cuba, the largest in the Caribbean, is situated about ninety miles away from the U. S. state of Florida. It thrusts its western end into the jaws of the Gulf of Mexico. Its affairs were of special concern to the United States since the middle of the nineteenth century. It was freed from Spain in 1895, but that meant no more than change of masters. It was far ahead of its Caribbean neighbours in educational standards and had the most advanced middle class of all the Latin American countries. However, it was known for bad government all through, and neither any of her rulers nor the neighbouring United States could ensure efficient governance of Cuba.

The Island had been liberated by the America from Spain, and the right of U. S. intervention was written in the constitution of Cuba through the so-called Pratt Amendment. But under the influence of Wilsonian idealism, American refrained from intervention after the First World War. Later it was asserted that the Monroe Doctrine was a case of the United States vis-a-vis Europe and not United States visa-vis Latin American. Therefore, in 1934 President Franklin D. Roosevelt scraped the Pratt Amendment and initiated the policy of “good neighbour”. Within this period, U.S.S.R. intruded into the affairs of Cuba and was building missile sites in the country without the knowledge of U.S.

However, during the summer of 1962 rumors had begun to mount that the Soviet Union was placing missiles in Cuba. But conclusive evidence of Soviet missiles in Cuba was not obtained until October 14, 1962. On October 22, President Kennedy announced the imposition of a naval blockade and set a deadline for a Soviet response.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- narrate the history of the Cuban missile crisis
- highlight the interest of the United States and Soviet Union in Cuba
- explain the Cuban missile crisis as the seminal Cold War event
- Assess the roles of the super-powers in Cuba.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 The Conflict in Cuba

Perhaps, at no time has the world come closer to a nuclear war than during the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy put the odds of avoiding war at between one of the three, and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev observed that “the smell of burning hung in the air.” Estimates projected the probable deaths resulting from such a conflict at 100 million in the United States, more than 100 million in the Soviet Union, and several conflicts in Europe. At the heart of the crisis was the discovery that the Soviet Union had secretly placed 42 medium range missiles in Cuba, each of which had an estimated range of 1,100 miles.

By October 1962, the United States enjoyed a substantial lead over Soviet Union in international ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The U. S. had 226 ICBMs to the Soviet Union’s estimated 75, it had a 144-0 advantage in submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and has a 1,350 to 190 advantage in long-range bombs. These numbers translated into a U. S. capability to attack the Soviet Union with unclear weapons without a corresponding Soviet capability to attack the United States. Missiles in Cuba effectively negated this edge. All but a small portion of the United States could now be reached by Soviet missiles.

The Cuban missile crisis involved more than just nuclear saber rattling. Soviet weapons shipments to Cuba had been taking place at an uneven pace since the summer of 1960 and involved more than just medium-range missiles. By the beginning of September 1960, the Soviet inventory in Cuba included 12 intermediate range missiles, 144 surface – to – air missile launchers, with four missiles per launcher, 42, MIG-21 fighters, and cruise missiles, patrol boats and large quantities of transportation, electrical and construction equipment. In responding to the Soviet action, the United States drew upon virtually every part of its military establishment: Military forces, around the world were put on alert, tactical fighters were called up, over 180 ships patrolled the Caribbean and imposed a naval blockages on Cuba, and plans were drawn up for a surgical air strike of Cuba to be followed by a 100,000 man invasion force.

Cuba was very important to the Soviet Union for several reasons. First, it was an excellent base from which it could offset the U. S. edge in ICBMs. As a result of advances in reconnaissance technology, by 1961, the Kennedy administration had realized that the United States was ahead in the intercontinental ballistic missile race (the so called missile gap). Soviet leaders feared that, armed with this knowledge the United States would practice nuclear black mail against them. A quick and economically inexpensive fix was necessary to counter the U. S. advantage and to buy time for the Soviet Union to build up its nuclear inventory.

Secondly, Krushchev had just suffered a series of foreign policy set backs in trying to get the western powers out of Berlin. A dramatic foreign policy success in Cuba not only would do much to bolster Khrushchev's control over the communist party but also might provide an additional bargaining chip to use against the United States somewhere in Europe. Finally, this was the problem of defending Cuba from the United States. On the one hand, the problem was symbolic (could the Soviet Union allow a communist government to be overthrown? But, on the other hand, it was also a very real problem.

Cuba had become an obsession with U. S. policy makers almost from the moment that Fidel Castro's guerrilla forces overthrew the corrupt Batista regime in January 1959. By the end of 1959, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was advocating Castro's elimination. In March 1960, President Eisenhower approved a plan calling for the training of a small band of Cuban émigrés for guerrilla activities within Cuba. By the time it was implemented by the Kennedy administration, the plan had been altered to call for an invasion of Cuba by the émigrés. Little went according to plan. On April 17, 1961, some 1,400 Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs. Within two days they were surrounded by 20,000 well-equipped and loyal soldiers. On the third day, the 1,200 survivors were marched off to prison camps.

3.2 Dilemma in Foreign Policy Making in Cuban Missile Crises.

Rumors had begun to build during the summer of 1962 that the Soviet Union was placing missiles in Cuba but the United States was slow to move on this information for several reasons. No conclusive piece of evidence existed to support the charge, and much of the evidence came from unreliable sources. For example, Cuban refugees arriving in the United States had been reporting the arrival of Soviet missiles in Cuba before any Soviet military equipment reached Cuba. Moreover, not all the evidence was available for analysis at the same time and place.

On September 19, the U. S. Intelligence Board reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union would not try to put offensive missiles in Cuba. A second factor inhibiting a response to signs that the Soviet Union might be placing missile in Cuba was the unwillingness or inability of key figures in Kennedy administration

to believe that this, in fact could be happening. Khrushchev had promised Kennedy that the Soviet Union would do nothing “to complicate international situation or aggravate the tension in relations between our two countries” before the fall congressional elections.

John McCone, who was the head of the CIA, believed that the Soviet Union was putting missiles in Cuba. As the evidence mounted to support his views, a U-2 reconnaissance flight was ordered. Conclusive evidence of Soviet missile in Cuba was not obtained until October 1962. On October 22, President Kennedy went on national television to reveal the discovery, to announce the imposition of a naval blockade, and set a deadline for a Soviet response.

The naval blockade was only one of several options that were considered by Kennedy and his advisers. Others were: Do nothing, put diplomatic pressure in the Soviet Union, make secret approach to Castro, launch an invasion, and conduct a surgical air, strike. None of these options were without drawbacks and the naval blockade was chosen as much for what it did not do as for what it accomplished. The blockade by itself could not get the missiles out of Cuba (they were there already). However, it did not signal U. S. resolve to end the situation without initiating armed conflict with the Soviet Union. It also placed the responsibility for the next move and for a possible escalation in the level of violence with the Soviet Union.

The crisis ended on October 28, when Khrushchev publicly agreed to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba in return for a U. S. pledge not to intervene in Cuba. The Soviet Union used the need to defend Cuba from America aggression as its reason for putting missiles in Cuba, and this formula allowed both sides to claim victory. This compromise was not easily reached. Evidence suggested that Khrushchev was not totally in control of the communist party and the Soviet government during the crisis and at one point he had almost been removed from power. Only a creative diplomatic response by the United States to contradictory signals from Moscow, regarding its willingness to end the crisis on the terms acceptable to the United States, may have kept Khrushchev in power and ended the crisis peacefully.

Disagreement on how to resolve the crisis also existed within the U. S. government. On October 24, a day before Khrushchev offered to remove the missiles, Kennedy gave his approval to an October 29 air strike against missile silos, air bases, and anti-aircraft facilities. An air strike had originally been set for October 20, but was postponed in favour of the naval blockade, which was less dangerous. The blockade succeeded in stopping any additional material from reaching Cuba but it did not get the missiles out. Infact, the construction of missile bases was accelerated, and 20 medium-range missiles had become operational.

Because of this, on the day that Kennedy approved the air strike, Secretary of Defense McNamara concluded that “an invasion had become almost inevitable”, and that at least one missile would be successfully launched at the United States.

Members of Kennedy’s inner decision-making circle also disagreed over the propriety of making a secret deal to end the crisis. While Kennedy had publicly rejected Khrushchev’s call for removing U. S. missile from Turkey in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, he agreed to do so in secret offer made on October 27. The Soviet Union was told that a response was needed the next day and that the offer was conditional on his keeping the agreement secret.

4.0 Conclusion

There is a need to revise our thinking about the Cuban missile crisis in some respects. First, the decision to place missiles in Cuba appears to have been made by Khrushchev in April and was discussed in the following months by top Soviet leaders. He did so not to test Kennedy’s resolve but to deter the U. S. from attacking Cuba and correct the strategic imbalance. Khrushchev apparently believed that confronted with a fait accompli, the United States would not take any military action but learn to live with the missiles just as the Soviet Union had learned to live with missiles on its borders.

Secondly, it became clear that the Soviet Union introduced 42,000 troops into Cuba and not 22,000 as assumed by U. S. policy-makers during the crisis. Moreover; President Kennedy was far more committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis than was believed to be case. A military strike against Cuba does not appear to have been in the offing in the last stages of the crisis. Furthermore, Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles not because he feared a general war, but because he was convinced that the United States was prepared to invade Cuba.

Finally, the contradictory tone of Moscow’s message at the end of the crisis was due to the changing nature of the intelligence making its way to Soviet leaders. The conciliator message came on the heels of information that the United States was about to invade Cuba. The more deviant message was written after it became clear to Moscow that the there would be no invasion.

5.0 Summary

The Cuban missile crisis was only one episode in the Cold War between the United States of America and the Soviet Union that has cast a shadow over virtually all major conflict in the post Second World War era. The length and scope of this conflict was remarkable. While frequently intense, the struggle did not rise to a point of direct military warfare. Instead, the crisis remained “cold” with diplomacy, psychological warfare, economic coercion, foreign aid, and

ideological competition, covert action, and armed races being used alone and in combination to advance U. S. and Soviet interests.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- i. Discuss the dilemma experienced by both the Soviet and American policy makers in the face of Cuban missile crises
- ii. Perhaps, at no time has the world come closer to a nuclear war than during the October 1962 missile crisis. Explain this statement.
- iii. Apart from the naval blockages, what other options did the U. S. policy makers consider?

7.0 References for further Readings

Glenn, Hastedt and Kay M. Knikarehm (1991). *Dimensions of World Politics*, New York: Harpercollins Publishers.

Graham, Allison (1971). *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston: Little Brown.

Richard, Nedlebow (1981). *Between Peace & War: The Nature of International Crisis*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Hoffmann, Erit and Frederick, Fleron, Jr. (1980). *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, New York: Aldine.

UNIT 4: AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Contents

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Body
 - 3.1 Historical Development of Vietnam and Events to the Crisis
 - 3.2 American Interest in Vietnam
 - 3.3 American Foreign Policy Mistakes over the Crisis
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments
- 7.0 References / Further Readings

1.0 Introduction

America's involvement in Vietnam spanned the terms of six presidents. The cost of the war and its level of destruction were enormous: 55,000 Americans lost their lives, at its height, 541,000 Americans were fighting there, \$150 billion were spent on the war effort, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese died or wounded, 7 million tons of bombs were dropped, and 20 million craters were left behind.

The Vietminh was a guerilla force under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. It was organized in 1941 as a national front organization, bringing together Vietnamese communists and others opposed to French and Japanese domination. Ho Chi Minh had helped to found the French Communist Party in 1920, and in 1930 he oversaw the creation of the Vietnam Communist Party. In 1945, the Vietminh proclaimed Vietnam, formerly a French colony an independent country.

However, at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, the last of the wartime conferences of the Allied powers, it was agreed that Vietnam could be divided at the sixteenth parallel, with Chiang Kai Shek's Chinese forces controlling the northern half of Vietnam and British forces controlling the southern half. The British, short of troops, rearmed the French forces, which had been interned at Saigon and on September 23, 1945 permitted them to seize control of the Saigon government from the Vietnam.

20. Objectives

At the successful completion of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the reasons why the U. S. got involved in the Vietnam War
- establish exactly when the U. S. started to take active interest in Indo-China politics
- highlight the role of French participation in plans for defense of Europe

- highlight the dangers of military intervention in foreign country.

3.0 Main Body

3.1 Historical Development of Vietnam & Events to the Crisis

Indo-China proved to be the most disputed area after the Second World War, in South-East Asia. This area had been put together by the French late in the nineteenth century. Indo-China initially consisted of five areas. They were (a) Annam, Tongking and Cochin-China (now known as Vietnam), together the three were then called three keys; they were Annamite by race and Chinese by culture (b) Laos or the kingdom of Laung Prabang and (c) Cambodia, or Kampuchia, whose most people were Thai by race and Indian by culture.

French power remained substantially unshaken from 1863 till France was occupied by Germany in 1940. During the period of French rule not only agriculture was developed and mining promoted but several important cities were also developed.

Japan occupied Indo-China in 1941 and left only after she was defeated in 1945. During the period of occupation, Japan had united Annam, Tongking and Cochin-China into one political entity called Vietnam.

France tried to resume her imperial rule soon after the war, but she did not succeed. As soon as Japan was defeated, Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the pro-communist nationalist coalition, proclaimed the independent Republic of Vietnam. But for practical reasons, as in case of Korea, Vietnam was occupied by the British South of 16th parallel and the Chinese established themselves north of this line. Both countries withdrew in 1946, but they could not prepare ground for re-establishment of French empire.

When the French arrived they found most of the North under the control of Ho Chi Minh. France tried to integrate Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia into the French Union. Meanwhile, Bao Dai, the Emperor of Annam had abdicated and accepted the position of Advisor to Ho Chi Minh. The French were willing to recognize the Ho Chi Minh Government in the north, but refused to the suggestion of Ho Chi Minh for the union of the three keys. In November-December 1946, France adopted a stiff attitude which resulted in a war mainly with the communists. The war lasted over seven years. In 1949, the French created the new state of Vietnam under the leadership of Bao Dai, who had switched sides. The French Union of Laos, Cambodia and Bao Dai's Vietnam was resisted not only by the communists but also by the Roman Catholic leader, and President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh.

The victory of communists in China transformed the situation. The communists growing influence could not be checked despite American assistance. Finally, a conference in Geneva held in 1954 formerly created two Vietnams – North and South. Both sides (France and the Communists) had to make concessions. France granted complete independence to North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Elections were to be held within two years. The Geneva conference, meanwhile, allowed preservation of the communist's regime in the North. It was hoped by the communists that both North and South Vietnam would come under their control after the election. For the time being, Ho Chi Minh controlled only the North.

Three armistice agreements were signed at the Geneva conference. Vietnam was portioned roughly along the 17th parallel. This was a compromise choice. The communist north was called Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Republic of Vietnam for the south was based at Saigon. Vietnam agreed to withdraw from Laos and Cambodia. Three armistice commissions were constituted with Indian, Canadian and Polish members to supervise the implementation of the agreement. The conference marked the defeat of France and her withdrawal from all states of Indo-China. The final declaration, prepared but not signed, proposed election in the whole of Vietnam. South Vietnam had a government led by Bao Dai.

The United States and South Vietnam disassociated themselves with the provisions regarding elections in the whole of Vietnam by the middle of 1956. The North Vietnam under communist rule had much larger population than the South, with leftist elements in the south likely to vote for Ho Chi Minh. The communist victory in whole of the country was certain. Ho Chi Minh was convinced that he would soon rule over the entire Vietnam. He announced a Fatherland Front and asked the South Vietnamese people to participate in the elections to be held in the whole of Vietnam, according to the rules framed by Ho Chi Minh. However, the Saigon government, led by Bao Dai, refused to participate in the elections designed by Ho Chi Minh.

The 17th parallel which divided the two Vietnams created great problems because south used to supply most food grains to the north. Diem's refusal to feed the northerners, made the northerners to suffer heavily in terms of loss of human lives. At the same time, agrarian reforms initiated in the North Vietnam on the pattern of Chinese collectivization, provoked peasant uprising and consequent reign of terror resulting in nearly 50,000 deaths. Ho Chi Minh had a life time association with Soviet Union but did not wink taking full advantage of Sino-Soviet rift beginning in mid 1950s. But China and Soviet Union were interested in ending the conflict. Therefore, they had managed to secure North Vietnamese consent to the Geneva agreement. However, Geneva agreement did not solve the

problem. A war soon broke out between North and South which lasted for 20 years and proved to be the most destructive of the post-war conflicts.

3.2 American Interest in Vietnam

After the Geneva conference, the United States showed her determination to save what could be saved from communism. The most important step in that direction was setting up of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), on the lines of NATO earlier created to contain communism. India and Indonesia refused to join. Britain protested against inclusion of Taiwan (Forma), and France would not allow South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to be part of SEATO. The new treaty organization aimed at saving South and South East Asia from communism had as members, the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. U. S. Secretary of states, Dulles ensured the ratification by the U. S. Senate by 82 votes to 1. But SEATO could not save South Vietnam from communism.

The United States began to take an active interest in indo-China in mid-1949 as a strategy of containing communist expansion took on an Asian dimension. Mao Zedong had won the civil war in China, and tensions on the Korean peninsula were rising. In February 1950, the United States recognized Bao Dai's government one week after the French formally granted it independence. Weeks before, seeing the French decision as imminent, Ho Chi Minh sought and received diplomatic recognition for his government from China and the Soviet Union. Matters came to a head with the entry of Chinese troops into the Korean War in 1950. At the same time that Truman sent troops to Korea, he increased arms shipment to the French in Indo-China. By 1952, the United States was providing France with \$30 million in aid to defeat Ho Chi Minh, and in 1953, the United States was paying one-third of the cost of French war effort.

Ho Chi Minh had, at one point held out hope for U. S. support in his bid to create an independent Vietnam, but none was forth coming, although at that time, the United States was resisting calls for help by France. He based this hope on the Atlantic Charter which was signed in 1941 and spoke of the importance of national self - determination, and on Roosevelt's general opposition to the reestablishment of colonial empires by the British and the French.

However, in the United States decisions on Indochina came to be viewed in large context. France was reluctant to participate in any European defense system, which the United States saw as vital if Europe was to contain communist expansionism there. In a virtual *quid pro quo*, the United States agreed to underwrite the French war effort in Indochina in return for French participation in plans for defense of Europe. In the process, Ho Chi Minh was redefined from a nationalist to a communist threat to U. S. security interests.

By mid-1953, France was encouraged by the United States to attempt one final military campaign against Vietnam. The offensive was a disaster. So when its force was under siege at Dienbienphu, France informed the United States that, unless it intervened, Indo China would fall to the communists. The Eisenhower administration was divided on how to proceed. Some, including Vice President Richard Nixon and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff favoured prompt military action, while others including Army Chief of Staff and many in the State Department and Congress urged restraint. And in the end, no aid was forthcoming resulting in Frances withdrawal. And France’s involvement in Indo-China officially came to an end with the signing of the 1954 Geneva Peace Accord. The United States did not sign the Geneva Accords but pledged to refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the settlement.

3.3 American Foreign Policy Mistakes over the Vietnam Crisis

The Vietnam War proved to be a disastrous adventure of American foreign policy. The Geneva Agreement of 1954 confirmed the exit of French from the whole of Indo-China. It also created two Vietnams, but they never lived in peace. The elections that were to be held in the two parts by 1956 were never held. Instead the war began which lasted almost twenty years and finally led to the creation of one unified Vietnam under the communist rule.

While North Vietnam was helped by the Soviet Union, it was mainly the American intervention that made Vietnam War different from other wars between two neighbours. The Vietnam War must be viewed in the context of cold war politics. Then, United States made desperate unsuccessful attempts to save what could be saved from communism.

The foreign –policy-makers of the United States made several miscalculations and became responsible for a prolonged war in which large numbers of casualties were suffered by both the American and the Vietnamese. Eisenhower’s decision to provide American military and economic assistance to Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime war was not in conformity with the U. S. policy of free elections to decide the contentions issues. In denial of unitary elections, Viet Cong emerged in 1957 and a war started. Denial of unitary elections was described as America’s original sin in Vietnam.

When Kennedy assumed office in January 1961, Vietnam was already America’s costliest commitment. He should have ended it, but he did not. In May 1961, President de Gaulle told Kennedy to pull out of Vietnam. He said “I predict you will sink step by step into a bottomless military political quagmire” (Khana, 2004) Kennedy ignored the warning, though he was aware of the futility of American involvement. He told Arthur Schlesinger, “The troops will march and the bands

will play, the crowds will cheer, and in four days everyone would have forgotten. Then we will be told to send in more troops. It is like taking a drink. The effects wear off, and you have to take another”.

America kept on giving ever increasing assistance to a government (Diem regime) that Kennedy could not control. Diem, a civilian catholic, was a brilliant leader but his people’s morale was low and Viet Cong were far better organized. But Kennedy blamed Diem than admit his own failure. When Diem was murdered, allegedly with the CIA support, President Johnson described it as “the worst mistake we ever made”. This has been described as America’s second sin. Kennedy was killed 22 days after Diem’s Murder.

Lyndon Johnson, who succeeded Kennedy, continued the American involvement, though he promised to de-escalate. He contested and won the presidency in 1964 on a peace platform, yet during the campaign when North Vietnamese attacked U. S. Destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Congress authorized the president to take vigorous measures to protect U. S. interest. Johnson won the election on peace platform but escalated the war. This was an irony in the Wilson Roosevelt fashion. These former U. S. Presidents were champions of neutrality and peace, yet both of them had to lead America in the two World Wars. In February 1965, following heavy U. S. casualties in Viet Cong attack, Johnson ordered the bombing of North Vietnam. This was America’s third sin, or critical mistake.

Nixon could not change the course of events, although he worked hard for East-West détente. While Nixon administration ensured expulsion of Taiwan and admission of communist China in the United Nations, it failed to end the Vietnam War. The war ended only during Ford’s Presidency in 1975.

Self Assessment Examination (SAE):

The Vietnam War proved to be a disastrous adventure of American foreign policy. Discuss.

4.0 Conclusion

America lost greatly in its involvement in the Vietnam War. The foreign policy makers made several grievous miscalculations in their foreign policy decisions during the period. Communism achieved a remarkable success in the whole of Indo-China. Elections were held in both the Vietnams in April 1976. A new National Assembly was constituted as a result of these elections. The National Assemblies became the legislature of the United Vietnam. It was inaugurated on June 24, 1976, Hanoi was declared to be the capital of the unified Vietnam.

5.0 Summary

The Vietnam conflict was a prolonged struggle between international communism and American capitalism. It spread through different phases of Cold War and resulted in a major setback to Americans and a victory of the Soviet Union.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs)

- i. Trace the historical development of the Vietnam conflict.
- ii. What was America's main interest in Vietnam?
- iii. Discuss the mistakes made by U. S, foreign policy decision-makers on the Vietnam conflict.

7.0 References / Further Reading

Khana, V. N. (2004). *International Relations, Fourth Revised Edition*, New Delhi India: Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd.

Glenn, Hastedt and Kay, Kniekrehm (1991). *Dimensions of World Politics*, New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Daniel, Ellsberg (1992). *Papers on the War*, New York: Simon & Schuster.

George, Kahn and John, Lewis (1993). *The United States in Vietnam*, New York: Viking.